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INTRODUCTION
A Portable Concept of Fascism
Julia Adeney Thomas
Gustave Courbet’s painting Burial at Ornans caused outrage when it was ex-
hibited at the Paris Salon of 1850 –51 because it depicted ordinary people at an 
ordinary funeral. Instead of using artist models in sentimental, allegorical, or 
heroic guises, Courbet (1819 – 77) had persuaded the mourners attending his 
own great- uncle’s burial to pose for his monumental ten- by- twenty- two- foot 
canvas. Aghast critics recognized a revolution when they saw one, and Cour-
bet proved them right — not only artistically by overturning Romanticism for 
Realism, but also politically by playing a leading role in the Paris Commune 
of 1870, an action that led to his imprisonment and ultimate exile to Geneva.1 
As Courbet’s notoriety shows, in the nineteenth century the mere act of rep-
resenting common people had a radical edge allied with liberal democratic, 
socialist, or anarchist movements. However, by the twentieth century the 
assumption that “the people” and “the Left” might be rough synonyms in 
art and in politics crashed against a new form of right- wing populism that 
claimed the people for itself. As historian Peter Clarke observes, “the novelty 
of Fascism was to politicize the masses from the right.”2 
Right- wing populism’s novelty created a problem when its proponents 
tried to promote their politics visually. Fascism upended the Left’s exclusive 
claim to represent the people, but rejected its artistic experiments with form 
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and subject matter. It discarded the traditional Right’s elite aesthetic tastes, 
but required a glorious vision of the nation. In short, fascism awkwardly visu-
alized itself as neither avant- garde nor traditional, while poaching from both 
camps. It therefore confronted an unprecedented challenge when it came to 
self- depiction. It needed to create a new visual repertoire that avoided the 
leftist taint of high modernism and socialist realism without seeming to ca-
pitulate to a rarified culture borne aloft by old aristocratic or new oligarchic 
tastes. How fascists around the world met — or, indeed, failed to meet — this 
aesthetic challenge is the focus of this volume. 
This book approaches the question of how fascism was visualized in two 
complementary and connected ways: as a global phenomenon and as an aes-
thetic phenomenon. Both themes are interwoven throughout the essays. Here 
in the Introduction, I explore each theme separately before introducing my 
synthesis of the two — a portable concept of fascism. I then go on to delin-
eate specific traits common to the global practice of visualizing fascism and 
end by underscoring the novelty of the twentieth- century rise of the global 
Right, a phenomenon impossible before colonial capitalism, socialism, and 
nation- states emerged.
Global Fascism
In arguing for fascism as a worldwide phenomenon, our work explores the 
rise of the Right during the interwar years as it emerged transnationally. This 
global approach is now possible because of new scholarship on interwar and 
wartime Asia, particularly Japan, that begins to balance previous research 
weighted heavily toward Europe.3 Indeed, until very recently fascism may 
have seemed European simply because Europe was the place historians stud-
ied most intensively (outside their home countries), not only in the United 
States, Canada, and Britain but also in Japan.4 Our deepening understanding 
of Japan and its Asian imperialism is critical to grasping the transnational 
nature of the rise of the Right.5 It is now possible to argue, as literary scholar 
Alan Tansman does, that “Japan’s confrontation with modernity was coeval 
with Europe’s.” As Tansman observes, “the social, economic, and cultural 
conditions that gave birth to European fascism were also shared by Japan, 
and the solutions, through the state’s imposition of mythic thinking that ex-
tolled natural bonds of blood and demanded devotion and sacrifice of the 
individual to the state, nation, or lineage, backed by coercion at home, in 
the name of domination of peoples of poorer bloodline abroad, made Japan 
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one among other fascist nations.”6 In this volume, then, Japan figures promi-
nently alongside the other Axis powers. 
As Asia comes more sharply into focus, it also becomes clear that fascism 
is not best understood by creating particularistic models that focus on single 
nations or by abstracting a Euro centric version of the populist Right and ap-
plying it elsewhere. Three reasons support this contention. First, the forces 
of capitalism and imperialism operated globally. As Ethan Mark argues, 
envisioning the Second World War as a conflict among European nation- 
states and excluding Asia has created a “pervasive scholarly blind spot” about 
the degree to which “fascism was itself determined within a broader, long- 
term global context of competing imperialisms.”7 The excesses of capitalism, 
resting on uneven relations of power within and among nations, dissolved 
the bonds of communities at all levels and sowed despair and resentment 
around the world. Everywhere this led to similar reactions, including fascist 
tendencies. 
Second, better communication and faster travel increased the speed at 
which desires, discontents, and, especially for our purposes, aesthetic rep-
ertoires were shared. For instance, modernist designs deployed by artists 
in the Soviet Union and in liberal democracies also figured on the cover of 
Shanghai’s fascist monthly Qiantu [The future], as Maggie Clinton shows 
in chapter 1. Beginning in the 1920s, regular airmail routes carried letters, 
publications, and news of all sorts, spreading ideas and innovative graphics 
like wildfire. People traveled more, too. By 1937 Britain’s Imperial Airways 
advertised its flight from Hong Kong to London as taking a mere ten days as 
opposed to a month by sea, although only the very rich could afford such diz-
zying velocity. Most ocean- crossing travelers still embarked on ships, as did a 
mission of Italian Blackshirts who visited Japan in the spring of 1938.8 A year 
earlier, Nazi film director Arnold Fanck (1889 – 1974) had also made the jour-
ney to Tokyo. So impressed was Fanck by actress Hara Setsuko (1920 – 2015) 
that he teamed up with Itami Mansaku (1900 – 1946) to cast her as the star in 
their coproduced film The New Earth (the Japanese version was titled Ata-
rashiki tsuchi and the German version, Die Tochter des Samurai). The film 
ends with a celebration of Japan’s takeover of Manchuria. Such collabora-
tions would obviously have been impossible a few decades earlier. Speed and 
connections were central to developing fascist visual tactics. 
Along with the forces of capitalism and communication, the third factor 
that compels a new understanding of global fascism is the key role colonies 
played as sites for producing right- wing populism. The importance of this 
 4 Julia Adeney Thomas
factor has emerged only recently, in part because of revised understandings 
of German and Italian colonialism.9 Work on Japanese colonialism has also 
heightened awareness of these “offshore” arenas for negotiating national-
ism. Particularly in Asia, where Western and Japanese colonialism clashed, 
these negotiations became murky and complex. In some cases — such as that 
of Indian leader Subhas Chandra Bose (1897 – 1945), who allied himself with 
the Nazis and the Japanese against British imperialists, or Indonesian leader 
Sukarno (1901 – 70), who briefly allied himself with the Japanese in opposi-
tion to Dutch imperialism — the fascism of the colonized was opportunistic, 
a means to obtain national independence.10 In other cases, the fascist vas-
sals willingly mimicked their overlords. As Bertrand Metton demonstrates 
in his essay on Slovakia, after the Nazis colonized Eastern Europe, Slovaks 
created organizations and publications that paralleled German counterparts: 
the Hlinka Youth organization for the Hilterjugend and magazines including 
Nová Mládež for the New Youth, Slovenská for girls, and Vlca (Wolf Cub) for 
boys. As in Germany, Slovaks produced a vibrant national myth to replace 
stale right-wing conservatism.11 
In still other cases, colonies served as places where settlers developed 
their own iteration of fascism. Examples include the fascination with white-
ness in Namibia, which Lorena Rizzo explores in chapter 6, and greater sup-
port for the fascist party in the Dutch East Indies than in Holland, as Ethan 
Mark shows in chapter 8. Likewise, in the 1930s, fascist ideas and institutions 
were fostered in Manchuria and then exported from this colony back to Ja-
pan, as Paul Barclay argues in chapter 2, building on the work of historian 
Janis Mimura.12 These three factors — capitalism, modern communication, 
and colonies — generated the pulsing, angry networks that propelled fascism 
globally. 
In short, fascism did not have a single place of origin — not even Italy. Its 
birth certificate is held in the archives of many nations, and it grew up as a 
transnational traveler, a denizen of late- night railroad stations and neon- lit 
hotels. Historian Reto Hofmann rightly describes it as emerging through “a 
complex interplay between ideas both local and global.”13 Thus the essays 
here extend beyond Italy, Germany, and Japan to Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, 
China, and Indonesia in the East, and to Holland, Spain, Slovakia, southern 
Africa, and the United States, in order to suggest that the allure of the Right 
was almost universal.14 Fascism was a transnational phenomenon. 
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Aesthetics of Fascism
In order to show fascism as a global phenomenon, this volume emphasizes 
its aesthetic strategies. I approach fascism as an aesthetic phenomenon both 
in the sense of using beauty to mask modernity’s pain and in aestheticism’s 
root sense of “perception.” How is it possible for something as immaterial and 
invisible as “the nation” to be seen as the fount of all truth? Looking at pho-
tography, the graphic arts, monuments, architecture, and cinema can help 
answer this question.15 It may at first seem eccentric for historians, as most 
of us are, to abandon analyses based on texts alone and focus instead on the 
changing visual repertoires of fascism, but this approach provides several 
benefits. As Ruth Ben- Ghiat notes, “The visual not only communicates in 
ways written documents cannot; it can also enrich the field of historical re-
search by leading us to new subjects and lines of inquiry that often have scant 
traces in the written and oral historical records.”16 The visual also helps lib-
erate us from mired national debates by revealing how easily aesthetic styles 
and modes of public commemoration slip across borders. Awareness of this 
aesthetic dynamism undermines the conventional geographical boundaries 
that persist among historians and that have truncated our understanding that 
fascism’s heightened nationalism was a product of globalization. 
A further value of seeing fascism in action is that using visual evidence 
shows just how permeable the borders were not only among right- wing move-
ments and nations, but also between fascism and antifascism. Visualizing 
fascism is part of visualizing mid- twentieth-century mass society in general, 
no matter what sort of politics that society claimed. The final essays in this 
volume, by Nadya Bair (chapter 10) and Claire Zimmerman (chapter 11), dem-
onstrate how anti- fascist work made during the war was recast from a differ-
ent perspective afterward. The shared aesthetic repertoire of fascist, commu-
nist, and liberal democratic states becomes truly apparent only when viewed 
transnationally and across time. In other words, by actively looking at the rise 
of the global Right, we can perceive just how powerfully visual sensations can 
bind people to nations, but also how fragile the alliance between any artistic 
style and any particular politics became by the 1930s. I will return to the ques-
tion of defining fascism’s aesthetic later. My point here is that this volume’s 
global and visual approaches reinforce one another as we strive to see the 
rise of the interwar Right in all its complexity. Some studies have stressed the 
global nature of fascism and others have concerned themselves with the aes-
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thetics of fascism in a single nation. This volume is the first to fuse global and 
visual approaches to propose a new way of understanding fascism’s strategies.
Five Propositions toward a Portable Concept of Fascism 
The result of combining the global and the visual is a concept of fascism 
that is no longer confined to any particular nation. Nor is it restricted to the 
decades after World War I with its particular crisis of capitalism. This vol-
ume argues instead that the fascist ideologies and visualizations that emerged 
during the interwar period are maverick enough to reemerge in similar cir-
cumstances whenever people become alienated not only from the traditional 
Right but also from liberal democratic and left- wing alternatives. When un-
derstood in this way, fascism — defined primarily by its ideological energies 
rather than by parties and institutions — remains a danger. I call this a “por-
table concept of fascism.” It travels across space and time and is useful in an-
alyzing places where fascist movements failed as well as places where fascist 
regimes were established. This portable concept of fascism is the volume’s 
primary theoretical contribution. It rests on five propositions, outlined below, 
that culminate with fascism’s use of visual culture. 
First and foremost, fascism cannot be safely consigned to the past. It is not 
the antiquarian phenomenon that Hugh Trevor- Roper insisted it was when 
he told us that fascism “began in 1922 – 23 with the emergence of the Italian 
fascist party . . . came of age in the 1930s when ‘fascist’ parties sprang up 
throughout Europe . . . [and] ended in 1945 with the defeat and death of two 
dictators.”17 I wish Trevor- Roper had been correct. If fascism could be con-
fined to those actions and those years, it could be dispensed with as an unfor-
tunate but discrete episode. Like hoopskirts, it would have no contemporary 
allure. However, as my coeditor Geoff Eley rightly argues in Nazism as Fas-
cism, the reason for studying fascism is, “above all, to help with the urgency 
of our present discontents.”18 Today’s “political dynamics easily threaten the 
kind of crisis where a politics that begins to look like fascism might coalesce.”19 
Our current discontents are manifold and magnified most especially, I think, 
by the pressures of climate change creating refugees and of transnational 
neoliberalism producing ever- greater inequality. Fascism defined by height-
ened nationalism, perpetual warfare, and reactionary fear of enemies — real 
or imagined — cannot be relegated to the dustbin of history.
Second, fascism is the product of political crisis in modern capitalist states. 
All three terms — “modern,” “capitalist,” and “political” — are important. The 
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modernity of fascist states used to be disputed, but most scholars now agree 
that neither “backwardness” nor “late development” nor a “feudal mind- set” 
explain the energetic assertion of organic unity between a regime and its 
people. Premodern regimes were manifestly uninterested in including “the 
people” as active agents within the polity; only with the rise of modernity 
does this change. In fact, the consensus today is that Italy and Germany did 
not become fascist because they were not modern states; they became fascist 
because they were.20 The same is true for Japan.21 Ethan Mark and historian 
Rikki Kersten have elegantly summarized the debates over whether Japan 
was fascist, ultimately siding with Japanese scholars such as Yoshimi Yo-
shiaki who are committed to the rubric of “fascism.” They do so because it 
places developments in Japan within global history rather than treating them 
as sui generis outliers, as Japan’s nationalist ideologues like to claim.22 
To this shared modernity must be added capitalism or at least a strong 
capitalist sector within the economy. Along with many others, sociologist 
Mark Neocleous argues point- blank that fascism is “generated by modern in-
dustrial capitalism.”23 Here too the Japanese empire is not an Oriental outlier. 
Although its economy weathered the 1929 economic collapse better than the 
European and American economies, growing at a rate of 5 percent through-
out the 1930s, tensions in its dual economy between tenants and landlords, 
and between industrial workers and large corporate conglomerates called 
zaibatsu, echoed economic struggles elsewhere. Finally, there is the issue of 
politics. Producing fascism required not only a crisis of capitalism but also 
political disarray. Leadership proved timid and self- interested.24 In Eley’s 
words, “fascism prospered under conditions of general political crisis, in so-
cieties that were already dynamically capitalist (or at least possessed a dy-
namic capitalist sector), but where the state proved incapable of dispatching 
its organizing functions for the maintenance of social cohesion.”25 It took co-
lossal political failure to clinch the deal, enabling fascist regimes to emerge 
from fascist movements. 
These three factors — modernity, capitalist crisis, and political ineptitude — 
all existed in Italy, Japan, and Germany where the state became fascist. But 
fascist movements could emerge without all three factors being present. Sur-
veying the interwar world, Reto Hofmann argues, “Recognizable fascist 
movements were springing up seemingly everywhere, its members donning 
a rainbow of shirts — white in Syria, green in Egypt, blue in China, orange 
in South Africa, gold in Mexico. Politically, Hitler took office in Germany in 
1933; in China, Chiang Kai- shek launched the New Life Movement (1934) to 
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counter socialism, liberalism, and democracy; two years later, Spain’s Fran-
cisco Franco staged a military coup with the support of the right- wing Fa-
lange movement.”26 To understand the rise of the global Right, both fascism’s 
victories and its defeats need to be brought into focus. This volume considers 
places where fascism foundered — China, Holland, and Namibia — as well as 
places where it triumphed.
The third proposition of my “portable concept of fascism” is that violence 
is key to propelling the dissolution of civility and governability. Words be-
come blows. Yet, as Ruth Ben- Ghiat notes, “after an initial period of pub-
lic violence meant to close off other political options and frighten people 
into submission, fascist governments often sent those agents of violence off-
stage.” They turned to other means for subduing dissent and interpolating 
the fascist.27 
Fourth, as Mark Neocleous argues, “fascism is first and foremost an ideol-
ogy.”28 For some, fascist ideas lack systematicity and should therefore be dis-
missed, but an ideology need not be logical or even coherent to be effective. 
Among fascism’s main targets, after all, are rationality and the conception 
of politics as the arena where clearly articulated positions can be expressed 
and differences negotiated with the help of political parties and representa-
tive state structures. Indeed, fascism’s success seems to stem largely from 
its ideological vagueness and mystification of power. Amorphous evoca-
tions of national spirit inspire people precisely because they lacked rigor and 
form, and therefore they cannot be countered by reasoned appeals or expert 
analysis of probable consequences. Emotions such as wounded pride and re-
sentment can be channeled against “enemies” within and without, bringing 
new meaning to life and to sacrificing that life for the nation. Gender poli-
tics is central to fascist ideology. As women gained a faltering toehold in the 
public sphere, reactionary fear and a sense of emasculation was assuaged 
by bouts of manly chest- thumping and by relegating women to the roles of 
wives and mothers. Compelling ideological gestures pointing to the vitalist 
energy of youth, the comforts of naturally sanctioned belonging, and the ne-
cessity of righteous wars in a hostile world helped mask the paradoxes and 
tensions of economic and political failures at home. As Eley indicates, it is 
“vital to reinstate the importance of fascist ideology, not just as the critical 
dissection of fascist ideas in the programmatic and philosophical senses, as 
interpretative readings of key texts, or as the analysis of the fascist outlook, 
but by studying the nature of the fascist popular appeal.”29 
Fifth and finally, visual presentations of fascist ideology were crucial pre-
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cisely because the “message” of the graphic arts, images, collages, movies, 
monuments, and pageantry was elusive and emotive. Stylized typefaces on 
magazine covers could gesture toward a vibrant future without specifying 
policies. Posters depicting the tender love of a mother for her child could 
evoke traditional gender roles and the warmth of “home” while deflecting 
questions about military deaths, missing neighbors, and raining bombs. Pho-
tographs of Hitler at the Berghof in the Bavarian Alps or paintings of an in-
candescent Mount Fuji floating against a red sun celebrated nature while ob-
scuring the military’s depredations on natural resources. Although the visual 
was vital to fascism, our essays show that fascist aesthetics had no essence, 
no exclusive medium, and no invariable set of visual tropes. The elusive and 
emotive qualities of fascism’s mystical message coalesced no more in visual 
form than in philosophical form. In some ways this is a disappointment. If 
all we had to guard against were black shirts and mass rallies illuminated by 
the antiaircraft searchlights of the 1934 Nuremberg rally, resistance would be 
far easier. We find instead an array of visual efforts to bind the national com-
munity and to heal history’s wounds. Fascism’s visual tactics were effective 
because they were diverse, opportunistic, and incoherent. 
Many of us associate fascism with the “spectacle” so prominent in Walter 
Benjamin’s analysis. We think immediately of Mussolini’s March on Rome, 
Hitler’s Nuremberg rallies, and Japan’s 1940 celebration of the supposedly 
unbroken 2,600- year reign of the imperial family. Such orchestrated public 
rallies are central to Eley’s essay in chapter 3. But spectacle was not the only, 
or even the most crucial, way in which fascism tried to abolish the distance 
between the state and its subjects. Images of particular leaders whose height-
ened presence (and even their incantatory absence) made them magnets for 
popular desire were important as well; these photographs served almost as 
a form of mesmerism, replacing democracy’s painstaking processes.30 The 
challenge of portraying a leader was to make him simultaneously transcen-
dent and yet accessible, which is a difficult thing to do, as Lutz Koepnick 
makes clear in his analysis of Heinrich Hoffmann’s photographs of Hitler 
as an outdoor reader posing in the mountains (chapter 5). In chapter 4, Ruth 
Ben- Ghiat explores not only films focusing on Mussolini but also those mo-
ments at mass rallies when the camera turned to capture the crowd’s re-
sponse. As Ben- Ghiat observes, when the crowds appeared stone- faced and 
silent, sounds of cheering were added, using the roar of acquiescence to blot 
out the vision of passive resistance. Viewers were encouraged to see enthu-
siasm with their ears. Finally, as the majority of our essays show, fascism 
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was most often brought home at the level of the people’s everyday activi-
ties through photographs, photomontages, etchings, and graphics in maga-
zines and tourist pamphlets, and through the architecture and monuments 
intended to glorify the dead from Amsterdam to Manchuria. The most strik-
ing feature of most fascist art in many of these formats is not its ecstatic hy-
perbolism but its banality. 
In short, fascism brought into view mass spectacle, awkwardly posed lead-
ership, and people’s daily lives, but these visual tropes never added up to a co-
herent aesthetic. Fascist art was caught in its own paradox. On the one hand, 
like the avant- garde movements of the early twentieth century, it sought to 
“redistribute the sensible” (in Jacques Rancière’s phrase) across society, and 
yet unlike the avant- garde, it also sought to contain and control the sensible 
within the purview of the nation.31 The result was often hackneyed — thin 
whitewash with a dash of menace. 
Fascism’s Counter Aesthetic
Fascism in the 1920s, ’30s, and ’40s never crystallized a defined aesthetic. In 
the brief heat of that quarter-century, fascism’s aesthetic tactics were driven 
by political necessity rather than concern for art- making per se. Moreover, 
fascism resisted drawing attention to modes of representation either in poli-
tics or in the arts precisely because it wished to present the unity of nation 
and people as unmediated. Indeed, the new Right’s attack on the traditional 
Right, liberalism, and the Left unmoored it not only from political and philo-
sophical history but also from art history. Embedded in no particular lineage 
and without a past, fascist aesthetics had no reservoir of visual gestures and 
subject matter to draw from. Without an idiom of its own, it operated as mag-
pies do, stealing bits and pieces for ragtag presentations. The result, I argue, 
was a counter aesthetic constituted primarily in opposition to tradition of all 
kinds, to individuality, to universalism, and even, it could be said, to art it-
self as a mode of representation. Let me expand briefly on each of these three 
reasons — functionality, resistance to acknowledging representation, and be-
ing unmoored from the history of art and design — to explore why the fascist 
aesthetic is so incoherent and yet so effective. 
First and foremost, the visual manifestations of fascism vary because 
they were functional. Fascist visuality was instrumental, manipulative, and 
“propagandistically” conceived. Under the watchful eyes of movement ac-
tivists and regime censors, its primary purpose was to promote unity, sup-
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press individuality, defend hierarchy, model discipline, and still dissent. If 
we understand the aesthetics of fascism not as an ontological category with a 
particular style, medium, and subject matter, but instead as a dynamic func-
tion dedicated to producing heightened and uncontested allegiance, it makes 
sense that fascist aesthetics would be flexible, varied, and changeable. It had 
to respond to the immediate needs of the movement or regime. In Italy, for 
instance, during the long years under Mussolini, the film industry, which 
had initially celebrated the glories of the new state with hard- hitting political 
messages, gradually accommodated light entertainment and even domestic 
comedies.32 In Germany, in preparation for the 1933 election, as Lutz Ko-
epnick shows, Hitler’s official photographer Heinrich Hoffmann (1885 – 1957) 
altered his presentation of Hitler from the wildly gesticulating leader of the 
famous 1927 series to the empathetic, morally upright man presented in the 
1932 Hitler wie ihn keiner kennt (The Hitler nobody knows). In the Japanese 
empire, as Paul Barclay demonstrates, memorial towers to the “loyal dead” 
from the turn of the century were made to look like ones built in the 1930s, 
despite their different styles, through “etchings, magazine illustrations, tour-
ist brochures, and postcard renderings that made them look ‘all of a piece’ as 
the Japanese state sought to impress loyalty upon its subjects.” Fascist aesthet-
ics slipped from grandeur to sentimentality, from monumentality to kitsch, 
from the classical to the futuristic, calibrated for immediate circumstances. 
Instead of visualizing a fascist essence, the essays herein visualize fascism’s 
operations within the body politic. 
But the variability, shallowness, and opportunism of fascist aesthetics 
arise not from its propagandistic function alone. Fascism also resisted one 
of the core concepts of artistic and political practice: representation. I dis-
cuss this further in chapter 7, but let me make the case briefly here. The act of 
representation in philosophical terms rests on the understanding that a gap, 
however small, exists between the entity anterior to cultural and political for-
mations and that entity’s appearance within them. Political theory proposes 
rule- governed representative government as a means to give people a medi-
ated voice in decision- making. Fascism, on the other hand, insists that the 
tedious political operation of representing and negotiating interests can be 
discarded since national unity leaves no gap between the people and their na-
tion. In a similar manner, fascism mistrusts concern for artistic representa-
tion. This is one reason why fascist governments were leery of modernist aes-
thetic theories and experimentation, discrediting them as decadent precisely 
because they were self- reflective. Artistic fascination with the relationship 
 12 Julia Adeney Thomas
between artifice and reality spawned heady debates over how art might repre-
sent reality. For instance, cubists experimented gleefully with various ways of 
suggesting light, speed, and point of view. Their defiance of old conventions 
heightened the viewers’ perception of the canvas as an aesthetic interpreta-
tion of the world. Surrealists investigated how landscapes of the psyche could 
be made visible. Modernists, such as photography critic Ina Nobuo in Japan, 
insisted that even the camera, far from producing an exact copy of the world, 
transformed it through framing, exposure, and printing techniques. In other 
words, attention to the constraints and possibilities of representation made 
clear that art was not an automatic act of mimesis. 
Fascism resists acknowledging that representation lies at the heart of poli-
tics and art because representation is an act of mindful artifice always open to 
reexamination. There is nothing natural about it. As such, it raises the spec-
ter of competing forms and interests that might not dissolve in the lukewarm 
bath of ethnic unity and national greatness. To acknowledge representation 
is to admit the necessity of reflecting on means and ends. In this regard, it is 
intriguing, as Lutz Koepnick tells us, that “no photograph ever shows Hitler 
looking at photographs” — an act at once too self- reflexive and too indexical.33 
Fascism, in short, committed itself ideologically to overcoming all forms of 
alienation; it promised not a better form of representation but unity and nat-
ural wholeness without the need for mindful mediation. Its antirepresenta-
tional drive was part of its claim to authenticity. 
The third reason why fascism never achieved a positive aesthetic was this: 
it was unmoored from a genealogy of aesthetic production. Defying all that 
came before and yet rejecting conscious aesthetic experimentation, fascism 
was reduced to stealthy borrowing from many periods in order to clothe its 
menace in visually palatable forms. Fascist images referenced many ancient 
worlds — from classical Greece in the opening moments of Leni Riefenstahl’s 
1935 Triumph of the Will to Jōmon- era (10,000 – 300 bce) artifacts shared be-
tween Korea and Japan.34 Etruscans, Romans, and Vikings adorned the mau-
soleum that avowed Dutch fascist Johan Bastiaan van Heutsz Jr. erected for 
his father, who had been governor- general of the Dutch East Indies. The fas-
cistic faction of the Chinese Nationalist Party combined the Zhou dynasty 
(1046 – 256 bce) military emblems of archer and chariot with modernist let-
tering to convey their appreciation of Confucianism as the basis for class- 
harmonious nationalism without any of Confucianism’s “feudal remnants.”35 
With this sort of artistic and ideological mishmash, fascism attempted to 
forge a past that would anchor its claim to a glorious future while simulta-
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neously obliterating history as a resource for understanding difference and 
change. 
But the borrowings were not only from ancient repertories. Bourgeois 
ideas of art, such as pictorialism (a photographic idiom mimicking paint-
ing), and avant- garde elements usually associated with Soviet realism and 
constructivism were also wielded in fascism’s favor.36 In envisioning the pres-
ent and the future, fascism’s counter aesthetic emerged in a number of ways. 
The desire to annihilate individuality (despite lauding heroes) turned people 
into “ideal national types” such as “the youth” depicted on the cover of the 
December 1941 issue of Nová Mládež in Slovakia and in subsequent issues of 
that journal, as Bertrand Metton explains in this volume. Another ideal type 
was “the nurse,” which was found on the cover of Japan’s July 1938 Shashin 
shūhō.37 Foreign elements, places, and people figured only within the hier-
archies dominated by the home nation and not as equal yet distinctive ele-
ments of a common humanity. Finally, a deep- seated misogyny sentimental-
ized women’s traditional roles and depicted motherhood in the service of the 
state, although femininity retained culturally specific aspects, as shown in 
historian Andrea Germer’s comparison of visual propaganda in Nippon fu-
jin (The Japanese woman) and ns Frauen- Warte (ns women’s outlook), the 
major Nazi women’s magazine.38 In short, fascist artists, designers, architects, 
stone carvers, and photographers sought to build a visual bulwark against 
“history’s disquiet” without having a visual history to draw upon.39 The result 
was a grab bag of incoherent styles. 
The end of the war did not clarify the relation between artistic styles and 
political ideologies. At the end of this volume, we turn the question of visu-
alizing fascism on its head and ask how antifascism was visualized and what 
became of it when hostilities ceased. As the essays by Nadya Bair on photog-
rapher Robert Capa and Claire Zimmerman on American architect Albert 
Kahn demonstrate, wartime work that was resolutely antifascist could lose its 
political charge by being reframed. Bair argues that Robert Capa’s intensely 
left- wing political photography in Spain during the 1930s was reinterpreted 
as apolitical humanism by the 1950s and as “concerned photography” in the 
1960s — a legacy that lingers today. This transformation produces a paradox. 
On the one hand, Capa is crucial to our understanding of the Spanish fight 
against fascism, and on the other, because his work has been depoliticized 
(in part by his own self- promotional activities), Capa’s legacy obscures our 
understanding of fascism. The result with Capa’s work, as with the famous 
Family of Man exhibition curated by Edward Steichen at MoMA and travel-
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ing the world from 1955 to 1963, is that what had been explicitly political art, 
at least at its inception, was reduced to an anodyne humanism that rejected 
politics as part of the human condition. 
An even more dramatic fate befell the legacy of Albert Kahn (1869 – 1942), 
who had inspired modernist architects in Europe and worked for America’s 
war effort until his death. After the war, architectural historian Henry Rus-
sell Hitchcock transformed Kahn’s industrial buildings. Originally conceived 
as enlightened, welcoming places of work, Kahn’s modern egalitarian spaces 
were recoded by Hitchcock as “retrograde, obsolete, and developmentally 
stunted” bureaucratic monuments akin to the Nazis’ public buildings.40 This 
transposition of Kahn’s architecture from the cutting edge of democratic 
hope to emblems of dark, despotic power was achieved, Zimmerman argues, 
through the power of photography. During the postwar period, the camera 
remediated these buildings, placing them in a completely different visual his-
tory. Kahn’s buildings, like Capa’s photographs, no longer served as examples 
of politicized, antifascist art. Not only were the visual repertoires of left and 
right remarkably fungible during the war, but politically committed art could 
be stripped of its politics quite quickly and inserted into alternative narra-
tives, as Bair and Zimmerman show. 
Conclusion 
Pankaj Mishra’s recent Age of Anger attempts to give fascism — and contem-
porary discontent — a deep history. “A particular climate of ideas, a struc-
ture of feeling, and cognitive disposition” centered on ressentiment can, he 
claims, be traced back to Jean- Jacques Rousseau and the eighteenth- century 
critique of the Enlightenment.41 Anger due to the unmet promise of individ-
ual and collective empowerment emerged, suggests Mishra, over 250 years 
ago. According to Mishra’s narrative, this anger links malcontents, from the 
alienated Genevan author of The Social Contract to Gabriele D’Annunzio (the 
Italian ultranationalist) and ultimately to 9/11 terrorists and beyond. What 
Mishra misses by casting his net so widely is the extraordinary novelty of 
mass right- wing radicalism in the early twentieth century.42 The particular 
form of anger that in this volume we call “fascism” arose not two and a half 
centuries ago but rather only after World War I, when the partial failures of 
liberal democracy and capitalism became globally apparent. The equality of 
political and economic opportunity promised to men had not entirely ma-
terialized, yet some women were beginning to enjoy marginally improved 
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conditions. Wealth was being created through capitalism, but was distributed 
unequally. This toxic combination of political, economic, and male humili-
ation became politically potent when opportunistic leaders cultivated griev-
ances to fuel their rise to power and deliberately added national humiliation 
and fear to the mix. Instead of a modernity founded on individualism and 
egalitarianism, a new modernity of ecstatic unity was promised, one resting 
on political and gendered hierarchies, autarkic economies, and national pride 
regained through aggression. 
As these essays show, the media tactics this novel form of politics deployed 
were aesthetically underwhelming because their shallow functionality lacked 
both historical resonance and theoretical concern for representation. The 
result was a visual hodgepodge, both traditional and futuristic, local and 
international. In the first half of the twentieth century, as Clinton observes, 
“fascist symbolics emerged from place- specific struggles while also applying 
globally circulating tropes.”43 By contrast, in the nineteenth century, when 
Courbet painted the townspeople at his great- uncle’s funeral, he was speak-
ing both within and against an artistic tradition that had institutional and 
theoretical backing within European, and particularly French, culture. In 
Courbet’s day, this specific aesthetic history allowed Burial at Ornans to be 
seen as radical, as he wished it to be seen: elevating ordinary people against 
established elites and replacing Romantic glory with dignified ordinary real-
ity. Seventy years later, Courbet’s revolution was reversed. Ordinary people 
would be radicalized from the Right and glory asserted in defiance of reality. 
Fascism, constituted primarily through negation, lacked a single visual rheto-
ric of its own, but that lack of aesthetic distinctiveness was not a detriment 
to its utility. Indeed, right- wing populism seems to have been all the stronger 
for its undisciplined eclecticism of style and its grab bag of motifs. Its protean 
qualities made opposition all the more difficult, and it could travel the world 
more freely. Indeed, it could be argued that fascism’s visual farrago perfectly 
matched its political requirements. 
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SUBJECTS OF  A NEW  
VISUAL ORDER
Fascist Media in 1930s China
Maggie Clinton
In 1933, several issues of the Shanghai monthly periodical Qiantu (The Future) 
ran on the cover a vibrantly colored image of an archer atop an ancient char-
iot.1 The archer, depicted in red against a blue, gray, and white background, 
drives his chariot beneath a blazing red sun. He aims his arrow at the mast-
head characters “Qiantu,” which are printed in a geometric typeface. Archery 
and charioteering — two of the six arts scholars had been required to master 
during the ancient Zhou dynasty (1046 – 256 bce) — are represented here in a 
modernist idiom. The image conjures a lapsed Confucian scholarly ideal con-
joining physical and mental agility and suggests the forceful leap required in 
the present to connect China’s militarily formidable past with a bright new 
future (figure 1.1). Evincing a simultaneous yearning for a bygone age and one 
yet to come, China’s national rebirth appears here as a “thrust towards a new 
type of society,” building “rhetorically on the cultural achievements attrib-
uted to the former, more ‘glorious’ or healthy eras” rather than suggesting a 
desire to return to the dynastic past as such.2 Such Janus- faced glances toward 
both past and future were recurrent themes in 1930s periodicals circulated by 
Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang [gmd]) factions known as the “Blue 
Shirts” and the “cc Clique.”3 Deploying an image such as this through mass 
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media entailed staking a position in local political struggles, demonstrating 
that the gmd stood at the forefront of history by simultaneously embracing 
key aspects of modern life and respecting native traditions.
Throughout the 1927 – 37 Nanjing decade, during which the Nationalist 
Party, under Chiang Kai- shek, ruled China as a de facto one- party state from 
the city of Nanjing, the technocratic cc Clique and militaristic Blue Shirts or-
chestrated state violence known as the White Terror. They waged this terror 
with the conviction that the national development agenda gmd leader Sun 
Yat- sen had developed before his death in 1925 constituted the only suitable 
revolutionary path for China to follow. Their objections to capitalism and 
liberal democracy, to class struggle and gender equality, were leveled with a 
1.1 Cover of Qiantu [The 
Future] 1, no. 8 (1933). 
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sense of themselves as revolutionary vanguards empowered to eradicate peo-
ple and ideas that blocked China’s national rebirth. Blue Shirt and cc Clique 
activists had trained as soldiers and engineers at schools in China, the U.S., 
the USSR, and Japan; they had come of age participating in debates about 
science, democracy, and the status of Confucianism in the modern world; 
and they had sharpened their political views amid mass mobilizations in 
the southern Chinese port city of Canton during the early 1920s. In antago-
nistic dialogue with Chinese Communists — with whom the gmd formed 
a tenuous, Soviet- backed alliance from 1923 to 1927 — these militant young 
nationalists grew adamant that the true agent of China’s revolution was not 
the proletariat or peasantry, but the class- harmonious nation bound by a na-
tive Confucian culture. After orchestrating the 1927 coup led by Chiang Kai- 
shek and assuming positions of state power, they remained preoccupied with 
differentiating both their national- revolutionary agenda from what they re-
garded as Communism’s vulgar materialism and their interest in Confucian-
ism from that of conservative “feudal remnants” who clung to preindustrial 
ways of life. With these opponents, among others, in mind, Blue Shirt and cc 
Clique theorists distilled Confucianism into a “national spirit” that anchored 
national belonging across time and space. And with this spirit animating a 
strong state- led program of industrial development, they believed they could 
defeat all legacies of imperialism and restore the nation to its rightful posi-
tion of worldly strength.
This chapter addresses two aspects of the visual culture that Chinese 
fascists — that is, the men who composed the Nationalist Party factions 
known as the Blue Shirts and the cc Clique — generated during the Nanjing 
decade.4 First, it examines imagery, including cover art, photo collages, and 
cartoons, that they deployed in their periodicals. Although scholars still typi-
cally regard modernist aesthetics to have been the province of China’s inter-
war commercial advertisers and political left wing, they were also embraced 
by men who railed against the former’s Western sycophancy and condemned 
the latter as criminals alienating China from its cultural roots; indeed, the 
fascists killed them on these grounds.5 As elsewhere, the visual repertoires 
favored by China’s interwar left and right were markedly similar. Both used 
angular typefaces, industrial motifs, and geometric forms to underscore the 
futuristic thrust of their respective political agendas. Both also resuscitated 
indigenous iconographies, in particular flat- planed textile and woodblock 
patterns, in ways that made familiar the social estrangement that their mod-
ernizing agendas otherwise spelled.6 The fact that Chinese fascists claimed 
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this imagery as their own — and attempted to invest it with particularly na-
tionalist meanings — gives us clues to the ways in which fascist symbolics 
emerged from place- specific struggles while also applying globally circulat-
ing tropes. 
Second, this chapter addresses the significance of the fact that fascists in 
China tried and failed to harness and restrict the meanings of this shared 
visual language. Their ultimately unsuccessful efforts highlight the degree 
of state power necessary to enforce particular ways of representing and see-
ing. Jeffrey T. Schnapp observed that in Italy, fascists managed to generate 
a kind of “aesthetic overproduction — a surfeit of fascist signs, images, slo-
gans, books, and buildings — in order to compensate for, fill in, and cover up 
[fascism’s] unstable ideological core.”7 By the time invading Japanese troops 
forcibly uprooted the Nationalist government in Nanjing in 1937, the large 
quantity of new visuals produced by Chinese fascists had hardly succeeded in 
crowding out — let alone overwhelming — other claims to popular attention. 
They did, nevertheless, try, and it is in their vociferous attempts to do so that 
we can discern how an effective state monopoly on representational practices 
is key to rendering a fascist visual culture identifiable as such. 
An integral aspect of the fascist political project was that of remolding the 
masses to be capable of appreciating these new practices — that is, of under-
standing the kinds of struggle that they were supposed to disclose, spur, and 
preclude. It was necessary to transform “ways of seeing” and forcibly restrict 
fields of vision.8 Reflecting on the entwined relationship between visual im-
agery and viewing subjects, Stuart Hall and Jessica Evans succinctly observed 
how “meaning is constituted not in the visual sign itself as a self- sufficient 
entity, nor exclusively in the sociological positions and identities of the audi-
ence, but in the articulation between viewer and viewed, between the power 
of the image to signify and the viewer’s capacity to interpret meaning.”9 In the 
case of fascist movements and regimes, Hall and Evans’s insight suggests the 
imperative to account for how new visual repertoires were created over time 
and in a complex, uneven relationship with the forging of new viewing sub-
jects. As China’s fascists well understood, images such as the aforementioned 
archer- charioteer on the cover of The Future likely held little resonance be-
yond coastal cities subject to imperialist influence; they were perhaps more 
illegible than inspiring to much of China’s rural, preindustrial population. 
Chinese fascists therefore made a concerted effort to endow the Chinese pop-
ulace with new ways of understanding and experiencing the world via sweep-
ing social movements such as the New Life Movement, launched in 1934 by 
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the Nationalist military as it expunged Chinese Communists from their rural 
base areas, and by marshalling modern technologies such as film for specific 
ends. The fascists on whom this chapter focuses embraced technologies of 
mechanical reproduction and the visual forms that echoed them, seeking to 
circumscribe their meanings and cement them to a collectivist struggle for 
national rebirth. That the aspirations of fascists in China far outstripped their 
ability to realize them — which would have been all but impossible given the 
limited and fractured sovereignty of the Nationalist state on the eve of World 
War II — underscores the importance of state power in shaping the politics of 
a given set of visual practices.
Fascist Media and Machine- Age Aesthetics 
After the Nationalists proclaimed their new state in 1928, fascist groups (the 
cc Clique and what came to called the “Blue Shirts” after 1932) expanded 
their power within the party’s civilian and military ranks. While they orga-
nized and staffed the secret services responsible for the White Terror, they 
also became active in the media, over which they fought to exert total state 
control. cc Clique and Blue Shirt media endeavors included magazine, book, 
and newspaper publishing, radio broadcasting, and film production. These 
groups also opened bookstores in major cities across China. They attacked 
what they regarded as degenerate and divisive influences, compensating for 
the state’s limited censorship capabilities by terrorizing individuals deemed 
to be responsible for such influence, and they attempted to saturate the public 
with their own political writings, cultural theory, and short fiction.10 Follow-
ing various initiatives from the late 1920s onward, at the 1935 Fifth Party Con-
gress a state committee formed to coordinate and police cultural production 
on an all- China scale.11 This committee marked the culmination of debates 
that had taken place within party ranks — and in antagonistic dialogue with 
Communists and other leftists — concerning what constituted a properly na-
tionalistic work of art or literature, and attempted to officially delegate what 
fell within and outside such bounds. Despite these efforts, however, and even 
though the Nanjing government had already criminalized the propagation 
of ideas deemed “detrimental to the People’s Revolution,” the regime’s actual 
jurisdiction remained limited geographically, and it had little control over the 
kinds of works disseminated through the colonial concessions.12 Thus factors 
beyond the government’s control consistently hampered nationalist efforts to 
police what Chinese citizens were allowed to view. 
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With a keen sense of the importance of controlling the media, the cc 
Clique made their first organized forays into publishing in the late 1920s with 
daily papers and monthly magazines, and by establishing bookstores in ma-
jor cities.13 By the time the cc Clique launched their flagship magazine Cul-
tural Construction (Wenhua jianshe) in October 1934, they had the financial 
and technological resources to print high- quality photo spreads and special-
ized typefaces. Likely spurred by cc Clique leader Chen Lifu’s interest in the 
ways in which cinema could help mold senses of national belonging (dis-
cussed below), and by the emerging trend in Chinese publishing of synchro-
nizing graphic design with written content, Cultural Construction attempted 
to convey visually the gmd’s capacity to simultaneously defend native tradi-
tions and modernize all aspects of national life.14 Each of Cultural Construc-
tion’s three dozen or so monthly issues was frontloaded with photographs 
and typefaces that exuded the harmonization of China’s enduring Confucian 
spirit with the nation’s material progress. While the magazine’s covers show-
cased traditional handicraft patterns and ancient seal designs, each issue’s 
twenty- odd pages of pictorial front matter placed these designs in the context 
of a world on the cusp of a second cataclysmic war, during which the Chi-
nese nation would either revive or perish. Photographs of China’s dynastic 
art treasures and engineering marvels ran quickly into photo spreads of new 
domestic construction projects and global advances in science and technol-
ogy. Readers were also presented with laudatory pictures of technology that 
enhanced the government’s capacity to wage war, and with pictures of tech-
nological applications of the art deco styles then popular in Shanghai’s hotels, 
cabarets, and department stores. Photographs showcasing the “streamlined 
style” of an art moderne airplane and the U.S. Union Pacific Streamline Ex-
press train, for instance, communicated that the cc Clique approved of this 
popular style as long as it served a strictly delineated nationalistic purpose 
(figure 1.2). In turn, such aerodynamic forms visually expressed the kind of 
rationalized efficiency that cc Clique leaders desired to foster within soci-
ety at large.15 Tactically, pictorial pages such as these reinforced their overall 
push for Confucian- based national unity under the direction of a powerful 
developmentalist state. 
To this end, Cultural Construction’s visuals underscored the life- or- death 
necessity of national cohesion under powerful gmd leadership. While ar-
ticles stressed Confucianism’s enduring emphasis on prioritizing collective 
needs above individual interests and obeying state authority, photo collages 
reinforced this message in numerous ways. For example, a 1935 news pictorial 
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on the Italy- Ethiopia conflict — one that was closely followed in the Chinese 
media for its connections to China’s struggle with Japan over Manchuria — 
depicted mass organization and emboldened state authority in a time of cri-
sis. Here we see a portrait of Benito Mussolini angrily shaking his fist super-
imposed on a tightly organized mass of Italian troops mobilizing for war 
(figure 1.3). These images of Mussolini and Italian troops are positioned above 
paired images of Haile Selassie and Ethiopian soldiers. The collage as a whole 
simultaneously conveys the discipline that a strong- willed Mussolini had im-
posed on his people, the upper hand that Italy had quickly established over 
Ethiopia, and the latter’s relative military disorganization. While these col-
lages referenced the imperial- Italian context that Ruth Ben- Ghiat addresses 
1.2 “Streamlined Forms.” 
Late art deco trains 
and planes featured in 
Wenhua jianshe [Cultural 
Construction] 1, no. 5 
(1935).
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in chapter 4 in this volume, Italian aggression toward Ethiopia had specific 
meanings in interwar China. China’s fascists simultaneously admired Italy 
for its ability to unite and exert military strength, and they identified with 
Ethiopia as a victim of imperialist aggression, failed by the League of Na-
tions.16 The top half of this pictorial signaled a future aspiration and the bot-
tom, a present reality, underscoring the message that militarized national 
unity was of even greater importance for countries subject to imperialism, 
such as China and Ethiopia. In key respects, such still images resonated with 
what Susan Sontag, deriving her notion of fascist aesthetics from Leni Riefen-
stahl’s film oeuvre, called a “characteristic pageantry: the massing of groups 
of people; the turning of people into things; the multiplication of things and 
1.3 “International News” 
(page 1 of 2). Photos of 
the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia, featured in 
Wenhua jianshe [Cultural 
Construction] 2, no. 1 
(1935).
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the grouping of people/things around an all- powerful, hypnotic leader fig-
ure or force.”17 But in China’s case, the nation’s failure to organize around 
a leader posed a threat that referred, in one way or another, to the damage 
Euro- American imperialism had wrought and to Japan’s escalating territo-
rial demands. In this sense, while fascists the world over decried threats to 
the nation posed by internal and external enemies and clamored for unified 
struggle against them, how such enemies were construed and depicted inevi-
tably depended on historical context. 
The violence that the cc Clique perpetrated in the name of creating a dis-
ciplined, synchronized polity was only intermittently visible in magazines 
such as Cultural Construction. Violence, by contrast, was foregrounded and 
celebrated in periodicals produced by the military- based Blue Shirts. After 
the Blue Shirts were founded in 1932, they quickly launched various media 
outlets, actively circulating their plans for a reborn China in books, newspa-
pers, and magazines.18 Like the cc Clique, Blue Shirts were also enthusiastic 
about cinema’s propagandistic powers, but for tactical reasons their most con-
certed media interventions took the form of print, which was cheaper to pro-
duce and circulated readily to areas without electricity.19 In terms of titles and 
design, some of these publications, like the Nanjing- based newspaper China 
Daily (Zhongguo ribao), were indistinguishable from the many mainstream 
papers that the Blue Shirts sought to edge out of circulation. Others such as 
Iron and Blood Monthly (Tiexue yuekan), Sweat and Blood Weekly (Hanxue 
zhoukan), Mopping- Up Thrice Monthly (Saodang xunkan), and the Future 
(Qiantu) readily announced the militancy of their content. The 1933 archer- 
charioteer cover of the Future, for instance, conveyed the fusion of China’s 
ancient military advances with the industrial era; the Future’s more prosaic 
covers still took care to frame each issue’s table of contents with abstract de-
signs and innovative typefaces (figure 1.4). Meanwhile, military magazines 
such as Saodang (Mopping Up) and Jingcheng (Absolute Sincerity) favored 
more organic forms but likewise celebrated battlefield martyrdom and heroic 
encounters with death. Illustrations featured in these magazines reinforced 
Blue Shirts’ decisions to live soldiering lives, showcasing what they were fight-
ing for and the forces and behaviors that they struggled against. Commu-
nists’ base and ulterior motives (banditry, mayhem, and sexual indulgence) 
were favored themes, underscoring the legitimacy and necessity of violently 
eliminating them from the national scene. So too were Japanese predations 
in north China, as seen in a cartoon of Japanese settlers feasting on a Chi-
nese corpse, published in a 1937 issue of Sweat and Blood Weekly (figure 1.5).20 
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Blue Shirt magazines typically foregrounded concerns common to fas-
cist movements around the world. Many images that circulated in their 
pages were, at the same time, indistinguishable from those that simultane-
ously appeared in popular, nonpartisan Chinese lifestyle periodicals such as 
Liangyou (The Young Companion), and their design schemes echoed those 
in magazines concurrently produced by China’s embattled left wing.21 For 
instance, covers and pictorial spreads similar to those in Sweat and Blood 
Weekly featuring Chinese athletes in exertive poses could be found in all 
manner of periodicals at the time. By the 1930s, those across the Chinese 
political spectrum shared pride in tempered, athletic bodies, which often 
took on connotations of eugenic success. In this regard, the text that framed 
an image continued to impart necessary information for understanding its 
message, because the wider sociopolitical context that might have otherwise 
shaped the meaning of a given image remained highly contested. Images be-
1.4 Cover of Qiantu [The 
Future] 1, no. 3 (1933). 
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came “fascist” when fascists operationalized them, deploying them for spe-
cific ends. As Nadya Bair highlights in chapter 10 with respect to the Left 
and Right in Spain, in the 1930s China’s sharply polarized political factions 
battled over similar visual repertoires, in particular those that had come to 
be seen as avant- garde. Moreover, both the Far Left and the Far Right were 
closely attuned to commercial trends and to the popular purchase, especially 
in Shanghai, of industrial- inspired styles. In the years leading up to Japan’s 
1937 invasion of China, neither end of the political spectrum succeeded in af-
fixing a particular repertoire to their own political project or divesting it of 
other possible meanings. 
Yet it was hardly accidental that fascists in China deployed certain kinds 
of visuals. They did so not simply because some European and Japanese fas-
cists already favored them, but rather because the visuals seemed to convey 
most effectively the dynamics of revolutionary restoration. While China’s 
fascists touted themselves as defenders of China’s ancient Confucian culture, 
it is important to recognize that they were not particularly interested in revi-
talizing art forms that had been popular during dynasties past. Media such 
1.5 “Human Calamity in North China.” Cartoon by Gao Longsheng, Hanxue Zhoukan 
[Sweat and Blood Weekly] 8, no. 20 (1937): 373. 
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as ink- and- brush painting were not, they believed, sufficient for inspiring 
the Chinese populace to participate in a totalizing project of national re-
generation. Rather, to borrow a phrase from Maria Gough, they “promoted 
especially those arts that shared with modern industrial production its pri-
mary condition of technological reproducibility, such as graphic design, pho-
tomontage, photography, and cinema.”22 These were “consonant with the em-
phasis on mechanization and acceleration” that animated their visions of a 
revolutionized China, which were modeled by turns on the efficient capital-
ist firm and the rationalized military.23 Such forms more precisely captured 
the ethos of following orders and streamlining efficiency associated, in their 
view, with the nation’s presently waned Confucian spirit. As Julia Thomas 
noted in the introduction regarding the malleability of notions of “national 
spirit,” China’s fascists could and did insist that their aesthetic preferences 
readily accorded with China’s national spirit, rather than with any partic-
ular traditional artistic form or sensibility. The national spirit and the vi-
sual forms that effectively expressed it were what the fascists declared them 
to be. 
If the demands of these Nationalist Party factions for revolutionary resto-
ration were forged in increasingly volatile local and global contexts riven by 
class- based and anti- imperialist activism, the factions’ aesthetic preferences 
were also informed by the military and technical training that they had re-
ceived in China and overseas. The cc Clique and the Blue Shirts were on 
different sides of the Nationalist Party’s thin civil- bureaucratic and military 
divide — the cc Clique comprised mostly civilian bureaucrats, whereas the 
Blue Shirts were soldiers — but the highly militarized nature of the nation-
alist state and the two groups’ shared anti- Communist developmentalism 
spelled a distinct convergence between their hierarchically rationalized as-
pirations for a reborn China.24 They favored industrial- inspired visual styles 
that seemed to best capture history’s acceleration, and they wanted to reorder 
Chinese society in a streamlined fashion. They rejected the class strife prom-
ised by Communism and the atomization encouraged by Western liberalism, 
and for state- led industrial and infrastructural development grounded in in-
terclass cohesion and coordinated action. At the same time, they worked to 
ensure that the population at large would understand this political program 
in intended ways. Colonial treaty ports from which China’s fascists emerged, 
such as Shanghai and Canton and the surrounding regions, were in key re-
spects worlds removed from rural hinterlands. As much as fascists celebrated 
primordial national unity, they understood that most of the nation still had 
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to be taught the importance of streamlined efficiency, and self- sacrificial pa-
triotism. They wanted the art deco – inspired graphics and laudatory photo-
graphs of technologies such as airplanes that circulated in their magazines 
to be read and understood in particular ways. People also had to be taught 
how not to misread modern imagery as if it permitted individualistic con-
sumerism or pointed toward a nationless, Communist- governed future. To 
this end, fascists worked to police ways of seeing as much as they sought to 
police what could be seen.
New Frames of Reference 
As indicated above, when thinking about the ways in which Chinese fascists 
tried and failed to craft a new order, it is necessary to stress that, although 
the Nationalist regime claimed for itself most of the territory that had be-
longed to the Qing dynasty, vast stretches of this territory remained beyond 
its jurisdiction. Regions bordering French Indochina, British India, and the 
recently consolidated USSR were for all intents and purposes independent. 
Japan formally claimed the vast northeastern region of Manchuria after 1931, 
whereas areas of the rural southwest were effectively controlled by the Chi-
nese Communist Party. Equally significantly, areas within the Nationalists’ 
territorial jurisdiction, including the wealthiest and most developed sections 
of Shanghai, remained autonomously governed by various colonial powers, 
which made it impossible for the Nationalists to effectively control cultural 
production and distribution. A distinctive visual culture had emerged, in 
Shanghai in particular, since the late nineteenth century — one that mani-
fested the innumerable global currents present there, from Hollywood films 
to the art deco building designs of the sojourning Hungarian- Slovak ar-
chitect László Hudec.25 The fascist response to this colonial conundrum of 
compromised sovereignty involved redoubling force against tendencies that 
seemed to block the nationalists’ recuperation of sovereign control and hence 
China’s path to national rebirth. They did not seek to return China to a time 
before movies and motorcars but instead to revive an ancient spirit of unity, 
domesticating what they regarded as healthy aspects of modern life and di-
vesting these aspects of imperialist associations. This required remolding the 
Chinese population in a manner that made them perceive and engage with 
modern life, especially as it had emerged in Shanghai and other coastal cities, 
in disciplined ways, and likewise controlling what the population was able to 
perceive in the first place. But the gap remained enormous between the de-
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sired future and the existing present situation, and it seemed to widen further 
as local and global crises mounted over the course of the 1930s.  
One index for gauging the amount of time and degree of state strength 
required to construct and control a coherent visual landscape appears in the 
1993 documentary The Wonderful Horrible Life of Leni Riefenstahl (released 
in the U.S./English language in 1998). Partway through the film, Riefen stahl, 
by then a nonagenarian, is shown erupting in anger at her interviewers for 
having the gall to speak in the same breath about the results of her first and 
second attempts to film a Nazi Party congress. The first, Victory of Faith 
(1933), she protested, was not to be considered in the same league as her iconic 
second film of a party congress, Triumph of the Will (1935), whose choreog-
raphy of enthralled masses, a lionized and individuated Hitler, and surging 
phalanxes of soldiers soon set a kind of global standard for what fascism in 
power allegedly looked like. Contextualizing Riefenstahl’s misgivings about 
the first film, the English- language narrator of Wonderful Horrible Life ex-
plained that “with amateurish shots of Hitler and rather elementary camera 
angles, Victory of Faith is perhaps understandably a film Riefenstahl is very 
reluctant to talk about. . . . Not only was the camera work shoddy, but the or-
ganization of the event itself [i.e., the 1933 Party Congress] seemed uncharac-
teristically chaotic. The Nazis had not yet learned how to march like Nazis.”26 
The narrator thus indicated that neither Riefenstahl’s paradigmatic cinematic 
representation of fascism- in- power nor the Nazis’ own self- orchestrations yet 
measured up to what either would become in time. 
This exchange highlights the importance of understanding fascist visual 
cultures as works in progress. It also reveals the importance of a given re-
gime’s capacity to associate certain representational forms and ideas with 
itself. As Schnapp indicated in the earlier quote regarding how Italian fas-
cists ultimately generated a kind of “aesthetic overproduction,” effectively 
harnessing certain forms or overcompensating for whatever jumble of mes-
sages they sent (comfort amid estrangement, stillness amid dynamism, the 
ancient amid the modern, empowerment in submission, etc.) required a for-
midable degree of state power. The continued appearance in Nazi Germany, 
for instance, of entertainment films that were not overtly propagandistic was 
possible precisely because they circulated within what had quickly become 
an “entirely hierarchical cultural domain” transformed via “mechanisms 
of coercion whereby Nazi ideology asserted its dominance across all socio- 
cultural fields, including film” and thus either shored up, or at the very least 
did not threaten, the integrity of the larger Nazi agenda.27 Fascists in China 
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never gained enough strength to secure a state monopoly on representational 
practices, effectively flood the landscape with materials they deemed to be 
properly nationalistic, or remold how people would perceive and experience 
these materials. Hollywood films screened in the colonial concessions, such 
as Clyde Bruckman’s Welcome Danger (1929), with its racist depiction of San 
Francisco’s Chinatown, were certainly protested and denounced, but the dis-
course surrounding such imported films could not effectively saturate the 
population for reasons already noted.28
The most determined effort Chinese fascists made to transform popular 
ways of seeing was known as the New Life Movement (nlm), which the Blue 
Shirts launched in the inland city of Nanchang in 1934 and the cc Clique 
and many other groups soon theorized and promoted. The nlm aimed to 
instill new subjectivities among the Chinese population and to remold it into 
a regimented national mass. The movement’s purpose centered on imbuing 
the nation with militantly organized productive capacities in preparation for 
total war and for realizing Sun Yat- sen’s program of state- directed indus-
trialization.29 In a nod to the engineering and military training of the men 
who devised it, the nlm had a distinctly top- down view (from officers’ and 
managers’ perspectives) of the social world. It used militaristic and produc-
tivist metaphors interchangeably to speak about the social world: workers 
were soldiers in an industrial army, soldiers were expected to be as punctual 
as workers bound by factory whistles, and household management was con-
ceived in terms of battlefield violence. Such directives sought to foster people 
who understood themselves as dutiful soldiers and workers who voluntarily 
obeyed commands because doing so was in the best interest of the national 
collective and would hasten the arrival of a renewed national future. Via cam-
paigns to militarize, aestheticize, and “productivize” everyday life, the minds 
and bodies of Chinese citizens would become accustomed to the temporal 
rhythms of mechanized agricultural and industrial work and to being con-
stantly prepared to mobilize against domestic and foreign enemies. One pro-
moter called this process “zhengqihuayi”: “to organize and remake as one,” or 
“to make uniform” in the sense of calibrating weights and measures.30 As in 
a scientifically managed factory or a rationalized military, everything would 
be rigidly organized and maximally efficient.
New Life Movement events bombarded participants with images of dy-
namic progress while also interpellating them as Confucian subjects for 
whom a reborn future would arrive if and only if they performed their proper 
social roles, and if they accepted the limited range of meanings the state per-
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mitted them to perceive in an otherwise anarchic swath of modern signifi-
ers. The movement worked to delimit what could be perceived and by whom. 
It shined the light of the state into novel spaces such as cabarets and movie 
theaters — spaces that novelists, left- wing activists, and the masses themselves 
were concurrently interpreting in very different ways. The nlm sought to 
penetrate into the deepest recesses of popular consciousness and to ren-
der political opposition an unnatural, nonnational, non- Confucian stance. 
As The Future editor Liu Bingli put it, “revolution must enter into people’s 
hearts, consciousness and unconscious life . . . it must permeate the entirety 
of the life process.”31 Conceiving of daily life as alternately a battlefield and 
a worksite filled with insubordinates and Luddites, the nlm aimed to keep 
everyone’s eyes trained on a streamlined and efficient future. The rational-
ized Confucianism that the nlm invoked was central to this process, as it 
provided a seemingly natural ground for national cohesion amid an unprec-
edented state effort at social engineering. Jettisoning in the name of efficiency 
and following orders the socially reciprocal mandates that were intrinsic to 
dynastic Confucian schemas, nlm Confucianism aimed to foreclose the om-
nipresent possibility that people would question state directives, look where 
they should not, and then take unauthorized action. The more intensely peo-
ple identified with their assigned social roles, the less likely they would be to 
act unpredictably, and the less likely they would be to notice anything but 
what they were told to notice. This aimed to “depotentialize areas of struggle” 
that the gmd itself had ridden to power, turning popular energies against 
sanctioned enemies when the timing was deemed right.32
This intense reconfiguration of ways of being and seeing would, among 
other things, prime the population to receive state propaganda in intended 
ways. In this context, nlm champion and cc Clique leader Chen Lifu be-
gan to explore film as an ideal medium for fostering new perceptions of the 
nation while enlightening the masses out of their alleged backwardness. It 
could simultaneously help alter and saturate perception. In 1933, Chen wrote 
an extensive treatise on film’s capacity to overcome national alienation by 
presenting Chinese audiences with images of themselves hitherto denied by 
imperialist domination of China’s silver screens.33 In a self- determining fash-
ion, Chinese- made movies should present the nation’s own history and own 
scenarios. Yet whereas Chinese film studios currently took on this task by 
churning out martial arts and fairytale films — which Chen noted competed 
admirably with higher- budget and technically savvy foreign imports — the 
films that Chen envisioned would present realistic, nationalistic, and spiritu-
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ally uplifting stories. In a complementary manner, newsreels could be used 
to publicize state- sponsored development projects, particularly those that re-
quired massive organization and labor participation. Successfully harnessing 
the medium of film would enable fellow nationals to experience their connec-
tions to one another in new ways and to collectively envision the nation’s past, 
present, and future precisely as party leaders desired they would. 
According to Chen’s plan, China’s new national cinema would “dramatize 
the process of nationalist revolution.”34 This meant enabling people to see and 
hear the nation and its history in new ways — to feel it in their hearts and be 
moved to sacrifice for it. “Films must not only satisfy people’s senses of sight 
and sound,” Chen explained, “they must also move the people’s mind- spirit, 
stimulate their morality and wisdom, spur them to improve their behavior, 
and increase their knowledge.”35 This entailed showcasing the differences be-
tween Eastern and Western civilizations as well as China’s national unique-
ness.36 Film should make “China’s native old morality” — values of loyalty and 
filial piety, benevolence, good faith, and peacefulness — “manifest before the 
eyes of the audience, bolstering their beliefs, stirring their adoration, and pro-
viding them with direction.”37 The cooperative thrust of this effort masked 
distinct social hierarchies within the nation. Newsreels propagating state re-
construction efforts, Chen suggested, could help mitigate “bad habits of lazi-
ness, increase the enjoyment [that people] feel in productive labor, and give 
them bodily experience of the construction of a new country.”38 Although 
the population writ large needed to acquire a higher level of scientific knowl-
edge, Chen noted that only a select few would actually proceed to become 
scientists, devoting their minds to “great causes” and other things that “the 
masses need [not] appreciate.”39 Because the average person did not have time 
to study science, “we can select materials for them, edit them into scripts, 
capture them on camera, edit this into movies, present them everywhere and 
allow the masses amid their enjoyment to absorb into their lives beneficial 
experiences and knowledge.”40 So powerful was this new technology that it 
could facilitate the enlightenment of “this mass of ignorant people” who “do 
not yet even clearly know themselves.”41 Limited electrification was a stum-
bling block, but film itself could broaden popular appreciation of electric-
ity, as well as of machinery and how it is used.42 Although cinema could not 
“rectify the chaos of modern China” of its own accord, Chen made a strong 
case for the value of cinema in sufficiently altering popular consciousness to 
make wide- scale industrialization possible and to spur people to perform 
new kinds of labor without seeking to alter social relations in any unauthor-
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ized way. The revolution would gain a recognizable narrative — one that was 
appreciated as uniquely Chinese.
According to film scholar Laikwan Pang, both the Left and Right in China 
seized upon film as a political instrument at roughly the same time, in the 
early 1930s.43 Cinema had been introduced to China in 1896, just a year after 
its debut in Paris, and the first Chinese- made film appeared by 1905.44 Amid 
the emergence of a domestic studio and star system, it is estimated that “be-
tween 1896 and 1937, five thousand or more foreign films, most of which were 
from Hollywood, were shown in China. Eight American film companies . . . 
established distribution systems” there.45 When organized political parties 
turned their attention to capturing its powers in the early 1930s, the Right 
had the political upper hand. Chen Lifu’s cc Clique spearheaded efforts to 
rid the film industry of leftists, establishing censorship guidelines by the late 
1920s and, by 1935, a state organ whose role was explicitly to control film 
production.46 Meanwhile, Blue Shirt vigilantes compensated for the state’s 
limited capacities on this front, ransacking the Left- leaning Yihua Film stu-
dio in 1933.47 Indeed, fascists’ recourse to direct violence — such as assassi-
nating media figures who would not abide by state censorship guidelines — 
signaled not only how far they were willing to go to control the flow of infor-
mation but how far they were from doing so effectively. 
The 1937 occupation of eastern China by Japan, and the ultimatums Japa-
nese occupiers put to Anglo- American imperialists after the Pearl Harbor 
attack in December 1941, transformed the country’s media landscape once 
again. Throughout the preceding decade of Nationalist rule, the existence 
of spaces beyond nationalist jurisdiction undermined the party’s capacity to 
create a new national frame of reference. The Nationalist regime certainly 
had the will to foster and enforce particular ways of seeing, but it lacked the 
power. Even if the Nationalists had been able to inundate domestic media 
spheres with favorable magazines and films, they did not garner the cor-
responding state strength to eliminate unfavorable works from view or to 
control the discourse surrounding them, as was largely the case in Germany, 
Japan, and Italy. The Nazis’ notorious staging of exhibitions of degenerate 
versus healthy art in 1937 is a telling demonstration of such power. Much as 
the Nationalists attempted to do, these exhibitions drew clear lines between 
art deemed beneficial for the nation and that which was harmful. While the 
authorial and formal properties were consistent among the artworks in-
cluded in each respective show, ambiguous selection criteria nevertheless 
rendered paramount the context in which the exhibitions were staged.48 They 
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were mounted in an environment that the Nazis had otherwise saturated 
with reinforcing messages regarding what they approved and disapproved. 
Moreover, the context was one in which contending counterdiscourses had 
been effectively silenced and criminalized. However much fascists in China 
wanted to convince fellow nationals of the degeneracy of Shanghai’s jazz 
clubs and foreign movie theaters, they did not effectively control the dis-
course around them. They certainly made concerted efforts to do so, how-
ever, and readily compensated for state weakness by waging direct violence 
against alleged national enemies. 
Conclusion
Erica Carter summarized how “it is discursive production around the film 
text that ultimately determines its broader socio- cultural location: its class 
position, as articulated through debates on high versus mass culture, its re-
lation to audiences, its modes of spectatorship, its relevance to state politics, 
and/or to revolutionary movements for political change.”49 This observation 
helps us to see the importance of a given state’s ability to regulate the dis-
course around a set of objects and practices, to shape what each means and 
could possibly mean. It further helps us understand how a wartime Japanese 
aesthetic of quietude and perseverance —richly described in this volume by 
Julia Thomas in her analysis of photographs (chapter 7) and by Paul Barclay 
in his analysis of imperial monuments to Japan’s war dead (chapter 2) — can 
make sense alongside a dynamically energetic Riefenstahl film or a futurist 
sculpture as recognizable components of a global fascist visual culture. For-
mal properties mattered, but they perhaps mattered less than how they were 
operationalized. In all cases they were put in the service of virulent nation-
alisms pitted against overlapping sets of enemies, seeking similar reconfigu-
rations of state and society, and with shared conceptions of historical tem-
porality. They also made use of and referenced technologies of mechanical 
reproduction that imperialism and colonialism had rendered global by the 
early twentieth century, attempting to restrict what these technologies could 
mean and do. The key to its coherence, or to compensating for its incoher-
ence, was effective policing.  
When formulating plans for a new nationalist culture in China, neither 
the Blue Shirts nor the cc Clique viewed the revival of dynastic art forms as 
an end in itself. Reproductions of centuries- old creative works seldom ap-
peared in the pages of their magazines unless they served to highlight future 
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hopes. When they did appear, they were remediated in distinctly modern 
terms; for instance, photographs of dynastic art and engineering treasures in 
the pages of Cultural Construction suggested the Nationalists’ effective sutur-
ing of a glorious national past with a radiant new future across the morass 
of China’s chaotic present. Blue Shirt papers such as The Future and Sweat 
and Blood Weekly favored abstract graphics, photographs of modern sub-
jects like sports teams, and figurative drawings that were formally distinct 
from popular cartoon arts of dynasties past. Their literary sections were not 
filled with Tang dynasty (618 – 907 ce) poems or Ming dynasty (1368 – 1644 
ce) vernacular fiction; rather, they contained markedly new kinds of stories, 
plays, and screenplays. By laying claim to modern repertoires, China’s fas-
cists self- consciously positioned themselves as anticonservative and as more 
capable of delivering on promises of modern development than their Com-
munist enemies. By promising to abide by the nation’s ancient Confucian 
spirit, they would modernize China without alienating it from its cultural 
roots and in the process repossess what imperialists had stolen. Unlike the 
crassly commercial, degenerate purposes to which popular styles such as art 
deco were currently put, fascists attempted to delimit their meanings and as-
sociate them exclusively with nationalist revolution. 
From this perspective, the nlm attempted to make the population capable 
of perceiving the significance of national regeneration. Bombarding audi-
ences with propaganda, even in the most technologically advanced forms 
available (film or radio), hardly guaranteed that people would receive its mes-
sages in intended ways. The nlm therefore attempted to foster new ways of 
seeing and to eliminate “the right to look” in unsanctioned directions.50 The 
nebulous category “national spirit” served to domesticate technologies with 
clear imperialist origins, absorbing everything from movies to automobiles 
into a seamless project of national regeneration and distinguishing China’s 
revolution from projects of national rebirth taking place in Germany, Italy, 
Japan, and elsewhere at the same time. Still, the gmd’s aspiration to control 
representational practices and modes of reception on an all- China scale had 
fallen well short of being realized by the time the Japanese Imperial Army 
invaded eastern China in 1937 and forcibly relocated the gmd government. 
The state terrorized dissenters in an attempt to compensate for its weakness, 
but this terror remained insufficient to cogently shape and saturate a visual 
landscape. 
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FASCISM CARVED IN STONE 
Monuments to Loyal Spirits in Wartime Manchukuo
Paul D. Barclay
An Image of the Empire’s Last Gasp
According to the Japanese Ministry of Education’s last wartime geography 
textbook, by 1944 the empire had finally integrated the former colonies of 
Taiwan, Korea, and Karafuto into the naichi (home territory) while secur-
ing peace and prosperity throughout the rest of Asia. It attributed these ac-
complishments to Japan’s persevering citizenry, sagacious government, and 
martial prowess.1 The textbook’s intended youth audience may have found 
such grandiose claims persuasive, but for adult readers at war’s end, they 
must have rung hollow. From their inception in 1903 through the 1930s, the 
geographies espoused by the Ministry of Education extolled Japan’s imperial 
expansion and waxing global reach by increasing their numbers and types of 
illustrations of colonized spaces. By 1940, however, they had reversed course.2 
Marking the nadir of the downward spiral of officially sanctioned geography, 
the last wartime edition of Secondary Geography transmitted its confident 
assessments on flimsy paper, with blurry type and only a handful of shod-
dily reproduced graphics.3 Therefore, our imagined adult reader must have 
wondered how the purportedly world- beating Japanese state, which had un-
til recently projected images of imperial power and success with world- class 
graphic art, photography, and print media, could have been reduced to pub-
lishing such humble and homely textbooks.
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As if to justify the deprivation exposed by its material form, Secondary Ge-
ography explained that the Greater East Asia War (1941 – 45) was but the latest 
installment in a defensive struggle against Western expansion, an aggression 
against Asian peoples that dated back to the 1490s. Japan fought the gruel-
ing war against the United States, Britain, and China not only for national 
survival, but for the sake of Asia — home to 1.2 billion people, over half of hu-
manity. And it was Manchuria that formed the lynchpin of this “Asia” in the 
Japanese imaginary. Secondary Geography regarded Manchuria’s 1932 “inde-
pendence” as a milestone in rolling back Western domination. It also identi-
fied Manchuria as the bulwark protecting Korea from the Soviet menace. As 
a source of raw materials and an arena for emigration, the authors declared 
that Manchuria was, “in actuality, Japan’s continental life- line.”4 
The trope of Manchuria- as- lifeline would have been familiar to our imag-
ined adult reader at war’s end, but the image selected to illustrate the Man-
churia section of Secondary Geography represented yet another departure. 
Whereas geographies of the more hopeful 1920s and 1930s introduced Japanese 
youth to Manchuria with pictures of bustling ports, planned cities, and diligent 
laborers — scenes that would have resonated with metropolitan audiences in 
any of the world’s empire- states — our swansong textbook adorned the “jewel 
in Japan’s imperial crown” with a single etching: a calligraphed masonry tower 
situated on an empty field silhouetted by darkened clouds. The forlorn struc-
ture was simply captioned “Shinkyō’s Loyal- Spirit Tower” (figure 2.1). 
In contrast to its illustrations of freight trains hauling Taiwanese sugar, 
tree- felling pioneers reclaiming Hokkaidō, and white- clad Koreans mill-
ing about near thatched- roof dwellings, Secondary Geography’s “loyal- spirit 
tower” graphic resisted absorption into the progressive, civilizing- mission 
discourse typical of Japan’s earlier experiments in multilateral imperialism. 
In this essay, I explain how this dark tower was able to convey, if not distill, 
a temporally distinct fascist ethos to youth readers in 1940s Japan. My argu-
ment here is that fascism in Japan created for itself a deep lineage of sacrifice 
by erecting towers to the dead, though many of these dead soldiers had lost 
their lives a quarter of a century before the rise of Japanese fascism. Crucially, 
there was nothing uniform about the aesthetics of the towers that became 
known as chūreitō (loyal- spirit towers). Instead, what homogenized them in 
the service of Japan’s militarily aggressive state in the 1930s and early ’40s 
were the etchings, magazine illustrations, tourist brochures, and postcard 
renderings that made them look all of a piece when the Japanese state sought 
to impress loyalty upon its subjects. 
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Birth and Transmigration of Loyal- Spirit Towers
By 1945, some 140 “loyal- spirit towers” (chūreitō) had been built in Japan 
proper, another 10 in Manchuria, 3 in China, and 1 in Singapore.5 A chūreitō 
was an ossuary for the cremated remains of those who died during war. These 
mausoleums were attached to towers of various shapes and sizes and fronted 
by expansive plazas with Shintō gates. The chūreitō hosted a gamut of rituals, 
from paying respects to family to exalting the imperial mission en masse on 
national holidays. Imperial Japan’s putative lifeline Manchuria was home to 
the first and largest of these loyal- spirit towers. The Shinkyō tower achieved 
particular prominence as the maiden chūreitō (figure 2.1). In addition to re-
ceiving tens of thousands of visitors during its brief life span, the Shinkyō 
tower attained iconic status through graphic reproductions in myriad for-
mats throughout Japan’s wartime mediascape. 
At thirty- five meters high, Shinkyō’s chūreitō towered over Manchukuo’s 
new capital. On November 21, 1934, the behemoth was christened as part of a 
2.1 “Shinkyō’s Loyal Spirit Tower.” From Monbushō [Ministry of Education], ed., 
Secondary School Geography 3 [Chūtō chiri san] (Tokyo: Chūtō gakkō kyōkasho  
kabushiki kaisha, 1945), 15. Courtesy of the Hiroshima University Library Digital  
Textbook Collection Database. 
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ceremony to inter the ashes and pray for the repose of General Mutō Nobuyo-
shi and over 2,800 “brave soldiers” who died to establish the puppet state. The 
war to occupy Manchuria started September 18, 1931. The initial invasion was 
something of an easy task for Japanese armed forces. Indeed, the new state of 
Manchukuo was announced within months of the first troop deployments, 
on March 1, 1932. The founding of the state touched off a fresh set of uprisings, 
however. Japanese forces annexed Rehe to Manchukuo and expanded army 
zones of occupation south of the Great Wall to buffer the new state, thereby 
fomenting further Chinese resistance.6 To house the resultant stream of war 
dead, the state launched the chūreitō movement in 1934.
Chinese resistance did not end with the 1934 interment of Mutō in Shinkyō, 
however. Consequently, three more Manchurian towers were built in Harbin 
(1935 – 36), Qiqihar (1935 – 36), and Chengde (1938). Meanwhile, on July 7, 1937, 
a larger war broke out in the suburbs of Beijing. Now fighting a fully mobi-
lized Chinese central government, Japan deployed over 850,000 troops to 
the continent. At this critical juncture, Japanese army leaders extended the 
Manchurian chūreitō program to the home islands. While only 140 of 1,500 
monuments planned for the home islands were completed between 1939 and 
1942, the energetic chūreitō publicity campaigns, subscription drives, and 
design competitions instilled visions of collective sacrifice, ennobled death 
in battle, and mobilized the populace for yet more war.7
To provide the 1939 chūreitō campaign in Japan with a compelling back-
story, publicists repositioned Manchuria’s inaugural 1934 Shinkyō chūreitō 
as a successor to a group of five monument complexes built decades earlier 
to house the remains of those who died in the Russo- Japanese War (1904 – 5). 
This chronological sleight of hand elevated a land grab in northeast China, 
which was initiated by a coterie of disaffected army officers, to the status of a 
three- decade national crusade for the defense of Asia. 
Fascist Imperialism
As fascist- era phenomena, it is fitting that the centrally organized chūreitō 
movement was launched in Manchuria. Japan did not have a Mussolini or 
Hitler, so no defining “moment” can attach the emergence of fascism in Ja-
pan to a particular event or villain.8 Broad consensus exists, however, that 
between 1928 and 1932, a historical conjuncture of global, regional, and do-
mestic forces stopped cold Japan’s experiment during the Taishō Democ-
racy (1912 – 26).9 The most infamous plots and assassinations presaging the 
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1931 invasion of Manchuria were hatched on the Chinese mainland. The so- 
called Manchurian Incident in turn fueled among the masses a patriotism 
that abetted a politics of intimidation in Tokyo, spawning a series of national 
unity cabinets headed by military figures.10 In other words, Japan’s fascist 
movements did not radiate outward and downward from an apex in Tokyo, 
but rather gathered steam across a wide geographic expanse. As the chūreitō 
movement in Manchukuo crested in 1936 with the completion of the Har-
bin and Qiqihar towers, for example, over 1,400 renegade soldiers launched 
a bloody coup attempt in Tokyo (see Thomas, chapter 7, in this volume) to 
usher in a decade of unchecked government- by- decree, political repression, 
and military adventurism. 
Whether the movements to eradicate the sprouts of Japanese liberalism 
were sufficiently based on the masses to satisfy Eurocentric definitions of 
fascism, Japan’s hard right turn exhibited several of fascism’s defining ele-
ments.11 Specifically, the Japanese case featured an antileftist political take-
over by right- wing nationalists in the context of liberal capitalism’s crisis of 
representation in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Fascists, as Geoffrey Eley re-
minds us, implement political agendas with cudgels, guns, and threats rather 
than through argument, persuasion, and electioneering.12 It would be diffi-
cult to come up with a better characterization of the violent political envi-
ronment that ruled Tokyo from the early 1930s through the end of the war. 
As Louise Young has convincingly argued, the species of fascism that 
overtook Japan in the 1930s is impossible to disentangle from Japan’s impe-
rial projects, especially those on the continent. Rather than separating “war-
time abroad” and “oppression at home” as analytically distinct phenomena, 
Young foregrounds the interplay between events and figures in Manchuria 
and the home islands. In formulating the concept “fascist imperialism” she 
identifies “the embrace of Asianism as the loadstar for regional autarky and 
the New Order in Asia, the mobilization for total war and glorification of the 
military, and the creation of an empire- wide anti- communist police state, as 
well as the fetishization of state power and magical thinking about state om-
nipotence” as its main pillars.13 
Janis Mimura’s study of “techno- fascism” in the 1930s also makes a case 
for the continental origins of Japanese fascism, with an emphasis on its mod-
ernist inflection. Charting the careers of Manchuria- based Japanese tech-
nocrats from the 1920s through the postwar era, Mimura demonstrates that 
employment opportunities and social spaces provided by the South Manchu-
rian Railway Company, the Kwantung Provincial Authority, and the imperial 
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army attracted a variety of misfits, climbers, and frustrated young officers. 
These techno- fascists were united by an aversion to capitalism, individual-
ism, and liberal politics. For them, war abroad was the key to Japan’s spiritual, 
political, and economic renewal at home. Manchuria was remote enough 
from the entrenched institutions, ideologies, and networks in Tokyo to serve 
as a fascist sandbox. After Shinkyō was established as the new capital of Man-
chukuo in 1934, Mimura argues, the techno- fascist bloc exploited the puppet 
state’s protean administrative structure to make Manchukuo into a proving 
ground for their version of a “high- performance, ‘advanced national defense 
state.’ ” In the late 1930s, techno- fascism was exported from Manchukuo to 
the home islands when Japan’s best and brightest took up posts in Tokyo.14 
Echoing Mimura’s work, architectural historians also emphasize Man-
churia as a futuristic seedbed, rather than derivative afterthought, for fascist 
movements. Shinkyō in particular — its city plan, its transportation grid, and 
its buildings — exhibited an avant- garde “high modernist” sensibility. Japa-
nese architects reinforced a hodge- podge of pan- Asianist ideologies such as 
“harmony among the five races” or the “kingly way” by capping Shinkyō’s 
colossal public and military structures with neo- Oriental parapets and roofs. 
In 1933, in conjunction with Japan’s departure from the League of Nations, 
Shinkyō’s imperial architects abandoned the practice of building Western- 
style public buildings in colonial capitals in order to demonstrate Japan’s mo-
dernity. In a new capital bankrolled with unprecedented state funding for 
architectural experimentation, a conscious effort to integrate Japanese, Chi-
nese, Mongol, and Manchu motifs into modernist ferroconcrete structures 
signaled the end of Japan’s multilateral imperialism.15 This pan- Asianist aes-
thetic is evident in the Shinkyō (figures 2.1 and 2.5), Liaoyang, and Chengde 
chūreitō.
Nine Foundation Stones for the Advance of Japan’s Empire
In 1939, the Baiyushan tower in Port Arthur (Lüshun) displaced the Shinkyō 
tower as grand progenitor of the chūreitō, at least in the propaganda used to 
launch the home- island movement. Builders broke ground on the sixty- five- 
meter- tall lighthouse- shaped monument in 1907 and completed it in Novem-
ber 1909. By the 1920s it drew 100,000 visitors annually to commemorate Ja-
pan’s great victory over Russia in 1905 (figure 2.2). 
Within walking distance of the Baiyushan tower was a mausoleum 
(nōkotsushi), one of five ossuaries built to inter the remains of over seventy 
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thousand Japanese soldiers scattered across Liaodong’s southern peninsula. 
Completed in 1907, the Lüshun mausoleum was opened to the Japanese pub-
lic as a site of mourning. The majority of its enshrined souls perished in the 
devastating (and failed) frontal assaults on Lüshun under the direction of 
Nogi Maresuke. Nogi’s debacle produced some sixty thousand casualties, fif-
teen thousand of which were fatal.16 Between 1905 and 1910, four additional 
mausoleums were built to enshrine Russo- Japanese War dead in Liaoyang, 
Andong (Dandong), Dalian, and Mukden (Shenyang). The Mukden mauso-
leum was moved and upgraded in 1925 to better protect remains from flood 
damage. In its remodeled iteration, which combined a ferroconcrete tower, 
an ossuary, Shintō gates, and a plaza on a single site, the Mukden complex 
prefigured the four giant Manchukuo chūreitō of the 1930s. 
2.2 Baiyushan, or 
“Lüshun’s Manifesting 
Loyalty Tower,” Lüshun, 
China, 2016. Photograph 
by Ning Jing. Courtesy of 
the photographer.
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The numerous Russo- Japanese War monuments that dotted Japan’s 
imperial landscape from 1904 onward had evolved from earlier lithic ex-
pressions of war remembrance known as chūkonhi (loyal- spirit markers), 
hyōchūtō (manifesting loyalty towers), and shōkonsha (summoning spirits 
shrines). Modern state- sponsored war death ceremonies trace their origins 
to rites carried out in the Chōshū domain in the 1850s. These underwent sev-
eral permutations in modern Japan, beginning with rites connected to the 
Boshin War (1868 – 69). In the main, Japanese erected monuments for family 
bereavement, to celebrate battlefield achievements, and to tame the spirits 
of unsettled ghosts. During the Sino- Japanese War (1894 –95), public, state- 
sponsored funerals were still optional, though they had become mandatory 
by the Russo- Japanese War (1904 – 5). However, the memorial landscape after 
the Russo- Japanese War remained heterogeneous and even contested. Be-
tween the conclusion of the Russo- Japanese War in 1905 and the construction 
of the Manchurian chūreitō in the 1930s, related movements in education, 
veterans’ activism, and state Shintō intervened to broadly and deeply natu-
ralize, even in rural Japan, the concepts of dying for nation and emperor, the 
notion of fallen soldiers as “military gods,” and the acceptance of the state’s 
right to preeminence in memorializing death.17 
As the culmination of these trends, the Manchurian chūreitō built after 
1934 were products of central planning for the purpose of war mobilization. 
They combined the normally separate functions of commemorating battles, 
mortuary services, and venerating the nation within single, publicly acces-
sible installations. In addition, these chūreitō, unlike Russo- Japanese War 
monuments, were built during an ongoing conflict with the expectation that 
newly dead soldiers would be interred. Nonetheless, despite the radical dis-
continuities introduced by the chūreitō, the appearance of seamless continu-
ity with the older forms was important to the fascist- era argument for open- 
ended war fought for increasingly abstract (and unattainable) goals. 
The stock phrase “Mongolian- Manchurian life- line” dominated Japanese 
popular discourse in the 1930s, after Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880 – 1946), a parlia-
mentarian, diplomat, and South Manchurian Railway executive, adopted it at 
a January session of the Fifty- Ninth Congress of 1931. This sobriquet implied 
not only that control over Manchuria was necessary for Japan’s preserva-
tion, but also that Japan’s war to secure it began in 1904. Matsuoka’s dictum 
was an important ideological watershed with world- shaking implications. 
The notion that the Russo- Japanese War (1904 – 5) had been fought to de-
fend Manchuria was a minority position at the time of the war itself. In fact, 
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many of Japan’s top politicians were willing to barter to Russia a sphere of 
influence in Manchuria in return for privileged access to Korea in the early 
1900s.18 Nevertheless, student tours to Manchukuo in the late 1930s and early 
1940s disseminated Matsuoka’s version of Japanese history. The tours, which 
included stops in Lüshun, Shinkyō, and Harbin, were organized around the 
fiction that the northern chūreitō near the post- 1931 battlefields were histori-
cal descendants of the war ruins from 1904 and 1905.19 Accordingly, after 1938, 
propaganda adopted a number of graphic devices to link sacrifices on the 
“plains of Manchuria” in 1905 to the war in China in the 1930s. 
The most richly elaborated example, a 1939 series of newspaper articles 
titled “Immortality on the Manchurian Plain: Nine Foundation Stones for 
the Advance of Our Empire,” sutured the two wars together by means of a 
fact- filled chart. Its x-axis (place) listed nine putatively commensurate 
chūreitō in order of completion. The y-axis (time) divided the purported 
thirty- five- year war into five temporal categories: the Russo- Japanese War 
(1904 – 5), the Zhengjiatun Incident (1916), the Siberian Expedition (1918 – 19), 
the Kuanchengzi Incident (1919), and finally, “everything since the Manchu-
rian Incident” (1931 – 39). According to the table’s structuring logic, the cost 
thus paid in Japanese blood spilled on the plains of Manchuria, for the greater 
good of Asia, had equaled 92,763 souls by May 31, 1939. 
It must be emphasized that roughly 83,000 of the 92,783 deaths recorded 
in this table were connected to the Russo- Japanese War (1904 – 5). The re-
mainder, about 10,000 (with minor exceptions), occurred after 1932. The li-
on’s share of fatalities, therefore, were distantly related, if at all, to Japan’s on-
going war in Northeast China ca. 1939. Moreover, the incidents that bridged 
the chasm between the September 1905 Portsmouth Treaty that ended the 
Russo- Japanese War and the September 1931 Mukden Incident that set the 
stage for the Second Sino- Japanese War in 1937 were local dustups or his-
torical dead- ends. The Zhengjiatun (1916) and Kuanchengzi (1919) Incidents 
contributed a paltry 32 Japanese fatalities combined, whereas the concurrent 
Siberian Expedition furnished 118 dead to the grand total. The false equiva-
lencies concealed by this creative accounting in effect elevated minor Taishō- 
era scrapes to the level of modern Japan’s two largest wars, thereby extending 
the origins of the 1930s China quagmire back to the early twentieth century.
The fascist- era tourism industry reinforced the long- war discourse by fea-
turing the architecturally heterogeneous nine foundation stones in dedicated 
postcard sets. As playing cards in a deck, the photographed towers — built at 
different times over a thirty- year span for different purposes and in a variety 
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of architectural styles — were standardized with uniform lithography, light-
ing, and fonts. While the jackets for these postcard sets label the aforemen-
tioned nine foundation stones as chūreitō, the individual Lüshun and An-
dong postcards within the pack are captioned as hyōchūtō.20 Neither of these 
two outliers had been remodeled since the 1900s. These souvenir postcard 
sets thus followed the lead of the home- island chūreitō campaign of 1939 by 
appending the Andong and Lüshun hyōchūtō to the list of chūreitō towers, 
probably to better reflect the geography of battlefield tourism around 1940. 
On the cartographic front, wartime educational materials represented ten 
chūreitō as outposts in a network of functionally equivalent commemorative 
structures, suggesting their affinity if not their fungibility.21 
Loyal- Spirit Towers in Japanese Mass Culture
According to Jonathan M. Reynolds, today’s Japanese parliament (the Diet) 
debuted in 1936 despite decades of debate, planning, and budgeting; it re-
ceived tepid reviews as an unremarkable example of the internationally cir-
culated “stripped classicist” style of its time. Resembling its counterparts in 
liberal, communist, and fascist world capitals, the Diet’s heavy rectilinear 
concrete elements sought “to assure . . . citizens of [the state’s] strength and 
durability . . . [with] a building style which was both modern and somehow 
old” during the global crisis of the 1930s. As Reynolds emphasizes, the 1936 
Diet building was also photogenic.22 This important feature made otherwise 
immoveable and stolid structures portable and open to redefinition, liberat-
ing them from interpretations constrained by environment, function, or even 
the architect’s original intentions. 
Indeed, the chūreitō towers had much in common with Japan’s parliament 
building — a mix of old and new and the aura of permanence. Perhaps most 
signally, however, Manchurian chūreitō were especially fecund sites for pro-
ducing visual propaganda.23 Two of them, located in Dalian and Shenyang, 
shared the Diet building’s aversion to curvilinear and decorative elements. 
In contrast, the Liaoyang, Shinkyō, and Chengde towers accentuated neo- 
Orientalist motifs, exhibiting continuity with the nativist teikan yōshiki (em-
peror’s crown style) movement in 1920s Japan. Two other towers, in Harbin 
and Qiqihar, took yet another tack: as smooth- faced obelisks, these spires 
resembled the Wellington Monument in Dublin or the Washington Monu-
ment in the United States (figure 2.3).
The fact that such patently nationalistic, death- glorifying, and statist 
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monuments exhibited the full range of contestants from Japan’s architec-
tural modernity contests of the early Shōwa period (1926 – 35) suggests that 
we should qualify the entrenched view of Shinkyō’s neo- Orientalist designs 
as “fascist architecture.” David Buck has usefully highlighted the distinction 
between commercial and state architecture in Shinkyō after 1933, noting that 
with the former, grand structures could still include art deco designs and 
other non- Oriental styles into the mid- 1930s.24 Nonetheless, the Harbin and 
Qiqihar chūreitō, both completed in late 1936, were forthrightly noncom-
mercial, pan- Asianist in function, and yet clearly Western in form. The syn-
ergistic relationship between Manchuria’s chūreitō and Japan’s fascist turn, 
in other words, cannot be divined through a visual inspection of the towers’ 
formal properties, but only from their uses in particular times and places. 
Drawings, photographs, paintings, and etchings of the Shinkyō chūreitō, 
in addition to the aforementioned geography textbook, graced notebook cov-
ers, tourist maps, coffee- table books, South Manchuria Railway magazine 
advertisements, and picture postcards.25 Considering the enormous circu-
lation figures for Japanese dailies and propaganda magazines at the time, 
photographs and drawings of chūreitō were, from the central government’s 
viewpoint, likely as efficacious as the physical sites themselves.26 
On the eve of the full- scale land war in China in the summer of 1937, 
the national daily Tokyo Asahi Shinbun printed a photograph of the recently 
completed thirty- seven- meter- tall chūreitō in Qiqihar. The paper’s editors 
framed the image with a typical description of Manchuria’s remoteness, for-
bidding climate, and crimson sunsets.27 Invoking the Soviet Union as an exis-
tential threat, the article referred to Japanese troops in the northern sector as 
a “first line of defense.” In return for care packages from a Tokyo Elementary 
School, Japan’s stalwart defenders of Qiqihar mailed the children a thank- you 
card with six hundred photographs of the tomb of fallen heroes in this deso-
late, frigid land (figure 2.3).28 
The Cabinet Information Bureau’s photographic monthly Shashin shuhō 
also featured chūreitō photographs, whereas its South Manchurian Railway 
advertisements touted them as main attractions for tourism.29 A typical one 
read, “To Manchuria, where the heroic deceased are at rest; in an autumn of 
full- throttle national mobilization, we pay respects on the ground of our ex-
alted ancestors’ spilled blood.”30 In addition, the Shinkyō monument alone 
spurred at least twenty different picture- postcard designs between 1934 and 
1945.31 
Foot traffic was also central to the propagation of the chūreitō gospel of 
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collective sacrifice. The Shinkyō chūreitō commanded a prime location, 
thereby facilitating pilgrimage to the tower from the home islands. The ad-
joining parade grounds accommodated crowds of up to twenty thousand 
people.32 Just after alighting near Shinkyō station, visitors stopped at the 
tower for an “interesting explanation by a female guide,” as one pamphlet 
put it.33 A 1940 bus tour ad suggests the flavor of their scripts. It paid homage 
to the hero of Manchukuo’s founding, Kwantung Army Commander Mutō 
Nobuyoshi. Mutō signed the Japan- Manchukuo accord with Emperor Puyi 
as Japan’s plenipotentiary, commanded operations to annex Rehe in 1933, and 
died of jaundice while at his post on July 27 of the same year. Mutō’s was the 
first soul to be interred at the Shinkyō monument. His successor Hishikari 
Takashi, who lent his calligraphy to the tower, is also mentioned, along with 
the 1,318 who died since the “Manchurian Incident.” The ad also reminded 
tourists of the chūreito’s price tag: 250,000 yen.34 
A fictionalized set of letters from a school- age Japanese settler to his 
parents back in Japan captured the Shinkyō monument’s intended effects 
on a more intimate level. Published in 1944, it was marketed as a “tour” of 
Manchukuo for a youth audience. After visiting Kodama Park (named af-
2.3 “The War Monument Near Completion,” Qiqihar, China. Picture postcard, ca. 1937. 
Image courtesy of the Harvard- Yenching Library, Harvard University. 
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ter a Russo- Japanese War hero), the protagonist approaches the resplendent 
Shinkyō chūreitō. He comments on its “real Manchurian flavor” and its re-
semblance to the Qing imperial tombs in Mukden. General Mutō is invoked 
as the first soldier interred, along with the brave men who fought to secure 
Manchuria in the battles of Nanling and Kuanchengzi. Seeing its height and 
its shiny gold roof tiles, and sensing the weight of history, the student feels 
small. As he takes in the scene, his Manchurian homestay father reminds 
him that Japanese grave markers can be found in cities, the countryside, and 
at every small rail station in Manchukuo — reminders of the high price in 
blood and buried corpses that Japan paid to build such a marvelous country.35 
Japan’s tourist infrastructure, increasingly tilted toward conveying the 
message of sacrifice, funneled by bus some 38,741 tourists to Shinkyō in 
1939 alone. By then, the annual numbers of Japanese visitors to Mukden 
(Shenyang) and Harbin had reached over a million per year, respectively.36 
The former boasted the most “populous” chūreitō: it housed over 35,000 spir-
its from the Russo- Japanese War. The latter was Japan’s tallest, reaching a 
height of sixty- seven meters.37 Manchuria was also a popular destination for 
school trips in Japan in the late 1930s. In 1938 alone, “213 of these groups, with 
a total of 14,024 students,” took advantage of the 50 percent educational dis-
count to visit Manchukuo. The surviving schedule of the Osaka University of 
Foreign Languages tour indicates that the stay in Shinkyō, whose route was 
anchored by the chūreitō and other war monuments, was the longest segment 
of the itinerary.38 
“Sunk Costs” and the War without End
The 1931 Manchurian Incident was ostensibly launched in order to pro-
tect resident Japanese from the “Chinese bandits” who blew up a section of 
the South Manchurian Railway. In reality, Kwantung Army officers set the 
charges themselves. Although Japanese forces were greatly outnumbered in 
Mukden, they attacked an army that was poorly equipped and under orders 
to retreat instead of fight back.39 It was a stretch, therefore, to claim that the 
gunning down of Zhang Xueliang’s troops in the Beidaying barracks was he-
roic. Nonetheless, the anniversary of the September 18 attack was commemo-
rated in festivals, holidays, and rituals attended by hundreds of thousands of 
Japanese residents of Manchukuo.40 
Within two years of the Mukden takeover, Japanese delegates to the League 
of Nations cemented a link between the rout of Beidaying barracks and sei-
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zure of Mukden on September 18, 1931, and the 1904 –5 Russo- Japanese War. 
The delegation’s stout defense of Mukden’s occupation articulated to an in-
ternational audience the “sunk cost” argument for open- ended warfare in 
China:
Japanese interests in Manchuria differ both in character and degree from 
those of any other foreign country. Deep in the mind of every Japanese 
is the memory of their country’s great struggle with Russia in 1904 – 05, 
fought on the plains of Manchuria, at Mukden and Liaoyang . . . and in 
the Liaodong Peninsula. To the Japanese, the war with Russia will ever be 
remembered as a life- and- death struggle fought in self- defense against 
the menace of Russian encroachments. The fact that a hundred thousand 
Japanese soldiers died in this war, and that two billion gold yen were ex-
pended, has created in Japanese minds a determination that these sacri-
fices shall not have been made in vain.41
It is doubtful, however, that sacrifices made during the Russo- Japanese War 
were “deep in the minds” of most Japanese in 1933. Famine in the northeast 
and the recent assassinations of two prime ministers were certainly as press-
ing for this nation of newshounds — and all the more reason for Kwantung 
Army authorities to begin constructing the mammoth Shinkyō tower in 1934. 
The figure of “100,000 dead” in the Russo- Japanese War became a talisman 
for Japanese pan- Asianists until the end of the war, even though it consider-
ably overshot the known total, even when that number was padded with un-
related deaths from the 1930s.
After all- out war with China commenced in July 1937, Japan lost over 
twenty thousand soldiers (but killed many more) during the subsequent bat-
tle for Shanghai. After committing a massacre of epic proportions in Nanjing 
in December, the Japanese government presented conditions for cease- fire 
to the Chinese Nationalists.42 These conditions included China’s formal rec-
ognition of Manchukuo as an independent nation (though in reality it was a 
Japanese puppet state) and a halt to anti- Manchukuo activities. Predictably, 
Chiang Kai- shek’s nationalist government rebuffed these demands. He could 
not surrender territory that had been under Chinese rule for three centuries. 
In response, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimarō issued his “non- recognition” 
declaration of January 16, 1938. The declaration is known in Japanese as “Ko-
kumin seifu o aite to sezu,” or “the Nationalist Government is no longer [re-
garded as] an aite.” To deny a person or party the status of aite is to “refuse 
to deal with, have nothing to do with, ignore, or spurn,” which is to say that 
 58 Paul D. Barclay
Konoe disqualified the ruling Nationalist Party (Guomindang) as China’s le-
gitimate government. The parties in this land war in the heart of the world’s 
largest nation were thus no longer amenable to negotiated settlement.43 
The aite to sezu posture vis- à- vis China’s government in the late 1930s dif-
fered from official and popular views of Russia during the earlier war. John 
Dower’s pioneering study of woodblock prints shows that Japanese artists por-
trayed Russians as people capable of heroism, self- sacrifice, and suffering — 
 in sharp contrast to their dehumanizing portraits of Qing subjects in art of 
the Sino- Japanese War (1894 – 95).44 After the Russo- Japanese War, in June 
1908, the Japanese government dedicated a large mausoleum in Lüshun to the 
Russian dead. Historian Aaron Cohen described the scene: “Officials from 
both countries celebrated together in an atmosphere of mutual respect and 
admiration. General Gerngros led a ‘hurrah’ from Russian troops in honor 
of the Japanese emperor and his ‘excellent’ army, while General Nogi and 
Japanese soldiers cried ‘banzai.’ ”45 Moreover, the meeting place where Gen-
eral Stöessler surrendered Port Arthur to General Nogi, called the “Suishiei 
Negotiation Site,” was commemorated with a stone monument, preserved 
historical site, and group portrait, and it was a regular stop on the 1920s “Lüs-
hun Battle Ruins” sightseeing course.46 Russia was a threat, an adversary, and 
even a bullying power, but its military commanders and negotiators were re-
garded, diplomatically and mnemonically, as aite, which means “companion, 
partner, opponent, rival, or interlocutor.”
More importantly, the parity- denying implications of the aite to sezu for-
mulation vis- à- vis China found an analogue in the Japanese citizenry’s sub-
ordination to the throne. The chū in chūreitō, after all, stands for “loyalty” to 
Japan’s royal house and imperial bloodline.47 As Julia Thomas underscores 
in chapter 7, by the late 1930s, any theory of Japan’s political identity that 
deviated from an organicist conception of the Japanese body politic, cen-
tered on the emperor, was considered heterodox and punishable. Thus, as 
crowds of mourners, tourists, celebrants, and functionaries assembled be-
fore the chūreitō, they were diminished before the apotheosized defenders 
of the family- state — both named heroes such as Mutō and Hishikari, and 
thousands of anonymous fallen soldiers. If such postures felt forced, wrong- 
headed, or even silly, doubters could do little to push back effectively.
To put it in another way, if chūreitō discourse had merely abetted the dehu-
manization of the enemy or the packaging of belligerence as holy war, it could 
hardly be labeled “fascist.” These tactics were operative before the fascist era 
and have been staples of war mobilization in capitalist, communist, and an-
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ticolonial states up to the time of this writing. The chūreitō and the tropes it 
concretized were agents of fascist culture because they advanced a discourse 
that blunted, if not eradicated, opportunities to launch coordinated opposi-
tion. In imperial fascist regimes — be they Italian, German, or Japanese — 
civil society collapses along numerous fronts. Their subjects thus destroy, 
while being robbed of, the means to stop genocidal and self- destructive wars 
from within. 
The Taishō era (1912 – 26) began with a constitutional crisis sparked by 
public opposition to the military’s overreach into civilian politics. The period 
also witnessed successful rollbacks of military budgets and a greatly enlarged 
civil society and electorate. The extent to which the Taishō era can be consid-
ered “liberal” has been hotly debated because of repressive measures such as 
the Peace Preservation Law of 1925.48 Nonetheless, in 1921, the famous avatar of 
Taishō Democracy, Yoshino Sakuzō, publicly took exception to “a system . . . 
which allows anyone to become a god as long as he dies at war, whether he 
was a libertine or good- for- noting while alive.”49 The following year, a wire 
service post with a December 9, 1922, Tokyo dateline reported that “the popu-
lar swing in Japan against militarism is going to the extreme, so much so that 
the army is put on the defensive . . . . Objections are being voiced to some of 
the more prominent and famous monuments commemorating Japanese vic-
tories on land and sea. . . . One famous monument in Tokyo, erected to honor 
a hero of the Russo- Japanese War, is soon to be removed to make way for a 
street car track.”50 It is hard to imagine such public expressions of skepticism 
in the mid- 1930s, a period characterized by stifling political oppression and a 
public culture of soldier reverence that shaded into uncritical hero worship. 
Technowar, Didacticism, and Censorship
As the bodies from the China quagmire piled up, the literature and para-
phernalia promoting chūreitō began to quote precise Japanese casualty to-
tals. Initially, death counts were given in whole numbers. A 1934 newspaper 
announcing the dedication of the Shinkyō chūreitō provided a figure of “a 
little over 2800 brave warriors” interred.51 Kenneth Ruoff quotes a figure of 
2,900 for the same monument in his important study of fascist- era imperial 
culture.52 These figures do not jibe with subsequent numbers, such as the 
1,318 mentioned in the 1940 bus tour ad cited above. More importantly, a new 
form of numerical reporting was ascending — one that evidenced an obses-
sion with body counts as a measure of the state’s investment in securing peace 
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in Asia. Eerily prescient of the U.S. body count mentality in Vietnam in the 
1960s, the Japanese thirst for clarity on this front belied the absence of other 
measurable criteria for progress in the war.53 
The press release for a mass- interment ceremony on the fifth anniversary 
of the Mukden Incident, held on September 18, 1936, claimed that 1,569 sol-
diers who had been killed in action were being memorialized at the Shinkyō, 
Harbin, Mukden, and Qiqihar chūreitō. General Hishikari Takashi’s August 
1939 newspaper op- ed, published to whip up support for transplanting the 
Manchurian chūreitō system to the home islands, put the Shinkyō monu-
ment’s body count at 1,173 souls. A 1939 newspaper report on the Harbin mon-
ument announced that “we have newly welcomed those brave warriors who 
sacrificed for the foundation of Manchukuo: 522 souls in 1937; 726 souls in 
1938; and at the spring ceremony in 1939, we newly welcomed 496 souls from 
Lieutenants downward for a total 3,523 souls altogether.” Each of these ex-
amples supplies a precise date to end the accounting period for each statis-
tic.54 The temporality undergirding these reports was purely actuarial, de-
void of reference to strategic or tactical gains during the war. The debt paid 
in Japanese sweat and blood to secure the peace of Asia was thereby visibly 
compounded, presumably to accrue interest for the foreseeable future. By 
one reckoning, the number of deaths since the outbreak of the Manchurian 
Incident reached 24,141 by its eighth anniversary on September 18, 1939.55 Ac-
cording to another count dated May 31, 1939, some 9,724 of those killed since 
September 18, 1931, were enshrined in nine Manchurian chūreitō.56 
Mukden gave its name to both the largest battle of the Russo- Japanese 
War (commemorated as a March 10, 1905, event) and the opening battle of 
the Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931. It was therefore a pivotal site 
for the chūreitō movement. Because the revamped tower at Mukden, com-
plete with a large parade ground and Shintō gate, had been in place since 
1925, it could host throngs of Japanese residents and soldiers for a ceremony 
on October 23, 1931, less than two months after the invasion.57 This date was 
the national day for summoning the spirits at Yasukuni Shrine and into the 
1940s would remain one of two main annual chūreitō ceremonies in Mukden. 
Millions of imperial subjects across the empire participated, experiencing not 
only the synchronicity inherent in a militarized ritual calendar, but also near 
real- time coordination of bodily movements and auditory sensations via ra-
dio broadcasts, which had greatly expanded the reach of chūreitō ceremonies 
in the home islands and in Manchukuo in the 1930s.
The other annual ceremony at the Mukden chūreitō commemorated the 
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last major land battle of the Russo- Japanese War, which became national 
Army Day (March 10). A series of snapshots from a 1935 celebration, taken by 
U.S. Vice Consul Gerald Warner, documents a carnivalesque Army Day cel-
ebration replete with cross- dressing, exuberant patriotism, and anti- Russian 
caricatures on floats.58 Although the proceedings occurred in the shadow of 
the Mukden chūreitō, celebrants’ behavior can easily be imagined as going 
off script, not unlike the urban crowds described in Andrew Gordon’s study 
of working- class culture during the same period.59 Accordingly, publishers 
and censors labored to remind Japanese subjects that chūreitō visits were oc-
casions for revering soldiers and committing spiritually to the ongoing war 
against China.
One striking example came in the form of a picture postcard (figure 2.4). 
In counterpoint to the scenes of carnival recorded by Consul Warner’s cam-
era, it reminds viewers that the Mukden chūreitō stood in remembrance of 
Chinese treachery, national peril, and collective sacrifice. The postcard im-
age mashed up a photograph of billowing smoke and destroyed rail track on 
the South Manchurian Railroad at Liutiaogou with a drawing of the Mukden 
chūreitō. It explained that the railway explosion that occurred suddenly at 
Liutiaogou outside of the walled city of Mukden on the evening of 18 Septem-
ber 1931, in due course, became a big event in world history. The Manchurian 
Incident broke out, and in the blink of an eye, clamors of “let’s guard our life-
line to the death” reached high and low and spread like the wind. 
Going forth to conquer in faraway lands, our imperial army’s might is kin-
dled by righteousness to assure easy victory against overwhelming numbers. 
On the wide frigid plains of Manchuria’s borderlands, and the torrid estuar-
ies of Jiangnan [southern China], precious blood is spilled daily, despite our 
success in the violent and strenuous fighting. Now, with many difficulties at 
home and abroad, the establishment of everlasting peace in the Orient rests 
upon the shoulders of our imperial soldiers.
Using less florid language, the postcard in figure 2.5 instructed visitors in 
proper comportment at a chūreitō. A pilgrim demonstrates correct and def-
erential behavior, exhorting, “This is the way you express reverence to the 
soldiers who fell for the sake of our nation.”
A late 1930s ethics textbook for Japanese children in Manchukuo echoed 
the aforementioned picture postcards, explaining that passersby should face 
the chūreitō and bow to show thanks for the sacrifices of the soldiers who 
died so that they could live happily in Manchukuo. The chūreitō section of 
the primer was preceded by detailed instructions on how to walk, bow, and 
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clap at Shintō shrines.60
In addition to the mass ceremonies and didactic texts that strove to keep 
behavior and ideation regarding the mute chūreitō on track, censorship and 
photography restrictions helped ensure that alternative imagery, such as that 
contained in Consul Warner’s unpublished 1935 photo album, did not chal-
lenge fascist orthodoxy. As the war in China became more severe, restrictive 
versions of the Fortified Area Laws encroached on the visual culture of battle-
field tourism and the depiction of chūreitō. After 1938, all guidebooks, post-
cards, and albums of scenic spots in the empire’s port cities, harbors, ancient 
battlegrounds, and transportation hubs were stamped with permits from 
the Fortified Zone Authority Command censors.61 Late 1930s and early 1940s 
tourist guides for Manchukuo carefully outline the constraints on photogra-
phy, commanding tourists to put their cameras away in the fortified zones, 
which included almost all tourist sites. This combination of censorship and 
prohibition left officially sanctioned image- producers with a near monopoly 
on the production of chūreitō iconography. 
The model city Shinkyō was built at breakneck speed in 1933 and 1934, 
2.4 “Mukden Chūreitō and the Manchurian Incident,” Liutiaogou, China. Picture 
postcard, ca. 1931. Image courtesy of the Harvard- Yenching Library, Harvard University. 
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but as of 1940 the capital remained a half- built construction site because the 
imperial war effort drained resources.62 As for the monuments themselves, 
material shortfalls prompted Army directives for wooden grave markers on 
the home islands; chūreitō construction in Manchukuo ceased in 1942.63 Al-
though advocates boasted in 1939 that the chūreitō would stand forever, when 
the Soviets poured over the border on August 9, 1945, the Kwantung Army 
had already abandoned the Japanese settlers and their sacred ossuaries to 
the liberated Chinese and the invading Red Army. In the name of postwar 
international diplomacy, the government in Tokyo made no effort to trans-
ship the charred remains back to the home islands.64 This ignominious end 
2.5 “War Memorial: 
Shinkyō Comics,” 
Changchun, China. 
Picture postcard, ca. 
1940. Courtesy of the 
Rupnow Collection. 
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to the once vaunted “Nine Foundation Stones to Advance the Empire” was 
well reflected in the 1945 textbook graphic that opens this chapter (figure 2.1). 
It depicts Shinkyō’s darkened tower with no communicants, no crowds. The 
chūreitō’s iconic silhouette may have signaled another round of mass funer-
als to its war- weary audience, but the black clouds on its horizon suggest that 
at least a few propagandists in Tokyo had, by the winter of 1944 – 45, stopped 
trying to conceal the futility of a strategy that aimed to recover the sunk costs 
of war by continuing to feed the towers of death. 
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3
NAZISM,  EVERYDAYNESS,  
AND SPECTACLE 
The Mass Form in Metropolitan Modernity
Geoff Eley
Visualizing Fascism
In Don DeLillo’s 1985 novel, White Noise, the protagonist, Jack Gladney, a 
professor in the rural Midwest at the fictitious institution The- College- on- 
the- Hill, is a specialist in “Hitler studies,” a field Gladney is known for pio-
neering. In tune with the discourse of postmodernism of the time, DeLillo 
uses this invented academic specialism to convene the novel’s interlinked 
themes, including the addictive properties of mass consumption; the impact 
of media- driven popular culture on family relations, childhood, and general 
psychic well- being; the character of contemporary academia and its preten-
sions; the prevalence of political conspiracy theories; the regenerative po-
tential of violence; and (as a metacommentary informing them all) the rela-
tionship between representation and the real. Running through the whole is 
DeLillo’s interest in the Debordian idea of spectacle, itself a primary fasci-
nation of the then emergent cross- disciplinary field of cultural studies. The 
novel strongly suggests, with varying directness across its respective themes, 
that fascism’s emotional power and popular appeal rested in harnessing new 
technological means and society’s ritual and symbolic resources for purposes 
of cleverly choreographed mass mobilization. The manipulative apotheosis 
was the Nazi spectacle, which DeLillo encapsulates in the following descrip-
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tion early in the book, as Gladney rhapsodizes about his subject: “Close-
 up jostled shots of thousands of people outside a stadium after a Goebbels 
speech, people surging, massing, bursting through traffic. Halls hung with 
swastika banners, with mortuary wreaths and deaths- head insignia. Ranks 
of thousands of flagbearers arrayed before columns of frozen light, a hundred 
and thirty aircraft searchlights aimed straight up — a scene that resembled a 
geometric longing, the formal notation of some powerful mass desire.”1
DeLillo’s description vividly conjures one of our most enduringly famil-
iar images of the Third Reich as it wanted to be seen. By simply googling 
“nsdap Nuremberg Rallies,” for example, we instantly receive an endlessly 
cascading array of the kind, showing vast numbers of uniformed, symmet-
rically ordered, immaculately disciplined, usually male Nazi supporters in 
anonymously massed ranks, marching or standing, sometimes with arms 
raised in salute — an embodied perfection of homogeneous collective simul-
taneity. In the guiding conception behind such massed displays, this perfectly 
drilled uniformity was intended to symbolize the ideal unity of the nation in 
a manner that celebrated both the leader’s plebiscitary endorsement and his 
resulting authority. For illustrating the distinctiveness of Nazism’s popular 
appeal, or indeed the self- projection of fascist movements more generally, 
these are probably the most commonly reached- for visual markers. Yet, when 
designing posters or choosing illustrations for flyers and magazines, Nazi 
propagandists themselves were as likely to choose individuated versions of 
the same messages — the idealized worker, soldier, farmer, mother, family, 
student, shining young boy or girl — or else an image of violent action, a fist 
crashing into an opponent’s face, for example. A further stock repertoire used 
caricatures of the Jewish, Bolshevik, Social Democratic, liberal- bourgeois, or 
other enemy (figure 3.1).2
In other words, the Nuremberg Rally and its equivalents were only one ele-
ment of the purposeful machinery of Nazi visuality. The Third Reich’s visual 
landscape had far more to it than the relatively small number of spectacular 
massed events per se, however essential these became to the state’s ritual cal-
endar. That greater multiplicity of images circulating inside Nazism’s visual 
economy had an impact far beyond what the elaborately stage- managed offi-
cial spectacle might accomplish. For such rallies, however gigantic, were con-
fined physically in time and space. Their full popular reception presumed va-
rieties of amplification, most obviously via radio, but also via satellite events, 
print media (newspapers, flyers, posters, pamphlets), photography, and per-
haps especially film. Our lasting perception of a Nuremberg Rally has, after 
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all, been indelibly shaped by Leni Riefenstahl’s artfully contrived documen-
tary of the 1934 rally in Triumph of the Will (Triumph des Willens, 1935).3 The 
event’s mobilizing effects, in terms of political excitement, spontaneous iden-
tification, and affective solidarity, could be transferred immeasurably more 
widely than the immediate venue and physical surroundings of the rally it-
self. Within the overall fields of ideological influence and action managed 
from Joseph Goebbels’s Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Pro-
paganda, the mounting of these massed spectacles was held mainly distinct, 
whereas the larger task of producing active popular compliance, in Goebbels’s 
remarkably catholic estimation, knew no boundaries. Schooling, policies for 
youth, recreation and sports, social work, everything associated with the 
workplace, family values and domesticity, the behavior of the professions — 
all were arenas requiring attention, where the Nazi state sought to shape so-
cial practices and expectations. The written and spoken word, print and vi-
sual media, and cultural policies and the arts were all deployed, consciously 
3.1 The Aryan Family 
(undated), print after a 
painting by Wolfgang 
Willrich. Copyright 
bpk Bildagentur/Art 
Resource, New York. 
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and systematically (if not always with the desired consistency), to massage 
and coerce into existence the active conformity the Nazis wanted.
Here the jump from “movement” to “regime” — a long- standing focus in 
fascism historiography — had decisive effects. The Nazis had been impres-
sively active in the aforementioned ways before 1933, even without the re-
sources of a state. They were not the first party to perceive the importance 
of the mass form, whether in stylistics and display or by converting politics 
into spectacle — even learning some of this from the Left — but they did so 
on a strikingly new scale by boldly occupying public space. During the elec-
tioneering of 1930 – 32, they blanketed print media and streets with flags, fly-
ers, posters, and badges in a gaudy red- and- black, swastika- adorned visibil-
ity; they conveyed youthful energy through every possible type of agitation 
(marches, parades, rallies, picketing, leafleting), further sensationalized by 
the sa’s (Sturmabteilung’s) street- fighting violence; they held 34,000 meet-
ings in the last month of the 1930 election alone. By 1932 such action had 
already been elaborately choreographed. The April 1932 presidential elec-
tion saw another bold innovation: Hitler’s first publicity- grabbing “Germany 
Flight” (Deutschlandflug), an airborne campaign with no German precedent, 
used a chartered plane emblazoned with “The Führer over Germany” that 
crisscrossed the country for twenty major rallies in less than a week, with ag-
gregate audiences a million strong. Hitler repeated this for the various state 
elections immediately afterward, addressing twenty- five major rallies during 
April 16 – 24, ranging from 120,000 in big- city Hamburg to several thousand 
in small- scale Miesbach in rural Upper Bavaria, where the audience “waited 
for hours in pouring rain” to hear him speak. For the July national campaign 
his third “Germany Flight” covered a staggering fifty- three venues. This time 
the party also used film while distributing fifty thousand gramophone re-
cords of Hitler’s “Appeal to the Nation.”4
After power was seized, the technicians of the spectacle worked this into 
a highly ramified system. With resources of state, the possibilities became 
incomparably greater: Goebbels acquired a subordinate press, national film 
studios, and a national broadcasting system; buildings, public arenas, and 
parade grounds could be commissioned; cities and the entire built environ-
ment could be redesigned, technologies harnessed, and centralized budgets 
deployed. At hand was an elaborate, organized machinery of mobilization, 
not just for setting people into motion, but for bringing them into deliberately 
managed public visibility, by materializing them as a mass. By these means, 
the nation and its histories and futures could be reimagined. Citizenship and 
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national belonging could be re- presented through the language of Volksge-
meinschaft, the community of the people- race- nation. “Germany” itself could 
be revisualized.
Aesthetics and Politics
In much recent discussion, whether of the Third Reich, Mussolini’s Italy, or 
fascism more generally, this process is conceptualized as the “aestheticization 
of political life.” Most such usage refers to the Inszenierung (stage- managing) 
of political action enabled by the pushing of Gleichschaltung (complete coor-
dination and standardization of organized social and political life) into the 
sphere of cultural expression. Thus, in a drive toward “dedifferentiation and 
false reconciliation,” often mistakenly characterized as “anti- modern,” Na-
zism “infused aesthetics into the political sphere in order to turn life into a 
unified work of art.”5 The result was a deliberately engineered political sty-
listics, epitomized not just by the Nuremberg Rallies but still more by the 
elaborate secondary staging of the surrounding representational excess. Mo-
bilizing the latest technologies of radio, cinematography, light, and sound; 
organizing masses of people into regimented and ritualized displays of dis-
ciplined uniformity; drawing upon rich iconographies, powerfully resonant 
mythologies, and easily recognizable symbolics, whether well- tried or freshly 
invented: these were key for the fascist spectacle, all concentrated in the glo-
rified charismatic leader. Politics became subsumed into “a highly ritual-
ized and operatic public sphere” wherein the acclamatory performance of 
mass political submission followed upon the destruction of the pluralism 
and procedural negotiations associated with the practice of democracy.6 The 
mounting of the fascist spectacle and its intended visual power specifically re-
placed the exchange of views and deliberative civility of the democratic public 
sphere: “It recast the political as a realm of the beautiful so as to compensate 
for the costs of modern disenchantment and to suture disenfranchised indi-
viduals into an all- encompassing spectacle of homogenization, an aesthetic 
simulation of community.”7
The cue has been Walter Benjamin’s oft- quoted assertion that “the logi-
cal result of fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life.”8 An 
industry of exegesis has gathered around Benjamin’s elliptical and aphoristic 
remarks on this subject, to be found in his brief “Epilogue” to the 1935 es-
say “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technical Reproducibility.” Thus for 
Benjamin fascism was a brutally coercive response to the crisis of capital-
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ism and its associated social and political contentiousness, a violent rejoin-
der to the rise of the masses and the organized challenge of the urban work-
ing class, whose impact through the 1918 German Revolution first instigated 
the Weimar Republic’s democratic constitution and then supplied its main 
defense. Politically, fascism sought to replace the fragmented, mobile, and 
conflict- ridden openness of society under Weimar with a diametrically con-
trasting authoritarian frame — one that was centered, rigid, and closed — in 
a relationship to history conceived as organically finished and whole. In the 
face of the Left’s political challenge, under the late- Weimar political crisis, 
fascism wanted to immunize the given property relations against reform 
or attack.9
Benjamin’s thinking rested on a contrast between “auratic” and “postau-
ratic” art, or the qualities of authenticity and uniqueness of traditional art-
work against the commodified circulation of images enabled by the new in-
dustrial technologies of photography and cinema and their applications. As 
a consequence of the latter, the artwork’s presumed and reverential authority 
was lost. “For the first time ever,” John Berger argued in one of the earliest 
commentaries on Benjamin’s insight, “images of art have become ephemeral, 
ubiquitous, insubstantial, available, valueless, free.”10 Against those democ-
ratizing effects, Benjamin warned, fascism wanted a restoration. It sought 
to return the new perceptual openness to the coercively imposed rigidities 
of order, in an apotheosis of “l’art pour l’art.” This was in turn linked to an 
argument about urban modernity (Paris, New York, Berlin) and its transfor-
mative consequences for sense perception.11 Here Benjamin voiced the often 
seemingly ubiquitous efforts of German intellectuals to capture both the spe-
cific qualities of metropolitan life after 1918 and their consequences for how 
people could live, in their social habits, their psychic composure, and their 
negotiable forms of everydayness. How, given the challenges of this new en-
vironment, should one learn to live in the modern world? Severed from the 
familiar securities of smaller- scale and readily knowable community living, 
or “experience” as a lived relationship to dependably known continuities of 
cultural understanding, people were exposed instead to the constant commo-
tion of city streets: “According to Benjamin, in the age of crowds and automa-
tons, bombarded by images and noises, overwhelmed with chance encoun-
ters and glances, we need to put up a ‘protective shield’ against the excesses 
of daily shocks hitting us. In this process, our system of perception ends up 
repressing our senses, deadening them in an ‘anaesthetic’ procedure, and we 
lose the capacity for shared meaning.” The “alienation of the senses” associ-
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ated with this condition of modernity opened a new and distinctive space for 
politics, one that fascists proved adept at using (figure 3.2).12 
Parsing this argument requires returning to those pioneering attempts 
of the 1980s, associated with writers such as Marshall Berman and Stephen 
Kern, to reopen a discussion of “the modern” and modernity by rehistoriciz-
ing their emergence and currency to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.13 Among German historians, the relevant impact came from the 
oeuvre of Detlev Peukert.14 Here the Third Reich’s advent and the specificities 
of Nazi rule were traced back to the unmanageably hypertrophied contradic-
tions of modernity under the Weimar Republic, with its “charged atmosphere 
of social and cultural innovation,” its “dreams of reason,” and all the result-
ing conflicts and insoluble contestation.15 During the 1920s, Peukert argued, 
the urgencies of crisis pervaded one sphere after another, including “econom-
ics, politics, high culture and mass consumption, science and technology, 
architecture and city planning, the family and gender relations.” Beneath 
3.2 Berlin: Symphony of a Great City (Berlin: Die Sinfonie der Grosstadt),  
by Walter Ruttmann (1927). 
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the Republic’s protections, he continued, both the cultural experiments of 
the avant- garde and the progressivist projects of social reform collided with 
yearnings for a simpler, less hectic, and more reliable way of life, so that under 
pressures of economic collapse, political polarization, and social disorder, a 
reach for dictatorship started to become thinkable.16 
On the one hand, the project- driven imagining of a realizable modernity 
among the new cohorts of managers and planners, architects and designers, 
social engineers and social policy experts encouraged an unbounded belief 
that society could be entirely remade, in effect a utopian wish that social 
and economic needs would be addressed to a degree that could never actu-
ally be satisfied, least of all under the straitened circumstances of fiscal re-
trenchment after 1929. The Machbarkeitswahn (“delirium of makeability”) 
of the heyday of the Republic passed during the freneticism of the succeed-
ing economic and political collapse into anxieties of disorientation. Yet, mo-
dernity’s inescapable “irritations” hardly ceased to engender the fantasy of 
wholeness, whose appeal became even radicalized under the societal crisis 
and its polarizing disorders. Once the Nazis achieved their startling electoral 
breakthrough in September 1930 and reached a crescendo of success by the 
summer of 1932, before being hoisted into power in January 1933, that appeal 
to wholeness acquired material political form, whether by reclaiming “tradi-
tions” or through “a ‘clean,’ frictionless modernity to be achieved by dictato-
rial political means.”17 
This was what Benjamin meant by “fascist aesthetics as a monolithic space 
of false reconciliation, as a postauratic renewal of aura.”18 “By demystifying 
the world,” David Crew argues by means of Peukert, “modernity produces a 
desire for a revitalization of everyday life by a charismatic leader and by ir-
rational appeals to ‘new religions’ — such as ‘race.’ ”19 The most successful ef-
forts at concretizing Benjamin’s claims — at grounding them in a convincing 
account of Nazism and its dynamics of organized appeal — have reformulated 
their conception of modernity in this way, as an argument about Weimar’s 
historical particularities. The Republic emerges as a regime space of social, 
cultural, and political experiment whose radicalisms provoked an increas-
ingly violent right- wing response. That backlash had many triggers and tar-
gets, from the New Woman, the trashiness of popular culture, the flaunting 
of permissive sexuality, and the visibility of the avant- garde to the political 
culture of liberal constitutionalism, the legal entrenchment of trade unions, 
and the militancy of Social Democrats and Communists. The new freedoms 
simultaneously enabled their opposite: “Modernity constructs new social and 
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cultural forms (i.e. a mass consumerist public) that are politically ambiguous 
and can be appropriated for dictatorial as well as for ‘progressive’ political 
purposes (i.e. the Nazi Inszenierung der Massen).”20 
This is really an argument about the predisposing- cum- generative rela-
tion of a certain sociocultural condition of modernity — as modes of intelligi-
bility, as default regimes of perception, as psychic predicament, as sensorium, 
as both unsettlement and excitation, as both warning and incitement— to the 
enabling of a certain kind of politics.21 If we render this more cautiously, then 
Peukert’s approach (and Benjamin’s) asks us to consider how the definite po-
litical outcome of the 1930s, along with the distinctively fascist publicness of 
the Third Reich, might be read for their relationship to that cultural condi-
tion of modernity. But what, concretely, did the “bringing of aesthetics into 
politics” mean? My opening gloss on DeLillo’s rendering of this into fiction, 
along with Lutz Koepnick’s further explication, seems the most convincing 
and helpful way of beginning to answer that question. In what follows I point 
to some of the complications.
Mosse, Gentile, and Political Religion
Here certain affinities exist with arguments about the “sacralization” of politics 
and “political religion,” associated with Emilio Gentile and George Mosse.22 In-
voking the “cult- like” or “quasi- religious” features of the Third Reich’s public 
ceremonial and commemorative calendar, plus some homologies between Na-
zism’s public symbolics, ritual practices, and formal beliefs and those of Ger-
man Protestantism, this approach reads Nazism’s mass appeal for its displaced 
religiosity, attributing its purchase to a combination of political inventiveness 
and popular susceptibility during the extremes of the crises of Weimar. Be-
yond functional and imitative similarities, the most fruitful analyses suggest 
Nazism’s deeper indebtedness to the apocalyptic and salvationist thinking 
generated by a crisis of German Protestantism in the early twentieth century, 
which grew ever more radicalized by the traumas of war, military collapse, 
and revolutionary upheaval. Amid wild talk of spiritual endangerment, dark-
ness, and catastrophe, Nazism offered a redemptive vision of political deliv-
erance based on the leader’s charismatic authority, the primacy of the Volks-
gemeinschaft, and a Manichean drive against the enemies of the race. By 
addressing the religious disorientation, it sought to capture for itself the pri-
mary faculty of faith in the divine — namely, the promise of transcendence — 
to raise the movement rhetorically above politics and sublimate worldly fears 
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in the supreme postulate of the racial struggle for existence and its rewards. 
This illumines the internal structure of the outlook of ideologues such as Jo-
seph Goebbels, Dietrich Eckert, and Alfred Rosenberg, as well as leading Na-
zis’ salvationist language and the messianic aura imputed to Hitler himself. It 
makes intelligible the extremes of emotional investment orchestrated around 
the Nuremberg Rallies and other elements of the Nazi liturgical calendar.23
By its excessive formalism and functionalism, however, the sacralization 
thesis sacrifices historical specificity to an overarching interpretation of the 
political forms called functionally into life by the conflictual dynamics of 
modernization as a diffuse macro- historical process. Mosse’s version, with its 
deep cultural indebtedness to his so- called anthropological approach, rests 
heavily on an argument about the larger political forces of nationalism and 
mass- political forms seeded by the nineteenth century.24 Mosse ascribed both 
the popular breadth of fascism’s appeal and the ritualized forms of its plebi-
scitary orchestration to this ability to draw “for its own purposes” on “the 
fragments of our Western cultural and ideological past.” Fascism succeeded 
“because it annexed and focused those hopes and longings that informed di-
verse political and intellectual movements of the previous century.”25
While originally engaging “the aesthetics of politics” by pioneering the 
historical treatment of masculinity and sexuality and calling attention to “the 
myths and symbols that comprised a national liturgy appropriate for national 
self- representation,” Mosse always recurred in this way to a longer- range 
metatheory of European history, reflecting his own default understanding of 
Enlightenment- initiated cultural change. Cultural rootedness and “the dia-
lectics of irrationalism” were primary to Mosse’s concern.26 His particular 
idea of political religion involved essentializing claims about the “hunger for 
totality” produced by the worries of Europeans in “confronting modernity.”27 
But here modernity becomes a far more diffusely transhistorical category 
than Peukert’s (and Benjamin’s) more grounded argument about metropoli-
tan life in the 1920s. The particular audacity of the movements of Hitler and 
Mussolini dissolves into the deeper mists of European time:
In analyzing a political style which was eventually used for such ugly ends, 
it may seem odd to begin with a discussion of beauty. But the “aesthetics 
of politics” was the force which linked myths, symbols, and the feeling of 
the masses; it was a sense of beauty and form that determined the nature 
of the new political style. The ugly ends to which this style was eventually 
used were masked by the appeal of the new politics for a large section of 
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the population, by its usefulness in capturing their longings and dreams. 
A concept of beauty objectified the dream world of happiness and order 
while it enabled men to contact those supposedly immutable forces which 
stand outside the flow of daily life.28
Mosse does extend Benjamin in emphasizing the kinds of equivalence 
that linked Nazism to the mass forms cultural socialism had invented ear-
lier. One unhelpful version of that argument was the conflationist approach 
of totalitarianism theory, in which Stalinism and fascism are rendered simply 
the same. Likewise, it is easy enough to invoke the authoritarian dourness 
of official culture in the post- 1945 state- socialist world, with its collectivist 
uniformities, standardization, limiting morality, and repressive disciplin-
ary power, epitomized in the paramilitary conformities and Boy Scout ethos 
of the Young Pioneers and other official youth cultures. We might also cite 
the regimentation of the official Soviet- style sports apparatus, the hostility 
against sexual dissidence, and the highly gendered languages of Stalinist 
collectivism. But however uniformly rigidified these state- institutionalized 
forms were during the 1930s and after, whether in Stalinist, fascist, or wider 
collectivist versions, the new genres of mass- political action originally had 
more contingent and dynamically variable meanings in the popular political 
cultures of the early twentieth century. They came, above all, from the un-
precedented post- 1918 wave of European democratization and its global anti-
colonial equivalents. Rather than the novelties attending the “nationalization 
of the masses” deeper into the nineteenth century (Mosse’s view), they came 
far more specifically from the popular politics accompanying the revolution-
ary turbulence of 1917 – 23. Fascists in Italy, Germany, and more widely cer-
tainly invented their own forms of direct- action militancy, collective display, 
and public intervention based around the heedless paramilitary recourse to 
physical violence. But they also consciously appropriated the mass forms de-
veloped earlier in the socialist tradition (before 1914), while responding with 
alacrity to the Left’s innovations after 1917.
By the 1920s in Germany, in other words, Social Democrats, Communists, 
and Nazis were all drawing on a rapidly developing common repertoire of 
organized display and collective mobilization: huge rallies and festivals; pub-
lic shows of massed discipline and strength; the well- choreographed mass 
march; the mass gymnastic displays and mass choirs; the development of 
new rituals; and the orchestration of a distinctive political symbolic. Fur-
ther, the massed visual power defining that repertoire increasingly obscured 
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individual political subjectivities. Sublimating personal desires, effacing in-
dividuality, frowning on dissident sexualities, closing down diversity and the 
latitude for cultural experimentation — all might be found on the Left no less 
than on the Right. Specifying Left/Right differences is difficult within this 
emergent arena of spectacular politics. Thus, in Red Vienna, surrounding the 
opening of the socialist- built Vienna Stadium in July 1931, aggregate crowds 
of 240,000 watched a mass pageant of the Austrian Socialist Party’s history 
performed by thousands from the movement’s cultural organizations, which 
climaxed with worker- actors toppling “a huge gilt idol- head representing 
capital from its scaffolding.”29 
Visuality, Monumentalism, and the Faces in the Crowd
Thus, much received wisdom notwithstanding, Nazis did not exactly invent 
the mass spectacles associated with the Nuremberg Rallies, the 1936 Olym-
piad, and other efforts at staging the disciplined formations of popular hom-
age and nationalist unanimity. Rather, they drew upon rich antecedents from 
the 1920s, which the Social Democratic and Communist Parties inventively 
pioneered. As Nadine Rossol remarks, “in contrast to the common mod-
ern perception, the Nazi Party Rallies did not create aesthetically original 
features. Instead, they combined and expanded, often on an unprecedented 
scale, well- known elements characteristic of political assemblies.”30 Thus a 
mode of massed political choreography was already at hand, through which 
republican loyalists had sought to invent “highly disciplined rituals that situ-
ated bodies in space — the style of walking, the clothing of the demonstrators, 
the route of the parade, the sounds of their steps and slogans — to symbolize 
the unity and strength of the national community.”31 Yet, as the Nazis then 
showed, these potentials could enhance the public arsenal and performa-
tive repertoire of the Republic’s enemies too. The mass form in that sense 
became a site of contestation. As Rossol concludes, “rather than inventing 
mass spectacles, the Nazi movement brought them under the state’s control 
and eventually abandoned them.” Ironically, “the National Socialists showed 
that the inclusive, spectacular, and representative forms tried out as part of 
visualizing the republic could be easily extended and reinterpreted to reflect 
the structure of their own political system.”32
Fascist monumentalism becomes similarly ambiguous. The Nazi architec-
tural vision seemed distinctive enough in its colossal scale alone. As imag-
ined, this extended from the Nuremberg Party Rally grounds, the Olympic 
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stadium, and the new Reich Chancellery, through a variety of showcase proj-
ects across the emblematic cities of the Reich, to the plans for a new Berlin, 
envisaged to reemerge by 1950 as the new world capital of “Germania.” Ham-
burg was planned to receive the world’s tallest skyscraper as the new party re-
gional headquarters, along with the world’s largest suspension bridge across 
the Elbe; Munich’s new central rail station would be the world’s largest steel- 
frame structure.33 One such project actually built was the reconstructed Tem-
pelhof Airport in Berlin, designed by Ernst Sagebiel in the mid- 1930s and at 
the time the largest in the world.34 Nazi planners happily deployed the mod-
ernist techniques and materials of the New Architecture (Neues Bauen), if not 
its aesthetic vision and ethicopolitical esprit. Other new technologies were 
enlisted too. Beginning in August- September 1933, Albert Speer designed a 
so- called Cathedral of Light to enframe the annual Nuremberg Rally by po-
sitioning antiaircraft searchlights at twelve- meter intervals around the Zep-
pelin Field parade ground and pointing them directly into the night sky. To 
achieve that effect, he requisitioned the Luftwaffe’s entire inventory of 152 
powerful searchlights (figure 3.3).35
A complex of grand- scale halls, arenas, and assembly grounds covering a 
site of 4.2 square miles, the Party Rally Grounds in Nuremberg, whose con-
struction was never quite completed, supplied the single clearest example of 
Nazi monumentalism at work. When filled each year with the regimented 
ranks of fascist collectivism in motion, the Rally Grounds glorified power as 
such; they conveyed a morally coercive pedagogy of the state’s authority, and 
they staged the latter as a public drama carefully conceived to overwhelm 
visual sensibilities.36 As an organized megaspectacle, the annual Reich Har-
vest Festival, held on the Bückeberg Hill during 1933 – 37, was even larger still: 
likewise overseen by Speer, its initial attendance was half a million, increas-
ing to 1.2 million by 1937. Experientially, these events were certainly mul-
tifaceted. But the physical monumentalism of Nazi official architecture — 
ministries, ceremonial buildings, cultural institutions — was deliberately im-
posing: the purpose was to intimidate, belittle, overawe. The epitome was 
the Reich Chancellery, conceived in 1934 – 35 and built 1938 – 39, again by 
Speer: after negotiating a series of entrance rooms (725 feet long) through 
double doors nearly 17 feet high, visitors approached Hitler’s study via the 
450- feet- long Gallery of Mirrors, twice as long as its model in the palace at 
Versailles; the study itself was 4,305 square feet in size (88 feet long, 47.5 feet 
wide, 40 feet high), intensely laden with promiscuous symbolism (busts, art-
works, tapestries, swastikas, eagles, laurel wreaths) and culminating in Hit-
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ler’s enormous desk (11.5 by 4.6 feet). When aged Czech President Emil Hácha 
arrived there at 1 a.m. on March 14, 1939, to sign off on the dissolution of his 
country, “his face red from nervousness and anxiety,” he first had to trudge 
the full length of this building before presenting himself.37
Spatially and visually, this was an architecture of belittlement and intimi-
dation, conceding nothing to ambivalence or talking back.38 But the massed 
spectacles were more complicated. The photographic record surrounding 
Nazi celebrations, such as the popular adulation accompanying Hitler’s forty- 
eighth birthday on April 20, 1937, was only deceptively transparent. Did the 
cheering crowd giving the Hitler salute signify genuine joy, or were the pic-
tures carefully selected and staged? How far was adoration of Hitler’s per-
son endorsement for the policies of the regime? Which policies were sup-
ported and which not? Who was absent from the crowd and why? These 
same questions also apply to the organizing ideal of the Volksgemeinschaft, 
in whose name Nazi spectacles were staged. In the heyday of social history, 
German historians gave a confident answer: the “people’s community” was a 
3.3 Photograph of the 
Nazi rally in the Cathedral 
of Light, a main aesthetic 
feature of the Nuremberg 
Rallies, 1937. Copyright 
Alamy.
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mere trick and a “fictitious concept,” a projection of bogus unity by the now- 
triumphal Nazis who declared the divisiveness of Weimar democracy healed. 
The spectacle was “an aesthetic simulation of community” and a “false rec-
onciliation,” in Benjamin’s sense.39 The Volksgemeinschaft may have been “a 
potent mobilizing agent.” But “between the exaggerated pseudo- egalitarian 
propaganda that claimed to have transcended class, denominational, and po-
litical division and the essential continuities in the class structure of Nazi 
Germany,” a huge gap still existed.40 “What are the reasons,” asked Heinrich 
August Winkler rhetorically, “why we should actually take the Nazi slogans 
for anything real?”41
The big events of the Nazi ritual calendar can be seen too straightfor-
wardly as the vehicles for successful Nazi indoctrination. Readings that rely 
mainly on the photographic record too trustingly take the visual bombast 
of Nazi self- representations at face value, accepting that Nazi culture should 
be identified primarily with “the deindividuating, conformist, and unify-
ing spectacles of Leni Riefenstahl’s films and Albert Speer’s monumental ar-
chitecture.”42 In contrast, we need to probe more searchingly into how the 
impact of the mass spectacle worked its way into the minds and habits of 
individual Germans, whether they joined in the event directly or partook vi-
cariously from various kinds of distance. For “ideology” existed not only in 
the explicitly programmatic and dramatically staged doctrinal content of the 
Nuremberg Rally. It also lurked in the social relations and material practices 
by which Germans found themselves having to live in an unfamiliar social 
world after 1933. It was found in the ideas, beliefs, values, prejudices, and as-
sumptions through which people tried to bring meaning and order into their 
material everyday lives. 
The massified character of the spectacle necessarily presumed the multitu-
dinous participation of socially diverse populations, whose personal experi-
ence involved complicated mixtures of emotions. Propagation of the Volksge-
meinschaft after 1933 was systematic, unceasing, and morally coercive. But 
joining its appeal could also be emotionally satisfying and socially enjoyable. 
Ordinary Germans might well embrace “Nazi ideology” as such. But they 
could also accept Nazi values on a variety of other grounds, including already 
formed if diffuse patriotic loyalties and anti- Bolshevik fears of disorder, as 
well as self- interested careerism and material advantage, including the desire 
for a quiet life and simply to be left alone. Joining the regimented multitude 
of a Nuremberg Rally or other massed events entailed a very convoluted set 
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of motivations, some consciously chosen, but others externally anticipated 
or imposed. Joining a rally might well concentrate a person’s subjectivity, but 
only provisionally and doubtless only in part. Being a face in the crowd si-
multaneously implied a practical self- erasure and a conscious individuality, 
disappearing into the disciplined and uniform anonymity, on the one hand, 
yet seeking a satisfying self- validation on the other. What people really did at 
those official events, and what they took away, would vary immensely, even 
as their experience undoubtedly converged around certain common ideas 
and values. Likewise, the event carried very different meanings for the direct 
participants as against the various categories of immediate spectators, the 
wider audience listening to the radio, or the broader publics at still further 
remove, not to speak of the many categories of service laborers who enabled 
the event even to be staged. Once again, the precise efficacies of the Nazis’ 
intended message will come better into view only if we pursue its effects into 
the mundane and localized settings of daily life, away from the alarums and 
excitement of the performance of the spectacle per se.
Here, the evidence of film may help. The earliest historiography of Nazi 
cinema typically used a dichotomous model of propaganda and society, in 
which the vast top- down machinery of Goebbels’s Ministry acted concert-
edly on German society to manipulate the masses into the desired confor-
mity. In its treatment of filmic content such work was also reductionist, 
simplifying complex fields of meaning into a straightforward story of indoc-
trination, even while conceding the entertaining qualities of the vast bulk of 
the films actually produced after 1933. Thus if the approach presumed one bi-
nary opposition between ideology and social context (“propaganda” and “so-
ciety”), it also added a second between ideological indoctrination and escapist 
diversion, which obscured much of what films actually produced in meanings 
for the people who saw them. Yet precisely as entertainment, films not only 
filled people’s everyday lives by distracting them. They also offered images to 
frame a private realm of wants — a dreamworld of a better life — in ways that 
stitched these into the racialized vision of the Volksgemeinschaft. Popular 
and official culture could thereby be made to work together. Far more than 
just the regime’s propaganda operations, Nazism developed a complex aes-
thetic program that matched the mass spectacle to the appeals of consumer 
pleasure and visual enjoyment. In the “seemingly unpolitical spaces of private 
commodity consumption” and “American- style consumerism,” Nazi cinema 
projected a promise of private satisfactions, “even as it coopted these ‘to ar-
 Nazism, Everydayness, and Spectacle   85
rest and rechannel’ them.”43 It was in the cinema’s space of enjoyment, no less 
than in the audience for the Nuremberg Rally, that Germans were invited to 
become good Nazi subjects.
Under its ruthlessly authoritarian and violently coercive terms of rule, the 
Third Reich’s visual environment was both multifaceted and systemically 
clear. But nor was it lacking in positive appeal. The Nazi Volksgemeinschaft 
was not just an elaborately constructed propaganda screen or a “beautiful 
illusion” based on deception and sloganeering that simply disguised repres-
sion and preserved social inequalities as before.44 Workers’ rights and col-
lective bargaining may have gone, but the “Beauty of Labor” (Schönheit der 
Arbeit) program of Strength through Joy (Kraft durch Freude [KdF]), created 
under the aegis of the German Labor Front in September 1933, brought real 
practical benefits into the workplace, from better washrooms and changing 
facilities, brighter lighting, and more generous space to improved health and 
safety, longer breaks, and expanded holidays, which increased under the Na-
zis from an average of only three days to one or two weeks. Even as older 
forms of collective solidarity and the dignity of labor were being traduced, in 
other words, new slogans such as “Honor of Labor” (Ehre der Arbeit) and “Ex-
cellence of German Work” (Deutsche Qualitätsarbeit) brought very tangible 
meanings. KdF also operated sports and fitness facilities; broadened access 
to previously exclusive pastimes such as sailing, horseback riding, and ten-
nis; discounted tickets for concerts, theaters, and museums; subsidized cin-
emas and theaters; supported hobbies and adult education; and maximized 
workers’ access to holidays and recreation. As a travel bureau it had some 
140,000 employees and by 1939 was running twelve cruise ships, including 
the custom- built Wilhelm Gustloff and Robert Ley. By 1938, an aggregated 
54 million Germans had passed through its hands; in 1937, inland vacations 
peaked at 1.4 million tourists, and weekend excursions at 6.8 million; by 1939, 
140,000 were taking cruises of the Baltic, North, and Mediterranean Seas.45 
The balance sheet of popular acceptance of what the Nazis tried to offer 
was very mixed. In common with other recovering economies in the 1930s, 
Germany saw certain consumer industries able to flourish: radios, cinema, 
furniture, and telephones, for example. But the Nazis’ grander promise of ac-
cessible “people’s products” (Volksprodukte) never came to much.46 Although 
340,000 orders were placed for the “people’s car” (Volkswagen), which was 
announced to great fanfare in 1937, not a single unit ever rolled out of the 
giant purpose- built plant, which was converted for military production in 
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September 1939, along with its model city (KdF- City) and planned family 
housing and amenities.47 Prora, the intended KdF showcase megaresort, a 
twenty- thousand- bed vacation complex begun in May 1936 on the Baltic is-
land of Rügen, was likewise never completed but refitted for military use. Yet 
the potency was in the promise of improvement, which was seemingly guar-
anteed in the Prora resort’s imposing comprehensiveness, which combined 
the collectivist sameness of Germans being together with the personal plea-
sures of relaxation. This vision of the future, of a purified Germany beyond 
the former class divisiveness, in which the body of the nation (Volkskörper), 
healthful and united, purged of its weaknesses and foreign elements, could 
be strengthened and renewed in the pursuit of wholesome enjoyments was 
continuously reaffirmed, not just in the visual barrage of the KdF’s happy 
propaganda but in the tangible actualities of the goods it delivered: “Strength 
through Joy catered to consumer expectations as economic recovery ended 
unemployment and raised family incomes, recognizing that individual plea-
sure and autonomy mattered as much as the collective experience of cultural 
uplift and national renewal. While KdF directed its low- cost, non- commercial 
consumption toward collective ends, it simultaneously embedded visions of 
future prosperity in the dream worlds of the present, advertising material 
‘luxuries’ to appeal to its audience.”48
Any appraisal of Nazi Germany’s visual record must take all of these 
aspects into account. My purpose is not to dispute the attractions of the 
Volksgemeinschaft or the efficacy of the Third Reich’s propaganda, but rather 
to complicate how their impacts each occurred. Moreover, once we grasp 
the more insidiously unspoken means by which ideology does its work — 
 in everyday processes, in unexpected places, in personal lives, and in the 
many semiconscious and unconscious ways through which subjectivities are 
made — we are unlikely to underplay fascism’s popular appeal. Surely the 
large- scale, extravagant, and systemic propaganda offensives needed to de-
pend on a substrate of ordinary perceptions and quotidian practices. Cer-
tainly, through their gargantuan and monolithic scale, Speer’s major build-
ing projects sought to architecturally stage the fascist will to power. To those 
already mentioned we may add his design of the German Pavilion for the 1937 
World Exposition in Paris.49 The massed spectacles, no less than this monu-
mental built environment, were meant to dwarf the individual subject while 
investing the Führer with grandiosity. 
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Conclusion
These thoughts on Nazi visuality might be taken in various further direc-
tions. The “aesthetics of production” and the “beautification of labor,” men-
tioned briefly above, would certainly be one.50 Representations of Heimat (lit-
erally, “home”) could be another, involving the complex reciprocities joining 
local and regional rootedness to national identifications in a time of aggres-
sively pursued foreign expansionism. Nazi imperialism — the ideology of Leb-
ensraum (living space), the projection of a racialized European “New Order,” 
and the spatial imaginary of the “East” — would be a closely allied third. Yet 
a fourth could be a visualization of the Jewish enemy, along with the many 
other categories that the Volksgemeinschaft ruthlessly debarred. Along with 
the spectacle of the stage- managed massed event, my discussion has focused 
mainly on the classically modern visual media of film and photography, plus 
architecture and a redesign of the built environment. But Nazism’s visual rep-
ertoire also included painting, drama, heroic poetry and myth, dance, monu-
ments, commemorations, museums, exhibitions, and everything involved in 
memorialization and memory work.
Finally, my discussion deliberately stops short of World War II because 
with the outbreak of the latter in September 1939, the stakes so markedly 
changed. The visual landscape was now one of troop movements, weaponry, 
motorization, and aerial warfare, leading initially to victorious occupation, 
then apocalyptic retreat, in “the iconography of metalized bodies” joined to 
“images of death and transfixation.”51 The spectacle moved indoors; after No-
vember 1938, no more massed events occurred in the open air. All the war’s 
major speeches, whether by Hitler himself or by Goebbels, including the in-
famous “Total War” address of February 18, 1943, were interior affairs, deliv-
ered invariably in the Berlin Sportpalast before audiences of around fourteen 
thousand. The spectacle was literally unseen, sent by radio over the airwaves 
(figure 3.4).
But Nazism was nothing if not an imperialism. Only “imperial warfare” 
could “fulfill the palingenetic promise of national rebirth and racial purifi-
cation,” Koepnick argues, in a politics implacably opposed to Weimar’s “po-
litical modernity” of conflict, civility, and difference. In 1933, that politics 
brutally severed the preceding democracy of popular representation while 
siphoning individual and collective hopes into a new arena of ritualized char-
ismatic redemption. When we describe the fascist spectacle as an effort to 
 88 Geoff Eley
“recast the political as a realm of the beautiful,” Koepnick reminds us, we can 
easily efface these other scenes of mass action, which took brutality, physical 
violence, destructiveness, and killing as their script: from the repression of 
1933 – 34 through the desecrations and humiliations of Reichskristallnacht in 
1938 to the mass murdering in the killing fields of the east. These were ver-
sions of the spectacle that were not publicly emblazoned across the visual 
landscape of the official nation, as was the artfully constructed showcase of 
the Volksgemeinschaft. Nonetheless, they incited and produced records of 
visualization, circulating privately and furtively in the countless snapshots 
of ordinary soldiers from the Eastern Front, colonizing the everydayness of 
intimate life more insidiously, but no less potently, than had the images of 
Nuremberg. In other words, we should not forget “the distinctive implica-
tion of fascist aesthetics in a project of imperial warfare, national purifica-
tion, and genocide.”52 
3.4 Goebbel’s speech at the Sportpalast in Berlin, February 18, 1943.  
Copyright: Bundesarchiv, ID number 183-J05235.
 Nazism, Everydayness, and Spectacle   89
Notes
 1 Don DeLillo, White Noise (New York: Penguin, 1985), 25 – 26. I was originally 
brought back to DeLillo’s novel by the brilliant treatment in Lutz Koepnick, Wal-
ter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1999), 1 – 6.
 2 See, for example, Steven Luckert and Susan Bachrach, eds., The State of Decep-
tion: The Power of Nazi Propaganda (Washington, DC: U.S. Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, 2011), produced for the exhibition of the same name (January 2009 – 
October 2011).
 3 Contemporary access became mediated in turn via Susan Sontag, “Fascinating 
Fascism,” in Under the Sign of Saturn: Essays, 73 – 105 (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 1980). Originally published in the New York Review of Books, Febru-
ary 6, 1975, 11, 18, which appropriately pillories Riefenstahl’s reputation.
 4 Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1989 – 1936: Hubris (New York: Norton, 1998), 329, 363, 369.
 5 Koepnick, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power, 1.
 6 Koepnick, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power, 187.
 7 Koepnick, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power, 1.
 8 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in 
Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt 
(London: Collins/Fontana, 1973), 243.
 9 Benjamin’s thinking about mass- reproduced visuality — photography in particu-
lar — channeled wider debates in interwar critical theory about new mass- cultural 
forms and their relationship to the bases of political life under modernity. Key 
here was the journalist and critic Siegfried Kracauer (1889 – 1966), whose 1927 text 
Ornament der Masse was essential context for Benjamin’s insight. See Siegfried 
Kracauer, The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, ed. Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). For brilliant commentary on the cinematic 
dimension, see Johannes von Moltke, The Curious Humanist: Siegfried Kracauer 
in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016), 93 – 108, 109 – 31. See 
also Kracauer’s classic 1947 retrospect, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological 
History of the German Film (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).
 10 John Berger, Ways of Seeing (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 32 – 34.
 11 My citation here is to the brilliant compilations of Peter Wollen in Paris Hollywood: 
Writings on Film (London: Verso, 2002) and Paris Manhattan: Writings on Art 
(London: Verso, 2004); also Peter Wollen, “Modern Times: Cinema/Americanism/ 
The Robot,” in Raiding the Icebox: Reflections on Twentieth- Century Culture (Lon-
don: Verso, 1993), 35 – 71.
 12 Simonetta Falasca- Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Musso-
lini’s Italy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 12. In Benjamin’s termi-
nology, this is the contrast between two distinct meanings of the English “expe-
rience”: Erlebnis (encountering the random shocks of life) and Erfahrung (being 
able to know life as continuity).
 13 Marshal Berman, All That Is Sold Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity 
 90 Geoff Eley
(London: Verso, 1983); Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880 – 1918 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).
 14 See especially Detlev J. K. Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, 
and Racism in Everyday Life (London: Batsford, 1987; published in German in 
1982); Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Moder-
nity (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989; published in German in 1987); and Detlev 
J. K. Peukert, Max Webers Diagnose der Moderne (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht, 1989).
 15 Peukert, Weimar Republic, xiii and 273 – 82; see also Kathleen Canning, “Intro-
duction: Weimar Subjects/Weimar Publics: Rethinking the Political Culture of 
Germany in the 1920s,” in Weimar Subjects/Weimar Publics: Rethinking the Politi-
cal Culture of Germany in the 1920s, ed. Kathleen Canning, Kerstin Barndt, and 
Kristin McGuire (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 2 – 5.
 16 Intervening discussions now carry forward Peukert’s argumentation, especially 
Moritz Föllmer and Rüdiger Graf, eds., Die “Krise” der Weimarer Republic: Zur 
Kritik eines Deutungsmusters (Frankfurt: Campus, 205); Rüdiger Graf, Die Zu-
kunft der Weimarer Republik: Krisen und Zukunftsaneignungen in Deutschland 
1918 – 1933 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008); Rüdiger Graf, “Either- Or: The Narrative 
of Crisis in Weimar Germany and Historiography,” Central European History 43, 
no. 4 (2010): 592 – 615; Peter Fritzsche, “Historical Time and Future Experience in 
Postwar Germany,” in Wolfgang Hardtwig, ed., Ordnungen in der Krise: Zur poli-
tischen Kulturgeschichte Deutschlands (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 141 – 64; and 
Martin Geyer, “ ‘Die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen’: Zeitsemantik und die 
Suche nach Gegenwart in der Weimarer Republik,” in Hardtwig, Ordnungen in 
der Krise, 165 – 87. See also Peter Fritzsche, “Did Weimar Fail?,” Journal of Modern 
History 68, no. 3 (1996): 629 – 56; Peter Fritzsche, “Landscape of Danger, Landscape 
of Design: Crisis of Modernism in Weimar Germany,” in Dancing on the Volcano: 
Essays on the Culture of the Weimar Republic, ed. Thomas W. Kniesche and Ste-
phen Brockmann (Columbus, SC: Camden House, 1994), 29 – 46; and Kathleen 
Canning, “The Politics of Symbols, Semantics, and Sentiments in the Weimar 
Republic,” Central European History 43, no. 4 (2010): 567 – 80.
 17 David Crew, “The Pathologies of Modernity: Detlev Peukert on Germany’s Twen-
tieth Century,” Social History 17, no. 2 (1992): 321.
 18 Koepnick, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power, 190.
 19 Crew, “Pathologies of Modernity,” 321.
 20 Crew, “Pathologies of Modernity,” 321.
 21 For the affective registers of Weimar politics and the pertinence of the history 
of emotions, see Canning, “Politics of Symbols,” 577 – 78; and Manuela Achilles, 
“With a Passion for Reason: Celebrating the Constitution in Weimar Germany,” 
Central European History 43, no. 4 (2010): 666 – 89.
 22 See Emilio Gentile, The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1996); Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion (Princeton, 
 Nazism, Everydayness, and Spectacle   91
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of 
the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napo-
leonic Wars through the Third Reich (New York: Meridian, 1977); and George L. 
Mosse, The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism (New York: 
Howard Fertig, 1999). See also Roger Griffin, ed., Fascism, Totalitarianism, and 
Political Religion (London: Routledge, 2005); and Roger Griffin, “Withstanding 
the Rush of Time: The Prescience of Mosse’s Anthropological View of Fascism,” 
in What History Tells: George L. Mosse and the Culture of Modern Europe, ed. 
Stanley G. Payne, David J. Sorkin, and John S. Tortorice (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2004), 110 – 33.
 23 See especially Claus- Ekkehard Bärsch, Die politische Religion des Nationalsozialis-
mus: Die religiöse Dimension des ns- Ideologie in den Schriften von Dietrich Eckert, 
Joseph Goebbels, Adolf Rosenberg und Adolf Hitler (Munich: W. Fink, 1998); Klaus 
Vondung, Magie und Manipulation: Ideologischer Kult und politische Religion 
des Nationalsozialismus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1994); Rich-
ard Steigmann- Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919 – 1945 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Wolfgang Hardtwig, “Political 
Religion in Modern Germany: Reflections on Nationalism, Socialism, and Na-
tional Socialism,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute (Washington, DC), 
28 (spring 2001): 3 – 27; Jane Caplan, “Politics, Religion, and Ideology: A Comment 
on Wolfgang Hardtwig,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute (Washington, 
DC), 28 (spring 2001): 28 – 36.
 24 Griffin, “Withstanding the Rush of Time.”
 25 George L. Mosse, Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality 
(New York: Howard Fertig, 1980), 194 – 96.
 26 Steven E. Aschheim, “Introduction,” in Payne, Sorkin, and Tortorice, What His-
tory Tells, 7.
 27 Mosse, Nationalization of the Masses, 127; “The Aesthetics of Politics” is chapter 2 
of the latter (21 – 46); Gentile uses “hunger for totality” and “confronting moder-
nity” in characterizing Mosse’s oeuvre; see Emilio Gentile, “A Professional Dwell-
ing: The Origin and Development of the Concept of Fascism in Mosse’s Histori-
ography,” in Payne, Sorkin, and Tortorice, What History Tells, 56, 58.
 28 Mosse, Nationalization of the Masses, 20.
 29 Helmut Gruber, “History of the Austrian Working Class: Unity of Scholarship and 
Practice,” International Labor and Working- Class History 24 (fall 1983): 50 – 52. See 
now Nadine Rossol, “Performing the Nation: Sport, Spectacles, and Aesthetics in 
Germany, 1926 – 36,” Central European History 43, no. 4 (2010): 616 – 38; and Nadine 
Rossol, Performing the Nation in Interwar Germany: Sport, Spectacle, and Political 
Symbolism, 1926 – 36 (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
 30 Rossol, “Performing the Nation,” 631.
 31 Canning, “Politics of Symbols,” 577. 
 32 Rossol, “Performing the Nation,” 638. 
 92 Geoff Eley
 33 See Jochen Thies, “Nazi Architecture: A Blueprint for World Domination: The 
Last Aims of Adolf Hitler,” in Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations, 
ed. David Welch (London: CroomHelm, 1983), 45 – 64.
 34 Martin Kitchen, Speer: Hitler’s Architect (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2015), 33.
 35 Kitchen, Speer, 35.
 36 See Paul B. Jaskot, “Heinrich Himmler and the Nuremberg Party Rally Grounds: 
The Interest of the ss in the German Building Economy,” in Art, Culture, and Me-
dia under the Third Reich, ed. Richard A. Etlin (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2002), 230 – 56.
 37 During the audience with Hitler, Hácha was assaulted by a verbal tirade so fero-
cious that he eventually fainted. See Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936 – 1945: Nemesis (New 
York: Norton, 2000), 170 – 71.
 38 The style of building per se could be quite eclectic. Sagebiel’s Air Ministry 
(1935 – 36) might well be assimilated into what became the international style, 
from Albert Kahn’s General Motors Building in Detroit (1919) to Hans Poelzig’s 
ig- Farben- Haus in Frankfurt (1931). That style traveled transnationally across Jo-
sef Stalin’s Soviet Union, Benito Mussolini’s Rome, and Stanley Baldwin’s Lon-
don. As Speer later claimed, there was nothing specifically national socialist about 
much of the architecture of the 1930s: “Ideology was apparent in the definition of 
the commission, but not in the style of its execution.” See Albert Speer, Spandauer 
Tagebücher (Berlin, 1975), 202, quoted in Kitchen, Speer, 32. For longer- term lega-
cies, see Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, Munich and Memory: Architecture, Monuments, 
and the Legacy of the Third Reich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); 
Karen E. Till, The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2005).
 39 Koepnick, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power, 1, 190.
 40 David Welch, “Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a Peo-
ple’s Community,” Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 2 (2004): 213, n1.
 41 Heinrich August Winkler, “Vom Mythos der Volksgemeinschaft,” Archiv für Sozi-
algeschichte 17 (1977): 485. 
 42 Scott Spector, “Was the Third Reich Movie- Made? Interdisciplinarity and the Re-
framing of ‘Ideology,’ ” American Historical Review 106, no. 2 (2001): 482 – 83, cit-
ing the argument of Lutz Koepnick, “Fascist Aesthetics Revisited,” modernism/
modernity 6 (1999), 51 – 73.
 43 Spector, “Was the Third Reich Movie- Made?,” 483. This is Spector’s rendition of 
the argument in Koepnick, “Fascist Aesthetics Revisited,” 52 – 54.
 44 See Peter Reichel, Der schöne Schein des Dritten Reiches: Faszination und Gewalt 
des Faschismus (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1992).
 45 Shelley Baranowski, “Strength through Joy: Tourism and National Integration in 
the Third Reich,” in Being Elsewhere: Tourism, Consumer Culture, and Identity in 
Modern Europe and North America, ed. Baranowski and Eileen Furlough (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 216; Shelley Baranowski, Strength 
 Nazism, Everydayness, and Spectacle   93
through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 121 – 22, 135.
 46 The “people’s radio” (Volksempfänger) was an exception: by 1941 almost 75 percent 
of households had radio sets, up from only 25 percent in 1933. But this was not ex-
ceptional to Nazi Germany. Radio was still more extensive in Denmark and Swe-
den, whereas Norway and France had faster growth from lower starting points.
 47 Bernhard Rieger, The People’s Car: A Global History of the Volkswagen Beetle 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 42 – 91.
 48 Baranowski, Strength through Joy, 6.
 49 “It was dominated by a massive pseudo- Classical tower of ten fluted piers joined 
by a cornice at the top, towering over all the nearby structures, including the So-
viet pavilion, and outdone only by the Eiffel Tower, which stood at the end of the 
avenue on which the structures were located. Red swastikas glowed at night from 
the spaces between the piers. Next to the tower, the long, rectangular, windowless 
main hall projected a monolithic sense of unity to the outside world.” See Richard 
J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power 1933 – 1939 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 185.
 50 See, classically, Anson G. Rabinbach, “The Aesthetics of Production in the Third 
Reich,” Journal of Contemporary History 11, no. 4 (1976): 43 – 74.
 51 Koepnick, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power, 180 – 81.
 52 Koepnick, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power.
 
4
F IVE FACES OF  FASCISM
Ruth Ben- Ghiat
“Visualizing fascism” might seem to be an easy endeavor. Most of us can 
easily conjure mental pictures of the right- wing regimes of the interwar and 
World War II years. Uniformed men on the march, children performing in 
sports arenas, the dictator in his uniformed splendor, state- sponsored vio-
lence on the street and in disciplinary spaces (prisons, camps, penal colonies) 
probably figure in this repertoire. One national case may come to mind, or 
perhaps the differing flags, costumes, and emblems blend into a transnational 
flow of fascist images. Either way, our quick takes (and those produced by 
Google and YouTube searches) often settle on two sets of images: the portrait 
of the leader, and fascism as a mass movement captured through shots of 
large- scale political spectacle and choreographed bodies.1 
The mental reflex that defaults to these two poles — the individual and 
the anonymous crowd — captures an essential truth about the workings and 
appeal of fascism in its own time. Studies of fascist aesthetics, spectatorship, 
and ritual bear out the importance of communal activities in shaping the 
particular sense of togetherness and social cohesiveness such regimes de-
pended on. Paul Corner cites “mass participation in public events” as the 
defining trait of Italian Fascism, understood as a “popular dictatorship,” and 
this could be extended to many other right- wing regimes. Attending mass 
rallies, taking part in parades and paramilitary exercises, or even just seeing 
films with the knowledge that informers were likely present in the theater 
trained people to subsume their own individuality to that of the collective. 
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This helped to shape the kinds of subjects who would work toward the so-
cial and political goals of the dictatorship. The leader, even if absent, was the 
binding force at these events. “Losing oneself” in public and sharing adula-
tion of the leader proved to be no small part of fascism’s appeal.2
This essay argues that when we uncritically rely on this image bank to 
study fascist regimes we risk replicating fascism’s point of view. It asks us to 
consider other ways of visualizing fascism, and it proposes one: focusing on 
the anonymous “faces in the crowd” that populate so many fascist photo-
graphs and moving images. We cannot draw any firm conclusions about what 
those unknown people might be thinking — we can never know the inner 
lives of those caught by fascism’s cameras — yet these visages, which are often 
neglected in analyses of the regime’s visual propaganda, deserve our atten-
tion nonetheless. They remind us of what these regimes most feared and what 
their leaders could never fully control: the agency and humanity of the indi-
vidual, and the everyday that existed apart from, or in spite of, the regime. 
It is remarkable that fascism’s visual archive has had such staying power, to 
the point of dominating popular views about what dictatorship looked and 
sounded like, even seventy years after the demise of these regimes. This essay 
asks us to look at elements that are already present in that archive but that we 
too often gloss over, and to look again at other kinds of images of the fascist 
era that we “see,” albeit perhaps through the veil of established visual tradi-
tions and historiographies. Noa Steimatsky argues that the cinema has long 
been inspired by “the inexhaustible promise of its human faces to condense 
and open up clues — true or false — of an inner life, of subjectivity.” Histori-
ans of dictatorship who seek to know more about those who were caught up 
in fascism’s mass occasions can scrutinize the faces of those who featured in 
its propaganda to glean clues as well.3 
Fascist techniques of visualization reflect the mind- set of leaders who 
consider people in the aggregate, charting history in grand lines and from a 
top- down perspective. Their states’ photographic and film archives excelled 
at conjuring this collective drive toward a glorious future, producing end-
less stills and reels of crowds as they enacted Fascism’s “wheel of destiny,” as 
Benito Mussolini called it, going where the regime wanted them to go.4 When 
the camera does come to rest on a face for more than a few seconds, it is usu-
ally for a political reason. Pans of “regional” or “imperial” physiognomies or 
traditional dress in the context of troop reviews or folkloric performances 
assert the diversified support for the regime’s endeavors. Lingering cameos 
of faces flushed with joy or otherwise overcome with emotion as they gaze 
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upon the leader reinforce the rewards of submission to his cults of virility and 
authority. And the continuous feed of loving gazes upon the leader shores 
up notions of his omniscience and omnipotence. Such close framings of the 
leader and his masculine proxies in fascist visual propaganda also inculcate 
ideals of masculinity through intermedial and extracinematic circulations. 
In his studies of the face, Roland Barthes called attention to “class and so-
cial markers effecting facial attitudes and repertoires of expression,” as Stei-
matsky writes, which were then internalized by the public and brought into 
daily life. Fascist propagandists added to these political and racial markers 
that led them to single out certain physiognomies and affects. Yet these spe-
cial faces also end up in the image- flow of a collective march to the future. 
Time and the cameras stopped only for the face of the one who was direct-
ing this fast history while also standing above it; as such, he was already a 
monument(al)- figure. Under fascism, the leader’s was the only political face 
that viewers were encouraged to duplicate and admire from every angle.5 
Taking as my case study fascist Italy and its culture of empire, I mine im-
ages from a variety of sources: films and photographs of the Istituto Luce (the 
regime’s official image production agency); a photograph taken by an Italian 
soldier who served in Ethiopia; raw footage of British troops capturing sol-
diers like him during that empire’s demise; and stock photos of the libera-
tion of Italy from Mussolini. Studying the faces therein, I seek to uncover the 
visual edge of the everyday, the small moments inside big events, as lived by 
men and women who face the cameras and silently speak to us — if we know 
how to look and listen. I also reflect on what “visualizing fascism” can mean 
for historians. For one thing, it raises questions about what sources we privi-
lege to understand the past. It means asking how we can locate history in im-
ages, and what the place of images is in history. The former question touches 
on methodology, whereas the latter engages in historiography. The historical 
profession still displays a certain reluctance to use images as anything more 
than supplements to written documents, whether for lack of confidence and 
training or a bias toward what might be called “proof of the page.” These are 
missed chances to learn what only images can tell us. The visual not only 
communicates in ways written documents cannot; it can also enrich the field 
of historical research by leading us to new subjects and lines of inquiry that 
often have scant traces in the written and oral historical record.
While I’m mindful of the particularities of the photographic medium, I 
rely here primarily on the writings of scholars who have studied the cinema- 
history relationship (such as Marc Ferro, Robert Rosenstone, Antoine de 
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Baecque, Marcia Landy, and Christian Delage) and on my own investiga-
tions into the case study of Fascist empire films. This body of work reminds 
us that images have their own ways of narrating the past, and to hold them to 
the standards of written historical texts is, in part, to miss the point.6 Images 
convey facts but also realms of perception and intuition. The stories they nar-
rate often don’t coincide with those the written records of the public sphere 
convey, nor do they always map onto what the historical and state establish-
ments deem appropriate, interesting, or worthy of narration. Long before the 
advent of gender and postcolonial studies, for example, the visual record of 
modern European empires told us just how central indigenous women and 
relations with them were in the operation of imperial fantasy and of practices 
of domination on the ground. As Rosenstone has written, the visual can be a 
valuable font of alternative historiographies that often precede written ones, 
especially in “societies recovering from totalitarian regimes or the horrors 
of war.”7 
My essay locates us in the thick of such a regime, during the Italian Fas-
cist occupation of Ethiopia (1935 – 41) and into World War II. The invasion 
of a League of Nations member and the massive use of chemical weapons 
brought international sanctions and the urgent need for image management 
on a different scale. Starting in 1936, the regime intensified its control of the 
media and invested heavily in both documentary and feature films on impe-
rial themes. These years allow us to explore what Lutz Koepnick terms “the 
distinctive implication of fascist aesthetics in a project of imperial warfare, 
national purification, and genocide.”8 They also highlight the regime’s stake 
in the visual as a means of conquest and governance. The Istituto Luce be-
came a laboratory for visual propaganda, and both the film and political press 
hosted lively debates about the potential of moving images to transform war 
journalism and the representation of history. Yet even as cameramen were 
hailed as paragons of military manhood, the space for their own vision nar-
rowed considerably. Luce’s industrial aesthetic required the body behind the 
camera to all but disappear in the name of a collective and anonymous “eye.” 
Moreover, the fast pace of newsreels and their aim to distill single moments 
into exemplary mass experiences left almost no room for the expression of 
individual subjectivity of the kind that might translate into the camera lin-
gering on a particularly expressive face. Thus do the two predominant views 
of the face in fascist newsreel propaganda mirror the broader figurations of 
the leader- mass model of power. We have the face of the leader — its compos-
ite elements (such as the eyes and jaw) each the subject of visual and textual 
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elaboration — and the cheering crowds seen in rapid pans that leave very little 
room for individuation.9 
Mussolini, All- Seeing
In their attention to the mechanics and culture of the image, Fascism’s film 
professionals had a superb teacher: Mussolini, who was Fascism’s most pro-
lific generator of images and its most beloved object.
My chosen view of Il Duce may seem odd in an essay about faces, given 
that his is only partly visible (figure 4.1). The focus, rather, is on his barely 
clothed body, the camera he peers through, and his scrawled signature. I 
start with this image as a reminder that processes of visualization begin and 
end with bodies. It is too easy for dictators’ faces to end up as otherworldly 
objects, ripe for worship as timeless symbols of absolute power — as, for ex-
ample, in the kind of internet memes so popular among today’s alt- right. In 
fact, at least three bodies haunt every image of the face: the body behind the 
camera, the body of the subject, and the bodies of its intended spectators. All 
three of these bodies are invoked in this image, released in 1934 by Musso-
lini’s press office, that depicts him on vacation in Rimini. The autographed 
card of Il Duce wielding a movie camera conjure his audience while alluding 
to the image- making process. Mussolini, then at the peak of his international 
celebrity (it would be tarnished when he invaded Ethiopia), was extremely 
conscious of all the elements of the stardom equation. Not only was his vis-
age disseminated and plastered all over Italy, but he was a star in America 
through his regular presence in newsreels and his own syndicated column in 
William Randolph Hearst’s one- thousand- plus publications.10 
But make no mistake: even as he allows us to gaze undisturbed at his 
sturdy body, he signals his control of the gaze and the technologies that ex-
tend it. Who is he looking at from his boat? His obscured face and pros-
thetic vision channels a world of state surveillance — informers hidden in 
the shadows, watching and listening, and policemen looking for the “right” 
faces — that often had brutal bodily consequences. We are always watching 
you, Mussolini says, even on the beach in July. It’s not surprising that a gi-
ant image of him looking through a movie camera, with armed soldiers and 
black- shirted officials lined up under it, reigned over the inauguration of the 
Cinecittà movie production complex in 1937.11 
The Face in the Crowd 
The mass events that feature so heavily in the repertoire of received images 
of fascism had a crucial role in the national and international legitimation 
of such regimes. After an initial period of public violence meant to close off 
other political options and frighten people into submission, fascist govern-
ments often became visible in a different manner. They marshaled crowds of 
people into public spaces to display approval of the dictator and his proxies 
and policies. The individual has meaning on these occasions only as part of 
an aggregate that lends itself to spectacle — a labor no less important than 
building roads or invading countries. The second face of Fascism, therefore, 
4.1 Mussolini All- Seeing, Rimini, 1934. 
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must be that of the individuals we find when we go into the crowd, in this 
instance the one assembled in Piazza Venezia in October 1935 to hear Mus-
solini’s announcement of the invasion of Ethiopia (figure 4.2). Italian troops 
were ready to strike at the Ethiopian border, so the rally was largely perfor-
mative: the regime wished to show the world that the coming aggression had 
a popular mandate.12 
The presence of Luce cameras everywhere at the rally underscored that the 
participants were “on stage,” no less so than Mussolini. In the spirit of the Na-
zis’ blockbuster rally in Nuremberg in 1934, people assembled during the day, 
giving the press ample time to track their activities. Mussolini delayed his 
appearance until nightfall. For further dramatic effect, and to let his phrases 
resonate, silences and pauses composed half of the oration. As always at mass 
rallies, only a tiny fraction of those present actually saw him. Most looked in 
the direction of his voice, as transmitted by loudspeakers — those agents of 
interpellation — or directly at the Luce cameras. Their closed mouths and ex-
pressions strongly suggest silence. They are not part of the wild cheering and 
shouting on the soundtrack later overlaid by the Luce — those after- the- fact 
sounds of “consent” that become part of the default images of such rightist 
rallies. Their faces are sober and alert: after all, impending war meant worry 
about husbands, fathers, and boyfriends being drafted. Or maybe they merely 
arranged their faces into the neutral expressions that are recommended when 
one lives in a police state, especially when one finds oneself on camera. The 
directness of their gazes suggests a calm dignity and reserve. In the midst of 
a Fascist spectacle announcing that Italians will be sent off to Ethiopia like 
cattle, they were perhaps reluctant to show the kinds of emotions the state 
prompted them to have on such occasions. Here, the face is a kind of wall or 
buffer against the state’s intrusions.13 
In another way, too, these faces in the crowd can help us to “visualize Fas-
cism.” Julia Adeney Thomas in chapter 7, this volume, calls attention to the 
states of unexception that exist during wartime and the many moments that 
require not rallies and heroics, but quiet fortitude.14 The faces in this photo, 
taken on the eve of a military invasion, also anticipate that state of waiting 
and endurance. Over a million men would be mobilized over the course of 
the next nine months, and we can imagine that some of these men would be 
injured, or even dead, one year later. Fascism is nowhere, and everywhere, in 
these images of the crowd, as it also might have been in the intimate lives of 
ordinary Italians. 
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The Face of Empire 
“Ethiopia, 1937” reads the inscription on the back of a photo found in an 
Italian soldier’s album of memories of his service (figure 4.3).15 We’re on the 
other side of the invasion, in a double sense. The highly asymmetrical Italo- 
Ethiopian war ended, after nine months, with the May 1936 declaration of 
Italian victory and the Italian East African Empire, although resistance re-
mained so fierce that the Fascists had to employ more air power for “gover-
nance” for the next three years than during the war.16 The stakes were high for 
the regime. In Ethiopia, Fascism would demonstrate what its “own” model of 
colonization really looked like, as Italy’s other African colonies (Libya, Soma-
lia, Eritrea) had developed in accordance with the lax racial and population 
concerns of the liberal era. Fascism’s “demographic colonization” foresaw a 
settler class brought from the metropole and from “Little Italies” all over the 
world. Luce films (and features) participated in this call for Italian emigrants 
to “come home” (to Addis Ababa rather than Asti), even as the prospect of 
a white influx into black Italian Africa led the Fascists to adopt racial laws 
starting in 1937. These laws criminalized miscegenation and levied fines for 
fraternalization among the races, which were considered damaging to Italian 
4.2 Faces in the Crowd: Listening to Mussolini, Rome, October 2, 1935. Still from 
“Adunata!” October 8, 1935, Giornale Luce b0761, Archivio Luce (author’s collection).
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“prestige.” As oral and other histories of the period make clear, though, this 
ideal of a segregationist paradise fell short in practice. Italian men listened 
more to the temptations advertised by the song “Faccetta nera” than the dic-
tates that came from Rome. Italian soldiers frequented local brothels (leading 
the regime to import white prostitutes to deter them) but also had long- term 
relationships with women, and some deserted the military to make a life in 
Ethiopia with their companions.17 
All of these histories surround the image of an Ethiopian woman who 
wears the hat of an Italian soldier. Perhaps the hat belongs to the soldier who 
took the picture, or to the third party she is smiling at. This female face, 
and its absent interlocutors, initiates us into the complexities of colonial re-
4.3 Woman Wearing a 
Soldier’s Hat, Ethiopia, 
1937. Courtesy of Maaza 
Mengiste.
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lations, which were built on dynamics of intimacy and distance, dependency 
and domination.18 Who is this woman? Did the soldier place the hat on her 
head to stage the picture, or did she do it herself? If so, was it in a spirit of af-
fection or of mockery? The scale of the picture is intimate, almost domestic. 
She looks down, as though at someone seated close by; a tucul, or hut (per-
haps hers?), is in the background. The hat is the contrasting element in the 
picture: seen with the hut and her dress it limns the foreignness and strange-
ness of the Italian presence in Ethiopia. At the same time, her wearing of the 
hat enacts the acceptance of the “normality” of the Italian occupation, given 
that the hat seems to be a familiar, rather than frightening, object for her. 
The seeming ease of the situation might lead us to assume that this woman is 
the soldier’s lover. Perhaps. The album that holds this image contains plenty 
of tourist- style pictures and shots of comrades, but no other such intimate 
photographs with women. Whatever their relationship, the image captures 
a happy moment, and its female subject escapes from both the ethnographic 
and eroticizing views of the “black woman as seen by white man” purveyed 
by fascist propaganda. 
And yet it is those highly asymmetrical relations that prevail in the fascist 
visual archive we have inherited and work with even today. After World War 
II, as Ruth Iyob has shown, the Italian soldier exited from colonial memory 
as an agent of violence but remained in play as a libidinal subject. For exam-
ple, the journalist Indro Montanelli (1909 – 2001), who denied for years that 
Italy used chemical weapons in Ethiopia, concurrently boasted on television 
about buying and then selling a twelve- year- old girl during his wartime mi-
litary service. The smiling woman in the soldier’s hat undoes this strategy. 
You can’t remember me and my beauty, she says to us, without thinking of 
the military occupation that made this picture possible. The photograph has 
the status of “imperial debris,” to use Ann Stoler’s term — artifacts of difficult 
memory that beg us to pick them up and take a second look.19
The Face of Defeat
The Italian soldier came back into the picture as the Fascist empire dis-
integrated. Italian East Africa had already been lost by the time the Allies 
launched Operation Compass to drive the Fascists and Nazis out of North 
Africa. Luce’s cameraman filmed the determinant Siege of Tobruk (1941), but 
this image is from the victor’s side. The conquering British shot the outcome 
of the battle: thousands of Italian soldiers and officers captured. The still in 
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figure 4.4 is from raw footage taken by the British military, some of which 
was destined for propaganda films that were shown to the public. The intent, 
as in the prisoner of war scenes filmed by almost every World War II captor, 
is to demonstrate momentum of the national war machine and boost spirits 
by showing the enemy cowed and taken from the battlefield. This particu-
lar film begins with every soldier’s biggest humiliation — disarmament — and 
continues through the prisoners’ transport to makeshift internment camps in 
Libya and Egypt. Relying on prisoners’ memoirs, oral histories, and archival 
documents, we can suppose that some of these men already knew they might 
be sent to faraway places (such as India, Australia, South Africa), and that 
others might have been secretly relieved at their removal from a war going 
badly. British cameraman had more liberty than Italians to film what inter-
ested them, and the film catches a range of individual reactions to the ordeal 
of capture. A high- ranking officer refuses a body search, his face showing 
irritation as he swats away the British soldier with a gesture of someone ac-
customed to the distance that comes with command.20 
I have chosen to present a moment in which the subject returns the cam-
eraman’s curiosity, resulting in sustained mutual regard. In this image the 
new prisoners crowd in, their differing attire showing how men from di-
verse military provenances had been thrust into a common fate. Those clos-
est to the camera evince an eagerness and even excitement at being filmed, 
as though everything else has been forgotten for a moment. In the men be-
hind them, though, one can intuit worry (far right) and perhaps the struggle 
to process the enormity of capture: Who are these men who will now decide 
my fate (center)? These candid shots, taken in the first flush of defeat, uncover 
moments that are forgotten or covered over in simplistic Fascist narratives 
of military heroism — fighting until death rather than surrender, the many 
willingly sacrificing for the one — that are kept alive throughout the postwar 
period, not least by the militaristic images of anonymous troops marching 
and saluting the leader. And so it’s interesting that it’s the small scale of hu-
man interaction — the scale of face- to- face contact, the spontaneously human 
moment — that irritates the Fascist film critic Sisto Favre when he laments 
that Italians were still too “generous” after twenty years of dictatorship. His 
solution? More displays of cruelty on screen. “The war film, whether as di-
rect documentary or documented dramatic feature, must teach and instill 
hatred,” he recommended in June 1943.21
By then the Italian war effort was in shambles. Mussolini would be re-
moved from power by his own Grand Council one month later. Surrender to 
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the Allies, occupation by both Allies and Nazis, and the trauma of civil war 
were to follow. Yet a new way of seeing had already began to take hold. The 
future director Alberto Lattuada had authored the manifesto of this new gaze 
in 1941 with a book of photographs that denounced the consequences of years 
of internalizing Fascist propaganda’s aggressive and dehumanizing gaze and 
belief that the individual must be sacrificed for the good of the whole: “People 
have lost the eyes of love and can no longer see clearly; they stagger in the ob-
scurity of death. Here are the origins of the disintegration of all values and 
the destruction and sterilization of conscience: it is a long chain that is an-
chored at the devil’s feet.” Lattuada’s own eyes of love translated into new im-
ages of Fascism: men, women, and children living in penury, selling humble 
objects to survive. This too was an outcome of Fascism’s visual culture, and 
one that would have important consequences for cinema and photography at 
the close of the war: the turn away from the triumphal and the exotic to look 
anew at one’s own surroundings and engage with the struggles and poetry 
of daily life.22 
4.4 Faces of Surrender: Greeting the Camera, Tobruk, 1941. Still from “The Fall of Tobruk,” 
January 24, 1941, ayy 91. Courtesy of the Imperial War Museum Film and Video Archive.
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Mussolini, Unseeing
Piazza Loreto, Milan, 1945. Mussolini lies on the ground, his eyes unseeing, 
his face and body battered (figure 4.5). No longer the Leader, he’s one of many, 
a body jettisoned with those of other Fascists after being executed by parti-
sans. His only distinction is a Fascist emblem ironically placed in his life-
less hands. This uncredited image must have been taken soon after Mus-
solini came down from the scaffolding he had swung from, high above the 
piazza, so that people who had lived for decades in a context of government- 
manufactured reality could verify with their own eyes that he was dead. For 
years, Fascist propaganda had elided the regime’s own violence and created 
a halo of invincibility around the chief persecutor. The display of the corpse 
was a kind of undoing of that blinded vision, while the actions the crowd took 
next — battering the inanimate Mussolini almost to a pulp — not only enacted 
popular revenge but literally defaced him, removing him from his pedestal. 
The writer Curzio Malaparte, long a worshipper of Il Duce and present at 
the scene, noted that only Mussolini’s eyes had escaped mutilation. “No one 
had ever looked at the Italians the way he looked at them when he was alive,” 
Malaparte wrote, noting that even in death those eyes retained their almost 
magical intensity. Clearly, Mussolini would be a troublesome corpse, capable 
of continuing to orchestrate the leader- crowd dynamic from his grave. Per-
haps that’s why the new Italian republic took the extraordinary measure of 
hiding Il Duce’s body from 1945 to 1957, refusing to return it to the Mussolini 
family until that year.23
Paradoxically, the quick removal of the defaced Mussolini from sight al-
lowed him to be remembered intact — effacing, as it were, that popular fury. 
When his name is entered into internet search engines, the resulting im-
ages show him at his peak splendor. Yet the knowledge of which bodies took 
those images, and why, has eroded over time. The digitalization of the Luce 
archives starting in 2000 counters this loss. Not only does it make Luce’s 
enormous corpus of photographic and nonfiction film propaganda available 
for study, it allows us to identify images we take as “typical” of Fascism still 
today as part of official state propaganda, reminding us of what remained off- 
screen. I’ve presented these five images to restore some of that context and 
to bring back into view those who might be dismissed as part of “the mass” 
that submits to authority. The faces I examine tell a more complicated story, 
one worth investigating further, for the common denominator of all such 
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regimes is their dedication to annihilating individuality. They mobilize the 
visual to teach us not to see. “Visualizing fascism” means taking up these old 
images with new eyes.
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FACE T IME WITH HITLER
Lutz Koepnick 
1
Published in spring 1932, Heinrich Hoffmann’s photo album Hitler wie ihn 
keiner kennt (The Hitler nobody knows) transformed Hitler’s private life into 
a matter of public concern. It did not simply showcase the ordinariness of 
Hitler’s existence beyond noisy party rallies and agitated performances, it 
also silenced rumors about his lifestyle and emphasized his fitness for gov-
erning. The book’s release date was well chosen, its pictures of Hitler in the 
mountains hiking, picnicking, or simply relaxing meant to reignite a political 
campaign presently in disarray.1 To see Hitler resting his hand on a child’s 
shoulder or enjoying moments of pause amid spectacular landscapes privi-
leged moral authenticity over strategic action; it was to witness an empathetic 
human who was much more electable than political opponents on the Left 
and hesitant middle- class voters may have assumed. To learn from Baldur 
von Schirach’s preface about Hitler’s vegetarianism and his resistance to both 
alcohol and tobacco, and to see him easily navigating the divide between the 
political and the intimate, was to situate the aspiring chancellor as a true 
embodiment of a future cleansed from the vices of Weimar political culture. 
Hoffmann’s images unlocked the private as a space seemingly void of politi-
cal conflict, only to convert it into a stage whose apparent ordinariness served 
eminently political purposes after all. 
Hitler’s success in 1933 hardly depended on Hoffmann’s public relations 
campaign of 1932. Yet Hitler wie ihn keiner kennt certainly brought a preview 
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of coming (fatal) attractions, a blueprint for coupling technological media to 
political causes without precedent in nineteenth- and early twentieth- century 
history. Hitler wie ihn keiner kennt ran through various reprints and sold 
more than 400,000 copies over the next ten years. It was complemented by 
similar volumes such as Jugend um Hitler (Youth around Hitler, 1934), Hitler 
in seinen Bergen (Hitler in his mountains, 1935), and Hitler abseits vom All-
tag (Hitler away from it all, 1937), each selling more than 200,000 copies and 
outflanking the distribution of photo albums featuring Hitler’s role as states-
man and commander in chief. It inspired the transformation of Hitler’s im-
age into a commodity of first rank, a desirable icon circulating as postcard, 
wall image, and collectable trading card. It also converted Hoffmann’s studio 
from a local photographer’s shop to a full- fledged industrial operation, an 
image factory that systematically capitalized on Hoffmann’s unique access 
to Hitler and his relative monopoly over the mechanical reproduction of the 
Führer’s face and body.2 Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, photographic 
images of Hitler as a private individual — his love for children, dogs, and the 
mountains; his need to relax from rigorous work without declining into mere 
idleness; his eagerness to read books, newspapers, maps, and architectural 
blueprints — became the stuff of his subjects’ dreams. These images vitally 
enhanced the Nazi choreography of political life, helped brand Hitler’s per-
sona, and energized a profitable culture of photographic reproduction that 
seemed to collapse given boundaries between professionals and amateurs, 
image makers and spectators. 
If scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s was quick to identify (and thereby de-
nounce) aesthetic strategies peculiar to fascism and national socialism, more 
measured perspectives have prevailed since the 1990s. Rather than seeing 
Nazi film, architecture, and painting as embodiments of fascist aesthetics, 
we focus on how aesthetics operated under conditions of fascism, that is, how 
fascism managed to massage minds and engineer politically useful emotions 
with the aid of aesthetic materials whose visual appearance may have been 
unique neither to the 1930s nor to the stages of totalitarian power. Not all 
products of Nazi film studios, nor even a majority, incorporated the chore-
ography of mass movements, the rituals of messianic leadership and collec-
tive submission, infamously captured by Leni Riefenstahl. Monumentalist 
sculptures à la Arno Breker and neoclassical designs by Paul Troost may have 
structured how Nazi politics wanted the individual to perceive and navigate 
public space, but neither Breker’s nor Troost’s styles were exclusive to the Nazi 
state, and both were potently present in contemporary democratic societies 
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too. If up until the 1980s Riefenstahl, Breker, and Troost provided signature 
examples of what Walter Benjamin called the fascist aestheticization of the 
political,3 the culturalist turns of the 1990s brought out the heterogeneity at 
the core of Nazi culture while highlighting many other aspects of art, culture, 
visual perception, mass media, and aesthetic experience during the 1930s and 
early 1940s. The notion of fascist aesthetics not only has lost both historical 
and systematic specificity, it also no longer illuminates the mingling of poli-
tics and the aesthetic, of advanced media culture and the representation of 
power during other periods. 
The life and afterlife of Nazi photography, of photographs taken, circu-
lated, and viewed under German fascism, relate oddly to these changes in 
perspective and evaluation. To be sure, Hoffmann’s own visual style of the 
1920s and 1930s, when showing Hitler not as a seemingly private citizen but 
as a statesman molding the body politic like clay, approximated what Riefen-
stahl’s films, Breker’s sculptures, or Troost’s architecture aspired to accom-
plish. Although not initially intended for publication, Hoffmann’s famous 
1927 series of Hitler probing different rhetorical poses sought, as I have ar-
gued elsewhere, “to define the political as a self- referential space of ongoing 
motion in which mesmerizing surface designs, strategic self- performances, 
and desensitized forms of seeing undid the legacies of bourgeois culture and 
public debate.”4 In showing Hitler in different postures of leadership, Hoff-
mann’s camera hoped no less than to eliminate some of the dominant bina-
ries of bourgeois life, such as that between authenticity and dissimulation. 
It invited viewers to become — true to Ernst Jünger’s writing on photogra-
phy and culture — experts in cool conduct.5 Rather than simply documenting 
what has often been read as a self- revelatory freak show, Hoffmann’s images 
coupled photographic reproduction to the cause of political mobilization. 
These images engaged different rhetorics of representation to do away with 
rhetoric altogether and, like Riefenstahl in the 1930s, recast the real as image, 
the image as real.
And yet, just as all of Hoffmann’s photography between the 1920s and 
mid- 1940s cannot be reduced to a single style, mode, or aspiration, nor can 
photography under German fascism be described more generally as existing 
in the singular. There is no particularly fascist way of capturing the world as 
photographic image; of cropping the image and situating certain elements 
outside the frame; of triangulating the relationship between photographer, 
photographed, and viewed; of depicting bodies and objects. With the advent 
of lightweight cameras in the 1920s, photography became a widespread prac-
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tice taking many forms. Most of the pictures taken, exchanged, and collected 
in albums during the 1930s and 1940s, by professionals, hobbyists, and ama-
teurs alike, are commonly indistinguishable, whether in form or even con-
tent, from what Germans may have been picturing on either side of the Nazi 
time. To speak of Nazi photography, of fascist photography, would mislead 
even more than would identifying a uniquely fascist language of filmmaking, 
public art, and architecture. Accordingly, the critical discourse about photo-
graphic images during the Nazi period emphasizes questions that are often 
different from those familiar from other art forms and mass media. On the 
one hand, much writing has concerned the role of amateur and professional 
photographers in capturing wartime atrocities and genocidal activities, prob-
ing degrees of culpability and complicity: How did taking and viewing pho-
tographic images, it has been asked, desensitize the perceptions of those com-
mitting or witnessing the crimes of national socialism?6 In perhaps the most 
rigorous inquiry yet, Georges Didi- Huberman’s Images malgré tout (2003) 
extends this line of inquiry to those rare images concentration camp prison-
ers took to document the horrors of Auschwitz.7 By learning to look at these 
images, argues Didi- Huberman, we do justice to photographic acts of resis-
tance and reclaim what was previously declared incommunicable, ineffable, 
and unrepresentable about camp atrocities. On the other hand, scholars have 
also devised frameworks to address the massive photographic archive left by 
amateurs and hobbyists in capturing and commemorating scenes seemingly 
devoid of politics altogether.8 Some of this work remains haunted by an older 
assumption: no picture of ordinariness, of nonpolitical intimacy, taken dur-
ing fascism can ever be viewed as unpolitical or innocent. But as other recent 
scholarship argues, rather than leaping directly from the Nazis enjoying their 
everyday lives to what precisely is not shown in the images themselves, we 
should refocus our gaze on what the image visibly displays. Although many 
amateur photographers were of course Nazis, the world as viewed and ar-
rested by means of their cameras cannot be reduced to a mere chimera whose 
sole purpose was to make people not see the violence and death Nazis com-
mitted in the real world.9
Hoffmann’s pictures of Hitler in domestic settings are usually read as 
highly calculated invitations to look away, to forget what fascism was all 
about. By endowing Hitler’s persona with human qualities so as to make 
people blind to his true nature, they made the political beyond the frame 
all the more compelling. As the argument runs, whatever we see in them 
is meant to eclipse what exists beyond the photographic frame, to vacate a 
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space for even more effective operations of propaganda and power; whatever 
they show leaves no later grounds for viewing them at all, other than to fe-
tishize the icons of Nazi power. By pretending to show something the viewers 
did not know, Hoffmann’s Hitler images deactivated the very possibility of 
knowledge. They obscured the truth of fascism. No look at what they frame, 
however rigorous, will ever restore that truth; it will always make us look at 
the monstrous without seeing it for what it was. 
When we abandon a merely representational understanding of photo-
graphic imaging and engage these images on their own ground, we find far 
more in Hoffmann’s images of Hitler during the 1930s than critics and histo-
rians typically assume. For Hoffmann’s images offer no less than a manual of 
how to think about, see, and circulate photographic images as something that 
exceeds the representational; a visual set of instructions teaching viewers not 
to burden photographs with traditional truth claims; a laboratory collapsing 
presumed differences between the real and the image by redefining a cam-
era’s mechanical gaze as the truth and essence of organic vision. Hoffmann’s 
images are deeply paradoxical. They not only train viewers to embrace photo-
graphic vision and practice as basic principles of what it means to live in and 
perceive Nazi Germany, but also seek to persuade the viewer that photogra-
phy at heart has very little to say and communicate in the first place. While 
showing Hitler off the beaten track, Hoffmann’s images want their viewers to 
understand that there is nothing to understand when it comes to photogra-
phy. Far more than simply glorifying Hitler as an honorable and empathetic 
man, they envision photography as a pervasive modern technology whose 
principle purpose is to take hold of the everyday, independent of what any in-
dividual picture might really be about. Similar to the tweets, Instagram mes-
sages, and Facebook communications of our own time, Hoffmann’s Hitler — 
a medium embodying its own message — wants to teach us that we need not 
read images because, in essence, photographic images are all about doing 
rather than representing; their task is to shape, transform, and be part of the 
world rather than merely to picture it. 
2
In the early years of the Nazi movement, Hitler was said to base his impact 
primarily on the aura of his voice and refused any effort to circulate photo-
graphic portraits in the public. According to Heinrich Hoffmann’s biogra-
phy, in autumn 1922 Hitler requested $30,000 to have his picture taken and 
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printed in national and international newspapers.10 In the preface to Hoff-
mann’s Hitler wie ihn keiner kennt, Baldur von Schirach described Hitler’s 
early camera shyness as a sign of the agitator’s moral authenticity, his refusal 
to buy into the putative degeneracy of Weimar consumer culture: “To be 
popular means: to be photographed a lot. Adolf Hitler has always resisted 
becoming an object of photography. In particular twelve years ago, when his 
name emerged for the first time from the darkness of anonymity, he was a 
declared enemy of the camera. Back then, the whole world’s illustrated press 
tried to obtain a picture of the Führer. Without success. In spite of all kinds 
of monetary offers, Hitler categorically refused to have his picture taken for 
the sake of reproduction.”11 At once the metaphorical and physical organ of 
the putatively disenfranchised, Hitler’s voice was to serve as the movement’s 
principal medium, not least of all because it seemed to escape the very traps 
modern technology had set for acts of human communication.
Little of Hitler’s reticence about cameras remained when Hoffmann, with 
Hitler wie ihn keiner kennt, embarked on a whole sequence of coffee-table 
books positioning Hitler as Nazi Germany’s foremost object of photography. 
Hoffmann’s images of Hitler’s private side have been much discussed, most 
often perhaps for what they do not show, or conversely, for reconstructing 
Hitler’s circles and hidden levels of access, influence, and command. In what 
follows, however, I identify four tropes that emerge if Hoffmann’s images 
are viewed at much closer range and our eyes peruse their visual surfaces. 
It transpires that the effort to read these images is deeply paradoxical, given 
that Hoffmann’s photography intends no less than to exceed and displace 
reading. And yet, whether they feature Hitler’s hands, his role as a reader, his 
unceasing alertness, or his transformation of the privacy of trains and cars 
into a public stage, all such tropes allegorize how photography can or should 
move photographers and viewers alike beyond traditional notions of the im-
age. As they present Hitler’s sight as a medium to propagate a world in which 
photographic perception and image making may reign triumphant, all four 
tropes define the very act of taking pictures as a technique of inhabiting the 
present. They provide interfaces to the matter of the nation.
Hands. Although rarely the single focus of any particular picture, Hit-
ler’s hands figure prominently in the entire series of photo books. They are 
folded across each other in postures of attentive listening; hold or rest with 
great care and deliberation on books, newspapers, architectural drawings, 
and maps; arch over a chair’s armrest in gestures of simultaneous relaxation 
and alertness; lift binoculars to the Führer’s eyes in order to fortify his gaze; 
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sign scraps of paper autograph hunters present to Hitler during car rides 
through the countryside; and most of all, touch upon the shoulders, cheeks, 
and heads of children as they cross his path in the crowd or are chaperoned 
by their parents to meet Hitler one- on- one. To touch one hand with the other, 
French philosopher Maurice Merleau- Ponty once argued, reveals to us the 
two dimensions of what he called the flesh: the fact that bodies are both ve-
hicles of (tactile) experience and objects to be touched by others. And yet, 
“when I press my two hands together, it is not a matter of two sensations felt 
together as one perceives two objects placed side by side, but of an ambigu-
ous arrangement in which the two hands can alternate in the role of ‘touch-
ing’ and ‘touched.’ ”12 In Hoffmann’s images, Hitler’s hands reveal little of this 
ambiguity. Hitler’s hands touch upon his subjects, but such touching in the 
larger choreography of Hoffmann’s images is designed as a one- way street, 
maintaining distances however proximate Hitler’s body may be. Here the 
hand’s touch enchants, energizes, fascinates, commands, arrests, and moves 
the one being touched, but it does so without ever collapsing the difference, 
on the side of the toucher, between “touching” and “touched,” that is, with-
out ever situating Hitler as the one recognizing the various dimensions of 
his own flesh. Hitler’s hands touch, but they never define him as an object 
of touch, nor do they ever serve Hitler as vehicles of haptic experience. They 
disseminate rather than grasp; they radiate outward rather than absorb or 
appropriate the world. 
In Jugend um Hitler (1934), Hoffmann presents the viewer with a young 
woman, eager to catch the Führer’s autograph as his automobile passes by 
(figure 5.1). Her face is in the center of the picture; her hands hold a notepad. 
Typical of Hoffmann’s casual style of framing, referencing an amateur’s lack 
of compositional control to create a sense of documentary authenticity, the 
image barely shows Hitler’s hand at all, relegates it to a small area at the lower 
left. And yet this hand completely dominates the picture. It reaches into the 
frame, clasping a pen between thumb and finger. About to leave a mark on 
the paper, Hitler’s hand is in full command of the woman’s eyes, riveting her 
attention to what is about to happen. Hitler’s hand is a sight that fascinates, a 
unique presence that governs space even before it touches upon objects and 
imparts their singular meaning. It not only animates and seizes the woman’s 
look. It structures and thereby “holds” the entire image, at once defining and 
transgressing the boundary between the visible and the out- of- frame. Al-
though the woman may have managed to halt the car’s movement to gather a 
handwritten trophy, it is Hitler’s hand that arrests viewers and thus precisely 
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succeeds in deeply affecting her, in moving the viewer. The pen in Hitler’s 
hand is no different than a finger ready to press a camera’s shutter release. It 
is poised to transform the world into an image, to divide space into zones of 
visibility and what resides off- frame, all the while defining images — the page 
of the notepad awaiting the Führer’s lasting inscription — as belonging to the 
very world they capture. As indexical traces of the real, they have a power 
that energizes reality itself.
Reading. The sheer number of Hoffmann’s images showing Hitler as an 
avid reader is astounding. None of them, however, depicts Hitler with what 
he required in order to read in the first place — namely, reading glasses — as 
though the visibility of such devices would question the intensity of his acts 
of reading, the display of sophistication and intellectual curiosity meant to 
correct images of Hitler as no more than a shrill agitator ill- suited for the 
demands of great politics. One of the most famous shows him in civilian 
clothes turning away from a newspaper and looking directly into the camera, 
a rather unusual smile — slightly forced — on his face, arms resting on legs as 
he sits in the grass in some indistinct outdoor location (figure 5.2).
5.1 “Ein Autogramm, 
bitte!” (Jugend um Hitler, 
1934). 
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As so often, Hoffmann’s choices of grain and focus obscure what exactly 
Hitler might be reading; here, as elsewhere, lines of text fuse into solid gray 
blocks on paper. The caption adds a curious twist. While presenting Hitler in 
a moment of relaxation and solitude away from the cities’ turmoil and his po-
litical duties, it identifies his reading material as an enemy news paper whose 
“fairy tales” about his persona — “Champagne orgies, Jewish girl friends, lux-
ury mansions, French money . . .” — visibly elicit his amusement. Viewers 
can glean nothing of this from the image itself. The illegibility of the text 
in the picture opens up ample space for signification, while Hitler’s missing 
glasses make viewers wonder what exactly produced the amusement in the 
first place. 
Hoffmann’s photographs of Hitler as reader, especially when capturing 
him in natural environments, recall and rework a long pictorial tradition 
in which reading was encoded as spiritual communication — initially with 
God, then later as literary exaltation. Reading subtracted the reader from the 
confines of space and time. It operated as a technique of disembodiment, of 
unbound absorption. As it connected the subject to something transcendent 
and invisible, the act of reading divested readers of self- awareness, intention-
ality, and instrumental reason, of doing something in the first place or being 
5.2 “Erholung. 
Abgeschieden von Lärm 
und Unruhe der Städte 
ruht hier der Führer auf 
den großen Wiesen in der 
Nähe seines Häuschens 
von den Strapazen des 
Kampfes aus. Dabei liest 
er dann die gegnerischen 
Zeitungen und freut sich 
über die Märchen, die 
sie über ihn verbreiten: 
Sektgelage, jüdische 
Freundinnen, Luxusvilla, 
französische Gelder . . .”  
(Hitler wie ihn keiner 
kennt, 1932). 
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viewed by others in this (non)doing. Although Hoffmann’s images work hard 
to continue this tradition, showcasing moments of absorption as a condition 
for the possibility of benevolent leadership, they invariably achieve some-
thing quite different. Books and newspapers in Hitler’s hands mostly figure as 
mechanisms of embodiment: they situate Hitler in, rather than evacuate him 
from, the materiality, temporality, and relationality of spatial environments. 
Here, to read is not to interface the divine or purely poetic or to transport 
the reading subject to a certain state of obliviousness and unconsciousness, 
ceding self- awareness and willfulness. It is to anchor the reader’s — Hitler’s — 
body in space, to showcase his wondrous ability to inhabit spaces of appar-
ent quiet and solitude amid the busy routines of political leadership, to refuel 
what it takes to be present rather than immerse himself in what exceeds vis-
ibility and tangibility. Hitler’s books and newspapers, in Hoffmann’s pho-
tographs, are objects of the world that enable readers to relish the physical 
pleasures of holding their covers, turning their pages, sensing their touch, 
and smelling their scent. Like photographs themselves, they do not lead their 
users to other worlds altogether but by their physical imprints insert differ-
ent times and places into the viewer’s space. No photograph ever shows Hit-
ler looking at photographs, not simply because self- reflexive gestures would 
have thwarted the authenticity of the amateur snapshot, but perhaps because 
Hitler always already reads texts as if they are photographic reproductions, 
as images that live in the world as much as index it.
Idleness. Hoffmann’s famous 1927 images of Hitler probing rhetorical 
poses tried to counter photography’s association with death, its logic of turn-
ing fleeting presents into corpses, by turning it on its head. In the name of en-
gineering a viewer whose body could be subsumed coldly to the task of total 
mobilization, Hoffmann’s camera pictured Hitler as a speaker poised to push 
against and break the frame; a body that could not be contained by the fixity 
of mechanical images; a presence that eliminated death from reproduction, 
inscribed temporal flows and dynamics in still images, and thus, in its effort 
to move and mobilize the viewer, animated photography to become film. In 
Hoffmann’s photographs from the 1930s, little remains of the Hitler whose 
arms, hands, limbs, and entire torso had once vehemently pounded against 
the cell of his reproduction. In most of the images gathered in Hoffmann’s 
coffee-table books, to be sure, Hitler’s gaze typically fixes on something out-
side the frame, his physical posture symbolizing his visionary powers. While 
serving as an object to be looked at, he is rarely shown reciprocating other 
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gazes. Most commonly, he directs existing networks of gazes to what only an-
other picture — hence, an anticipated future — could fully reveal. In addition, 
he is frequently captured in trains and cars, mobile interfaces rendering his 
image for crowds of attentive onlookers. On the other hand, pictures rarely 
show Hitler’s body itself in motion, midstride, capturing attention through 
physical activity as a kinesthetic attraction. In contrast to the 1927 series, 
Hoffmann’s Hitler of the 1930s is a man of calm and composure, no longer 
rubbing against the frame and trying to beat photography at its own game. 
He is, in other words, all photograph, compliant with, assimilating to, and 
embodying what photography as a medium can do best.
Not one of Hoffmann’s pictures, even those showing Hitler as a vacationer 
in “his” mountains in Hitler in seinen Bergen, ever presents him simply as 
being idle, as a slacker, as languid, or in poses of absentmindedness. On 
the contrary, repose comes with a sharpening of attention, with being alert, 
thoughtful, and receptive. The Führer’s body is never subtracted from the 
world but situated more firmly in its physical surrounds, recentering things 
around him. Although Hoffmann’s prefaces typically emphasize Hitler’s need 
for stretches of empty time, slowness, and absorption amid the demands of 
political campaigning and caring for the nation, the images themselves show-
case empty time as a time of heightened presence, not of drift but of utter fo-
cus and responsiveness. Hitler, the viewer learns, is always “on.” Nothing can 
possibly escape his gaze and awareness. 
In one picture, his head tilts downward, right hand holding the chin, eyes 
fixed on the ground (figure 5.3). The unusual composition has four planes of 
representation: Hitler in the immediate foreground on the left; some bushes 
and trees in the midground opening a view onto the background’s meadow, 
trees, and — somewhat surprisingly — a little shrine along a road; and finally 
a mountain rising majestically in the far background on the right. This is 
no posture of absentmindedness or absorptive introspection. The image’s 
horizontal spread, planar recession, and perspectival construction suggest 
something quite other: beyond Hitler’s features, screening the contents of 
his inner eye, lies a mindscape projected onto various planes of visibility. 
Rather than capturing Hitler in a moment of precarious nonengagement, 
then, the image actually constructs him as a powerful metteur- en- scène. He 
becomes a godlike conjurer who understands how to translate inner visions 
into physical realities. He potently directs the very structure of the viewer’s 
looking. 
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In another photograph, Hitler appears on the terrace of his mountain 
home watching a boy whose eyes are glued to a telescope, seeing what es-
capes our own (and Hitler’s) view (figure 5.4). Hitler’s half- open mouth sug-
gests that he is speaking to his young visitor. The slightly bent posture indi-
cates some urgency, as if encouraging or instructing the boy in the proper 
use of this technology of vision. In a curiously disjunctive triangle of looks 
linking Hitler, the boy, and the viewer, with no one’s gaze ever reciprocating 
the other, the photograph places Hitler in all his leisurely repose as the cen-
tral choreographer of the visible, of a visual field structuring the very modes 
of possible perception. 
In Hitler’s universe, these two photographs suggest, visual media are never 
merely tools for capturing the world in representation. Rather, they produce 
and provide an entire infrastructure of human existence, a comprehensive 
environment for, and elemental condition of, being in the world. For Hitler, 
with idleness this world would implode. It would radically deflate what holds 
Nazi society together. In Hitler’s (re)engineering of the world — as one made 
by and for different acts, practices, technologies, and techniques of looking — 
there is no outside.
5.3 Hitler in seinen Bergen, 1935. 
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Vehicles. In the early Nazi years, radio was to governance what Twitter 
is to twenty- first- century political campaigns: it provided a sense of instant 
connectivity, of seemingly unmediated presence, that cuts across existing 
boundaries of public and private, the intimate and the political.13 This ar-
chetype of modern communication technologies was at once succeeded and 
completed by Hitler’s use of airplanes during the campaigns in the early 
1930s. Before television’s mass arrival, yet not so removed from Instagram 
and other social media of today, air travel propelled Hitler’s image speed-
ily around the country, networking distant constituencies into the unified 
nation.14 If radios inserted the immediacy of Hitler’s voice into the home’s 
interior, airplanes mobilized Hitler’s body into ubiquitous visibility. What 
both media accomplished jointly, however, was to make political leadership 
seem inevitable and indisputable. So, far from simply re- presenting images 
and sounds of Hitler to the crowds, they used the capacity of modern media 
for building worlds and infrastructures to shape, move, and arrest these very 
crowds in space and time.
In Hoffmann’s photo albums, for good reasons, neither radios nor air-
planes really move center stage. The former eluded easy photographic repro-
5.4 “Wie schön ist die Aussicht vom Haus Wachenfeld” (Hitler in seinen Bergen, 1935).
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duction: neither invisible sonic waves nor sound’s ability to collapse spatial 
distance could fit the framing power of photographic images. The latter, on 
the other hand, still the wondrous spectacle of advanced technology, could 
scarcely feature Hitler’s humble and empathetic side in the way to which 
Hoffmann’s snapshot aesthetic aspired. Yet modern transportation is not 
entirely foreign to Hoffmann’s images of the 1930s. Hitler repeatedly travels 
the countryside in his Mercedes convertible, dispensing his autograph like 
a marquee movie star. While the images themselves may not have been de-
liberately staged, with crowd control and security measures, they each show 
Hitler’s car as a technology of emotional mobilization: a medium power-
ful enough to wrest individuals from the crowds amassed along the road, a 
technology allowing Hitler’s subjects to meet the Führer in close proximity, 
a tool wondrously collapsing the very distance and abstraction often asso-
ciated with modern technological culture. Often, Hitler’s car itself barely 
enters the image; it is present solely through a glimpse of the metallic body. 
Eliciting affects as a camera does, Hitler’s cars articulate the crowd through 
the very boundaries of the visible; they define the condition for the possibil-
ity of seeing (Hitler) without necessarily belonging to the visual field itself. 
Hoffmann’s images of trains, in contrast, show Hitler typically greeting his 
subjects through a compartment’s half- open window. If disparities of height 
and power are emphasized, they never obviate the staging of the intimate 
encounters. 
Hoffmann’s train windows served as interfaces long before the advent of 
computer screens; they offer a shared boundary between different systems, 
a material space of interaction where different realities, worlds, and compo-
nents can touch upon each other. They confer the privilege of face time with 
Hitler, not simply presenting the Führer as image to the crowd, an object of 
the look, but reconstituting what we understand as image in the first place, 
redefining images as meeting grounds of tactile transactions that far exceed 
the mere exigencies of re- presentation. 
In so doing, Hoffmann’s cars and trains inscribe the putatively private 
with what planes and radio were meant to do for public space. Indeed, by 
tackling the organization of public and private space- time from different 
ends, they each deliver a powerful reminder: even at its most intimate and 
private, Nazi visual culture aspired to lodge the public in the private, the 
private in the public, not simply by flooding its subjects with unprecedented 
numbers of mechanically reproduced images but also by emancipating im-
age making and viewing from traditional protocols of representation, mak-
 Face Time with Hitler 125
ing them far more than merely media of optical capture and reception. Hoff-
mann’s images of Hitler as private citizen are not about Hitler. They explore 
the conditions of what it might mean to be in the image with Hitler. His im-
ages were technologies that generate rather than merely depict spaces of won-
drous encounters and affective transfers. 
3
In his 1933 treatise Staat, Bewegung, Volk (State, Movement, People), Nazi le-
gal theorist Carl Schmitt argued that traditional concepts of the image as 
a vehicle for representing something would not suffice to theorize how the 
Nazi movement had come to embody leadership in the figure of Adolf Hit-
ler. “Our concept [of leadership] neither requires nor sustains the notion of a 
mediating image or representative likeness. It originates neither in baroque 
allegories and representations nor in Descartes’s idée générale. It is a con-
cept of immediate present and real presence.”15 Hitler, Schmitt intimated, 
did not simply represent, focus, or serve as an analogue or metaphor of his 
people, nor was it possible to consider his public image, his body and face, 
as a symbol, reflection, or projection of what German fascism was all about. 
Any of this, in Schmitt’s assessment, would have continuously enslaved the 
Nazi era to the legacy of bourgeois culture and political romanticism. True 
leadership, instead, did without ideas of mediation and representation. It was 
utterly nonmetaphorical. It collapsed what exile Ernst Kantorowicz would 
later call the king’s two bodies — the body natural and the body politic — into 
one,16 presenting Hitler as embodiment of the people, and the people’s ongo-
ing movement and mobilization as the energy center of political unity. Hitler 
was Germany as much as Germany was Hitler. Although his image, in me-
chanically reproduced forms, penetrated each and every corner of the land, 
it assumed no less than the qualities of an icon, presenting in material and 
haptic form what drove and held the nation together, thereby eclipsing bour-
geois democracy’s frail dedication to imaging rather than doing, mediating 
and negotiating rather than rendering present. 
How much were Hoffmann’s 1930s images of Hitler in private a paradoxi-
cal attempt to translate Schmitt’s philosophy into practice? Although they 
clearly do not hide their basis in technological reproducibility, Hoffmann’s 
pictures sought no less than to present Hitler as a leader of immediate pres-
entness and real presence, a post- bourgeois politician who no longer appeals 
to former rhetorics of representation, mediation, and symbolism. To gather 
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youth around him and to bless them with his touch; to refuse the lures of 
idleness and to embody unfailing alertness 24/7; to use modern vehicles to 
stage his presence for astonished onlookers — all this eclipsed what images 
as much as political leaders had once stood for. Hoffmann’s images dreamed 
the dream of no longer being mere images, of remaking themselves into ob-
jects that directly acted on and in the world, that empowered and channeled 
touch, presence, mobility, and movement rather than merely offering ocular 
and highly mediated interactions with the world. Following Schmitt’s under-
standing of fascism as a fundamental attack on the bourgeois concept of the 
image, these photographs described a key field of political meaning ordered 
around their onslaught against the representational and the mediated. Even 
at their seemingly most private, they unfolded a political mission that many 
photographs of Hitler in public places, increasingly clichéd and ubiquitous, 
were no longer able to accomplish. 
But rather than turn Hoffmann’s images of the unknown Hitler into a 
mere philosophical issue, a profoundly paradoxical assault on the nature of 
the image, I conclude this essay by reading photographs of Hitler’s hands, his 
alertness, his relation to printed matter and modern vehicles of transport, in 
more historical terms: as a concerted effort to train viewers to become pho-
tographers in their own right, to define photography as the primary lens for 
perceiving and inhabiting the realities of Nazi Germany. Seeking to roll back 
Weimar’s modernist forays into Neues Sehen, Joseph Goebbels opened the 
1933 photography fair in Berlin with the following words: 
The photographic image is a visible expression of the height of our cul-
ture; we must recognize the value of photography not only for artistic life, 
but most of all also for the practical existential struggle in its full extent 
and therefore place photography and the graphic arts into the service of 
the German issue. We believe in the camera’s objectivity and are skeptical 
about what is mediated through our sense of hearing or written letters. 
We stand at the threshold of an era which raises unprecedented demands 
through its community of faith. The human of today — in particular those 
Germans who were betrayed million- times in all areas of life during those 
fourteen horrendous years — has begun to be skeptical about news and 
opinion communicated to them through the ear or the medium of written 
words. He wants to see things for himself, and given the elevated state of 
the photographic arts and the illustrated press he has a right to do so. . . . 
Our modern artificial eye, the camera, has become a faithful witness of 
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our new times. . . . The experience of the individual has become the ex-
perience of the Volk, and this through the camera alone. . . . In this way, 
photography fulfills an important political mission these days, to which 
every German should contribute who owns a camera.17
Since the advent of lightweight cameras in the second half of the 1920s, ama-
teur photography in Germany had really taken off, hugely multiplying the 
number of people eager to capture family snapshots, assemble their images 
in curated photo albums, take cameras to public events, and document their 
travels through the countryside. To be sure, the first years of Nazi rule wit-
nessed tremendous conflicts among photo clubs and amateur organizations 
as they struggled over who could best represent what Goebbels called the 
new times.18 Moreover, Nazi authorities sought with alacrity to regulate the 
taking and circulation of photographic images, notably those of political 
leaders and party rallies, thereby constraining the desire of amateurs to cap-
ture exactly the pictures that “court” photographers such as Hoffmann cir-
culated so proudly. Germans may have demanded the right to look at pho-
tographs of things political, but in face of comprehensive legislation they 
could not take most of them on their own. At the same time, whether or not 
one needed proper accreditation to direct one’s camera at Hitler and his ilk, 
Goebbels’s 1933 speech left little doubt that even amateur photography — the 
family snapshot, the private moments of detached leisure — served the move-
ment and nation as vigorously as Hoffmann’s ever- growing monopoly over 
reproductions of Hitler’s official image. To train one’s camera at the new 
times; to retrain the eye for modern technologies of vision; to allow the pre-
sumed objectivity of photographic indexicality to raise individual sight to 
the level of collective unity; to learn how to frame the real without the me-
diation of concepts, words, and sounds — all would be no less vital for en-
rolling the individual in the mission of the nation than would generating re-
productions showing Hitler or other Nazi leaders in action. In capturing the 
familiar and producing memento mori of passing realities, amateur photog-
raphy could not only picture everyday scenes under the sign of Nazi rule. Its 
mission exceeded the representational. As it situated common users as both 
subjects and objects of technological reproducibility, photographic practice 
mobilized the people, engineered affects, and embedded the individual as 
a picture- taking subject in the community of the Volk, independent of the 
actual content of individual images, frames, and perspectives. To be a good 
Nazi, in Goebbels’s eyes, was to allow photography to permeate all aspects 
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of existence. It was to see the world through a camera’s viewfinder, not in 
order to distance oneself from the visible, but rather to experience the cam-
era’s technological logic as a medium for absorbing the particular into the 
movement of the whole. 
Ten years after Goebbels had envisioned photographic practice as an ideal 
tool for aligning the individual’s experience with the national community, 
Wolfgang Liebeneiner’s wartime feature film, Großstadtmelodie (Melody of 
a Great City, 1943), illustrated this political mission paradigmatically (figure 
5.5). Ravaged by aerial bombardments and other tolls of war, few may have 
remembered Goebbels’s upbeat vision of 1933, let alone be eager to capture 
the ruins of everyday life with help of a camera. But the film tells the story 
of Renate Heiberg (Hilde Krahl), a skilled photographer who leaves the Ba-
varian countryside for Berlin to become a successful photojournalist. Her 
zeal for picturing what eludes routine ways of looking initially thwarts her 
career. Berlin’s agitated newspaper editors and readers, she learns, have no 
time for those patiently aiming their camera at the unseen, the forgotten, the 
unnoticed. Yet, sticking to her guns while adapting to the tempos, rhythms, 
and demands of the urban metropolis, she ultimately triumphs as a female 
photographer in a world mostly dominated by men, taking pictures at pub-
lic events and capturing decisive moments amid Berlin’s restless street life, 
as well as producing poetic vignettes of everyday activities that escape the 
artificial eye of her colleagues. If Liebeneiner’s film initially enters Berlin as 
if emulating the legacy of the Weimar avant- garde and Neues Sehen — the 
canted angles, unusual camera locations, moving perspectives, and montage 
sequences are all quite striking — Heiberg’s camera teaches something quite 
different. It celebrates the power of photography to picture the city — its speed, 
its mobility and agitation, and the indefatigable activities of its citizens — as 
a defining environment of life in Germany circa 1943, a quasi- natural habitat 
charged with poetic energy and unifying force. 
Unlike most Nazi entertainment films, whether of the 1930s or 1940s, Mel-
ody of a Great City explicitly cites political actualities. We hear people greet-
ing each other with “Heil Hitler.” We follow Heiberg to political rallies and 
to a concert of Wagner’s music, conducted by no less than Wilhelm Furt-
wängler. We witness Heiberg taking pictures of architectural landmarks and 
monumental public art à la Breker, a close- up of her head superimposed onto 
the objects of her view as she peeks through the viewfinder of her state- of- 
the- art lightweight camera. In one shot, we even see half of a swastika painted 
on the tail of an airplane, an icon not really visible in any other feature film 
5.5 Stills from Großstadtmelodie (dir. Wolfgang Liebeneiner, 1943). 
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produced in Goebbels’s “ministry of illusion.”19 What we do not see, though, 
is any trace of war and aerial bombing, of military mobilization and civilian 
sacrifice. A one- second shot toward the end gives this absence a weak nar-
rative motivation: a rally for the annexation of Austria locates the film’s ac-
tion ahead of World War II. Such temporal displacement hardly masks the 
film’s effort at spatial reordering, however. It celebrates cameras as tools of 
intense looking, hyperattentive framing, physical mobility, and integrating 
even seemingly forgotten aspects into the larger picture — all at the cost of 
not allowing us to see what no filmmaker, photographer, actor, or spectator 
in 1943 Berlin could have escaped. No single image of Heiberg’s as captured 
by Liebeneiner “lies” in any strict sense of the world, even if photographs can 
be said not to tell the truth in the first place.20 
Photography, as presented by Liebeneiner, cannot but be true, not because 
it produces images that reveal what spectators may believe or know to be true, 
but because in essence it is not about representing the real at all. Rather, it 
depicts the ceaseless efforts involved in seeing the world through a camera’s 
viewfinder. Heiberg’s most important accomplishment is not to explore new 
ways of looking at the real and thereby disclose new insights about the texture 
of the everyday. Instead, she redefines the world as one produced by and for 
the camera’s modern artificial eye, in which photographic reproduction — its 
presumed objectivity and indexicality — can collapse the space between the 
individual and the collective and thereby precisely collapse the very kind of 
intersubjectivity that permits a lie to be called a lie. True to Goebbels’s call of 
1933, Heiberg’s images are all about doing, not representing. They are about 
sealing off the visible from the discursive, about evacuating reading alto-
gether from the visible world. They elevate the experience of the individual 
to the experience of the Volk, and in this way they define the world made by 
cameras and their photographers, whether in 1938 or 1943, as the shared en-
vironment of all experience.
Hoffmann’s private pictures, far from merely branding Hitler’s nonpo-
litical side as a site of political and economic utility, offered a medium and 
manual to turn Germans into Renate Heibergs. Their purpose was not simply 
to soften and popularize the image of the Führer. It was to train viewers to 
fancy themselves as photographers in their own right; to reframe the world 
as if seen through a camera’s viewfinder; to embrace photographic practice 
as a medium of social and political integration, embedding an individual’s 
perspective and action within the fabrics of the whole nation; not simply to 
map, but to produce the visible world with the help of modern technology. 
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As much as they publicized Hitler as the principal sight/site of visual con-
sumption during the Nazi era, Hoffmann’s albums promoted photography 
as a powerful medium for building worlds and thereby redrawing the line 
between the private and the public, the intimate and the political altogether.
Hoffmann’s images emulated and modeled the rhetoric of amateur pho-
tography, of how individual “Knipser” (amateur photographers) in particular 
since the second half of the 1920s had increasingly come to document their 
lives with the help of snapshots and even to center private activities around 
the presence of a camera and photographer. As importantly, Hoffmann’s 
images — with their stress on postures of focused alertness; on the pleasures 
of seemingly unmediated, yet framed looking; on acts of visual transport 
and wondrous experiences of being touched by the presence of the Führer — 
sought to shape attitudes and modes of perception that corresponded deeply 
with how photographic cameras were believed to change the modern sub-
ject’s being in, and impact on, the world. Although Hoffmann himself surely 
had no desire to give up on his monopoly to deliver Hitler in the form of 
a mechanical reproduction, his private images of the Führer aspired to no 
less than retraining the human sensorium. Their ambition was to enlist the 
value of photography, of a camera’s artificial eye, for the sake of mobilizing 
5.6 “Auch die Jüngsten 
wollen ihr Hitlerbild 
haben” (Hitler wie ihn 
keiner kennt, 1932). 
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the nation; their task was to propagate photography as a mode of action and 
sensory perception, as a shared form of practice. If properly pursued by each 
and every German, that practice could do at least as much to consolidate the 
national community as the experience at a party rally, the formation of the 
crowd through architectural projects, or the militarization of society at all 
levels of social interaction. Although the concept of fascist aesthetics may 
have lost both its descriptive and its critical purchase, Hoffmann’s work thus 
remains emblematic. By means of the above reading we can better under-
stand not only what photography did and aspired to do under conditions of 
Nazi rule, but also the uncanny echoes today between how fascism and our 
own image- driven times embed technological media in processes of physical 
and affective mobilization.
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Late 1930s Settler Photography in Namibia  
under South African Rule
Lorena Rizzo
The Spectre of Fascism in the Colony
This essay chooses settler photography in Namibia in the late 1930s as a point 
of entry into exploring the problem of fascism’s visuality in the colony and 
to reassess fascism’s historical trajectories and transnational interweaving.1 
Although addressing German and Italian fascist endeavors in colonial Africa 
has occasionally served to decenter and refine historical analyses of fascist 
aesthetics, such scholarship remains caught in a Eurocentrism that treats the 
colony as a backdrop for metropolitan fantasy and projection.2 In contrast, 
I foreground the question of fascist visualities in the colony, more specifi-
cally in South West Africa. Ruled by Germany between 1884 and 1915, it later 
became a South African mandate for more than seven decades until inde-
pendence in 1990. Thinking about the history of South African segregation 
and apartheid in terms of fascism has intermittently troubled South African 
historiography and has gathered momentum more recently in transnational 
and global inquiries into historical configurations of the Far Right.3 German 
and Afrikaner sections of South African and South West African society are 
considered key vectors of fascist thought throughout the subcontinent, but 
the process has been commonly understood as a symptom of the brittleness 
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of whiteness in a settler society divided by antagonistic imperial, national, 
and ethnic affinities throughout the interwar period.4 
The spread of fascism in Namibia during the interwar period and the 
founding of a local branch of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party 
(nsdap) in 1928 have generally been attributed to sociopolitical erosion and 
ethnonational revival among German settlers in the colony.5 Key to this pro-
cess was the gradual formation of a myth of discrimination that strategically 
merged memories of internment and large- scale repatriation after the First 
World War with German- Afrikaner socioeconomic antagonism and com-
petition over land.6 A growing sense of exclusion paired with feelings of re-
sentment and cultural marginalization among those who had lost the war 
and “their” colony created fertile ground for the seeds of national socialist 
thought. While settlers of German descent had long wavered between assimi-
lating into the South African racial fabric of whiteness and retreating into a 
politics of reified ethnicity based on Deutschtum, political distress intensified 
amid growing Afrikaner nationalism. Talk of South West Africa’s inclusion 
into South Africa as a fifth province threatened to bury hopes of the colony’s 
return to the German “motherland.”7 During the 1930s, systematic nsdap 
propaganda backed by substantial material and human resources from Ger-
many enabled Nazism to permeate every aspect of German sociopolitical life 
in the colony.8 While pressure was occasionally applied to individuals and 
groups who questioned the ideological alignment with the Third Reich and 
insisted on the colony’s self- determination, the spread of a fascist mind- set 
was facilitated by its shared ground with colonialism, which long nurtured 
the ideas of a master race and blood and soil ideology.9 Although it tarried 
in responding to the fascist threat, the South African administration even-
tually banned the nsdap in Namibia in 1934, repatriated most of its leaders, 
and curtailed German immigration and political organization.10 Finally, at 
the outbreak of the Second World War, a thin parliamentary majority over-
came Afrikaner- nationalist demands for neutrality, and South Africa joined 
Britain in the war against Hitler.11 For many German and Boer settlers, who 
had traceable links to nsdap organizations, the war inaugurated yet another 
period of internment and deportation.12
Constrained by the conventions of political history and the racial and 
ethnic categories shaping the focus on inner- white conflict, Namibian his-
toriography only scratches the surface of fascism’s spread during the inter-
war period. Existing accounts assume a causal relation between German-
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ness and national socialist sympathies, and thus they fade out deeper lines of 
class, gender, and generational division within the German settler commu-
nity.13 Some of these shortcomings come from neglect of archives that would 
yield a subtler sense of fascism’s sedimentation across the Namibian politi-
cal and social landscape. Indeed, the sources considered herein are drawn 
predominantly from national socialist propaganda or from files produced 
by the South African colonial administration in relation to legitimizing its 
colonial grip on Namibia and preventing hostile political mobilization.14 Ne-
glected most, though, is the extent of the sympathy for fascism among the 
African majority in the region. Although the literature refers to political or-
ganizations on the Left and African intellectuals in the diaspora mobilizing 
against the threat of fascism, no historical research investigates black politi-
cal, intellectual, and everyday responses to the spread of national socialism 
in Namibia.15 
Against this historical backdrop, what can photographs produced at the 
time tell us about the visuality of fascism in Namibia? With this in mind, 
how should we read the colonial photographic archive of Namibia during 
the interwar period? How do images as a historical form complicate received 
understandings of fascism here? Finally, in a context marked by the embroil-
ment of empire and nation, race and ethnicity, colonialism and fascism, how 
do we clear an analytical space in which to interrogate historical photographs 
without straightforwardly conflating ideology and the visual?
Visual Layering 
Let us move to the Namibian photographs of Ilse Steinhoff and Anneliese 
Scherz, professional photographers who operated within colonial and met-
ropolitan visual economies where women of European descent were success-
fully claiming a share.16 While Steinhoff’s photographic journeys through the 
former German colonies of South West and East Africa have been taken as 
an example of Third Reich colonial revisionist propaganda,17 Scherz’s oeuvre, 
in contrast, has received much less attention, being associated with amateur 
research in the context of interwar German cultural production.18 The pho-
tography of these two women seems to suggest antagonistic ideological and 
aesthetic positions. Yet it seems worth exploring whether and how their work, 
once placed alongside each other, spoke to cultural imaginaries in the colony 
itself, thereby complicating metropolitan articulations of fascist visuality.
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Ilse Steinhoff: Into and Out of Propaganda
Ilse Steinhoff traveled as a photojournalist through South West and East Af-
rica in late 1937 and early 1938. The source of the commission for her travels 
to the continent remains unclear,19 but the trajectories of her photographs 
across various publications and archives, in both Germany and southern Af-
rica, suggest a dynamic of image production, circulation, and consumption 
that lies partly beyond the axis of the German metropole and its former colo-
nies. Steinhoff’s photographs were published in Illustrierter Beobachter, the 
official nsdap magazine, in 1937 and 1938; they were included in reportages 
in Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung and the more liberal travel magazine Atlantis; 
and they eventually were reused in Deutsche Heimat in Afrika.20 These pub-
lications helped situate her images in the photojournalism that had flour-
ished during the Weimar Republic and continued into the period of the Third 
Reich.21 Steinhoff belongs conclusively among a number of women profes-
sional photographers whose work transcended the framework of temperate 
colonial desire and moved, after 1933, into the strident ideological framework 
of colonial revisionism.22 Yet, unbeknownst to previous commentators, parts 
of Steinhoff’s published and unpublished photographic works are preserved 
today in at least two archival institutions in Germany and South Africa.23 By 
linking the photographic holdings of these archives to Steinhoff’s published 
images, we can unearth some less conspicuous facets of metropolitan and 
colonial image use and circulation, while tracking the images’ opportunistic 
movement into and out of fascist propaganda.24
Deutsche Heimat in Afrika and Fascist Aesthetics  
in South West Africa
Deutsche Heimat in Afrika: Ein Bildbuch aus unseren Kolonien was first pub-
lished in 1939 and again in 1941. It took the reader on a visual journey to Afri-
can colonies that were boldly declared to belong to Germany and hence part 
of an extended German homeland. Divided into two sections, the book cov-
ered what Steinhoff called “German South West” and “German East” Africa, 
what were at the time the two mandated territories of South West Africa un-
der South African colonial rule, and Tanganyika under British colonial rule. 
Both parts of the book were narrated as the photographic diary of a traveler, 
but their positioning within the ideological frameworks of national socialism 
and colonial revisionism told surprisingly different stories. 
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Steinhoff’s Namibian photographs are at the center of Willeke Sandler’s 
reading of Deutsche Heimat in Afrika.25 Keeping in mind the possibility of 
censorship the German Colonial League imposed on images and writings, 
Sandler notes the centrality of the text- image relationship in the book, along 
with how Steinhoff deliberately guides her readers’ perceptions of the photo-
graphs.26 The captions indeed impose themselves on the photographs, as if 
concerned with narrowing their semantic instability,27 and it was the particu-
lar configuration of captioned images with the book’s focus on key elements 
of national socialist colonial imaginaries that blended into the revisionist 
project of Third Reich propaganda with such ease. The South West African 
colony was presented as a place where fellow Germans secured industrious-
ness and cultural self- consciousness, the actuality of Deutschtum, and the 
values of communal and family life and maintained racial purity while con-
currently fostering peaceful relations with a sympathetic colonized popula-
tion.28 Sandler continues to argue that it was German colonial women in par-
ticular who were given a crucial role in conveying the colony‘s pervasiveness 
in mid- twentieth- century German fascist ideology.29
Farm life featured prominently in Steinhoff’s narrative, and most of the 
chosen images showed female farmers at work, attending to children and 
livestock, carrying out domestic activities or overseeing cattle and sheep (fig-
ure 6.1). Aestheticizing female domesticity, these images conveyed an affec-
tive quality to corporal work, representing it as an expression of the trans-
formative value of colonial women’s life.30 At the same time, an ambiguity 
in the representation of women’s roles in the colony often served as testing 
ground for female identities.31 Steinhoff’s own African adventure was but one 
indication of how female subjectivities changed in Germany during the pe-
riod after World War I. Her aesthetics became more sophisticated in the fu-
turistic framing of colonial women encountered at the forefront of physical 
performance -cum -technological innovation.32 Still, celebration of women’s 
modernity and expanded spheres of action remained tentative, and the rep-
resentational idealization of German settler women seemed to rely less on 
equality with German men than on its visual and discursive juxtaposition to 
African women and men.33 Throughout the book, Steinhoff’s language, her 
insidious captioning, repeatedly debased local women and men to objects 
of cultural curiosity and racial prejudice, thereby cementing the reality of 
racial difference and the need for civilizing guidance under colonial rule — 
desirably kept in firm German hands.
Sandler’s reading of Deutsche Heimat in Afrika concludes with a reference 
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to those photographs, in which Steinhoff made explicit claim to contempo-
rary German presence and the settler community’s ideological alignment 
with national socialism.34 With one exception, Steinhoff’s images showing 
explicit Nazi posture and insignia all concern youth, depicting boy and girl 
scouts, schoolchildren, and a school gathering. Although images of youth 
resonated strongly with key means of Third Reich social mobilization and 
ideological coordination,35 the photographs’ embeddedness in a series that 
covered diverse educational institutions in the colony, including mission and 
vocational schools, seems counterintuitive to mitigating a more straightfor-
ward visual narration. The general sparsity of crude fascist visualization in 
the book seems especially noteworthy: only a few photographs document 
explicit national socialist iconographies such as the swastika or the Nazi flag. 
Indeed, Sandler fails to explain why most of Steinhoff’s photographs did not 
sit comfortably with an unambiguous fascist visuality. Still more, what was 
fascist about those few images that did?
Once we move away from implicit charges of fascist aesthetics — that is, 
6.1 Farm Nakusib, Hartmann family, Steinhoff, 1939. 
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Steinhoff’s undoubted national socialist orientation36 — and cease reading the 
photographs as signature images for fascism’s racial and gender regimes,37 a 
different interpretative path can open up that departs from Steinhoff’s own 
narrative and disturbs the photographer’s homogenizing gaze. The diversity 
of image subjects and genres featured in Deutsche Heimat in Afrika, then, 
points to the visual complexity of Steinhoff’s photographic engagement with 
the South West African environment. Indeed, almost half of the book’s Na-
mibian photographs are portraits of groups and individuals, and their aes-
thetic variety eludes any simple blending into ideologically circumscribed 
categories of race, class, or gender.38 How, in fact, do we account for the por-
traits of African women in beautiful attire or African children reading and 
writing? How can we explain photographs of Africans promenading in the 
streets of Windhoek, sometimes alongside “whites”? And would these photo-
graphs have inevitably incited the fascist vision of an “inferior race” rightfully 
placed under colonial rule? 
Steinhoff Photographs in the Image Collection  
of the German Colonial Society
Steinhoff was quite ingenuous in making her readers believe in the unmedi-
ated and sensual character of her photographic work.39 She claimed that her 
camera merely documented what she saw during her journey through South 
West Africa, as though her photographs simply recorded what appeared in 
front of her eyes. Evoking the medium’s realism undoubtedly substantiated 
the gravitas of German presence in the former colony, and her strategic com-
ments on the risks of camera work lent authenticity to her visual narrative. It 
was indeed photography’s propensity to merge the realistic and the sensual 
that made the medium so appealing to propaganda, as it enabled audiences to 
translate the act of seeing into one of tangible experience and cognition — of 
a colonial landscape that remained, in reality, remote.40 Yet, as much as the 
programmatic visual account of Deutsche Heimat in Afrika was geared to-
ward conflating metropole and colony, and Germany’s past and future as a 
colonial power, it was precisely through the photographs that the colony’s 
presence persisted and formed cracks in the visual architecture of national 
socialist propaganda. To locate these fissures in Steinhoff’s images, we need 
to consider the archival extensions of her photography.
The photographic collection of the German Colonial Society is suggestive 
of the process of image selection, exclusion, and inclusion that preceded the 
publication of Deutsche Heimat in Afrika, and of the ways in which the book 
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eclipsed the intricate seriality of photographic production by rendering single 
photographs as emblematic.41 The archive likewise provides a subtler sense of 
Steinhoff’s photographic practice on the ground and the transitory character 
of her sojourn and travels. The photographer’s South West African journey 
takes us along a distinctive selection of sites that delineated the space and 
time of the colony in very particular ways. 
When we pay careful attention to the precise locations depicted in the im-
ages, we move into the domain of settler topography, the material deposits 
of white land appropriation, and its photographic consolidation through the 
medium of landscape.42 This topographical mapping drew on a double tem-
porality: it used photography to highlight the here and now of white claims 
to land so that the photographic signification of colonial history natural-
ized these claims within the framework of settler historiography that had 
been on the upswing since the 1920s.43 If anchoring settler subjectivity in the 
political imaginary of landownership strongly resonated with broader visual 
configurations of whiteness in southern Africa of the time, then Steinhoff’s 
photographs were decisively engendered by local concerns as well, among 
them German farmers’ assertions of land ownership in relation to settlers of 
Boer and British South African descent.44 These become legible in the stra-
tegic assortment of the particular farms Steinhoff visited during her journey, 
a selection almost certainly authored by local travel companions.45 Figure 
6.2 captures the breathtaking vista from the main house on farm Okoson-
gomingo toward the Waterberg massif, an iconic site in the history of the 
South West African war of 1904 – 7.46 In the late 1930s, Okosongomingo and 
all other farms Steinhoff photographed were among the high- ranking, sub-
stantial, and highly capitalized estates owned by some of the most prominent 
and long- established farmer families of German descent, and Steinhoff’s ex-
tended archive perpetuated their claim to economic hegemony.47 But some-
thing else percolated through Steinhoff’s farm images, particularly once she 
moved northward to a frontier zone that shadowed out the texture of a con-
solidating economic and racial order in the colony. The farms Onguma and 
Nakusib, for example, were situated in close proximity to both the Etosha 
game reserve and the northern “native reserve” of Ovamboland. The farm 
owners, the Hartmann and Böhme families, had used the favorable location 
astutely, building up lucrative transport, trade, and game hunting businesses 
both under the guise of official authorization and in the more adventurous 
format of smuggling.48 Numerous farm photographs taken by Steinhoff in-
scribed the racialized nature of colonial labor relations and enshrined Af-
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rican presence on “white”- owned farms as the result of settler benevolence. 
On the northern frontier and on Nakusib in particular, though, the visual 
resonances had a further purview into the system of migrant labor that had 
parasitically spread into Owambo. This system bound men from the north-
ern reserve to year- long contract work on farms and mines across the Namib-
ian colony and beyond.49
Migrant labor served as the photographic thread into and across a series of 
images taken by Steinhoff in and around the Tsumeb copper mine, which re-
turned into the hands of private German financiers in 1936.50 Here again, her 
visual language shifted and reenacted more ambitious motifs. Adopting an 
increasingly modernist tone, her photographs aestheticized German indus-
trial infrastructure by, for example, placing the monumentality and power 
of Tsumeb’s lead furnaces in dramatic opposition to the minuteness and fra-
gility of the miners’ bodies. On the other hand, it was on the mines that her 
camera most clearly faced away from the programmatic and scanned the 
extractive mining economy on the northern Namibian frontier. The photo-
6.2 Farm 
Okosongomingo. 
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graphs taken in the workers’ compound in Tsumeb, for example, might ap-
pear as the mere result of the intrusion by a “white” woman into a secluded 
space for “black” men, but these images also referenced a longer history of 
control and isolation of contract workers who had been placed under the re-
gime of migrant labor and its biopolitical rationale.51
The described conditions of Africans present on farms and in mines point-
edly double back on the larger body of photographs included in Deutsche Hei-
mat in Afrika. Steinhoff’s narrative used images of the local population as 
evidence for indigenous approval of contemporary economic and future po-
litical submission to German colonial rule. The carefully staged photographs 
of Herero material culture and ritual performance seem to be a case in point. 
But these images of women in Victorian dress and men in German military 
uniform also bore the imprint of a subaltern temporality, one that invoked 
the colonial war and its massive repercussions across African society, while 
retaining the potential disclosure of forms of embodied memory, collective 
commemoration, and enactments of historical consciousness, even if the im-
ages were eclipsed by the intrusiveness of texts and captions.52 Against all 
odds, one is tempted to say that the photographs remained ambiguous and 
hesitant in the book, but more distinctively in their archival dissemination, 
where they enabled multiple temporalities to fold into each other and insert 
the Namibian landscape as a visually constitutive presence. It was the space 
and time of the colony (not the metropole) that served as the template for the 
visual positioning of the African subject, thereby disturbing the teleology of 
Steinhoff’s colonial retrieval tuned toward the national socialist imaginary. 
Steinhoff Photographs in the Image Collection  
of the Transnet Heritage Library
The pervasiveness of a colonial representational order, and the movement of 
Steinhoff’s photography into and out of propaganda, gathers further strength 
through some of her images in an album kept in the archives of the Transnet 
Heritage Library in Johannesburg.53 The album extends the scale and scope 
of Steinhoff’s visual topography mapped in Deutsche Heimat in Afrika and 
blends her photographs into a visual survey conducted under the aegis of 
South African Railways and Harbours (sar&h). sar&h was at the time the 
key commissioner and publisher of photographic images that helped config-
ure the imaginary of an inclusive whiteness grounded in a distinctive notion 
of landscape to the benefit of an emerging, modern South African nation 
after Union in 1910.54 Compared with Deutsche Heimat in Afrika, the rail-
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way album includes many more portraits of Steinhoff herself, thereby point-
ing to the centrality of mobility within the imaginary advanced by sar&h. 
By evoking the visuality of “trekking” or being “auf Pad,” her photographs 
forged links with historically embedded repertoires of travel that lent local 
flavor to sar&h’s growing orientation toward international audiences. Ac-
cordingly, her depictions of “natives” as ethnographic curiosity kept their 
currency once they moved from Deutsche Heimat in Afrika into the railway 
archives and acquired meaning as part of a larger conception of constricted 
African presence on the land.
The numerous images of the built environment rendered a smooth tran-
sition from the transitory image world of trekking into visual solidity. Many 
of these were not used in Steinhoff’s book, as they were no help in visualizing 
the German cultural imprint on South West Africa’s urban landscape.55 Of-
ten focused on railway stations, the street  views matched sar&h’s key preoc-
cupation with producing a consolidated nation- space marked by the homo-
geneity of railway infrastructure and a modern regime of rationalized time.56 
But more importantly, these images disclose rare hints at “white” mobility’s 
6.3 Street in Windhoek, Ilse Steinhoff, from Album 25, Transnet Heritage Library. 
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“other.” Steinhoff had a good eye for the subtleties of being in a racially frag-
mented space. Her backlit male African silhouette in figure 6.3, for example, 
appears to be lost, misplaced in an urban milieu not his own, his luggage si-
lently marking an unpredictable, disorganized temporality: one that would 
likely make the man wait for hours, watching cars drive past him, eventually 
to be removed from the site of futile waiting and the sight of “white” urban 
residents. These streetscapes assured audiences that by the 1930s even the re-
motest towns in the Namibian colony had become proper white towns and 
thus desirable travel destinations and residential locations. Once they entered 
the archives of sar&h, Steinhoff’s images hence became part of an aesthetic 
exploration that clearly outgrew the narrow confines of national socialist de-
sire and propaganda. Here, her photographs worked toward a copious visual 
economy that served the constitution of an inclusive white identity grounded 
in a specific construction of the physical and social environment.57 Photogra-
phy along the railway patched the fissures of inner- white division — between 
settlers of English, Boer, and German descent. It articulated what it meant, 
for all of them, to be white in a future held by South African national and 
imperial reconstruction. 
Anneliese Scherz and the Visuality of Retreat
The problem of photography, sight, and whiteness brings us to the photo-
graphic work of Anneliese Scherz, a German who emigrated to Namibia in 
the late 1930s.58 The following inquiry proposes a reading of some of the Scherz 
photographs alongside those of Steinhoff in order to determine whether 
these photographs reveal a different kind of aesthetic negotiation. Using 
Scherz’s photographs to think about the problem of fascism’s visuality in the 
colony might enable insights that trim back the notion of an image world — 
 the domain of German photographic production in Namibia of the time — 
unambiguously aligned with a particular ideological formation and histori-
cal teleology.59
Anneliese Scherz moved to South West Africa in 1938, but unlike Ilse 
Steinhoff, she remained there for almost forty years. Her photographic oeu-
vre is part of a personal archive containing photographs, correspondence, 
and manuscripts by herself and her husband, Ernst Rudolf.60 Attributing 
single photographs to one individual is often difficult in this archive.61 The 
couple’s Namibian careers differed to some extent, and Anneliese’s training 
and practice as a professional photographer was ultimately more consistent, a 
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circumstance potentially privileging her authorship.62 As already mentioned, 
Scherz’s photographs belong to the domain of German cultural work in inter-
war Namibia, more specifically, the field of semiprofessional visual produc-
tion and writing. Sections of the wider settler- community — individuals of 
diverse ethnic descent, social standing, and political couleur — were increas-
ingly concerned to establish niches of knowledge production that appealed to 
South African and metropolitan culture.63 In a broader context of 1930s set-
tler photography, Scherz’s photographs are quite consistent with the broader 
image economy in terms of both genres and subjects chosen for photographic 
documentation.64 Far less obvious is the remarkable visual consonance be-
tween Scherz’s early South West African images and Steinhoff’s travel pho-
tography, a convergence partly explicable by the German sociocultural mi-
lieu framing both women’s entrance into the photographic practice of the 
time. Still, the shared grounds need further explanation, and although par-
ticular photographic subjects surface in both oeuvres, Scherz’s photographs 
clearly adopted a different, less programmatic tone in the visual scanning of 
the physical and sociopolitical spaces they traversed.
Visuality of Retreat 
Much like Steinhoff’s archive, the Scherz collection circles around the space 
and subject matter of farm life. That Anneliese Scherz was in the process 
of relocating from Germany to South West Africa, joining her husband for 
their honeymoon during 1938, allows us to read these photographs for their 
personal and familial meanings that are intrinsically bound to a politics of 
sentiment.65 Indeed, most of the early images were never published, nor were 
they ever intended for public viewing.
Figure 6.4 is drawn from a series of portraits, photographs of farm inte-
riors and everyday objects taken during the 1938 honeymoon. Many of these 
speak for an aesthetic sensibility toward family as an emotional space en-
shrined in transgenerational solidarity, personal affection, and intimate so-
ciality. The moment captured is one of ease and serenity: a man in work wear, 
interrupting his farming duties to retreat to the cooling shade of the porch, 
smoking his pipe, gently holding the child in his lap, visibly feeling comfort-
able. The soft lighting enhances the beauty of the scene — of a father lovingly 
attending to his child — while concurrently evoking generic sentimental reg-
isters associated with the photographic trope of parental love.66 Although 
the man, and many of the photographic subjects in this series, remains un-
identified, Scherz’s photographs introduce us to individuals, particular men 
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and women, who inhabit the privacy and intimacy of their family and farm 
worlds, who appear relaxed, smiling, enjoying the rare moments of rest, the 
pleasure of a shared meal, and the poetics of photographic contemplation. 
Keeping in mind that the Scherzes had recently arrived in Namibia and An-
neliese had before moved among cosmopolitan photographers and artists in 
a Europe about to descend disastrously into war and fascist terror, the 1938 
farm portraits and scenes make photographic homage to the pastoral, to the 
simplicity and beauty of the rural, a visual valorization of a primordial spati-
ality and temporality embedded in farm work and domestic life that required 
the camera to approach its subjects with appreciation and respect. The famil-
ial and transgenerational cohabitation may also have been a romantic antici-
pation of the newlyweds’ future. But even along these lines, the photographs 
taken during their honeymoon evoked longer trajectories of aestheticized 
farm life and its sentimentally charged imaginary.67 The intimate privacy in 
the framings of farm and family life, the beauty of the portraits that individ-
ualized their subjects, and the archival seclusion of these particular images 
in the Scherz collection aesthetically elude any overt absorption into the po-
litical hegemony of late 1930s propaganda, whether in colonial revisionist or 
national socialist guise. It was indeed the moment rather than the momentous 
that asserted itself in the portraits. In this aesthetic language the German- 
6.4 Uncaptioned image. 
S004_107, bab Scherz 
Collection from Album 
Hochzeitsreise 1938. 
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speaking farmers in the community were neither an abstract category com-
prising individual types nor an essentialized register for the articulation of 
political — that is, fascist — subjectivity, but rather a visually receding social 
milieu where the intimacy and privacy of individual positionality could be 
quietly fathomed. Read alongside, yet in contrast to, Ilse Steinhoff’s contem-
porary work, Scherz’s photographs accordingly point toward a rather differ-
ent sensitivity or state of mind: one that presumably faced the spectre of fas-
cism yet chose to express itself in what might be called a visuality of retreat.
Hierarchies of Visual Philanthropy
The notion of a visuality of retreat reads the interiority and subjectivity in the 
Scherz portraits as a counternarrative to the exteriority and objectification of 
German colonial and national socialist visuality. Yet, although this holds true 
for parts of the archive, other images reveal the collection’s more venturous 
openings toward the public, the political, and the ideological.68
One of these openings comes through a series labeled “Boers on the move” 
in which the photographic camera left the farmhouse and its immediate sur-
roundings for the open veld.69 The labels for these photographs were quite 
suggestive in situating their subjects and scenes within a particular socio-
cultural and pertinently political frame — that of Afrikaner nationalism. As 
seen in figure 6.5, the photographs of Afrikaans- speaking farmers brought 
into focus the subjects and objects of a nomadic lifestyle shadowed out by 
household effects unhandily placed in the open, and usually embodied by 
women performing domestic work under arduous environmental conditions. 
Selected material markers of the trek, among them ox wagons, horses, and 
female garb, further specified the vernacular iconography of Afrikaner his-
torical mythology and folklore.70 Whether the Scherzes were familiar with 
the trope of “poor white- ism,” which the photographic discourse of poverty 
and vulnerability among white settlers and farming communities had pro-
duced in southern Africa and elsewhere, remains unclear. But the “Boers on 
the move” series undoubtedly shared representational and aesthetic char-
acteristics with photographs commissioned by the South African Carnegie 
Commission of 1932 or by the U.S. Farm Security Administration in the 1930s 
and 1940s.71 If poor white- ism had become a key theme in the political fabri-
cation of a consolidated white identity in South Africa, then in the Namibian 
colony it crumbled more along the fault lines of a frail white solidarity point-
edly marked by rivalry over land between settlers of German descent and 
Afrikaner immigrants.72 Placed against the backdrop of these fraught politi-
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cal complexities, which pitted white solidarity against white sectarianism, 
Scherz’s photographs of impoverished Boer farmers lacked any self- evident 
programmatic orientation that fueled anti- Afrikaner or partisan articula-
tions of German colonial revisionism. This calls into question the seman-
tic frame imposed on the photographic by the textual — that is, by the label 
“Boers on the move” — and its privileging of an interwar politics of ethnic dif-
ference. Paying attention instead to the camera’s focus on the material — on 
the objects, fabrics, and sites of the nomadic — evokes an opening of a differ-
ent kind. In fact, the question of lifestyles and living standards, based on per-
manent settlement and meticulously defined requirements for housing, had 
become normative for a generic understanding of “being white” in Namibia 
and South Africa in the 1930s.73 It was this particular materiality of white-
ness that endowed the “Boers on the move” series with the quality of visual 
philanthropy, in that it proved sensitive to the everyday normativities of being 
“white” and thereby ingeniously eclipsed the ways in which it drew less on a 
politics of ethnic essentialism than on one of colonial racism.74
The colonial racial order does indeed resonate across the Scherz archive, 
but its sedimentation at the level of the visual and even in the single image 
remains problematic. Pointing to some of the instances in which this col-
lection sheds light on the problem of race and photography implies a de-
6.5 Image from 
“ ‘Boers on the move” 
series. S004_152, bab 
Scherz Collection, 
Hochzeitsreise 1938.
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notative rather than assertive language, as, for example, when we look at 
the configuration of a key visual figure, such as the “black farm laborer.” As 
argued before, the threat of fascism lurking on the colony’s political hori-
zon gave pause to the photographic reflection of whiteness. But what was its 
bearing — if any — on the camera’s framing of blackness?
The figure of the black laborer in this archive emerges first while the cam-
era wandered around the farm and captured unidentified, solitary women 
washing linen or fetching water and men stowing away tools and appliances.75 
The workers’ presence in the photographs is silent and unobtrusive, insert-
ing itself almost naturally into the physical environment of farm life. While 
aesthetically more sophisticated, farm labor appears in accordance with its 
configuration in Steinhoff’s photographs. But unlike the latter, the Scherz 
archive proves less consistent and gives way to a remarkable framing of Afri-
can labor, as shown in figure 6.6, where a group of women, children, and one 
man lined up in front of Scherz’s camera. This photograph has an oppressive 
quality in the way it exposes the vulnerability of the black subject’s position-
ing, and the little girl’s marvel at the scene proves to be the image’s arresting 
detail, its intriguing punctum.76 But the semantic contours of this photograph 
are outlined most clearly through its archival proximity to the “Boers on the 
6.6 “Eingeborene in 
Haribes.” S004_160, 
bab Scherz Collection, 
Hochzeitsreise 1938. 
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move” series: it ultimately denotes simply the poverty and precariousness of 
colonial servitude and raises the question of the relationship of these “other 
poor” to the visual philanthropy described above. Does the Scherz archive 
address black poverty in a way that allows for blackness as vulnerability to 
emerge as a shared status with whiteness and accordingly invite the viewer’s 
empathic response?77 While this possibility is lodged in the photograph itself, 
it fizzles out in the shallow depth of the farm as a constitutive site of a colonial 
economy, in which empathy ran against the fact that, for the black subject, 
labor was the only way out of the poverty it had produced in the first place.
The Silent Spectre of Fascism
What does Scherz’s photographic configuration of whiteness as a modality of 
seeing, and its dialectical counterpiece blackness, tell us about the visuality 
of fascism in the Namibian colony? In contrast to Steinhoff’s photographs, in 
which the influence of colonial revisionism and national socialism is striking, 
the Scherz archive is much harder to read. We might understand the Scher-
zes’ photographic negotiation of their transition from fascist Germany to co-
lonial Namibia simply as a matter of empire, that is, as the unilateral move-
ment of people and things. Yet, we should likewise pay attention to the ways 
in which their transition consisted in the remaking of a visual epistemology 
that was precisely dependent on and engendered by the diachronic formation 
of fascism across empire.78 Thinking about Scherz’s photographs along these 
lines has brought to light a visuality of retreat — that is, a renegotiation of 
photography, ideology, and politics — and a visual philanthropy with its par-
ticular notion of whiteness enshrined in seeing blackness. These are but the 
first components of a late 1930s settler visuality that crisscrossed conventional 
distinctions between the private and the public, the political and ideological, 
and was ultimately preoccupied with scraping out what held the promise of 
persistence. Here the concern was less to make one’s choice between the im-
perial either- or — South African incorporation versus German national so-
cialist amalgamation — but more to secure the kernel of a colonial anyway, 
or the material standards of white privilege and a racialized labor regime.
A few archival casts of fortune exist though — photographs from the Scherz 
collection that constitute less elusive evidence for how fascism haunts this ar-
chive, even if it does so from the margins. One of them depicts a cryptic as-
semblage of letters, symbols, and dates engraved on a rock formation.79 While 
the image opens up diverse speculative paths into the depth and breadth of 
love (the heart, the initials) and religion (God and Christian nationalism), our 
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object of reflection here is a swastika engraved in the rock. What caught the 
attention of Scherz’s camera needs explanation: it might have been, of course, 
mere curiosity, even a sense of inappropriateness in view of a problematic po-
litical iconography, that informed the desire to document the site. Yet, other 
reasons explain why the material visuality of this swastika must have spoken 
to the Scherzes in particular ways, as it bizarrely resonated with one of their 
key fields of interest — rock art, archaeology — and their media: sketching, 
drawing, and photography.80 But how exactly does the photograph visual-
ize fascism, and what does its particular visualization tell us about fascism’s 
presence in the Scherz archive? 
The image of an engraved swastika is emblematic because of an intricate 
ambiguity, which applies first in terms of time as both persistence and decay, 
of presence and absence, in that the photograph highlights the swastika as an 
image set in stone, a condition of petrification marking endurance and the 
fragility of power and the force of destruction.81 Here the image displaces its 
object, in essence a swastika- as- petroglyph, into an analogy with archaeol-
ogy and its idiosyncratic temporality, its work of salvage, documentation, and 
preservation, against disappearance and for the sake of survival.82 And sec-
ond, an ambiguity exists at the level of visibility once the photograph brings 
to light an object that would otherwise have remained out of sight, buried, 
withdrawn from sensual perception, but would nevertheless claim unlimited 
visibility and tangibility through its persistent materiality. It is, in short, the 
described ambiguity of the photograph in terms of presence/absence and in/
visibility that qualifies the visualization of fascism in the Scherz archive as 
a spectral one.
Epilogue: The Visuality of Fascism in the Colony
The photographs of Ilse Steinhoff and Anneliese (and Ernst Rudolf) Scherz 
carried markedly differing meanings in a late 1930s political climate marked 
by colonialism and nationalism, by ethnic sectarianism and the politics of 
whiteness, by German national socialism, and by South African imperialism. 
While Steinhoff’s photographs were part of an explicit colonial revisionist 
and fascist imaginary, the Scherzes’ images aligned themselves less obviously 
with a clear ideological program. Yet, if fascist visuality becomes harder to 
find in the former, then it seems more insidiously present in the latter. It has 
appeared in this essay not just through the lens of photography in the colony, 
but in relation to the colony’s spatiality and temporality as they permeate 
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photographic representation. The relationship between fascism and colonial-
ism is actually an “old” historical problem. Before and after World War II, 
their mutual complicity was repeatedly addressed in black political thought, 
whose exponents eventually adopted the fiercer tone appropriate for a world 
shattered by fascism.83 Whereas debate over these questions exceeds the his-
tories of photography, the Namibian case study nonetheless confronts us with 
this problem. My reading of the photographs in the Scherz collection shows 
them to be deeply embroiled in precisely the desire to establish colonialism 
as different: as an aesthetic order both distinctive to the colony and unrelated 
to fascism. What were the stakes in making such a distinction? To whom did 
the distinction between the spectre of fascism and an ongoing colonial order 
make a difference politically, ideologically, and in terms of vision? Ironically, 
Steinhoff’s Deutsche Heimat in Afrika provides a reminder of this (figure 6.7). 
The photograph itself contains an oddity — the swastika on the roof of a cool-
ing house. But far more importantly, the image invites us to ask, What did 
the two women see?
6.7 Unidentified women, n.p., Steinhoff, 1939. 
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JAPAN’S WAR WITHOUT PICTURES 
Normalizing Fascism
Julia Adeney Thomas
Curiously, Japan’s Fifteen- Year War (1931 – 45) was largely a war without pic-
tures. The extraordinary fact is that few photographs of stirring civic events 
or genuine military valor appeared in domestic magazines, books, and post-
ers.1 Although the state demanded ever- greater popular support for the im-
perial cause, only rarely were people goaded by heroic imagery of national 
leaders and battlefield bravery. Japan’s emperor was nearly invisible and the 
war itself appeared primarily as a series of choreographed nonincidents and 
bloodless staged performances. This strange quietness prompted me to re-
visit the question of whether Japan could be considered fascist because fas-
cism is generally seen as a dramatic break with the past. If fascism requires 
a charismatic new leader, a self- styled fascist party, and the overthrow of the 
old government all feverishly celebrated in visual culture, then imperial Ja-
pan was not fascist. The Shōwa emperor reigned from 1926 to 1989, the Meiji 
constitution of 1890 remained in place without amendment until after the 
war, and no “single mass party along the lines of Hitler’s Nazis” arose.2 Un-
dramatic wartime photography might be seen as underscoring the lack of 
rupture in Japan’s polity, a lack that has allowed scholars to separate Japan’s 
experience from fascism in Europe.3
Nonetheless, I propose that the scholarly stress on overt, sudden institu-
tional change accompanied by dramatic imagery is misplaced as the key to 
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understanding fascism’s rise. A model based solely on Italian and German 
experiences is not universalizable. Japan and Japanese photography show that 
fascism need not involve revolution, but can emerge instead through redefini-
tion. Or, to put it another way, the Japanese case demonstrates that a revolu-
tionary transformation of the state can be achieved incrementally as radical 
right- wing nationalists outside the government compel conservative nation-
alists within it to embrace their ideas and desires. 
Gradually redefining institutions and ideology in the service of height-
ened nationalism, aggressive war, and naturalized authority can suffocate a 
liberal democratic society at least as effectively as violent overthrow. Popu-
lar dedication to the nation can be aroused by celebrating its eternal glories 
rather than some new vision of collective glory. Redefinition also has the tac-
tical benefit for fascists of not signaling a decisive moment when their power 
grab can be contested.4 If we understand fascism in this way, it becomes pos-
sible to see how it can emerge through established state institutions without 
overturning them. When fascism arises without a radical break and, as hap-
pened in Japan, in reaction to the challenge posed by ultraright factions (uy-
oku) claiming to be more patriotic than their patriotic leaders, those in power 
stress continuity as a means of stabilizing their authority.5 This velvet- gloved 
fascism is perhaps the most difficult form to guard against because no obvi-
ous moment of contestation arises; no emergency compels action; no crisis 
crystallizes dissent. In depicting a polity without change and a war without 
pictures, Japanese photographs help us to understand this insidious right- 
wing infiltration. Where better to see an event that wishes to efface its event-
fulness than in a still image? 
Here I explore three aspects of Japan’s war without pictures. First, I con-
sider the “imperial fascism,” in Andrew Gordon’s phrase, that arose in re-
sponse to more radical right- wing demands for direct imperial authority in 
the early 1930s and culminated in the February 26 (1936) Incident. Second, I 
survey the military- authorized images portraying the expanding war in Asia 
without battles or blood. Third, I show that official censors worked through 
the government- sponsored photographers’ guild to undermine photogra-
phy’s prerogative to represent reality and its capacity to convey artistic ex-
pression. As a result, photography became stranded in a no man’s land be-
tween reality and representation with no claim to truth of any kind, neither 
conveying facts nor expressing the photographer’s aesthetic vision. Photog-
raphy’s critical capacities were effectively neutralized. 
These three approaches to Japan’s war without pictures help us to place the 
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events there in relation to fascism elsewhere, making visible the similarities. 
As Gordon makes clear, much in Japan echoed Italian and German fascism: 
“economic crisis, intense polarization of left and right, intense conflicts in 
industrial workplaces and rural society, and murderous right- wing terror. In 
each case a perception took root among intellectuals and the political elite 
that a cultural malaise gripped the nation. Fear spread that established gen-
der roles were breaking down. Elite and popular opinion in each case held 
that Anglo- American power blocked the nation’s legitimate international as-
pirations to empire.”6 But unlike Italy and Germany, Japanese military, bu-
reaucratic, and capitalist elites remained in charge through these revolution-
ary changes. Their fascism through redefinition required that the energies 
transforming the nation be absorbed within a larger vision of national con-
tinuity. Real change, a true revolution, a “state of exception” (in Nazi legal 
scholar Carl Schmitt’s phrase) occurred, but it was coded as nonrevolution-
ary, as a “state of unexception.” Photography was used to mask change, not 
reveal it. 
Revolution by Redefinition
Those of us in love with words — and I count myself among them — sometimes 
forget the art of looking. So, first I want simply to look at an image I take to 
be emblematic of Japanese fascism (figure 7.1). We see here a winter scene at 
dusk, or perhaps at dawn. There are three partial figures and the suggestion 
of a fourth. All seem to be men; two wear fedoras and the third, the figure 
to the right, wears something like a bowler hat. They look tensed against the 
cold. All have their backs to us and face a snowy field, which has the charac-
teristics of Japanese public parks with their uninviting swards and semicir-
cular garden- edging. The old, hand- lettered sign warns visitors that there’s 
no throughway. Uncharacteristic of Japanese parks are the looping strands of 
barbed wire along what might be a street curb. A couple of moveable wooden 
barricades off to the right side also hint that trespass would be unwelcome, 
but these are hardly formidable deterrents. 
Formally, the composition of the image reinforces the tension of the men’s 
bodies. What attracts my notice time and time again (in the Barthesian way 
of the punctum) is the awkward angle of the man’s foot to the right. I won-
der if he is turning to go, tired of watching, or if he is bracing himself against 
some unseen threat. The indefiniteness of that posture is echoed by the ambi-
guity of the bowed tree trunk melding with the human figure on the left, like 
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something out of Ovid. There too, a shoe is silhouetted. These shapes, along 
with the slight tilt of the massive figure closest to the camera, respond uneas-
ily to the twin discs of sun and stop sign. These circles form the enigmatic 
double center of the composition. They are both light and dark, the celestial 
symbol of the sun- descended emperor and the quotidian symbol of state au-
thority. It is tempting to push the symbolics even further and toy with the 
idea that the emperor is represented by a distorted sun, enlarged on the hori-
zon by the atmosphere’s thickness, or by a false sun that hasn’t yet risen but 
is reflected upward, or even by a mirage created by the photographer’s lens.7 
In any case, this uncommanding center of sun and sign, at odds even with 
itself, barely holds the composition together. The tension among the off- kilter 
points of interest threatens to dissolve the image’s perilous compositional 
balance. This photograph makes me hold my breath, waiting for movement.
Of all the tens of thousands of photographs made during Japan’s Fifteen- 
Year War, why choose this one as exemplary? I do so because I think it helps 
us understand the nature of Japanese fascism despite its lack of overt political 
content: it shows us tension, rather than illustrating what we already know 
7.1 Kuwabara Kineo, Kōjimachi- ku, Babasakimon, Ni ni roku jiken tōji, 1936  
(At the time of the February 26 Incident, Babasakimon, Kōjimachi- ku, 1936).  
Courtesy of Kuwabara Kineo.
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about political clashes through texts. I want to treat the image itself — this one 
and others — as a source of knowledge, as a locus for producing understand-
ing, not a means of illustrating an understanding achieved through other me-
dia. Ultimately I will fail at this. We cannot do without words, but we can do 
more without them than we recognize. In this case we see little that is readily 
identifiable as violent or militaristic. The park might be a construction site; 
no massed crowd gathers; no one seems to be in charge. Tension hovers in the 
air, reinforced by the composition, but nothing is happening. It is this seem-
ing noneventfulness that I want us to see first and foremost: the tense quiet 
of this image, the way it teeters between centripetal and centrifugal energies.
If I now move to words and give you the name of the photographer, Ku-
wabara Kineo (1913 – 2007), and the title of the photograph, “At the time of the 
February 26 Incident, Babasakimon, Kōjimachi- ku, 1936,” we leave the im-
age as image and begin to create the linguistic net that pulls this still into the 
linearity of narratives and arguments. The “ni- ni- roku jiken,” or February 26 
Incident, was an uprising of the kōdōha (Imperial Way Faction) of the Japa-
nese army hoping to overwhelm the ostensibly more moderate tōseiha (Con-
trol Faction).8 It was not the first outbreak of radical right- wing groups. As-
sorted uyoku organizations had left a bloody trail, assassinating government 
and business leaders, since the May 15 Incident of 1932 and the Blood Pledge 
Corps (Ketsumeidan) killings of the same year. But the February 26 Incident 
was in many ways the culmination of extragovernmental ultra nationalism.9 
A group of more than 1,400 soldiers seized control of downtown Tokyo 
and executed several high- ranking government officials, including Finance 
Minister Takahashi Korekiyo (1854 – 1936), who had cut military spending; 
Lord Privy Seal Saitō Makoto (1858 – 1936), who had served as an admiral, 
as governor- general of Korea, and as prime minister; and the moderate In-
spector General of Military Education Watanabe Jōtarō (1874 – 1936). They 
also attacked, wounded, and killed others. Prime Minister Okada Keisuke 
(1868 – 1952) barely escaped with his life when the hapless revolutionaries mis-
takenly murdered his brother- in- law instead of him.10 After this slaughter, 
the insurrectionary officers then called for a Shōwa Restoration in which the 
Shōwa emperor would take direct military control and establish a glorious 
era for imperial Japan.11 The immediate response was muted. Martial law 
was declared, but the uprising was not instantly suppressed. For three days, 
Tokyo held its breath. 
The rebels, with their distrust of the leftist tendencies of the urban work-
ing class, made no attempt to spark popular enthusiasm in Tokyo or to con-
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test the prohibition against publications written by soldiers.12 No pamphlets 
were disseminated, and the radio station went unmolested.13 In fact, as Yo-
shimi Yoshiaki argues, “people felt a strong antagonism toward the young 
officers who had perpetrated the February 26 incident and toward the army 
authorities who used them in an attempt to secure hegemony.”14 Eventually, 
after a three- day wait, when no backing came from imperial, financial, or na-
val circles, the mutineers were labeled as such and other armed forces were 
brought in to quell them.15 Nineteen of the young officers, along with civil-
ian ideologue Kita Ikki (1883 – 1937), whose writings had inspired them, were 
executed on August 19, but most soldiers were simply reassigned to other 
units.16 Had this group succeeded, Japan might have experienced something 
more akin to the revolutionary fascisms of Italy and Germany. Instead, the 
state simultaneously moved to crack down on these extreme patriots and be-
came more extreme in its aims, embracing the renegades’ hopes as their own. 
Kuwabara’s photograph reveals three qualities that would help define the 
nonrevolutionary fascism in Japan after 1936. First, the photograph’s lack of 
a strong central focus suggests the lack of a strong leader. The sun, an impe-
rial symbol, is distant, decentered, and mediated by a stop sign. The Shōwa 
emperor likewise rarely took center stage. A barely visible public presence, 
he seldom appeared in person or in photographs. Even the government’s of-
ficial magazine, Shashin shūhō (Photographic weekly report), published only 
thirty- five different photographs of Hirohito in the long years between 1937 
and 1945.17 Second, Kuwabara’s image displays the tensions between cen-
trifugal and centripetal forces in its composition, echoing the contending 
impulses pulling at the polity even as its rightward tilt became more pro-
nounced. Third, the photograph’s hesitant figures embody the position of the 
people. They appear wary but susceptible to the general atmosphere just as 
Japanese subjects would ultimately embrace imperial fascism as it slithered 
into place after the February 26 Incident. In showing us these qualities, Ku-
wabara lets us see Japanese fascism taking hold of power. 
The February 26 Incident marks the defeat of the fascist movement in 
Japan, but not the defeat of fascism.18 The elites harnessed its revolutionary 
impulses by redefining the state. That redefinition had been several years in 
the making, most notably with the 1935 tennō kikansetsu jiken, or “Emperor 
Organ Theory” incident, when the standard interpretation of the Meiji Con-
stitution was overthrown. What happened was this: the aging legal scholar 
Minobe Tatsukichi (1873 – 1948), serving in the House of Peers, was verbally 
and physically attacked for supposedly having committed lèse- majesté be-
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cause he had taken the position — one perfectly unobjectionable in previous 
decades — that the emperor was an “organ of the state” and thus part of its 
constitutional framework.19 Minobe was vanquished, attacked by right- wing 
thugs, wounded, sent to the hospital, and dismissed from public life by the 
radical Right and its media allies. Their victory elevated the emperor above 
the constitution, transcending yet embodying the nation. This new version 
of the polity helped inspire the February 26 revolt, appealing to the emperor 
to assert his authority directly, freeing himself from his advisers. In response, 
the elite within military, bureaucratic, and industrial circles defended their 
own authority by suppressing the uprising while channeling its revolutionary 
energies through a redefined state. In so doing, they managed to have both 
worlds — a new order and an old order simultaneously — with themselves in 
charge.20 Continuity was the grounds of their legitimacy, even while they 
perpetrated dramatic change. The crucial point here is that Japan’s imperial 
fascism arose in reaction to liberal democracy, left- wing socialist and com-
munist efforts, and the Far Right revolutionaries at home in an increasingly 
tense international atmosphere.21 
War’s Indecisive Moments
Visualizing this stealthy fascism required different measures from those used 
by revolutionary fascist regimes. Take, for instance, mass spectacle. The chal-
lenge confronting the Japanese leadership was similar to that of Mussolini 
and Hitler in “funneling the energies of a glorified national body (whether 
the Volk or the Yamato race) into a quest for military hegemony, autarchic 
economic empire, and an antidemocratic, hierarchic new political and eco-
nomic order at home,” as Andrew Gordon argues, yet Japan’s efforts were 
encoded as emanations of an immutable empire.22 Instead of celebrating the 
recent advent of the fascist nation, Japan celebrated political continuum. This 
difference is clear when we compare national celebrations by the three Axis 
powers. In Italy, Benito Mussolini (1883 – 1945) opened with great fanfare the 
“Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution” in 1932 to mark the tenth anniversary 
of his nation’s heroic rebirth. Likewise, Adolph Hitler (1889 – 1945) descended 
from the clouds in the Nuremberg Rallies to mark Germany’s new era. Italy 
and Germany glorified new beginnings. By contrast, in 1940, Emperor Hi-
rohito presided over commemorations of the twenty- sixth centennial of the 
Empire of Japan marking the 660 bce descent of Jimmu, grandson of the 
sun goddess Amaterasu. As Kenneth Ruoff says, “The ancient nature and 
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fundamental continuity of Japan’s polity, however imagined this narrative of 
nation might have been, was the dominant theme in the 2,600th anniversary 
celebrations.”23 Huge rallies in Tokyo cheered the ceaseless state, not its birth.
Visually, Japan’s New Order (shin taisei) was made continuous with its an-
cient past even in mundane ways.24 A wartime cigarette package, for instance, 
displayed Jimmu, the mythical first emperor, with rounded legs modeled on 
haniwa, the burial statuary from the kofun  era (third to the sixth century ce), 
surveying a map of the Asian continent on which red marks Japan’s expand-
ing dominion.25 Time is collapsed. All eternity — mythical, archaeological, 
and contemporary — is on show on a pack of smokes. 
Under the cover of this hallucinatory continuity, the Japanese polity was 
transformed. The Diet became peripheral. Independent organizations of 
workers, tenant farmers, women’s rights groups, businesses, political par-
ties, and professional associations (including photographers) were dissolved. 
People were linked to the state and the emperor through vast, expanding 
state- sponsored networks such as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association 
working through neighborhood associations (tonarigumi), the Greater Japan 
Women’s Association, and the Greater Japan Imperial Rule Assistance Youth 
Corps. Beyond the home islands, the Second Sino- Japanese War, sparked by 
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Rokōkyō Jiken) on July 7, 1937, unleashed 
horrors of astounding magnitude offstage; in 1941, the Pacific war erupted 
with attacks on America and European allies. Yet despite this eventfulness, 
the Japanese polity had to be seen as noneventful so as to override any mo-
ment of resistance from the Left, from liberals, and from the ultraright.
The political imperative of “fascism through redefinition” posed particu-
lar challenges for Japanese photographers. Talented and technologically as-
tute as they were, they were still beholden to a relatively new medium that 
could claim no primal association with the Japanese archipelago.26 Moreover, 
this medium, through the mechanism of the camera, extracts particular mo-
ments and fixes them on film. In other words, instead of purveying eternity 
in the way that stone carvings might, cameras underscore the play of time, 
with each photograph “a clock for seeing.”27 A medium dedicated to “the 
decisive moment” was not ideal for conveying the sense that nothing was 
happening.28 
Yet Japanese photographers took seriously their patriotic duty within the 
new order — their shin taisei ni okeru shashinka no ninmu, as noted photog-
raphy critic Ina Nobuo (1898 – 1978) called it — and overcame photography’s 
alliance with temporality. Insistently, through subject matter, framing, and 
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printing techniques, they found ways to harmonize the instant with forever-
ness.29 Even in the contingent and action- filled arena of the battlefield, time 
was stilled. The government, especially the Cabinet Information Bureau 
(Naikaku Jōhō Kyoku), sought to direct photographers in this patriotic ef-
fort through sponsorship, informal guidance, some overt censorship, and the 
creation of a photographers’ guild to which all had to belong. Well- known 
photographers were commissioned by the military to tour battlefields. Name-
less military photographers provided images for the illustrated press. In Janu-
ary 1941, the riot of photographically illustrated publications was reduced to 
a small, manageable number both to conserve resources and to orchestrate 
patriotism through greater guidance and control. 
The results were war images of astonishing quietude. The photographs 
sent back to the home islands from military units on the continent seldom 
celebrated gallantry, glory, exceptional courage, fortitude, high emotion, or 
war’s bracing demands. They rarely depicted or even referenced actual fight-
ing; the enemy was usually completely out of sight; and the photographer 
himself almost always remained at a distance from his subjects. If our mea-
sure of successful war photography is the dramatic work of antifascist pho-
tographer Robert Capa (1913 – 54) or Soviet photojournalist Dimitri Balter-
mants (1912 – 90), then Japanese war photographers failed. Theirs was a style 
of image- making dedicated, or so it would seem, not to the decisive moment 
but to the indecisive moment. Although it was not literally a war without pic-
tures, Japan’s war appeared as a dampened, dull affair. 
For instance, during an official mission to occupied Manchuria in 1940, 
Kuwabara Kineo made Japanese troops look almost like lost boys on a 
scouting trip (figure 7.2). The bedraggled line of marchers appears to have 
no particular goal. Moreover, the troops’ awkward postures are emphasized 
by the awkward distance between them and the camera. Another example 
from the same army- sponsored propaganda tour also shows the troops 
standing in a haphazard line at a remove from the camera, this time facing 
the photographer while a frisky puppy digs in the muck in the foreground. In 
contrast to Robert Capa’s famous dictum, “If your picture isn’t good enough, 
you’re not close enough,” Kuwabara withdraws from his military subjects, 
standing far enough back to transform his war photographs into landscapes. 
The army commissioned and approved Kuwabara’s photographs, publishing 
them in Manshu Shōwa ju- go nen (Manchuria 1940), despite the fact that they 
make no effort to depict individual heroism, the consequences of Japan’s 
invasion in 1931 that led to its exit from the League of Nations, or the creation 
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of the new puppet state of Manchukuo, nominally under Puyi, the last Qing 
emperor. In fact, they were valued because they show eventlessness. Nothing 
much is happening at the edge of empire.30
This distanced stance was also adopted by embedded, unnamed military 
photographers whose images appeared in authorized general- interest maga-
zines. For example, the February 11, 1942, issue of Asahi gurafu published two 
shots of troops trailing through in the snow (figure 7.3). Both the top and bot-
tom images have a rhythmic elegance, like calligraphic strokes on rice paper. 
Both use distance to fuse the thin lines of the patrolling army with the vast 
wilderness of ice and snow. Here too troops become landscape, and national 
goals merge with nature. Compared with the commercial energy radiating 
7.2 Kuwabara Kineo, 
Manshu Showa Ju- Go 
Nen [Manchuria in 
Showa 15 (1940)] (Tokyo: 
Shōbunsha, 1974), 189. 
The caption reads “159 
Kokyōton tetsudō- airo- 
mura ken [Near the 
railroad depot village of 
Kokyoton].” 
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from the advertisement on the adjoining page, the war appears enervated. 
Given that these photographs depict the start of the grisly Aleutian Islands 
campaign, their quietness seems insistently at odds with the situation’s dra-
matic dangers. Almost all these men would be dead by year’s end. 
Calling these images “dull” is not simply my projection onto the past. As 
I have demonstrated elsewhere, there is no guarantee that our interpreta-
tion of a photograph today will resemble the way it was seen at the time it 
was taken.31 So, it follows that I have to verify that during the war, Japanese 
also found such wartime images uninspiring. As far as the evidence shows, 
they did. For instance, in 1943, the head of the official photographers’ guild, 
Domon Ken (1909 – 90), pronounced wartime images “boring.”32 Court pho-
tographer Ikegami Shirō also recalled the articles and photographs of those 
years as dull. Reminiscing in 1947, Ikegami wrote, “To tell the truth, it prob-
ably wasn’t me alone who, two or three years ago, upon seeing a headline of 
an article on the Imperial Family, didn’t feel like reading further. No matter 
7.3 Asahi gurafu, no. 973 (July 15, 1942): 2 – 3. The caption for the photographs on the  
left reads, “Special troops advance through a large snowy valley on the island of Attu.”  
On the right is an advertisement for Matsuda lamps, declaring “Matsuda” to be the 
“Trademark of Choice.” 
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how much honorific language I read, it didn’t evoke any reaction at all.”33 Ja-
pan’s way of visualizing fascism responded to the political exigencies of that 
state, trying to lull people into complacency about their inevitable war under 
the aegis of an inevitable state. A dulling “state of unexception” settled over 
the country. 
Neither Art nor Reality: Photography as National Spirit
In 1940, the year leading up to the government’s consolidation of domes-
tic photography magazines, a dispute (ronsō) broke out among the ranks of 
Japanese photographers concerning their duty to the state. At issue was the 
relation between art as a craft and politics as an imperative. Was it possible 
to serve both? On the one hand, Ina Nobuo (1898 – 1978), long a leading critic 
in the Japanese photography world, argued quite subtly that a photographer 
could be true both to his craft and to the nation. Serving the regime was not, 
he said, a matter of merely “communicating” (iu) the right subject matter but 
a matter of “leading” (michibiku) intellectually, emotionally, and sensually. 
To lead in this way required a self- aware practice that was cognizant of both 
method and message, technique and topic. Personal talent and patriotism 
were not at odds. In making this point, Ina insisted that “the difference be-
tween journalism (hōdōsei) and art (geijutsu) is a non- issue.”34 A honed aes-
thetic was a necessary component of good reportage (hōdōshashin); elevating 
the nation required a purposive art (mokuteki geijutsu). 
Photographer Domon Ken responded with his characteristic bluster to 
Ina’s proposals, accusing the critic of lacking patriotic zeal and “ignoring 
the superiority of politics over culture.”35 Railing against “theory” (riron), 
Domon rooted patriotic photography in ethnic identity and passion.36 Being 
Japanese, it seems, was enough for a photographer to produce photographs 
conveying the spirit of Japan (Nippon seishin). “Theory,” on the other hand, 
always requires self- reflection and as such threatens to expose the contin-
gency of the status quo. As other participants in the dispute pointed out, 
Domon had misread Ina’s true patriotism, but government officials oversee-
ing photographic publications shared Domon’s insistence on the primacy of 
ethnicity and his suspicion of mindful craft. Through their efforts, photogra-
phy was effaced as a self- aware aesthetic practice with the capacity to convey 
the conditions of empire. Patriotism alone mattered. The distance between 
image and reality, like the distance between state and subject, was to be ig-
nored for the sake of unquestionable and inevitable unity. All too often, the 
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resulting photograph was a mediocre muddle, neither aesthetic expression 
nor honest documentation. Even discussing how better techniques might 
produce stronger, more effective propaganda raised suspicion because it im-
plied contending alternatives and the possibility of choice. 
The officials in the Cabinet Information Bureau managed to obfuscate 
photography’s capacities as both art and reportage in several ways: publica-
tions dedicated to the discussion of photographic technique were limited, pleas 
for more deliberately artful propaganda were suppressed, and the govern-
ment itself sponsored images that turned the war into theater — melodramatic 
kitsch rather than reality. Below, I describe each of these official efforts to 
bring photography to heel, making it a pallid expression of national spirit. 
First, by government decree in 1940, photography magazines were con-
solidated, and those dedicated to art photography were either eliminated or 
absorbed by more prosaic publications. For instance, by January 1941, Asahi 
camera had been forced to incorporate two art photography magazines, Gei-
jutsu shashin kenkyū [Art Photography Studies] and Shōzō shashin kenkyū 
[Portrait Photography Studies]. The state apparently had no use for journals 
that explored varieties of photographic practice. Such mindfulness about the 
craft of image- making (or anything else for that matter) would suggest that 
some processes and values were only tangentially related to the kokutai. From 
the government’s perspective, it was better not to foster critical capacities re-
vealing that photography’s reality effect as just that: an effect. It followed that 
journals promoting a sophisticated understanding of this medium had to be 
suppressed. Photographers, of course, continued to use various techniques, 
but discussion of them largely ceased. 
Asahi camera, a magazine for amateur and professional photographers, 
provides an example of this muddle of art and politics. During the first nine 
months of 1941, after absorbing independent art photography magazines at 
the government’s behest, Asahi camera contained its usual mix of amateur 
submissions, essays by professional photographers, and advertisements for 
cameras and other equipment. Then the war began to figure. The October 
1941 cover portrayed factory workers in military garb. The November cover 
depicted tank maneuvers.37 The December 1941 cover featured a photograph 
of a naval destroyer as though with foreknowledge of the attacks on Pearl 
Harbor, Hong Kong, and other Allied outposts (figure 7.4, left). From the 
perspective of the relationship between aesthetics and politics, the curios-
ity here is that this image recuperates the pictorialist values of soft focus, 
distanced landscape, and gentleness. Pictorialism was a style developed in 
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the West in part to make the case that photography could be an art, and 
it had great staying power in Japan even after the 1920s, when American 
and European photographers largely abandoned it. Lenses blurring sharp 
lines and darkroom techniques manipulating the development of the film 
underscored the presence of the photographer in the creative process and 
showed his or her artistic sensibility, or so it was argued. English photog-
rapher Alvin Langdon Coburn (1882 – 1966) was a master of this technique, 
and indeed one might analyze Asahi camera’s depiction of the naval ves-
sel within the tradition exemplified by Coburn. Both compositions stress 
the calming line of the horizon, enlivened in each case by delicate rigging 
against an overcast sky. But in wartime Japan, the military photographer 
who produced this cover shot went unnamed and was certainly not elevated 
to the status of artist. Here reality was aestheticized through pictorialism’s 
soft focus not to turn it into art but, it would seem, to make artifice and re-
ality indistinguishable. 
Pictorialism was not the only photographic technique photographers de-
ployed in support of the state. Modernism also figured; its theatrical lighting, 
posed subjects, and careful backdrops implied that war was clean and orderly. 
7.4 On the left, the cover of Asahi camera (December 1941); on the right, Alvin Langdon 
Coburn, Wapping, 1904. Both images are manifestations of pictorialism. 
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Unlike battlefield photographs (figures 7.2 and 7.3), in which soldiers lost their 
individuality as they merged with the landscape, modernist portraits turned 
individuals into generic types such as “the nurse” (e.g., Domon Ken’s image 
on the cover of Shashin shūhō, July 8, 1938) and “the fighter pilot.” Standard 
categories were repeated frequently. For instance, Asahi gurafu was appar-
ently so taken with the idea of an airman posing in a cockpit that they used 
nearly identical compositions on the covers of both the September 1941 and the 
March 1942 issues. Both images were probably made during the same photo 
shoot. These photographs referred to war but were not taken during battle. 
The nameless man in the cockpit is posed in the role of an airman, but he may 
not even be in the air force. The abstraction and almost hieratic quality of such 
photographs turns war into theater, event into melodrama, and blurs the dis-
tinction between art and reality. Mostly, though, published pictures were dull. 
Eventually, even Domon Ken became restless in response to the repeti-
tive imagery, the tired techniques, and the lack of innovation. In 1943, while 
serving as head of the official photographer’s guild and thus a figure of some 
importance, he wrote an article attacking the government’s aesthetic com-
placency, especially with its twelve official graphic magazines targeting popu-
lations in the Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere (Daitōa kyōeiken). In 
“Taigai senden zasshi ron” (A Discussion of International Propaganda Maga-
zines), Domon, as was his wont, did not mince his words. This essay, excised 
from his postwar collected works and hard to find, decries the government- 
sponsored journals for committing several grievous visual sins such as dis-
playing “petit- bourgeois taste,” imitating Soviet montage, copying an “out-
dated French graphic style,” and being otherwise “ridiculous.” Poorly edited 
and visually dull, they fail as propaganda, reeking instead of “blatant men-
ace” and “cultural vanity” arising from a lingering inferiority complex in re-
lation to the West — or so Domon declares.38 In order for these publications 
to convey confidence in the power of Japan to construct a new Asia, Domon 
advocates a combination of graphic vitality and “accurate and strong” pho-
tojournalism. In other words, Domon advocates precisely the combination 
of sophisticated, self- aware technique and attention to the realities facing the 
nation for which he had lambasted Ina Nobuo in 1940. 
Domon ends his 1943 diatribe by suggesting that all twelve international 
publications be replaced by a single magazine, published from Tokyo. Ideally, 
a younger staff would push old- fashioned editors to secondary positions and 
direct “a sharp and quick camera eye over the entire Co- prosperity Sphere.”39 
The cacophony of languages used in the current publications in an attempt 
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to reach colonized peoples would be replaced by Japanese only because, after 
all, Japanese was supposed to become the “common international language 
within the Sphere.”40 Desirable topics in this substantial new publication, 
ultimately reaching perhaps “a billion people” in Domon’s wild estimation, 
would be upbeat yet quotidian: “constructive phenomena in political, eco-
nomic, and cultural realms, heartwarming scenes of the common people at 
mundane events, and the magnificent mysteries of Nature.”41 Colored pho-
tographs and even vivid advertisements for “modern transportation, speedy 
automobiles, and sweet canned goods” were all part of Domon’s recommen-
dations. “Taigai senden zasshi ron” is a bravura performance.
The police, however, did not applaud. Domon was summoned for a day- 
long interview with the authorities, which cannot have been particularly 
pleasant.42 Nothing more came of it, but afterward Domon refrained from fur-
ther suggestions for radically restructuring Japan’s international propaganda 
efforts. In a way, his day of official admonition has served him well, throw-
ing some postwar scholars off track. They mistakenly adduce — sometimes 
directly, sometimes by implication — that it was resistance to the war that 
caused official displeasure, when in fact Domon wanted propaganda of 
greater skill and sharper truth.43 The artistic techniques of photography 
should, he thought in 1943, be better exploited to reveal the value of Japan’s 
great empire. He had come around to Ina’s position.
The state had a third tactic for blurring art and reality in photographic 
images. Along with suppressing periodicals dedicated to craft and disciplin-
ing calls like Domon’s for aesthetically sophisticated reportage, the Cabi-
net Information Bureau supported the production of perhaps the most fa-
mous wartime photographic image, the staged studio shot titled “Uchiteshi 
yamamu.” This phrase, variously translated as “Continue to Shoot, Do Not 
Desist,” “We’ll Never Cease to Fire until Our Enemies Cease to Be,” or, more 
elegantly, “Fight to the Bitter End,” quotes Emperor Jimmu’s rallying cry dur-
ing his mythical invasion of the Japanese archipelago to found the empire. 
Beginning in 1943, this phrase, found in the eighth- century imperial history 
known as the Kojiki, was adopted as the slogan for the annual March 10 Army 
Day celebrations.44 As an image, “Fight to the Bitter End” is pure melodrama 
and verges on kitsch (figure 7.5). Two men (possibly the same model posed 
twice) pretend to advance upon the enemy’s abandoned position with its 
crumpled American flag. One of them, dressed in a crisply pressed uniform 
and sporting perfect white teeth, rises to throw a grenade.45 The poster of this 
image had a print run of fifty thousand copies, which were distributed across 
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Japan in February 1943. For the Tokyo celebration on March 10, the Yamahata 
Photographic Science Institute, under supervision by the Army Information 
Bureau, produced a giant mural of 3,559 square feet.46 This mural was hung 
from the roof of the Nihon Gekijō (Japan Theater) almost as if to underscore 
that mere playacting had been substituted for real battle. For all intents and 
purposes, by 1943, Japan was defeated, but the nation, trapped in its own false 
dream of an eventless history, could not wake itself to face reality.47
The Exceptional State Masked as the State of Unexception
In asking what photography might show us about wartime Japan, this essay 
has focused on two aspects: first, the marked placidness in the photographic 
portrayals in domestic magazines of military and civilian action and, second, 
the obfuscation of photography’s techniques of representation and its poten-
7.5 An article by Yamahata Yōsuke discussed the production and display of the 
photomontage “Uchiteshi yamamu” (Fight to the Bitter End, 1943) in Shashin Bunka 
[Photographic Culture] 26, no. 4 (April 1943): 8 – 9. 
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tial to convey reality. Together, the government and photographers masked 
not simply particular events but eventfulness itself as a characteristic of Ja-
pan’s imperial politics in the 1930s and early 1940s. The result of these tactics 
was a visual diet as bland as sawdust and an incapacity to see the truth of 
Japan’s situation. 
When we look at these wartime photographs, we can see the Japanese state 
as it wished to be seen, but we must not be misled into thinking that these im-
ages are benign or merely kitschy just because real strife and destruction are 
invisible. Looking at a similar phenomenon in film, the esteemed historian 
John Dower interprets the quietism as propitious: as he puts it, “The films 
are propaganda first and last, but they contain strains of humanism and even 
pacifism that bespeak the filmmaker’s roots in less militaristic and repressive 
times and constitute strong legacies to the years following Japan’s defeat.”48 I 
see this phenomenon in photography differently. Japan’s war was a war with-
out pictures not in friction with state interests but in support of them. Sadly, the 
images of rolling terrains, atmospheric seascapes, and bloodless battles are not 
remnants of laudatory popular decency and humanism — as Dower sees them 
in film — but the manifestation of fascism achieved through redefinition.49 The 
type of fascism that slithers into place is hard to guard against, but it is not in-
visible. We can see it in the quiet stills made by Japanese photographers who 
turned soldiers into landscapes and models into melodramatic men- at- arms. 
Looked at in this way, Japanese wartime photography shows us how we 
might achieve a new understanding of fascism that does not rely on overt 
revolution overthrowing liberal democratic institutions. Instead, a state of 
aggressive nationalism and uniformity can be achieved by gradually and in-
sistently downgrading representation in all its forms: political, economic, and 
cultural. Without modes of representation and the patterns of thought and 
action that measure the distance between what is and what might be, condi-
tions are seen as natural and incontestable. The Japanese regime absorbed 
the energies of the ultraright and redefined itself by undermining civil soci-
ety, unions, artistic independence, and ultimately democratic processes. This 
redefined state left people without the means to represent their differences. 
Japanese photographers served the fascist state by collectively forgoing the 
imperative to approach their craft as a self- aware practice representing social 
realities and individual vision. As the velvet- gloved hand of a nebulous, vital-
ist, counterrevolutionary ideology gradually squeezed the breath out of the 
pluralistic body politic, the “state of exception” appeared in Japan as a “state 
of unexception.” Inevitability erased eventfulness. Fascism was normalized.
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FASCISMS SEEN AND UNSEEN
The Netherlands, Japan, Indonesia,  
and the Relationalities of Imperial Crisis
Ethan Mark
Interwar Fascism Viewed from Empire
On July 16, 1943, Edward John Voûte, the Nazi- appointed mayor of Am-
sterdam, received a letter of complaint from Johan Bastiaan Van Heutsz Jr. 
Mayor Voûte surely knew who its author was. Van Heutsz’s father, former 
governor- general of the Netherlands Indies Joannes Benedictus Van Heutsz 
(1851 – 1924), was the most famous and decorated Dutch military man of mod-
ern times, known above all for his successful “pacification” of the ever res-
tive region of Aceh at the turn of the twentieth century. Eight years earlier, a 
grand monument to mark his memory had been unveiled, with great fanfare, 
in the southwest of the city and was christened by Queen Wilhelmina her-
self. Yet Van Heutsz Jr., who made little secret of his Nazi sympathies, was 
not impressed. With a smug conviction that reflected not only his prestigious 
familial pedigree but also the confidence of a man convinced that history was 
finally on his side, he condemned the monument as “weak” and “decadent,” 
unbefitting the image of his conquering imperial warrior father. As such, he 
wrote, it was in fact the very embodiment of the “weakness” of the prewar 
Dutch political status quo that had produced it — an indecisive, corrupt sys-
tem of parliamentary democratic rule that had proven itself incapable of de-
fending the national interest, sold out the empire, and, in effect, brought Nazi 
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occupation upon itself. The monument should be replaced, he insisted, with 
something more appropriately masculine and martial.1
Van Heutsz Jr. left behind his own visual record that makes it easy to 
imagine what sort of alternative he had in mind. A year before writing to the 
mayor, he had returned to the Netherlands from an extended tour of Nazi- 
occupied Russia and published a travelogue entitled A Viking in Russia (Wik-
ing door Rusland), its cover emblazoned with a Viking warrior with medieval 
armor, sword, a winged helmet, and a Nazi swastika on his shield, standing 
against a backdrop of a large “ss” logo. Several months later, Van Heutsz Jr., 
a medical doctor, volunteered for the Waffen ss (the ss military arm) and 
headed back to the Eastern Front to treat wounded German soldiers, by now 
in great supply. Subsequently decorated for bravery after his “Viking Panzer 
Division” escaped Soviet encirclement at Cherkasy in the Ukraine, he died in 
battle near Munich shortly before war’s end. In the meantime, Mayor Voûte, 
a faithful servant of the Nazis, had taken no action on Van Heutsz Jr.’s re-
quest to change the monument. Indeed, he had little incentive to do so: de-
spite their open and avowed loyalty to the Nazi cause, Van Heutsz Jr. and 
other open supporters of Nazi German rule, such as the Dutch fascist Natio-
naal Socialistische Beweging (nsb), wielded little influence with Voûte’s Nazi 
bosses. Nor were they popular with most of the Dutch population, many of 
whom viewed them as traitors to the nation.
Although not widely known among the Dutch general public, the story of 
Van Heutsz Jr. and his letter to the mayor is hardly a secret among scholars 
of modern Dutch history. On the one hand clearly substantiating the exis-
tence of home- grown Dutch fascists, it also serves to illustrate why schol-
ars of fascism and its visual expressions would rarely envision the interwar 
Netherlands as the most fruitful place to start: whatever his family relation 
to the Netherlands’ most famous colonial military man, in his open devo-
tion to Nazi Germany and to Nazism, Van Heutsz Jr. was an exception to the 
Dutch rule. Moreover, his problem with the monument was, after all, its lack 
of any fascist aesthetic, which he saw as symbolic of a prewar Dutch political 
regime also lacking in everything he admired so much in the German one. 
The period leading up to Nazi occupation had indeed witnessed a contin-
ued Dutch commitment to parliamentary democracy and to institutions 
such as the League of Nations as a civilized and progressive means of set-
tling international disputes, along with an ongoing faith in the possibility of 
respect for the Netherlands’ peaceful neutrality (which had kept it out of the 
 Fascisms Seen and Unseen 185
previous world war). Even at the height of its popularity during the depths 
of the Great Depression in the mid- 1930s, the nsb had never managed to 
attain more than 8 percent of the national vote, and it subsequently lost sup-
port as its leader, Anton Mussert, moved to embrace Hitler and his policies 
of anti- Semitism and racial purity. The stability of Dutch liberal democracy 
through the thick and thin of this period of crisis — a time when not only 
Germany and Italy but many other societies in central, eastern, and south-
ern Europe turned decisively toward reactionary authoritarianism — has 
conventionally resulted in a positioning of the interwar Netherlands at a 
far remove from fascism.2 In seeking out fascism in the Pacific theater dur-
ing this period, historiographical and popular conventions would much 
sooner point us toward the aggressive imperial Japanese than to the peace-
ful Dutch. Amid a long list of other wartime atrocities they committed 
against the inhabitants of East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, it was, 
after all, the Japanese who unilaterally invaded the Netherlands East Indies 
and subjected its Dutch population to a merciless and brutal incarceration 
many experienced as quintessentially fascist.
Yet looking beyond the conventional equation of interwar Dutch fascism 
with that of Nazi Germany — an equation that makes fascism in the interwar 
Netherlands seem reassuringly limited to a fringe group of puppets, opportun-
ists, and ideologues such as Van Heutsz Jr. and nsb leader Anton Mussert — 
another perspective exists from which emerges an entirely indigenous Dutch 
lineage of interwar fascism far more pervasive and troubling in its influence. 
It is a lineage whose monuments are still everywhere visible if we only take 
the trouble to look. That we are not in the habit of doing so is attributable 
to two ideological force fields whose global grip on the study of the interwar 
period, and thus also on that of fascism, remains nearly hegemonic: Euro-
centrism and nation- centrism. The identity of Van Heutsz Jr. as the son of 
the Netherlands’ most famous colonial general, born and raised in the Neth-
erlands Indies and obsessed with their fate, serves as an essential clue here, 
though his exceptional Nazi loyalties could also be said to have long served 
as a distraction convenient to the Eurocentric conventions of the discipline, 
distracting us from, in a word, empire. For while Van Heutsz Jr. must be 
thankfully acknowledged as atypical of the interwar Dutch social and po-
litical elite in his open Nazi sympathies, his anxiety over the fate of a Dutch 
empire under siege from within and without, his nostalgia for the memory 
of his imperial strongman father, and his embrace of a fascist worldview as a 
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means of “returning” the Netherlands to the imagined prosperous, orderly, 
and world- renowned empire over which his father had once presided were all 
in fact sentiments with a much wider currency.
Rendered invisible in the conventional Euro- and nation- centric story of 
the Netherlands’ World War II is the essential identity of this period as one 
in which Dutch colonial subjects still vastly outnumbered its citizens. In an 
increasingly hostile interwar environment that embraced metropole and col-
ony alike, many Dutch citizens were drawn not to Nazism as such but to an 
essentially native, imperial form of fascism as a vehicle for securing their 
continued imperial privileges or gaining new ones. Viewed not with the in-
ternecine rivalries of Europe but rather the global order of empires in mind, 
the peace- loving, democratic, progressive, liberal Netherlands motherland of 
the interwar period is thus revealed as rather like the top of an iceberg, whose 
emergence above the visible surface as such was made possible only by its 
placement atop a much larger social body groaning underneath the waves: a 
colonial body riven with social hierarchy, racism, autocracy, militarism, and 
exploitation — and a place where the Dutchman’s position of authority, supe-
riority, and prosperity was forever secure.
During the interwar period and above all amid the crisis generated by the 
Great Depression, uncontrollable revolutionary forces both within the King-
dom of the Netherlands and around the world began to raise the tempera-
ture of the seas in which this imperial iceberg floated: forces from the Left, 
including rising labor movements critical of the social status quo and anti-
colonial nationalists who sought an end to empire; and forces from the Right, 
including the Netherlands’ prime imperial competitors, the Japanese, who 
sought a radical global imperial redistribution. In response, Dutch political, 
economic, and social elites both in the metropole and in the colony increas-
ingly sought solace in a nostalgic return to the imperial glory days that was 
in fact something new. The period also witnessed the parallel rise of a Dutch 
middle- class fascist movement, the nsb, that shared and amplified these do-
mestic and imperial anxieties and antipathies. Domestically, the nsb had an 
agenda and social composition similar to those of contemporaneous fascist 
movements in neighboring countries, and as elsewhere in Europe, it stood in 
ambivalent relation to domestic elites as having shared social and political 
enemies but also as being a potential political competitor. Its failure to make 
serious inroads among metropolitan socioeconomic elites ensured that the 
dominant story of the Netherlands’ World War II would be one of fascist 
failure. Meanwhile, “offstage” in the colonial arena of the Netherlands East 
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Indies, however, the two streams of Dutch fascism flowed synergistically and 
powerfully together, revealing a shared imperial progeny and logic. Although 
it was increasingly politically contested and pushed to the fringes of the pub-
lic eye in the metropole as the more immediate threat of war within Europe 
expanded, Dutch interwar fascism thus remained strongest and most visible 
on the “front lines” of the Netherlands’ increasingly besieged Pacific empire.
Thus viewed in a relational and transnational frame that takes in the in-
terwar Netherlands, its Indonesian colony, and its main imperial competi-
tor Japan as an interconnected whole, it is in fact the Dutch interwar empire 
more than the Japanese one that confronts the viewer with the most obvious 
and monumental material expressions of fascism. It is these that are there-
fore the focus of this essay. Carved in stone or cast in metal and emphasiz-
ing the masculine military charisma of the individualized imperial ruler, 
they reflected Dutch fascism’s mainly elite and colonial pedigree as quin-
tessentially imperialist, exclusive, and hierarchical. Specifically, the discus-
sion revolves around three distinctive interwar monuments built to honor 
Governor- General Van Heutsz in colony and metropole in the 1920s and ’30s 
and their subsequent divergent histories: a massive militaristic mausoleum 
built in 1927 that still stands in Amsterdam’s New Eastern Cemetery; a domi-
neering memorial in the center of the colonial capital Batavia, completed in 
1932, that surprisingly survived the Japanese occupation but not the transi-
tion to an independent Indonesia; and last, a monument erected in the south-
west quarter of Amsterdam in 1935, which Van Heutsz’s son singled out dur-
ing the war for its atypical lack of a fascist aesthetic. All three were unveiled 
with equally immense fanfare during the interwar period, but only the last 
survived into postwar memory. 
Such Dutch designs of the interwar years reflected a yearning to freeze 
imperial hierarchy in place, thereby forever fixing Indonesians as colonial 
subjects rather than citizens of the Dutch nation. In contrast, visual and 
other propaganda produced by the Japanese promised the revolutionary 
destruction of the old Dutch order and its replacement with an Asia revi-
talized and unified by a common cause and a common culture. Insofar as 
it emphasized horizontal social unity and inclusion rather than the social 
hierarchy and distancing of the Dutch model, Japan’s call for an “Asia for 
the Asians” bore immeasurably greater potential appeal and transferability 
to Japan’s colonial populations. But in practice, such promises were contra-
dicted by a Japanese determination to preserve their empire that was no less 
fierce than that of their Dutch competitors. In Indonesian eyes, the resultant 
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contradiction — the gap between the nation- building that was promised and 
the empire- building that was delivered — ultimately revealed a Japanese fas-
cist logic no less cruel than that of the Dutch.
Bringing the two together, the following discussion presents a brief his-
tory of interwar fascism and its visual expressions in what might be called 
an Indonesia- centric frame: a look at Dutch and Japanese interwar fascisms 
and their social logics as revealed in mutual competition over an increas-
ingly resistant colonial location whose resources and population each sought 
to secure. The attempt has yielded a narrative centered on Dutch fascism 
and its interwar evolution, with Japan and its wartime alternative arriving 
and receiving brief attention as a counterreferent relatively late in the story. 
Such an emphasis reflects not only limitations of space and an Indonesian 
chronology in which Japan made a relatively late appearance, but also the 
oft- hidden relational nature of “Japanese fascism” as expressed in how Ja-
pan’s message necessarily manifested itself in a specifically Southeast Asian 
wartime context, that is, as a revolutionary alternative to the European impe-
rial order — and European fascism — that had come before. An exploration of 
these two distinct and competing fascist lineages highlights two inflections 
of a global phenomenon studies of fascism and fascist aesthetics underem-
phasize: the complex global relationality between the interwar rise of fascism 
and the crisis of empire.
Monuments to Imperial Glory and the Fascist Face  
of the Interwar Netherlands
Fascist monumentality in the interwar Netherlands? As the avowed Nazi 
Van Heutsz Jr. fulminated, little of this was on offer in the 1935 monument in 
the southwest of Amsterdam (figure 8.1). Its centerpiece was a female figure 
clad in toga, mounted upon a large stone base positioned in the middle of a 
reflecting pool. The figure bore in her hands not a sword but a legal parch-
ment roll: she was a version of the Greek Lady Justice. Behind her stood two 
small lions, and behind those towered two brick pillars connected high above 
by an inverted U- shaped metal form with rays projecting outward and up-
ward, suggesting the sun. The pillars and the lions were meant to symbolize 
metropole and colony, separated by the water below and united by the sun 
above. Between arched galleries emerging to the left and right appeared a suc-
cession of stone- carved pictorials representing the main islands comprising 
the colonial archipelago, peacefully populated by male and female Indone-
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sian figures and figurines of social status from high to low and in primitively 
stylized native dress — kings, peasants, and godlike figures — surrounded by 
products and dwellings associated with each. The image of the conqueror of 
Aceh himself, however, appeared almost as an afterthought, in virtually two 
dimensions, on a round metal plaque mounted on the front of the central 
base. Rather than that of the conquering Viking warrior that Van Heutsz Jr. 
had in mind, the colonial relationship depicted here was one of a gentle and 
maternalistic purveyance of civilization.
Since the end of World War II, the Van Heutsz monument in Amster-
dam’s southwest has remained standing in a relative obscurity reflective of 
a more general Dutch ignorance of, and discomfort with, the imperial past. 
For the minority taking an interest in the matter, it has nevertheless re-
mained the nation’s best known monument to that past, and as such has 
been the greatest focal point of public struggles over the meaning of that 
heritage. For the postwar Dutch Left in particular, the ruthless brutality 
associated with Van Heutsz’s “successes” in bringing to heel the rebellious 
“outer” provinces of Aceh as well as Bali, Celebes, Sumbawa, Lombok, and 
8.1 Unveiling of the Van Heutsz Monument, Amsterdam, 1935. From the photo collection 
Het Leven (1906 – 1941), sfa022001389, Het Leven, Spaarnestad Photo. 
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elsewhere during his tenure as general and subsequently governor- general 
(1904 – 9) made the monument a logical and perennial target of attacks as a 
symbol of the evils of Dutch imperialism. 
Even in his turn- of- the- century heyday, Van Heutsz’s capacity for “ex-
cesses,” yielding “native” casualties in the tens of thousands, were already 
well known. When news and grisly photographs of the 1904 slaughter of the 
entire Acehnese village of Kuta Reh trickled into the mother country, pres-
sure mounted for his resignation. He was saved from this fate only by the 
unyielding support of the young Queen Wilhelmina, who was to remain a 
die- hard fan of Van Heutsz during his life and after his death.3 In 1967, amid 
expanding anti – Vietnam War protests, the Van Heutsz monument was de-
faced with white paint and even subjected to a failed bomb attack. By 1984, 
when it was targeted in a second failed bomb attack, the lettering and the 
plaque of the general had disappeared altogether, never to be recovered.
Over the same decades, however, mainstream historians, military men, 
and others among the Dutch elite — including a large community of former 
colonial residents — have more quietly continued to characterize Van Heutsz 
as a tough but admirable figure who succeeded in unifying the archipelago 
when all others had failed, also emphasizing that he was not only a con-
queror but also a bearer of civilization. It was, after all, under his watch that 
the colonial regime had responded to long- standing progressive calls for an 
“ethical policy” toward the “natives” by instituting a system of village schools 
(albeit also catering to conservatives of the day by insisting that the “natives” 
foot the bill for the schools themselves). A 2006 essay in the mainstream His-
torisch Nieuwsblad described Van Heutsz as progressive for his day, a man 
“too practical to be racist.”4 Even today, a prominent infantry regiment of the 
Dutch Mobile Air Brigade still proudly bears Van Heutsz’s name; this brigade 
was originally formed directly out of units of the defunct Netherlands Indies 
Colonial Army (knil) when the Dutch lost their military bid to hold onto the 
colony in 1950. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that a committee appointed 
to restore and rechristen the monument in the early 2000s referred to it as 
representing the “two faces of Dutch colonialism.”5
For all the controversy and attention to Dutch colonial history that the 
Van Heutsz monument has brought to the surface since its unveiling some 
eighty years ago, the focusing of Dutch attention upon this particular mon-
ument, and upon the particular colonial history of the man with whom it 
is associated, is even more remarkable for what it obscures. For all their 
heatedness and social significance, such debates, and the ideological frame 
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they reinforce, have functioned as a remarkably effective means of detach-
ing and distancing postwar understandings of Dutch colonialism from the 
immediate late imperial context in which the monument itself was actually 
produced — that is, from the interwar period. Significantly, this was a pe-
riod in which Van Heutsz achieved a far greater stature in death than he had 
ever achieved in life. Among Dutch elites both metropolitan and colonial, 
it was in fact a period that witnessed a virtual Van Heutsz mania. Properly 
restored to this context, the monument in Amsterdam’s southwest emerges 
in quite a different light: as only the last in a whole series of Van Heutsz stat-
ues, busts, and monuments — a veritable avalanche, in fact — erected not only 
across Amsterdam and the Dutch motherland, but across the length and 
breadth of the Netherlands Indies as well, during the decade after his death 
in 1924. Among these, the 1935 monument in Amsterdam’s southwest in fact 
stands out as a striking exception to the interwar rule, particular in its pro-
nounced rejection of the fascistic martial, masculine aesthetics upon which 
Van Heutsz’s Nazi son insisted.
From the façade of the Dutch Commercial Company (Nederlandsche 
Handelmaatschappij) in Amsterdam’s city center to the central square of 
Banda Aceh, capital of the province where Van Heutsz’s worst atrocities were 
committed, busts, figures, and references to Van Heutsz (and other beloved 
Dutch colonial figures such as East India Company (voc) founder Jan Piet-
erszoon Coen), cast in bronze or cut in stone, came to adorn dozens of pub-
lic spaces across both metropole and colony between roughly 1925 and 1935. 
Along with the 1935 monument in Amsterdam’s southwest, the two largest 
and most monumental of these arose, respectively, in the east of Amsterdam 
in 1927 and in the center of the colonial capital of Batavia in 1932. Reflect-
ing the depth of Van Heutsz nostalgia that gripped Dutch economic and 
political elites during this period, each was funded through massive private 
donations and christened with overwhelming official fanfare.
When Van Heutsz Jr. wrote to Amsterdam’s mayor in 1943 to complain 
about the “weakness” of the newest monument to his father, he might have 
indeed pointed to more than just the cover of his own recent pamphlet as 
an example of an appropriately “strong” alternative. For sixteen years, the 
model alternative had in fact already existed for all to see: the Van Heutsz 
mausoleum, constructed as the centerpiece of Amsterdam’s New Eastern 
Cemetery and christened — like the 1935 monument — by Queen Wilhelmina 
herself (figure 8.2). Van Heutsz’s reburial there in July 1927 was conducted 
with the full honors of a state funeral, and he remains today the only non-
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royal recipient of such an honor. Those standing in attendance included an 
honor guard of the colonial militia (knil), which included a sizeable Indo-
nesian representation.
Led by an honorary monument committee whose membership repre-
sented the cream of the Dutch political and economic elite, the mausoleum 
had been financed through donations from a host of national, provincial, 
and local committees founded across the nation and in the Netherlands In-
dies upon the retired general’s death in Switzerland in 1924.6 Exhumed and 
transported to Amsterdam for reburial three years later, the general’s coffin 
and remains were first displayed at a great public ceremony at the royal pal-
ace on the Dam Square, from whence they were solemnly paraded some six 
kilometers to the cemetery. Designed by the modernist “Amsterdam school” 
architect Jordanus Roodenburgh and carved of great reddish granite blocks 
by the sculptor Bon Ingen- Housz (1881 – 1953) of the Hague — both winners of 
a design competition — the colossal mausoleum suggested the form of a mili-
tary fortress or an immense battle tank. Its bunker- like entrance was flanked 
by two supremely muscular, larger- than- life Viking warriors modeled after 
8.2 Reburial ceremony at the Van Heutsz Mausoleum, Nieuwe Oosterbegraafplaats, 
Amsterdam, 1927. From the photo collection Hat Leven (1906 – 1941), sfa022001387,  
Hat Leven, Spaarnestad Photo. 
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figures on the Monument to the Battle of Nations christened by Kaiser Wil-
helm in Leipzig in 1913.7 At the mausoleum’s rear, flanking a listing of Van 
Heutsz’s military and political titles, stood two more muscular male figures. 
The soldier to the left of the title list wore a helmet and sported the bundle 
of wooden rods that symbolized strength and authority in Etruscan and Ro-
man yore, now also the symbol of Mussolini’s new regime to the south — the 
fasces. To its right stood Mercury, the Roman god of trade and profit as well 
as guide to the underworld.
Despite the immensity and extravagance of Van Heutsz’s Amsterdam tomb, 
so much donor money was left over that the committee decided to invest 
this in two more monuments, one in the colonial capital of Batavia and the 
other in a second location in Amsterdam. As we have seen, the latter was 
to become a source of distress for Van Heutsz Jr. The stories of these two 
monuments reveal the way fascism’s course diverged between metropole and 
colony before and after World War II.
A suitably central location in Batavia had been chosen and work by 1930 
was underway. Reflecting the general’s sudden public ubiquity as symbolic 
crystallization of a colonial nostalgia that had only deepened since the Great 
Depression had set in, one observer noted, with little apparent sense of irony, 
that “the Van Heutsz Monument Committee chose this location because 
there is not enough room for such a large monument on the Van Heutsz 
Boulevard.”8 
The Batavia Van Heutsz Monument was finally unveiled in August 1932 
(figure 8.3). The winning design, stunningly executed by Indonesian crafts-
men, had been conceived in the Netherlands by the architect Willem Mari-
nus Dudok, famous for his “romantic cubism,” in collaboration with sculptor 
Hendrik van den Eynde.9 As Van Heutsz’s successor Governor- General J. C. 
De Jonge revealed the monument to the public for the first time, a great crowd 
of dignitaries and onlookers marveled at its immense and imposing stone-
work and the unmistakable message of imperial power it projected. The fig-
ure of Van Heutsz, his eyes and rigid body both facing firmly forward toward 
the horizon, stood high on a central pedestal from which emerged, far below 
and before him, a well- ordered mass of “natives” driven forward by Dutch co-
lonial troops. A great elephant stood in their midst, a “native” guide perched 
atop him, suggesting the opening of a way through hitherto impenetrable 
jungle. Other half- naked Indonesians emerged in a relief to Van Heutsz’s side, 
somewhat higher up but still well beneath him, bearing the fruits of their 
manual labors on their shoulders. Below them appeared Van Heutsz’s name 
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and dates in office (1904 – 9) and text that read, “He Created Order, Peace, 
and Prosperity, and Unified the Peoples of the Netherlands Indies into One.” 
In a commemoration speech amplified through great loudspeakers that 
could be “seen from afar” and relayed live to both of the new public radio 
channels in the European mother country more than ten thousand kilome-
ters distant, De Jonge said of his forerunner Van Heutsz: “He laid a mile-
stone.” Echoing the grand words carved into the monument, he continued: 
“More than ever before, he executed policies that aimed for prosperity, hap-
piness, and development of the land and its people. It is right,” he proclaimed, 
“that he is called an ‘Empire builder.’ But nevertheless, we must also acknowl-
edge that he was a ‘home builder’ — builder of the home of the Indies’ society 
that we now inhabit.”10
The monument’s reactionary colonial symbolism was not equally wel-
comed by all. Days before its unveiling ceremony, the Indonesian Student’s 
Association (pppi) had convened at their Batavia headquarters — a boarding 
house that had been rechristened the “Indonesia Building” since the asso-
ciation’s founding in 1928 — to issue the following statement: “The history of 
8.3 The Van Heutsz Monument in Batavia, covered in wreaths from its admirers, on 
the day of its unveiling ceremony in August 1932. From the photo collection Hat Level 
(1906 – 1941), sfa022001376, Hat Leven, Spaarnestad Photo. 
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General Van Heutsz is a history of suffering for the Indonesian people, the 
people of a subject nation, and Van Heutsz’ name is synonymous with the loss 
of freedom in various territories, causing Indonesia to be the victim of impe-
rialism . . . the construction of a monument to Van Heutsz in these times . . . 
means the deliberate deepening of a wound in the hearts of the Indonesian 
people.”11 In the metropole too, plans for a second Amsterdam monument 
had met with unprecedented resistance from the city council, whose mem-
bership now included socialists and even communists determined to pre-
vent another expensive tribute to “a man with blood on his hands.” After a 
long standoff, an uncomfortable, controversial compromise was reached: the 
conservatives would get “their” monument, and the Left theirs. The latter, a 
statue of Domela Nieuwenhuis (1846 – 1919), the founder of the Netherlands’ 
first social democratic party, was unveiled to huge, enthusiastic crowds in 
the west of the city center in 1931, his provocatively raised arm ending in a 
clenched fist.12
When the monument in Amsterdam’s southwest was finally unveiled 
in 1935, it was greeted with a hyperbolic speech from then prime minister 
Hendrikus Colijn entirely in keeping with earlier precedent. The hard- liner 
Colijn, founder of the “Anti- Revolutionary Party” and with a long record 
of ministerial appointments, had served under Van Heutsz in Aceh in his 
younger days, also committing atrocities in the name of “pacification.” His 
speech compared the general to no less than “Hannibal, Caesar, and Alex-
ander the Great.”13 Yet as Van Heutsz’s son later noted, this time the look of 
the monument decisively failed to match the martial rhetoric. In subsequent 
years, a remarkable story emerged as an explanation: Frits van Hall, coauthor 
of the winning entry in the competition for the monument’s design, was in 
fact a committed communist. A colleague even contended later that the su-
perficial, two- dimensional quality of the Van Heutsz plaque and lettering 
on the monument had been entirely intentional, attributing to Van Hall the 
subversive declaration, “replace it with the words ‘freedom,’ ‘merdeka [the 
Indonesian word for independence],’ or ‘Indonesia,’ and you’ve got a Statue 
of Liberty!” Yet the selection committee’s choice for such a peaceful, mater-
nal motif seems above all a reflection of the monument’s broader formative 
context: an interwar Dutch political environment in which the critical views 
of the now- established Left could no longer be simply ignored or suppressed. 
In its very serenity, the 1935 monument thus revealed the scars of the pitched 
political battles of the late 1920s that lay behind its construction.14 
It was no doubt to such unwelcome, “subversive” interwar developments in 
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both metropole and colony that Governor- General J. C. De Jonge alluded in 
his speech as he unveiled the Batavia monument in 1932 — developments that 
only seemed to be gaining momentum since the recent onset of the Great De-
pression: “How far away from us Van Heutsz now seems to stand. One might 
wonder if people would put up with a figure like Van Heutsz nowadays. He 
was a man of action. Imagine a man of action in these times of so much talk! 
A man like Van Heutsz in these times where everything is criticized! In these 
times, when everyone wants to have a say in everything!”15 For De Jonge and 
others of his ilk, the colonies at least remained a place where it was still possible 
to rule with an iron fist, particularly where the “natives” were concerned. Else-
where in Asia, where anticolonial movements were gathering momentum — 
places such as British India, the Philippines, China, and Burma — the Anglo- 
American powers were beginning to opt for a more “constructive” response 
that combined the suppression of “radicals” with piecemeal, gradualist de-
laying tactics of compromises and negotiations with “moderate elements.” 
By the late 1930s, within this context, the U.S. and Great Britain had made 
pledges of greater autonomy and future independence to Burma and the Phil-
ippines. But for the Dutch in the East Indies — as with the Japanese in Korea 
and China during the same period, for example — immense economic and 
psychological investments in their imperial “jewels in the crown” combined 
with heightened fears of international instability and economic peril to yield 
instead a more aggressive and uncompromising stance than ever. The ap-
pointment of the hard- liner De Jonge, and his enthusiasm for Van Heutsz, 
reflected the determination of Dutch elites to make time stand still — or bet-
ter yet, to make it retreat. 
Nowhere was this clearer than in De Jonge’s response to Indonesia’s fledg-
ling nationalist movement and its charismatic young leader Sukarno. Upon 
his appointment in 1931, one of De Jonge’s first moves was to send Sukarno to 
prison for a four- year term for “subversive activities.” At first, protests from 
Dutch progressives in both colony and metropole pressured him into releas-
ing Sukarno three years early, but a year later, after publishing the essay “At-
taining Indonesian Independence,” Sukarno was again arrested. This time 
De Jonge invoked emergency powers to ship the troublemaker and his right- 
hand man Mohammad Hatta safely off to unlimited exile on the distant is-
land of Flores. The two would only be released at Japanese hands some eight 
years later.
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Interimperial Competition and the Rise of Japanese Fascism
If the insecurity of the early 1930s found many Dutch looking back nostal-
gically, many Japanese were looking rather aggressively ahead. Just as the 
Dutch were unveiling the Van Heutsz monument in Batavia, their Japanese 
imperial competitors were busy putting the finishing touches on a radical 
challenge not only to rising Chinese anticolonial nationalism but also to 
long- standing Euro- American imperial hegemony in Asia: 1932 witnessed 
the crowning of Pu Yi on the throne of the puppet state of “Manchukuo.” 
Prompted by visions of a “Manchurian lifeline” that would provide land, re-
sources, and military security in a hostile and dangerous post- 1929 world — a 
buffer against the rising threats of Chinese nationalism and Soviet commu-
nism, as well as insurance against Western protective trade barriers and anti- 
immigration policies — the Manchurian invasion was initiated by rebellious 
factions within Japan’s military, but it quickly proved wildly popular among 
the general public. In Japan, as in places like Germany, where Hitler came to 
power in 1933, and in Italy, where Mussolini’s regime peaked in popularity 
with its brutal victory over Ethiopia in 1935, interwar yearnings for such a 
decisive “breakthrough” were feeding dangerous support for a combination 
of authoritarian politics at home and aggressive imperial expansion abroad.
The social mapping of Dutch and Japanese interwar fascisms alike was 
complex and varied, but they had important and telling differences. In com-
parison to Dutch imperial fascism, whose center of gravity lay among its po-
litical and economic elites, particularly those with a direct investment in the 
empire, Japan’s interwar fascism was fundamentally more a phenomenon of 
a frustrated middle class. As such, as much as it shared with Dutch interwar 
fascism an embrace of a reactionary nostalgia against the revolutionary social 
challenges and imperial threats of the era, it also had a stronger social revolu-
tionary component. Reflective of their class position, its supporters (heavily 
represented by younger, low- ranking army officers) often expressed a par-
ticular sense of frustration at the persistence of Japan’s “old order,” a domes-
tic power structure perceived to be dominated at the top by a “semifeudal” 
political and economic oligarchy from which they felt excluded. They also felt 
threatened “from below” by the rise of an increasingly restless, politicized, 
and chaotic “mass society” symbolized by activist workers and audacious 
modern women. A renovated, unified, virile nation- state — one cleansed of 
the “Western” scourges of individual and class interests, efficiently imple-
menting and distributing the benefits of technological progress, and regi-
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mented and mobilized for battle in the ruthless international struggles of 
the day — was the only way forward. In combining a call for a “return” to an 
ancient indigenous morality and spirituality with a leap into a socially and 
technologically engineered future, along with a critique of the materialism, 
individualism, and class conflict of capitalism and communism alike as un-
welcome “Western” imports, such discourses can be usefully compared with 
those of fascist Chinese counterparts that Maggie Clinton considers in chap-
ter 1 of this volume.
As in Italy and Germany too, Japan’s interwar spokesmen for national 
renovation saw an expanded and rejuvenated empire as key to the success of 
their domestic program (an aggressive luxury the Guomindang, relatively 
politically weak and at the mercy of the much more powerful Western and 
Japanese imperialists, could hardly afford). But unlike the Germans and 
Italians, Japan’s position as a non- Western empire in a Western- dominated 
world made both its imperialism and its stance toward anticolonial national-
ism more complex. As the crisis of Western modernity deepened and tensions 
with the Western powers mounted, Japan’s “outsider” status as a nonwestern 
society was increasingly seen as strength rather than weakness: Japan’s so-
lution to the interwar crisis would consist of a rejection of “Western” indi-
vidualism and liberalism and a “return” to its original Asian values. By the 
same token, interwar Japanese were inclined to sympathize with the anti-
colonial nationalism of fellow Asians so long as it was directed against West-
ern colonizers. As imperial Japan moved deeper into China, it increasingly 
proclaimed its struggle as a mission of Asian liberation from Western domi-
nation. Where the Dutch sought to increasingly suppress anticolonial na-
tionalism, Japan’s spokesmen sought in effect to transcend the inherently 
conflicting agendas of Japanese imperialism and Asian nationalism by co- 
opting Asian anticolonial nationalism and its appeals within a Japanese im-
perial framework.
Dutch Fascism from Below:  
The Crisis of Empire and the Rise of the NSB
As the Depression continued and the international climate darkened further, 
mass middle- class- oriented fascist movements gained traction not only in Ja-
pan, Germany, and Italy but across the length and breadth of Europe. Main-
stream observers in the Netherlands and elsewhere marveled at the “achieve-
ments” of Mussolini and Hitler, who seemed to be uniquely successful in 
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quieting unrest, unifying their populations, and strengthening their econo-
mies while the rest of the world was losing its way. Less commonly noted is 
that fascist ideas and movements also enjoyed a particular popularity among 
colonial middle classes as well as elites in Western Europe’s colonies in Asia 
and Africa. This was fortified not only by particularly strong colonial identi-
fication with fascism’s racist, social Darwinist worldviews but also by unease 
at the newfound aggressiveness of anticolonial movements and the fascists’ 
particularly muscular promises to defend against them.
In the Netherlands Indies such sentiments were strengthened further in 
response to increasing tensions with imperial Japan. Before Japan’s expand-
ing war with China raised the military temperature in the region from the 
late 1930s onward, these tensions were fostered primarily by economic com-
petition, as Japanese businesses and entrepreneurs aggressively sought, in 
Asian markets, a means of exporting Japan’s way out of the Depression. In 
the early 1930s, cheap Japanese products flooded the Netherlands Indies, and 
hundreds of small- scale Japanese entrepreneurs set up shops across the ar-
chipelago to sell them. Friendly and selling their wares at competitively low 
prices, these shopkeepers had become popular among the local population. 
Indonesians often favored them over the ethnic Chinese, who were tradition-
ally seen as economic and social rivals, dominated the lower reaches of the 
retail economy, and received relatively preferential treatment from the Dutch 
colonizers. With their own colonial market share severely threatened, the 
Dutch responded with protectionism. An increasingly militant Japan, which 
left the League of Nations in 1933 over Manchuria, responded with increas-
ingly militant rhetoric.
Against this ominous backdrop, the Netherlands’ own aspiring fascist 
leader Anton Mussert found no warmer reception than in the Netherlands 
Indies. When he arrived in Batavia in 1935, his nsb party, founded four years 
earlier, was the fifth largest in the mother country, having won 8 percent of 
the votes in the most recent election. But among the Dutch community of 
the Netherlands Indies, the nsb was the largest political party. In both col-
ony and metropole, the nsb enjoyed considerable support among the unem-
ployed, small- business owners, and low- ranking officials such as the police 
forces. “At home,” at least so long as Mussert’s support at the polls remained 
manageably low, the ruling elite preferred to keep him at arm’s length; state 
employees were prohibited from joining his party.16 In the Indies, however, 
Mussert was treated as a guest of state and was twice received with great cer-
emony by Governor- General De Jonge himself. The highlight of Mussert’s 
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colonial visit, avidly filmed and screened in the local cinemas, was his cer-
emonial wreath- laying at the new Van Heutsz monument.
In an accompanying speech, Mussert hammered upon his qualifications 
as defender of the empire from unprecedented threats within and with-
out: “Countrymen, any year now could be the last of our existence as a self- 
sufficient nation. And I say to you, the Indies is practically undefended, and 
if we lose the Indies — I cannot say it enough — at that moment there will be 
no possibility for a self- sufficient existence for our people. At that moment, 
we’ll have to become a part of Germany. And no matter how much we might 
respect our neighbors, that’s surely the last thing a real Dutchman would 
want!” Until 1940, donations from the Dutch colonial community would re-
main an essential source of revenue for the nsb — a little- known colonial life-
line for Holland’s metropolitan fascists.17
In both colony and metropole, however, 1935 proved to be the high point of 
Mussert’s popularity. In the mother country, the elite establishment shunned 
the nsb as radical upstarts, and strong conservative allegiance to the political 
parties associated with the Netherlands’ two main, largely separate religious 
communities (zuilen) of Catholics and Protestants further condemned sup-
porters of the nsb to “outsider” status and even social ostracism. Largely as a 
result, its support at the polls in 1937 dropped to little more than half that of 
two years earlier; it would not recover before the Nazi invasion in 1940. While 
the nsb in the colony clearly enjoyed more open support from members of 
the social elite, there, as in the Netherlands, a substantial proportion of the 
nsb’s support came from disaffected members of the middle class. In other 
ways, however, the social composition of the nsb’s supporters, the reasons for 
their support, and the eventual reasons for its decline were all distinctive — 
 and distinctively colonial. For here the majority of nsb party mem-
bers — some 70 percent — were members of its large mestizo Indo- European 
(“Indo”) community, who comprised some four- fifths of those with official 
status as Dutch citizens.18
The Indo community had come about through centuries of Dutch rule 
in Batavia and the surrounding areas, and it comprised the core of the tradi-
tional colonial ruling elite. In practice, as in other places around the world, 
closer ties with the Dutch motherland and the increasing influence of social 
Darwinist, racist thinking in the late nineteenth century meant increasing 
discrimination against these “mixed bloods” at the hands of the “pure” (totok) 
Dutch. But when the colonial state formalized a system of separate, discrimi-
natory legal codes for themselves, “natives,” and “foreign Orientals” at the 
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end of the nineteenth century, most Indos were awarded official Dutch status. 
However severe the racist attitudes that Dutch colonial elites entertained to-
ward them, in the overriding interest of maintaining the “tranquility” of the 
colonial status quo, the move was a practical necessity. In a classic act of colo-
nial “divide and conquer,” the Indos were thus strategically aligned with the 
totok Dutch and positioned above and separately from the natives, thereby 
heightening tensions between them and the latter.
As Indonesian anticolonial nationalism gained strength, for the many In-
dos for whom the Netherlands Indies was the only imaginable homeland 
(rather than the Netherlands, let alone “Indonesia”), the nsb’s stress on pro-
tecting Dutch civilization and the Dutch empire against all such “radical” 
threats inside and out held a distinctive appeal. nsb membership was also 
a way of emphasizing one’s Dutch cultural identity and loyalty in a colonial 
environment in which the questioning of both was frequently deployed as a 
basis for anti- Indo discrimination.19
Making such Indo support for the nsb at all possible was the nsb’s em-
phasis on cultural purity and national loyalty, rather than racial purity, as the 
prime criteria for membership in the Dutch nation. In this the Dutch fascists 
of the early to mid- 1930s more closely resembled and emulated those in Italy 
than those in Germany.20 This situation was to change, however, as Mussert 
and other nsb leaders increasingly came to identify the party with the Nazis 
and correspondingly increase emphasis on “Aryan” racial purity and anti- 
Semitism. Such moves inevitably alienated many Indos from the nsb, and 
the nsb overall experienced a dramatic decline in its colonial membership 
during the last years before the war.
After Nazi Germany invaded the Netherlands in May 1940 and the nsb 
there chose collaboration, the Dutch colonial authorities in the Netherland 
Indies cracked down on the local nsb as an enemy of the free Dutch state. 
Yet where Indonesian nationalists were concerned, the continued hard- line 
stance of the Dutch colonial regime was not easily distinguishable from that 
advocated by the nsb. It was only in mid- 1941, when the great showdown be-
tween imperial powers, long predicted by both fascists and the communists, 
threatened to spread to the Pacific, that the Dutch colonial state actively be-
gan to court the support of “moderate” Indonesian nationalist elements. In 
the meantime the Netherlands had been occupied by Japan’s ally Nazi Ger-
many, and Japanese relations with the Dutch and their American allies had 
steeply declined as a result of ongoing tension over Japan’s war in China and 
related Japanese moves into a French Indochina now controlled by Vichy 
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fascists. In their hour of need, the Dutch belatedly called upon their Indone-
sian “brethren” to help them defend “their” homeland against the invading 
Japanese “fascists.” 
Ambivalent Alternative:  
Japanese Fascism and Occupied Indonesia
For Indonesians, to say such Dutch wartime appeals were too little too late 
would be an understatement. Indeed, it was easy to view such belated Dutch 
calls for (little) “brotherhood” as nothing really new but merely the other side 
of the Dutch imperial Janus face that had existed in the form of the “ethical 
policy” at least since the days of Van Heutsz. While the Dutch sought to iden-
tify a common enemy by branding the Japanese as fascists, until now Indone-
sians’ most intimate encounter with fascism had been with that of the Dutch 
rather than the Japanese variety; democracy, meanwhile, had remained an 
exclusively Dutch possession.21 In practice, most Indonesians could therefore 
be forgiven for harboring a more positive inclination toward the arriving 
Japanese than the Dutch expected — all the more so given the jaw- dropping 
power with which the Japanese made their irresistible entry. 
On March 9, 1942, Japanese forces conquered Java after a whirlwind cam-
paign lasting just nine days, wresting it, along with the rest of the Indonesian 
archipelago, from centuries of Dutch colonial domination. Singapore, the 
“impregnable fortress” of Britain’s Asian empire, had fallen ignominiously 
just weeks before. Japanese, Americans, Europeans, and Southeast Asians 
were stunned and radicalized by the suddenness of this development and the 
vastness of its implications. Japan, perennially viewed not only by Westerners 
but by most Indonesians as little more than a distant, second- class Western 
copycat, now seemed to have beaten the West at its own game. Indonesians 
lined the roads to welcome Asia’s new leaders, who also proclaimed them-
selves Asia’s liberators; they emphasized the point by hoisting Indonesian 
flags alongside their own. Not just for Japanese but for Indonesians as well, 
both past and future seemed suddenly bathed in a new “Asian” light.
It is one of the great ironies of modern imperial history that the “liber-
ation” of Indonesians from the late imperial Dutch brand of fascism thus 
came at the hands of imperial Japanese, whose own fascistic conviction of 
their unique “world- historical” racial destiny as Asia’s natural- born lead-
ers and liberators, hardened through years of brutal, frustrated aggression 
against a resistant China and ongoing resentment at Western domination 
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and arrogance, was in turn immeasurably strengthened by their success in 
this very same act, and by the warm reception they received in response in 
Southeast Asia. For those who refused to acknowledge their new imperial 
hegemony — Chinese, Korean resistors, Westerners, communists — the Japa-
nese continued to reveal their most exclusionary and brutal fascist face. But 
Japanese justification of their Asian mission rested on a critique of a West-
ern hegemony based on imperialism, racism, and capitalism, and they were 
in desperate need of support from their neighbors. To those who acknowl-
edged their hegemony and shared their enemies, they promised inclusion in 
an Asian order of blood brotherhood rather than imperialist exploitation, a 
“return to Asia” comprising both cultural restoration and social renovation.
The result was that the legitimacy and identity of Japan’s mission of “lib-
eration” in Southeast Asia was located in a contradictory space, at once fascist 
and antifascist, imperialist and anti- imperialist, capitalist and anticapitalist, 
modern and antimodern. This is perhaps the reason that Japanese propa-
ganda imagery in Southeast Asia, like its domestic expressions considered by 
Julia Adeney Thomas in chapter 7 of this volume, appeared markedly lack-
ing in what might be called a fascist aesthetic — in stark contrast to the aes-
thetics of the monuments the Dutch erected in a desperate attempt to turn 
back the imperial clock. Reflecting a fundamentally ambivalent and con-
tradictory Japanese wartime position vis- à- vis its new colonial subjects — 
and indeed toward the old- fashioned hierarchies of empire itself — Japanese 
propaganda combined appeals to the imperial and the national that over-
lapped with and contradicted one another. 
As a first step toward building this new Japanese- Asian order, the Japa-
nese sought to undermine remaining symbols of Dutch imperial legitimacy 
not only through confining the Dutch to prison camps — first men and later 
women and children — but also by destroying monuments and other points of 
reference to Dutch colonial power. On April 29, 1942, the eve of mass celebra-
tions of the emperor’s birthday some two months after the Japanese arrived, 
a statue commemorating Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the seventeenth- century 
founder of Batavia, was toppled, along with the “Amsterdam Gate on Prin-
sen Street.” Yet remarkably, the Japanese chose to leave the Van Heutsz mon-
ument standing, electing only to erase the text engraved upon it and to re-
move the figure of Van Heutsz from view by encasing it in wood (figure 8.4). 
A Japanese- language newspaper explained that the monument “is considered 
unique and of artistic merit.”22
Elsewhere, in propaganda films such as The Battle of Hawaii and the Malay 
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Straits (1942), ordinary Indonesians were treated to repeated visual displays 
of Japanese power, most often in the form of ordinary soldiery mobilized for, 
and winning, battles in air and on land and sea. Such films were shown in 
theaters as well as in traveling film screenings throughout the countryside 
using specially outfitted trucks and portable outdoor screens, a technique 
that drew upon an Italian fascist model. Later, as the war situation grew more 
desperate, local propaganda such as the short film Indonesia Raya — named 
after and with a stirring soundtrack comprising the Indonesian national 
anthem — moved to incorporate Indonesians as active, empowered partic-
ipants in a similar militarized aesthetic. A series of recognizably typical 
Indonesian landscapes melted into anonymous, neat ranks of marching, 
muscle- bound Indonesian paramilitaries. (Although an ongoing Japanese 
ambivalence toward “arming the natives” could still be read in the soldiers 
bearing wood- carved rifles rather than real ones!) 
Dazzled by Japan’s military successes, seduced by such propaganda, and 
intrigued by the lessons of Japan’s experience as a uniquely successful and 
modern non- Western nation- state, many Indonesians were more receptive 
to Japan’s appeals than was later acknowledged.23 Sukarno, whom the Japa-
nese freed from years of Dutch- imposed exile, was the most prominent of the 
8.4 The Van Heutsz 
memorial in 1947, 
showing the Japanese 
erasure of the lettering 
and the covering over 
the figure of Van Heutsz. 
nfa02: cas- 10037- 9 
(negative), Indonesia 
Independent collection 
(photos 1947 – 1953), Dutch 
Photo Museum. 
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many Indonesian nationalists from across the political spectrum who chose 
to work with the new overlords. In practice, however, the Japanese delivered 
much less than they had promised. Early hopes that Japan might soon grant 
Indonesia independence were quickly dashed when both the Indonesian flag 
and the national anthem were banned “until further notice” in the name of 
maintaining public order. It was only in September 1944, when the tide of the 
war had turned decisively against Japan, that Tokyo finally issued a promise 
of Indonesian national independence, and only then at some undetermined 
point in the future — a point that had yet to be reached when Japan surren-
dered to the Allies in August 1945. Like the Dutch before them, the Japanese 
were little interested in affording Indonesians greater political autonomy, and 
Sukarno and other nationalist leaders soon grew tired of the fetters imposed 
on their expression and activities in the name of wartime unity. The mass 
of Indonesia’s population, out of direct reach of such media campaigns, ex-
perienced the Japanese and their regime in the impersonal form of increas-
ingly crushing administrative exactions, meted out by Indonesian officials 
who had little time for or interest in intellectual argumentation. Japan’s ever- 
escalating demands for labor and resources were combined with military- 
colonial arrogance, ignorance, and oppression that made the former Dutch 
rulers seem tolerant and brotherly by comparison. By the end of the occupa-
tion in 1945, with the colony ravaged and basic necessities in impossibly short 
supply, even most of the nationalists who had cast their lot with Japan early 
on had lost faith in them. The negative image of “fascists” in the minds of 
Indonesians, once dominated by the Dutch, was now more commonly asso-
ciated with the Japanese.
In the end, the ambivalence of Japanese occupation for Indonesia might 
well be summed up in the wartime fate of Batavia’s Van Heutsz monument: in 
erasing Van Heutsz’s name and tribute and covering up his figure, the Japa-
nese occupiers had succeeded in effacing Dutch authority and the symbols 
upon which its power and legitimacy were based. But they failed to replace 
it with anything concrete. Not only did they not have the time to craft and 
recraft the monumentalization of the dead as they did in Taiwan and Korea, 
as Paul Barclay shows in chapter 2; in ideological terms too the situation in 
Indonesia was even more unsettled and precarious. Throughout the occupa-
tion, the monument’s offer- bearing Indonesians remained, and its soldiers 
continued to drive them forward to ruin. When the returning Dutch began a 
new, ultimately futile and devastating war in late 1945 to turn back the colo-
nial clock, the monument remained standing as silent witness.24 During the 
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revolution, nationalist youth covered the Jakarta monument with anticolo-
nial slogans, and in 1953,  — four years after that war’s end, it was completely 
destroyed by the newly independent Indonesian government (figure 8.5).
Legacies Seen and Unseen
Long demolished in Indonesia, both the main monuments to Van Heutsz 
in Amsterdam remain standing today, each highlighting in its own way 
the ongoing limits and lacunae in the Dutch engagement with the colonial 
past — above all with regard to the inglorious interwar decades in which the 
two monuments arose. As noted above, the 1935 monument was a frequent 
target of postwar protest and vandalism, and by the late 1990s it was com-
monly recognized that it was in need of a facelift. In 2004, after several years 
of deliberations involving consultation with historians and interested parties, 
the city of Amsterdam rechristened it the “Indies- Netherlands Monument, 
8.5 The Van Heutsz monument in Jakarta in its final days. From the Spaarnestad  
photo collection. 
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1596 – 1949.” The first date refers to the Dutch founding of the colonial capi-
tal of Batavia by Jan Pieterszoon Coen (the same man whose monument in 
Batavia had been knocked down by the Japanese, to Indonesian applause, in 
1942). The second year marks that in which the Dutch were finally compelled 
to surrender their colony to an Indonesia whose leaders had in fact declared 
its independence four years earlier in 1945. A committee member claimed 
that they had thereby “finally honored [monument co- designer] Van Hall’s 
wishes.” Yet contrary to Van Hall’s wishes, it was to the colonial “Indies” 
rather than to an independent “Indonesia” that the monument was renamed, 
and nowhere did the anticolonial nationalist slogan “merdeka” (indepen-
dence) appear.25 The compromised new/old naming reflected a twenty- first- 
century Dutch state and civil society in which colonial nostalgia retained 
great sway among many of those with the greatest investment in the colonial 
past — foremost among them the large postcolonial community of former In-
dies residents and their descendants, along with the Dutch military.26 The 
Dutch king attended a ceremony to honor the Van Heutsz Brigade’s sixty- 
fifth anniversary in June 2015, its members proudly clad in colonial- era mili-
tary attire.
In 2003, with much less fanfare, the Van Heutsz mausoleum was disman-
tled and removed from its central, commanding position at the entrance to 
Amsterdam’s New Eastern Graveyard. Five years later it was reassembled in a 
more quiet and secluded location several minutes’ walk deeper into the grave-
yard, among trees, bushes, and, ironically enough, several graves of honored 
Dutch resistors to Nazi rule during the World War II era. Less ironic, but no 
less remarkable, is the presence of another grave nearby occupied by the no-
torious Dutch war criminal Captain Raymond Westerling (1919 – 87), who, in 
a manner reminiscent of Van Heutsz two generations before him, oversaw the 
killing of thousands of Indonesians in campaigns to “restore order” during 
the war of independence.27 Westerling was never prosecuted.28 
Interviewed in 2003 regarding the Van Heutsz mausoleum’s planned move 
to “a less prominent location,” the graveyard director insisted that the action 
was prompted not by the sight of the monument but only by long- standing 
frustration at the inconvenience of having to lead funeral processions around 
it on the way to the main hall. Despite the apparent synchronicity of the move 
with the refurbishing and rechristening of its sister monument to the west, 
the director denied any connection to “political correctness or any change in 
the status of the ‘pacifier of Aceh’. . . . ‘If it had been Johan Cruijff lying there, 
we still would have moved him.’ ”29 A small new signboard planted next to the 
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mausoleum when it was reassembled in its new location in 2008 nevertheless 
contends that it “tells the story of our changing view of the Netherlands’s 
colonial past . . .[;] designed to honor the general and his military successes, 
it now reminds us mostly of a dark page of Dutch history.” In the single 
paragraph subsequently dedicated to this history, however, reference is 
made only to the Aceh War. The history of the interwar period that actually 
produced the mausoleum — including its multiple fascisms and the imperial 
relationalities that shaped their distinctive forms — remain hidden in the 
shadows.
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YOUTH MOVEMENTS,  
NAZISM,  AND WAR 
Photography and the Making of a Slovak Future  
in World War II (1939 – 1944)
Bertrand Metton
The first independent Slovak state was created in March 1939 in the wake 
of the Munich agreement and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As 
the first of what were later to be called “Nazi puppet states,” its institutional 
framework was largely influenced by that of the Nazi tutelary power. In the 
months that followed, Catholic priest Jozef Tiso, who was the head of the 
new state, and his political formation, the reactionary- nationalist Hlinka’s 
People’s Party, implemented a policy of coordination that mimicked the Nazi 
Gleichschaltung of the mid- 1930s: it passed racial laws, outlawed other politi-
cal formations, and expanded the reach of the People’s Party by creating a 
number of affiliated organizations.1 The new state’s youth organization, the 
Hlinka Youth, which had been founded a few months earlier in December 
1938, was responsible for the physical and ideological training of the country’s 
future generations.2 As such it was ascribed the fundamental double task of 
regenerating the Slovak nation according to the new official creed, a mélange 
of reactionary Catholic ideas embodied by Tiso and a form of Europeanist 
Nazism championed by the radical wing of the People’s Party, and cementing 
the rebirth of the Slovak nation through its first independent state.3 
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From 1939 until the fall of the regime in 1945, the organization published a 
series of youth magazines relaying official propaganda among young Slovaks. 
Carefully crafted photographs quickly replaced the drawn illustrations of 
the early issues, while at the same time the party’s discourse proceeded to 
a reconsideration of the national narrative: references to a heroic national 
past came to be superseded by the transformative value of the war on the 
Eastern Front and by the future of Slovakia in Hitler’s Europe. The evidence 
of these Slovak youth magazines shows the national narrative being redrawn 
under the pressure of war and militarization. Photographic images and the 
use of a militaristic aesthetic emulating the Nazi model became means of 
developing a modernist discourse that exploded the conservative Catholic 
national narrative in favor of a new political myth turned toward the future.4 
As revealed in the interplay between visual representation and ideology, the 
images featured in the Slovak youth magazines helped develop political and 
historical discourses inspired by those of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. 
Evidenced by the power of photographic images in the ideological toolbox 
of fascism, this Slovak context delivers an interesting perspective on the at-
tempts of fascist publicists during World War II to use photography to pro-
duce serviceable ideological materials. Inscribed in those materials were the 
ideas of rebirth and an alternate modernity that saturated fascist discourses. 
Some of the main themes discussed in this chapter are also central to the 
arguments put forth by other contributors to this volume. It is particularly 
the case of Maggie Clinton’s essay on the Chinese fascists’ attempts to con-
vey ideas of rebirth and build up mass support through the use of modernist 
aesthetics (chapter 1). Ethan Mark’s chapter on colonial Indonesia also sug-
gests that the processes of identification that framed fascist ideology should 
be understood as part of metahistorical dynamics that transcended national 
boundaries (chapter 8). Finally, while Nadya Bair’s work on Robert Capa’s 
war photographs provides us with a powerful antifascist counterpoint, it also 
serves as a reminder that the massive reliance on visual materials was not the 
exclusive domain of fascist movements, but it nonetheless provided fascist 
militants and political formations from around the world with a common 
language that helped frame a unified self- image of power, dynamism, and 
regeneration (chapter 10).
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The Hlinka Youth and Its Propaganda Apparatus
From its inception, the Hlinka Youth organization sought to follow the Hit-
ler Youth’s German example: on the basis of one- party rule put into place by 
Tiso and the People’s Party, it incorporated and replaced preexisting youth 
organizations such as the Sokol and the Slovak scouts.5 Commander- in- chief 
Alojz Macek headed the movement, and it was placed under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Interior and the Hlinka Guard, both under the control of 
Alexander Mach, one of the leaders of the People’s Party’s radical faction.6 As 
an extracurricular paramilitary organization, the Hlinka Youth’s main pur-
pose was to replenish the ranks of the Hlinka Guard with ideologically and 
physically primed personnel. By 1940, membership was made compulsory 
for youth between six and nineteen years of age. At the height of its powers 
in May 1943, it totaled 238,000 members, accounting for over 10 percent of 
wartime Slovakia’s population.7
As Slovak Minister of Propaganda from March 1939 to August 1940, Mach 
vitally steered the modernization of the Slovak propaganda apparatus, draw-
ing heavily on the Nazi model. If Mach conceived the Hlinka Youth as “an 
autonomous organization for the extra- curricular education of the Slovak 
Christian youth,” its main task was to prepare youths for war and the role 
Slovakia played in Hitler’s new continental order.8 The education dispensed 
by the Hlinka Youth, which complemented that received in regular schools, 
consisted in two hours daily of courses and group activities divided into ide-
ological (national- political education, social education, social health educa-
tion) and military teachings; the latter became more prominent in the classes 
for older students.9
One of the principal innovations introduced during the first year of the 
Hlinka Youth and Mach’s tenure at the Ministry of Propaganda was the cre-
ation of a complete set of youth magazines aimed at Slovak boys and girls 
during their membership in the organization. The first and most important 
was Nová Mládež (New youth), an illustrated monthly that appeared for the 
first time in April 1939. It was intended for a large audience of boys and girls 
between ten and eighteen years of age.10 The Hlinka Youth also published a 
magazine for girls, Slovenská Deva (The Slovak girl), and another for boys 
aged six to ten years: Vlca (Cub).11 Both magazines were extensively illus-
trated and offered their young readers cartoons and activities (crosswords, 
drawings, or knitting patterns) as well as news pertaining to the organization 
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(summer camps, excursions, meetings with state officials).12 Starting in Sep-
tember 1939, a fourth magazine was published by Hlinka Youth Headquar-
ters: Straž was designed as a text- only organ and think piece for the chiefs and 
functionaries of the movement.13
Toward a Modernized National Narrative
Since the early 1990s and the democratization of Slovakia, historians have 
mostly focused on the question of the Slovak state’s responsibility in deport-
ing Slovak Jews and on the historical figure of Jozef Tiso.14 This research vi-
tally debunked the attempts by the radical nationalist Right, supported by 
then prime minister Vladimír Mečiar, to rehabilitate and glorify the figure 
of Tiso and the legacy of the Slovak state.15 These works played a significant 
political role by confronting the reemergence of nationalist myths in the po-
litical arena. Yet their specific, albeit justified, focus somewhat obscured the 
emergence of a new political ideology that effected the fusion of the conserva-
tive national narrative of the People’s Party with a fascism- inspired, forward- 
looking vision of the Slovak nation under Hitler’s new European order.16 The 
ensuing transformation of the national narrative in the Slovak youth press in 
1941 – 44, from Catholic conservatism to fascism, owed much to the increased 
reliance on photographic images. These carefully crafted and edited images, 
emulating those in popular Nazi publications such as the youth magazine 
Der Pimpf or the widely circulated illustrated Signal, were key in produc-
ing a dynamic iconography that gave credence to the new political myth of 
the future.17 A fine- grained study of the images that formed the core of a 
youth magazine such as Nová Mládež shows the extent to which the Catholic- 
national ideology of 1939 and 1940 was superseded by fascist conceptions of 
the future that promoted the construction of a “new Europe” through Slova-
kia’s support of the Nazi war effort.
The involvement of Slovakia in the Second World War, as part of a “mu-
tual assistance treaty” signed with Nazi Germany in 1939, made this radical 
discursive and ideological shift possible.18 In the wake of the invasion of the 
USSR, in which a Slovak expeditionary force took part, Slovak society and 
political culture became subjected to an intense military propaganda.19 The 
direct link between the Hlinka Youth and the military, through the training 
of future soldiers for the defense of the Slovak state, made it a primary outlet 
for official militaristic discourses. In September 1941, as the Axis forces ad-
vanced through the Soviet Union, Alojz Macek defined the purpose of the or-
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ganization as “the organization and fulfillment of the current acknowledged 
needs concerning extra- curricular education, for the establishment of a new 
order, of a new life at home and throughout Europe.”20 
Michael Geyer has defined the genuine experience of war in the modern 
world as a phenomenon that “engulfs everybody, comes from somewhere out 
there — literally and figuratively — and seems to envelop society in all its par-
tial activities and to transcend it. War thus becomes a metahistorical force, 
everyone participates but no one takes responsibility.”21 For the Slovak state’s 
youth organization, as for that of fascist Italy or Nazi Germany from which it 
drew inspiration, photography supplied an adequate means for representing 
this metahistorical dimension of total war. Individual subjects of the photo-
graphs, often cast in heroic poses, functioned as the expression of the mass, 
symbolic characters with which individual readers of the magazines could 
identify. 
Photographic images and simple photomontages, which the Slovak youth 
press featured extensively during 1941, were used to draw readers into the dra-
matic events unfolding before their eyes. From images of the Eastern Front’s 
battlefields, of youth in other fascist countries, or of women working in the 
Hlinka Youth uniform, each young Slovak could make of himself or herself 
a builder of the new nation, in the present and the future. A transformative 
experience for society as a whole, the war period seemed to effect a formi-
dable acceleration of time, promising for Slovakia a role in the grand his-
torical scheme of Hitler’s European project.22 Photographic images were also 
crucial in creating the new historical narrative: as snapshots of a history in 
the making, they powerfully conveyed the myth of rebirth that framed the 
fascist conception of self.
Drawings as a Middle Ground  
between Conservatism and Fascism
In the Slovak state’s first year, the visual output of the Hlinka Youth press 
mostly followed a traditional formula: textual content enhanced by drawings 
and illustrations. The themes developed in the magazines mostly fit within 
the Catholic, nationalist, and conservative discourse of the People’s Party’s 
ideological platform during the interwar period.23 The first issue of Nová 
Mládež particularly emphasized the roots of the Slovak nation, its Catholi-
cism, and the accomplishment of the People’s Party with a series of articles 
on the movement’s mythical forbears, such as Prince Pribina from Nitra (the 
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first Christian Slavic lord) and the paternalistic figure of Andrej Hlinka, or an 
article on the Vatican, which was referred to as “the smallest but the greatest 
state” as an allegorical image of independent Slovakia.24
The cover of the magazine’s first issue featured a black ink drawing of a 
Hlinka Youth member in uniform flanked by an eagle bearing a double cross 
and sitting on three bundled pieces of wood (figure 9.1). The cover’s design 
mixed a traditional aesthetic with a set of references to fascism in the form 
of the eagle, the bundle, and the slick, tie- wearing, uniformed member of the 
organization.25 Yet, the drawing’s main focal point was a double cross posi-
tioned on the eagle’s chest, a centerpiece joining the two wings; the cross is 
the national emblem of Slovakia and the expression of its Catholicism. In this 
image, the generic representation of the boy in uniform was placed under the 
protection of the cross- bearing eagle, a hybrid figure between fascist symbols 
and the traditional emblem of the cross. The same illustration was used, with 
9.1 Nová Mládež 
magazine (published in 
Bratislava by the Hlinka 
Youth organization), 
April 1939, original 
drawn cover illustration.
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different ink colors, for each of the magazine’s first three covers. The draw-
ing was loaded with symbols: a trinity comprising the state and the party (the 
eagle) and Catholicism (the double cross) looking over the emerging Slovak 
youth (the Hlinka Youth member). Its historicity relied precisely on the pres-
ence of these three elements yet somehow failed to render a convincing mes-
sage of historical and political dynamism. 
Photographic images were introduced inside the magazine at the begin-
ning of 1940. By then, the Slovak army had already participated in the inva-
sion of Poland in the autumn of 1939, and the contours of a new historical 
narrative were being sketched out. The German grip was tightening on Slo-
vak political life, and it was officially ratified when Slovak leaders met Hitler 
and foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in Salzburg on July 28, 1940.26 
The “Salzburg agreement” ensured that Nazi influence increased in Slovakia 
via the appointment of Vojtech Tuka as prime minister. A leader of the Peo-
ple’s Party’s radical wing, Tuka’s boundless opportunism, anti- Semitism, and 
lust for power met Germany’s needs for military and economic cooperation.27 
The agreement also introduced a number of German advisers who were re-
sponsible for securing German interests in all parts of public life in Slovakia. 
Among them were experts for the police, for the so- called Jewish question, 
and for the Hlinka Party and its youth organization.28
Visions of Movement in Photographic Images
Although the German advisers’ involvement in the Hlinka Youth does not 
appear explicitly in the archive, they surely contributed to the profound re-
vamping of its press in late 1940 and early 1941. Original, well- crafted pho-
tographs particular to each issue replaced the generic drawing of the cross- 
bearing eagle and Hlinka Youth member that previously adorned the covers 
of Nová Mládež. This new model, which also was used for the children’s mag-
azine Vlca, borrowed heavily from the Nazi youth magazine Der Pimpf. In-
deed, the printing patterns with a full- page photograph on the cover and a 
thick bottom band containing the name of the tutelary organization were 
strikingly similar.
While the new template retained the cross- bearing eagle, tucked in the top 
left corner and styled as a medallion, it now relinquished center stage to the 
photographs. The cover picture for the June 1942 issue of Nová Mládež is tell-
ing of the iconographic innovations of that period (figure 9.2).29 It features a 
group of teenage Hlinka Youth members performing a military salute before 
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a symbol of Slovak nationalism: a bust of Andrej Hlinka in Ružomberok, the 
priest- politician’s hometown and parish. The interplay between the youths 
looking to the left at an unknown horizon and the father figure of Hlinka 
looking benevolently upon them but in the other direction suggest a semantic 
opposition between past and future, old and new. It not only offers the image 
of a power transition but also posits two hardly reconcilable conceptions of 
time and politics: a history anchored in the past, immobile and looking in-
ward on the nation, and another narrative written in the present that frames 
movement as the precondition for its very existence. Finally, the image also 
suggests the passage of power from a unique, identifiable figure to a multi-
tude, a nation of future soldiers united under the banner of the Hlinka Youth 
and the People’s Party.
9.2 Nová Mládež 
magazine (published in 
Bratislava by the Hlinka 
Youth organization), June 
1942 cover, Hlinka bust 
and Hlinka Youth.
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War in the East and a Fascist Way of Life
The outbreak of war against the Soviet Union in June 1941 gave Slovak pro-
pagandists ample opportunity to test the appeal of photographic images and 
a powerful discursive trope with which to historicize the ideological struggle 
of the Slovak state. The dynamic of war, the physical movement of the Slovak 
army, served as parables for the inclusion of the country in Hitler’s new Euro-
pean order.30 The years 1941 and 1942 brought a remarkable surge of military 
imagery to the Slovak Youth press, while the adult press, especially the Slovak 
and Gardista newspapers, placed special emphasis on anti- Semitic textual 
content, as the Hlinka Guard prepared to deport the Slovak Jews.31 Aestheti-
cizing war in support of a renewed political message remained a crucial pre-
rogative of the Hlinka Youth and its press.
Embracing this turn toward militaristic imagery, the cover of the Decem-
ber 1941 issue of Nová Mládež showcased a staged picture of a young man 
wearing the parade uniform of the organization and carrying a gun among 
crawling soldiers on the battlefield (figure 9.3).32 A somewhat unrefined pho-
tomontage superimposing an armed character onto a picture of Slovak sol-
diers at war, this image nonetheless possessed a strong evocative power. The 
stance of the man in uniform clearly suggests an attitude of defiance vis- à- vis 
danger, fear, and fate; he stands among men laying on the ground, holding 
his weapon tightly with two hands. Despite the simplicity of composition, the 
picture produces a dramatic effect, projecting the reader into the battlefield, 
almost about to hear the bullets fly.
This image encapsulates the fascist conception of life familiar from Mus-
solini and Gentile in The Doctrine of Fascism: a life based on action, physical 
and moral courage, duty, and comradeship.33 In the picture, the Hlinka Youth 
member rises above the mass of soldiers to symbolize the heroic nature of 
his personal engagement, a life that, following the fascist creed, relinquished 
personal pursuits and instead was dedicated to the state and the nation. The 
significance of war in fascist ideology lies, as Mark Neocleous argues, “in the 
conjunction of war as an inner experience, as the highest form of political 
activity, and as the supreme application of modern technology. The subjec-
tivism of the front soldier’s experience of annihilation is transformed into the 
objectivist affirmation of metaphysical- vitalist strength shaped by fate.”34 The 
Slovak soldier pictured in the photomontage is framed as the embodiment of 
this attitude toward life. 
As the display of such images and photomontages of members of the 
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movement posing in heroic attitudes became the norm on the magazine’s 
cover, the back cover began showcasing the Slovak contingent in actual com-
bat operations in the east. The goal was to create interplay between the staged, 
fantasized renditions of warfare and real action photographs: if the former 
projected a much- desired future in which youths could see themselves while 
reading the magazine, then the latter depicted the present struggle, a neces-
sary stage in attaining political fantasy. The back cover of the December 1941 
issue of Nová Mládež was an ideal counterpoint to the picture of the standing 
man (figure 9.4). Entitled “The Slovak Army in the Far East,” it featured eight 
small frames organized around a bigger one showing three soldiers firing a 
long- range cannon.35 The smaller images showcased military personnel en-
gaging Soviet troops in the USSR, as well as captured Soviet equipment, with 
minister and Hlinka Guard leader Alexander Mach visiting troops near the 
front. When set next to each other, the front and back covers form a diptych 
bridging the mythical and the real, projecting the magazine’s young readers 
into the heroic life of the new fascist Slovak man.
Photomontage, Modernity, and War
By the time of the Second World War, photomontage was a common image- 
altering technique. According to Christopher Phillips, Soviet interwar art 
critic Sergei Tretyakov defined photomontage as a technique in which re-
ality is consciously altered by superimposing two or more images and fur-
ther transforming them by adding drawings, collages, or text.36 Building on 
Tretyakov’s definition, Phillips considers montage as a technique validating 
the changes that had been occurring in industrialized societies since the early 
twentieth century: “In Germany, in the USSR, and the United States, this 
(1919 – 1942) was a period of heightened awareness of being caught up in an 
epoch of accelerated transformation. This period marked the culmination 
of a series of irreversible passages: the passage from the seasonal rhythms of 
a rural society to the frenzied tempo of an urban culture; the passage from 
national economies based on the land and on artisanal occupations to indus-
trial economies driven by machine technology; the passage from a social life 
rooted in traditional family life and local communities to larger, more im-
personal aggregations of mass society.”37 The rudimentary photomontages 
featured in Slovak youth magazines lacked the refinement of the Russian 
constructivists or John Heartfield in Germany, yet they retained the evoca-
tive power and historical charge described by Phillips.38 In the case of Nová 
9.3 and 9.4 (next page) Nová Mládež magazine (published in Bratislava by the Hlinka 
Youth organization), December 1941, front cover (left) and back cover (right), showing  
the Slovak army on the Eastern Front.
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Mládež, photomontage was used in support of two main themes: warfare and 
the use of modern technology. It was usually subsumed into a larger visual 
trope in which modern warfare became a parable for the national commu-
nity’s accession to European modernity.
The relationship between photomontage and technology lies in its ability 
to elicit and contain “the speed of blur of an experience of modernity, of the 
everyday assimilation of modern urban and technological imagery.”39 In the 
particular context of wartime Slovakia, photography gave credence to the 
modernist political discourse of the Hlinka Youth by drawing a strong con-
nection between speed, politics, and warfare. The purpose of such images as 
the standing man with the gun was to emphasize the transformative value 
of the experience of modern warfare, for the individual soldier no less than 
for the larger national group (figure 9.3). The transition from a reactionary to 
a fascist discourse was precisely located in the exaltation of war and technol-
ogy and its ability to create a new, fascist man.40
For Paul Virilio, the relation between speed and politics is fundamentally 
an aspect of modern societies. About warfare in the twentieth century he 
writes, “Speed is time saved in the most absolute sense of the word, since it 
becomes human time directly torn from death. . . . Salvation is no longer in 
flight; safety is in running toward your death, in killing your death. Safety is in 
assault simply because ballistic vehicles make flight useless. . . . From now on, 
general safety can come only from the masses in their entirety reaching speed.”41 
The combination of photomontage and military imagery in Nová Mládež 
performed an essential task toward creating a fascist discourse by projecting 
onto the reading youths the perception that salvation could be attained only 
through voluntary sacrifice. Taking part in Hitler’s war was part of the same 
intellectual logic: Operation Barbarossa was conceived as a preemptive strike 
against the supposedly inevitable Soviet aggression; it sought to remake his-
tory by outpacing time. 
The Flying Youth
As the use of deftly arranged photographs and photomontages increased, 
so did the use of pictures of combat aircrafts as the definitive expression of 
both speed and modernity. The cover of the May 1942 issue of Nová Mládež 
exemplifies this evolution (figure 9.5).42 In the foreground of the image, three 
differently aged boys are putting together a wooden aircraft model. The one 
on the right appears to be the oldest; he wears a uniform with two crosses on 
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the shoulder, indicating his leadership in the organization.43 Beneath him, a 
younger member affixes the model’s wing to the frame, supervised by the first 
member. A third boy, on the left side of the frame, holds the model while the 
others work. Behind this image another picture is superimposed, presenting 
three Slovak air force fighter planes in tight formation. 
The interplay between the boys works on two levels: first, craftsmanship 
and knowledge are being transmitted from the older boy to the younger ones; 
second, a clear subjective transposition seems to exist from the model being 
built in the foreground to the actual aircrafts behind. Here, the training per-
formed in the Hlinka Youth acquires its concrete meaning: apprentices were 
figuratively transformed into actual combat aircraft pilots. This model- to- 
reality transposition also bears strong historical implications, erasing the dis-
tance in time that separates the boys from their future in the Slovak air force. 
9.5 Nová Mládež 
magazine (published  
in Bratislava by 
the Hlinka Youth 
organization), May 1942.
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Montage is used to transpose the present into the future: time is abridged and 
the warplane, as the expression of speed and power, endows the young Slovak 
militants with the substance of their future fascist selves.44
Perhaps more so than in a technologically advanced society such as Brit-
ain or Germany, using airplanes as a parable of the future would certainly 
have resonated powerfully with the young Slovak readers of the magazine. 
For Peter Fritzsche, aviation came to be understood as “the quintessential 
marker of twentieth century progress[;] the airplane, more so than any other 
technology, clarified the link between nationalist aspirations and the ad-
vent of the modern age. In promising military and economic advantage, and 
in demonstrating mastery over nature, the airplane emerged as the clear-
est measure of nations, distinguishing not only European civilization from 
those of Africa and Asia, but also great powers among the continent’s leading 
states.”45 In wartime Slovakia, a small agricultural country with a paper- thin 
national narrative, the use of airplanes in propaganda materials was meant 
to equip youths with an inflated self- image of power and a sense of belonging 
among the elite of European nations. 
The Hlinka Youth and Hitler’s Europe
During the Second World War, fascist parties across Europe embraced Hit-
ler’s continental rule as a protective bulwark against communism. In France 
and Belgium, fascist parties such as Jacques Doriot’s French Popular Party 
(PPF), Léon Degrelle’s Rexists or Marcel Déat’s National Popular Rally (RNP) 
made participation in Hitler’s European Project a centerpiece of their ideolog-
ical platforms.46 In east- central Europe, fascist leaders often used European-
ist discourse extensively; they conceived of Festung Europa (fortress Europe) 
as a means for their “backward” countries to board the train of modernity. 
Horia Sima, leader of the Romanian Legion of the Archangel Michael, saw 
the Nazi continental order as “a forerunner of today’s united Europe, insofar 
as it allowed the more developed countries to exercise benevolent tutelage 
over the small nations of the periphery that were struggling to break out of 
the confining condition of their underdevelopment.”47 In Slovakia, this brand 
of Europeanist positioning gained traction in the People’s Party in 1941 and 
became one of the pillars of the official discourse. The idea of Hitler’s Europe 
was emphasized with particular diligence in the youth press. The creation of 
a new Slovak future through the war effort worked hand in hand with the 
inclusion of the Hlinka Youth and its leaders among the future rulers of the 
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continent, learning their political craft in the Hitler Youth and other fascist 
youth organizations. 
By early 1941, the Hitler Youth and the Italian Youth of the Lictor (gil) 
regularly organized sporting events and summer camps, bringing together 
fascist youth movements from around Europe.48 In August, when interna-
tional youth games were held in Breslau, fascist youth delegations from four-
teen countries flocked to Lower Silesia for what was to be the first step of the 
European Youth Association.49 In Slovakia, the Breslau games represented 
the first participation of a Slovak state delegation in a significant international 
event. The Hlinka Youth press produced a series of articles and photograph 
albums showcasing progress since the beginning of the war. 
A first set of photographs from the Breslau games appeared on the back of 
the November 1941 issue of Nová Mládež (figure 9.6).50 The main frame com-
prised a silhouette of a Hlinka Youth member standing in front of the Bres-
lau stadium, facing the young athletes parading in tight formation wearing 
the uniforms of their respective delegations. In the background the stadium 
stands, overlooked by the typical clock tower of Nazi- era arenas, display rows 
of spectators forming the “V” of victory and Nazi symbols: swastika- bearing 
flags, uniforms, and eagles.51 Crowning the image, three smaller frames show 
Hlinka Youth leader Alojz Macek meeting with German, Italian, and Croa-
tian officials.52 At the bottom, slightly wider frames depict the starting line 
of a race and the Hlinka Youth delegation marching alongside youths from 
other countries. 
Linking the two sets of pictures at the top and the bottom, the main image 
performs a task similar to that of the Hlinka Youth member with the gun (fig-
ure 9.3) and the three model- making teenagers (figure 9.5). The shaded Hlinka 
Youth character stands in the center of the frame, creating a strong interplay 
between him and the crowd, the individual fascist man in the making as the 
emanation of the larger group. As in the two other images, the lone member 
of the organization, a generic identifiable model, delivers a metaphorical im-
age for individual readers and members of the Hlinka Youth. Such identifi-
cation mechanisms nurtured in the Slovak state’s youth press were essential 
for the wartime fascist national discourse. Through pictures of the Breslau 
games, Hlinka Youth members from Bratislava, Nitra, Ružomberok, or the 
Tatras Mountains found themselves sharing in a larger historical and spatial 
dynamic transcending the confines of Slovakia. The explosion of the passéist 
national narrative also meant a dramatic reframing of the collective spatial 
imaginary.53 Participation in Hitler’s Europe occurred at the military level 
9.6 Nová Mládež magazine (published in Bratislava by the Hlinka Youth organization), 
November 1941.
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through the conquest of territories in the east (figure 9.4) but also through 
international gatherings such as the Breslau games. Multinational camps 
also expanded in 1942; as the travels of the Hlinka Youth and their contacts 
with sister movements from fascist countries increased, so did the presence 
of photographs with a pan- European theme in the pages of Nová Mládež.54
The sense of belonging to a larger European and global fascist youth com-
munity was emblazoned in the eleven frames forming the back cover of the 
April 1942 Nová Mládež.55 The top part of the page, made up of images de-
picting a Hlinka Youth trip in the town of Asiago in northern Italy, func-
tioned as a roman photo of the life of Slovak youth leaders in Mussolini’s 
Italy.56 The pictures provided a detailed outlook on the travels of the Slo-
vak representatives, from their departure in Bratislava to their meetings with 
“comrades from the new Europe.” The bottom half of the page, for its part, 
comprised exclusively images of the Hitler Youth (“On the life of the Hitler 
Youth”) and of the Japanese Youth (“Learning How to Fly”). Juxtaposing 
photographs from the Hlinka Youth’s travels with others borrowed from the 
Nazi press effected the inclusion of the Slovak group in the activities of the 
future leaders of the two most powerful Axis countries. Once again, the ar-
rangement of this photographic set conveyed the newfound emergent power 
of the Slovak youth via the creation of the new European fascist man. The 
pan- European and pan- fascist imagery displayed in Nová Mládež suggested 
a recession of national differences before powerful generational sentiment.57 
Photographs and Fascist Imagery
By the autumn of 1942, the advance of the Wehrmacht and its allies into 
the USSR was at a standstill. Around the same time, the Slovak youth press 
sharply increased its militaristic content for what already seemed a prefig-
uring of the coming debacle. For a short period between summer 1941 and 
spring 1943, the “new youth” of Tiso’s Slovak state were framed as the heroic 
material for creating the Slovak fascist man. The Hlinka Youth’s paramili-
tary training and participation in the activities of the future fascist leaders 
helped advance the image of Slovakia as a historically significant entity. The 
space for cultivating this radically modern forward- looking self- image was 
opened by deploying photographic images, with their ability to convey move-
ment and physical dynamism. For the Slovak fascists, like their German and 
Italian godfathers, technology, speed, and war were key to fulfilling the myth 
of rebirth and the coming of the fascist man.58 The photographs used in the 
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wartime Slovak youth press testify to this obsession with war. Their fascist 
imagery composed the visual language of a movement that sought to portray 
itself as disdainful of the possibility of death.59 From a conception of time, 
politics, and the nation steeped in Catholic tradition and turned toward the 
past, the Slovak state developed, during World War II, a new historical vision 
based on technology and youth that was meant to find its end point in the 
foundation of Hitler’s Europe. For the small Slavic nation with virtually no 
history before 1918, participating in the creation of the new continental or-
der amounted to a thorough rewriting of the national narrative. History was 
written in the present and the future through the deeds of the emerging gen-
eration cultivated in the Hlinka Youth. The photographic images displayed 
in Nová Mládež, conceived as historical snapshots, also served as proof that 
the Slovak national revolution was happening.
Conclusion
By the autumn of 1943, as the course of events irreversibly turned against Nazi 
Germany and its allies, the Hlinka Youth magazines’ editors returned to a 
more conservative imagery emphasizing old and dignified national figures. 
This period coincided with a loss of popularity of Vojtech Tuka’s fascist gov-
ernment, largely because of its unconditional collaboration with Nazi Ger-
many and the central role it played in deporting Slovak Jews during 1942.60 
The retreat of the Wehrmacht in the east and the rapid advance of the Red 
Army all but signified the end of Hitler’s “New Europe,” a notion that had 
been instrumental in the development of Slovakia’s wartime spatial and his-
torical imaginary. The National Slovak Uprising that took place in the sum-
mer of 1944 prompted the Nazis to invade the country, and it put a brutal 
end to the relative independence Tiso and his cronies had enjoyed for a little 
over five years. 
More so than the return to prominence of the conservative faction within 
the Hlinka People’s Party,61 the reappearance of a traditional nationalist 
imaginary in the Slovak youth press at the end of 1943 signified the cancel-
lation of the short- lived political horizon opened by German victories in the 
USSR. From its foray into fascist territory during 1941 – 43, when modernity, 
war, and visions of the future formed its backbone, the Slovak historical nar-
rative retreated to a conservative position heralding the glorious figures of the 
past. In November 1944, a few months before the Wehrmacht’s final collapse 
and the disappearance of Tiso’s state, Nová Mládež published one of its last is-
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sues. The image chosen for the cover was rather unusual: instead of featuring 
a youthful character in a dynamic, willful attitude, it consisted of a picture of 
an emaciated Andrej Hlinka in his old days, wearing a clergy shirt and hat.62
The cover layout was modified for the occasion, and the tight black and 
white portrait of the Catholic national hero was framed by a solid black back-
ground. The interplay between the magazine’s title, set below the picture in 
white block letters, and Hlinka’s image functioned as an obituary: that of the 
magazine, the Hlinka Youth, the Slovak state, and the boundless power as-
pirations of the wartime years. The grim quality of this last effort should not 
overshadow the mastery of the composition and the remarkable ability of the 
Slovak youth propagandists to create an alternative national discourse dur-
ing the Second World War. The use of photographic images was instrumental 
in giving life to a doctored historical narrative that posited the accession of 
Slovakia to European modernity through its association with Nazi Germany. 
Considering the significance of national rebirth, youth, and the idea of the 
new man in fascist ideology, it is not surprising that these cutting- edge ma-
terials were primarily used in the People’s Party’s youth press. The photog-
raphy of Nová Mládež and other youth magazines published by the Hlinka 
Youth has no equivalent in the propaganda output of the Slovak state. As 
this essay has shown, photographs were used as a means to create a record of 
history in the making, snapshots of Slovakia’s accession to a larger historical 
stage. They can serve as the primary material to make a case for the “fasci-
zation” of Tiso’s Slovak state during 1940 – 43 and its attempt to remake the 
country’s future by mobilizing the generation that came of age during the 
Second World War.
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FROM ANTIFASCISM TO HUMANISM
The Legacies of Robert Capa’s Spanish Civil War Photography
Nadya Bair
In February 1953, the photographer Robert Capa was called to the Ameri-
can Embassy in Paris, where his passport was promptly revoked.1 Born An-
dre Friedman in 1913, the Hungarian Jewish photographer had spent most of 
his adult life as an émigré, first in Berlin, then Paris, and finally the United 
States, where he arrived in 1939. He attained American citizenship in 1946. 
Later in life he described this trajectory in humorous terms, making light of 
the rise of fascism that had sent him, like many other Jewish photographers 
of his generation, into exile time and again: “Due to disagreement with a Mr. 
Horthy, [Capa] left Hungary at the age of 18 and became a photographer in 
Germany. In 1933, due to disagreement with a Mr. Hitler, Capa left Germany 
and found his way to France.”2 But he rarely commented on the later turn of 
events, when, amid the Red Scare in the United States, an anonymous source 
had claimed that he was a communist. The naturalized American citizen 
lost his ability to travel throughout Europe, where he was supposed to be 
working on assignment for his magazine clients.3 This sudden turn of events 
was a blow not only to Capa, but potentially to all of Magnum Photos, the 
international photo agency that he had cofounded in 1947 in New York, and 
which now risked being blacklisted as a communist front organization and 
forced to close. The New York – based Photo League had, after all, been forced 
to disband in 1951.4 “It is needless to say that we have to be extremely careful 
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and attach no camarades [sic] to our free- lancing outfit, because it would be 
disastrous for both of us,” Capa noted in a confidential letter to Magnum’s 
executive editor John Morris after returning from the embassy.5 
The revocation of Capa’s passport may have been connected to his activi-
ties in the 1930s. Based in Paris at the time, the photographer had covered the 
rise of the Popular Front in France and the Spanish Civil War for a number 
of magazines on the Left, including the French Vu and the Communist Re-
gards.6 Between 1936 and 1939, his photographs of the civil war in Spain cir-
culated widely, informing American and European magazine readers about 
the conflict and earning Capa international fame as a war photographer and 
documentarian of antifascism in Europe. 
By the 1950s, the naturalized American needed to deflect attention away 
from his early international, Left, and antifascist networks, which had in-
cluded well- known communists such as Louis Aragon. Aragon had served 
as editor- in- chief of the communist- run Ce Soir, which had briefly employed 
Capa, and his continued support of Stalinist Russia after World War II made 
him a particularly undesirable connection.7 Thinking about how to best 
present his case against the charges, Capa emphasized his connections with 
conservative publications in France and enumerated the many patriotically 
American clients (such as Life magazine and the U.S. Economic Cooperation 
Administration, set up to administer the Marshall Plan) and editors (includ-
ing Ed Thompson of Life and Ted Patrick of Holiday) who had published his 
work during and after Spain.8 Capa suggested that his defense lawyer in New 
York ask for an affidavit from Lucien Vogel, the founding editor of the French 
illustrated magazine Vu, which could say that “he knew me well personally, 
that he took me to Spain first for his magazine, and that to his best judgment 
I never have been neither a member or other [sic]; and we could get the same 
from Pierre Lazaroff who was at that period of the conservative Paris Soir 
and Match, and is now the editor of the very conservative France Soir.”9 In a 
subsequent letter, he insisted, “even when I was involved in so- called politi-
cal reporting, I never editorialized, and my reporting was human or humor-
ous, never violently political in any direction.”10 Out of necessity, then, Capa 
depoliticized the meaning of his photographic output and his writing, espe-
cially from the Spanish Civil War. The State Department failed to produce 
enough evidence of Capa’s direct involvement in communist activities and 
soon dropped the case against him.11 
Within a year of the passport controversy, Capa was dead, having stepped 
on a landmine in Indochina on May 25, 1954, while covering the retreat of 
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French forces from the region for Life magazine. By many accounts, Capa 
took the Life assignment because he needed the money to pay off the thou-
sands of dollars in legal fees that he had accrued to disprove the State De-
partment’s allegations.12 Colleagues mourned the sad irony of Capa’s death 
in a faraway conflict that had meant little to the photographer, especially in 
comparison with what they understood as Capa’s personal investment in the 
fight against fascism in Spain and then during World War II. 
In a range of exhibitions and publications appearing in the decade after 
his death, Capa’s photographs from Spain became canonized as humanist 
imagery devoid of ideology. Today, one is hard- pressed to learn about Robert 
Capa’s pictures outside of two framing narratives: one of “concerned photog-
raphy” and the other the myth of Robert Capa as “The Greatest War Photog-
rapher in the World.” The former label obscures the historical and political 
specificity of his images and turns Capa into an apolitical humanist. The 
latter situates Capa’s work exclusively within the project of his adventurous 
and courageous reporting on international conflicts for the illustrated press, 
beginning with the Spanish Civil War.
 This essay’s inclusion in a volume about visualizing fascism invites a dif-
ferent set of questions about Capa’s legacy — ones that interrogate Capa’s fame 
and the discourse around his pictures. In particular, this chapter asks: What 
role have iconic images and legendary photographers played in perpetuating 
or obscuring certain narratives about the rise of the global Right? How have 
Capa’s photographs shaped memories and analyses of this era, and what can 
this history teach us about approaching iconic images as historical docu-
ments? While Spain is crucial to discussions of fascism and the 1930s, Ca-
pa’s Spanish war photographs are key to understanding how photography’s 
relationship to politics and history has been narrated at different moments 
in the twentieth century. Examining the uses and interpretations of Capa’s 
Spanish Civil War imagery from the 1930s to the 1970s means asking how 
photographs, as material objects, “shape how what happened is remembered, 
taught, learned, and interpreted.”13 
A War of Images and Print Media 
The Spanish Civil War began on July 18, 1936, with a military coup against 
the democratically elected Republican government, which established a 
dictatorial regime in Spain from 1939 to 1975 under the leadership of Gen-
eral Francisco Franco.14 While Germany and Italy covertly provided mili-
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tary aid — especially planes, aerial bombs, and pilots — to Franco, Britain and 
France, Spain’s traditional allies, signed a nonintervention treaty in August 
1936, effectively isolating the Spanish Republic.15 Spain thus became the bat-
tleground for people from a range of ethnic, national, and political back-
grounds who united against Spanish fascist aggression without the aid of 
their governments. In the United States, sending aid to Republican Spain 
became a leading form of American antifascist activism, and it was highest 
among Eastern and Western European émigrés who had fled the conservative 
politics and anti- Semitism of their birthplaces.16 Such émigrés also made up 
the vast majority of the International Brigades — the army made up of thou-
sands of volunteers from Europe and North America who came to fight in 
support of the Spanish Republic between 1936 and 1939. 
The Spanish Civil War became an international affair not only through 
such volunteer activism but especially through how its story was told in the 
press, particularly the illustrated press.17 Publications at both ends of the po-
litical spectrum had recently gained the technical capability to print pho-
tographic reports of conflicts as they unfolded, and Spain provided them 
with a headline story of unprecedented urgency and international relevance. 
Conservative publications that supported Franco’s insurgents included Le 
Matin, L’Illustration, Paris- Soir, and Match in France and the Daily Mail and 
Illustrated London News in England.18 Founded in 1936, the American Life 
claimed neutrality, but its publisher, Henry Luce, was an ardent anticommu-
nist who often showed sympathy toward Franco and Mussolini.19 Magazines 
sympathetic to the Republican cause included the French Vu and Regards 
and England’s Picture Post, and they employed a new generation of young, 
Left- leaning photojournalists, many of whom were Jewish émigrés to France 
from Eastern Europe. Motivated by their progressive politics and a healthy 
dose of professional ambition, these photographers flocked to cover the fight 
against fascism in Spain.
Although the meaning and uses of press images are always inherently flex-
ible and open to manipulation, during wartime in Spain the boundary be-
tween news and propaganda became basically nonexistent. Operating in an 
economy of limited resources and high stakes, the Right and the Left relied 
on cheaply reproduced photographs to cast blame on the opposite side, and it 
was not uncommon for publishers across ideological and political boundar-
ies to reprint the same images, photographic layouts, and visual tropes while 
inflecting them with radically different messages via text.20 Similar to the 
case of interwar China, where, as Maggie Clinton demonstrates in chapter 
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1, artists on the Left and Right drew on the same styles and iconographies, 
the publishing practices in wartime Spain make it difficult to identify a sta-
ble body of imagery aligned consistently with either fascism or antifascism. 
With the right caption, images of fleeing refugees, distraught mothers and 
children, rubble, and other signs of violence and destruction could point the 
finger of guilt at either side. Both sides regularly used these visual tropes with 
damning texts. 
Upon arriving in Paris in 1933, the Hungarian- Jewish Andre Friedman 
(Robert Capa) met the German- Jewish Gerta Pohorylle (later Gerda Taro) 
and the Polish- Jewish Dawid Szymin (David “Chim” Seymour), who was al-
ready employed as a photojournalist by Regards. These photographers took 
on names that were legible across language barriers and free from Jewish 
associations in the hope that this would help them to sell their pictures to 
diverse magazine clients.21 The three often worked together and distributed 
their images to the press through the same agents, including Alliance Photo 
and later through Capa’s own studio, Atelier Robert Capa.22 While these fig-
ures crafted their own personas to attract magazine clients, the magazines 
used them in a similar way, vaunting the photographers’ accomplishments in 
order to increase their prestige and grow their readership. The Spanish Civil 
War thus helped create celebrity photojournalists, and Robert Capa became 
the best known of these through magazine publicity. When Life used Capa’s 
“Death of a Loyalist Soldier” on July 12, 1937, to lead into a review of the first 
year of the conflict in Spain, the magazine marveled especially at the photog-
rapher’s ability to capture the moment. And on December 3, 1938, the Picture 
Post endorsed him, quite simply, as “The Greatest War Photographer in the 
World.” Notably, Capa’s celebrity eclipsed Chim’s and Taro’s role in docu-
menting the civil war for decades.23
Photographers, of course, were in the business of selling their pictures to 
as many clients as possible. Scholars have noted that the variability and ex-
pansive framing of Capa’s contact sheets from Spain seem purposeful, en-
couraging picture agencies and magazines to crop, montage, reproduce, and 
interpret the photographs in different ways.24 The agents with whom Capa 
worked, including those at Alliance Photo, printed copies of images that they 
deemed particularly successful and distributed them quickly and widely, en-
couraging their use in magazine features, as illustrations for political propa-
ganda, and as promotion for humanitarian aid. In the context of magazines, 
Capa’s images of the events in Spain were presented as news and opinion. 
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Some of his photographs took on heavy symbolic weight. On December 10, 
1936, the cover of Regards featured Capa’s photograph of a woman stand-
ing on a heap of rubble and the words “La capital Crucifiée” (The crucified 
capital) printed across the bottom half of the image. Her face was gaunt and 
her skirt was stained; the slippers on her feet and her short jacket suggested 
that she has no warmer clothes, and she appeared to be immobilized by the 
sight of destruction. The dramatic word choice cast blame on Franco’s cruel 
betrayal of the city and its inhabitants. The woman was proof that this war 
was uprooting and shattering lives, but standing on top of the rubble, she was 
also a symbol of antifascist resilience. Inside the issue, a double- page spread 
combined seven more photographs by Capa showing life in a working- class 
area of Madrid that had been hit hard during the bombing of the capital. Fre-
quently overlapping and arranged at slight angles, the photographs contained 
many debris piles, bundles of intimate belongings, and groups of women and 
small children who, the captions explained, were the primary victims of the 
conflict. These repetitive visual details showed the extent of the physical de-
struction while also conjuring the shock and dislocation Madrid’s residents 
experienced. 
One of the photographs from this essay later became the cover of a pro-
paganda pamphlet printed in 1938 in Barcelona, a key publishing center and 
the center of Catalan culture held by the Republican side during the Civil 
War.25 Showing three children sitting on a broken sidewalk with the façade of 
a shelled-out building behind them, the picture was no longer about the siege 
of Madrid but rather about the effects of war in general. The title of the pam-
phlet read, “La guerre en Espagne: barbarie et civilization” (The war in Spain: 
barbarism and civilization). Like other iconic pictures by Capa, including 
“Death of a Loyalist Soldier,” the photograph was appealing not for its inher-
ent meaning — which is hard to deduce without a caption — but rather for the 
symbolic implications that could be read into it.26 The reappearance of such 
images in international antifascist publications including Ilya Ehrenburg’s 
two- volume Ispania — No Pasaran!, released in Moscow in 1936 –37, shows 
that book and magazine publishers worked with a relatively limited set of 
pictures.27 Although select photographs traversed long distances and became 
visible, profitable, and eventually iconic, the vast majority of pictures were 
filed away, unused and unseen. Such practices helped shape what are now 
considered the foundational visual tropes of antifascism and Capa’s work, 
confined to images of distraught mothers, children, rubble, and refugees. 
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Death in the Making
In 1938, Capa traveled to New York to visit his mother and brother Cornell, 
who had already emigrated to the U.S., and to discuss possible work arrange-
ments with editors at Life and the Pix photo agency.28 While there, he also 
worked with his colleague and mentor, André Kertész, on a book of Civil War 
photographs. Published by the New York – based firm Covici- Friede as Death 
in the Making, it was intended in part to raise American support for the anti-
fascist struggle in Spain.29 Like most books published by Covici- Friede, Death 
in the Making had a relatively limited print run, suggesting that the firm pri-
oritized print quality over affordability and extensive sales.30 At $2.50 per copy 
(roughly $41 by today’s standards), the book required a moderate investment 
from buyers, who may have been motivated to buy it as a philanthropic act 
in addition to their interest in acquiring a limited edition of Capa’s pictures. 
In Death in the Making, Capa’s self- promotion was inextricably linked with 
portraying the heroism of the international antifascist coalition in Spain.31 
Although the book featured many photographs by his colleagues Chim and 
Taro, the book’s cover identified only Robert Capa as the author.32 The im-
ages in the volume were uncredited, reflecting the lax standards of attribution 
at the time as well as the photographers’ teamwork. The book thus helped 
Capa’s name become the synecdoche for Spanish Civil War photography.33 
Death in the Making relied on photography’s evidentiary status and im-
plied objectivity — that is, the indisputable fact of the photographer and cam-
era having been there — to present a highly selective accounting of the Span-
ish Civil War. It opened with enthusiastic crowds of Republican supporters 
raising their fists in support of the Popular Front and quickly moved to par-
tisan soldiers training and engaging in combat, including in Madrid. The 
book focused especially on the war’s heroes and victims: the farmers turned 
partisan soldiers, the youth of the International Brigades, the refugees who 
fled rebel bombs and violent takeovers of Republican- held towns and villages, 
and the key battles of the war in Madrid and elsewhere. Its most obvious oc-
clusion was the total absence of the fascist side: no photographs of the fascist 
salute nor Franco himself, which were regular tropes of insurgent publica-
tions. In part, this was a question of access. Franco’s press office refused en-
try to correspondents working for the left- wing press. The Battle of Teruel in 
December 1937, which ended in nationalist defeat, is one of the few instances 
in which Capa could photograph the insurgent side.34 As a result, the photo 
book showed a war against the looming but invisible sceptre of fascism.
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Death in the Making also included visual rebuttals of anti- Republican pro-
paganda that used picture sequences that had already appeared in the press, 
often in the same layouts and to the same ends.35 During the conflict’s early 
stages, American and European publications reported on a series of church 
burnings by supporters of the Republican government. Subsequently, the 
Republic worked to show that it was protecting the Church and religion in 
Spain (a trope that the insurgents regularly exploited as well). In Death in the 
Making, a five- page section on “Catholics in Bilbao” showed members of the 
clergy living peacefully alongside members of the Basque militia. Church 
and hospital scenes showed that priests and nuns were helping the Republic 
by giving “comfort to the wounded, absolution to the dying and Christian 
burial to the dead.”36 The sequence concluded with Chim’s bird’s- eye view 
of an outdoor mass for Republican soldiers, who fold their hands and bow 
their heads respectfully. The caption explains that these men would gather 
early on Sunday mornings, “before the rebel planes came over to spit death 
along the green hillsides,” affirming that Republicans and Catholics could 
be one and the same, and that both were potential targets of Franco’s indis-
criminate air raids. 
Other images took part in a visual battle over which side could be trusted 
to protect Spanish art and culture. Five pictures were dedicated to “Safe-
guarding of the art treasures,” including a scene from the Palacio de Liria in 
which young Republicans help take inventory of Spain’s national treasures 
and prepare them for safekeeping. Also taken by Chim, the photograph was 
part of a carefully constructed propaganda series that worked against Fran-
coist representations of Republicans as destroyers of the country’s infrastruc-
ture and religious buildings.37 For instance, the Francoist five- volume photo 
album Estampas de la Guerra, produced and circulated by Franco’s Delega-
tion of Press and Propaganda, devoted ample space to both of these tropes, 
overwhelming the reader with images of decimated churches and destroyed 
bridges (figure 10.1). With no visual evidence of Republicans actually carry-
ing out such deeds, the publication relied on scenes of the aftermath to cast 
blame. On other page spreads, Estampas included scenes of its own outdoor 
masses, presenting Franco’s insurrection as a crusade to restore tradition and 
the authority of the Church. 
Toward the middle of the book, Death in the Making turns to the war’s 
victims and refugees, which would have been familiar to readers from their 
previous appearances in the illustrated press. Capa and Kertész selected im-
ages of mothers fleeing with children along rural roads, running from aerial 
 244 Nadya Bair
bombings in Bilbao, and living in the subway tunnels or rubble heaps of Ma-
drid. Labeled with new captions written by Capa, the images symbolized fas-
cist violence against civilian populations “at their most generalized and uni-
versal level” instead of describing the details of specific military campaigns 
or aerial attacks.38 In one spread of three images, a mother holds her half- 
naked child with a firm grasp and seems eager to rush out of the frame; on 
the right, children walk along a rail track wearing extra layers of clothing, a 
few holding small parcels. Below, a young man with a child on his back helps 
an older woman who struggles to keep up. Printed toward the middle of the 
book, these photographs were labeled as having been taken “On the Road to 
Malaga,” though according to Capa’s biographer, Capa made some of them 
the year prior at Cerro Muriano. The photographer’s own sense of iconicity 
and the news seems to be at play in this captioning decision.39 Capa under-
10.1 Federico de Urrutia, Estampas de la Guerra, Album no. 1, De Irun a Bilbao (Bilbao: 
Editora Nacional, 1937). Reproduction courtesy of the Jon Bilbao Basque Library, University 
of Nevada- Reno Libraries.
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stood that the wide reporting on the massacre of refugees by aerial bombard-
ment between Malaga and Almeria in February 1937 had become known as 
an episode of insurgent ruthlessness. Showing readers the actual images from 
the episode was less important than using the book to help them recall what 
they had already heard about Francoist crimes. The pictures likewise contrib-
uted to the image of Capa as a valiant war reporter capable of arriving at the 
scene of action in time and at any price in order to make such events known 
in the first place. 
Death in the Making gave Capa his first opportunity to introduce himself 
to an American audience. In 1938, he promoted the book at his first exhibition 
of the same name at the New School for Social Research in New York City.40 
The displaced and financially struggling photographer hoped that his Span-
ish Civil War images would help generate more assignments in the United 
States. The book was therefore bound up in the history of fascism on the level 
of form and material. On the one hand, it created a lasting iconography of 
antifascism focusing on refugees and partisan soldiers. And as an object, the 
book is a by- product and material trace of the rise of fascism, which sent pho-
tographers, magazine editors, and picture agency directors into exile, chal-
lenging them to pick up their work and reinvent themselves on the other side 
of the Atlantic. In an era when photographers and agents passed through 
editors’ offices, showing samples of recent work with the hope of making a 
sale or gaining a new assignment, we can imagine Death in the Making func-
tioning as a portfolio and a calling card. With the help of publishers and edi-
tors, Capa made his first mark in America as a photographer of war and the 
struggle against fascism.41 
Concern for Humanity 
In the aftermath of Capa’s death in May 1954, the photographer’s antifas-
cist work began to be reinterpreted, reflecting both Cold War politics and 
the changing market conditions for photojournalism. Magnum, the photo 
agency Capa helped found, poured energy into proving that it could remain 
the premier supplier of images despite losing its most entrepreneurial pho-
tographer. As part of this effort, Magnum adapted the rhetoric of humanism 
in its promotional articles for the industry press. This rhetoric was also being 
popularized at the Museum of Modern Art through the work of its photog-
raphy curator Edward Steichen. Humanist photography, Steichen enthused, 
possessed “a tender simplicity, a sly humor, a warm earthiness, the ‘every-
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dayness’ of the familiar and the convincing aliveness found only in the best 
of the folk arts.”42 Magnum suggested that the compassionate and universal 
spirit of photography on display at MoMA, including the 1955 blockbuster ex-
hibition The Family of Man, had likewise driven the photojournalistic efforts 
of its founder Capa.43 In a Popular Photography feature, the agency’s execu-
tive editor John Morris explained that Magnum’s “reporter- photographers” 
have a “peculiarly human point of view,” which satisfied editors and readers 
who wished to “understand their confusing world in terms of people rather 
than propaganda or statistics.”44 Morris frequently used such formulations 
to suggest that Magnum’s photo essays offered a corrective to fascism’s ma-
nipulation of the media in the years leading up to World War II. Together 
with Steichen, Morris was part of a larger network of cultural leaders who 
believed that the mass media could be used to create democratic citizens in 
postwar America.45 
Against this backdrop, Capa’s pictures from Spain continued to garner at-
tention, and Capa became institutionalized, quite narrowly, as the war pho-
tographer of the twentieth century — a label that ignored his ample peace-
time work, including in color.46 A year after his death, in 1955, the Overseas 
Press Club established the Robert Capa Gold Medal to award the “best pub-
lished photographic reporting from abroad requiring exceptional courage 
and enterprise.”47 Capa’s icons of war — his “Death of the Loyalist Soldier” 
and D- Day landing photos — were displayed in MoMA’s Memorable Life Pho-
tographs and included in the Missouri School of Journalism’s influential list 
of Fifty Great Photographs.48 By 1960, such pictures were also seen in art gal-
leries and photography festivals that hosted traveling exhibitions of the pho-
tographer’s work. War Photographs — Robert Capa, organized by his brother 
Cornell Capa and circulated throughout the U.S., Italy, France, and Japan, 
surveyed his career through an exclusive focus on his best- known images 
of war.49 Capa’s work also appeared in the group show The World as Seen by 
Magnum Photographers, organized by Magnum and shown in Japan and the 
U.S. In that exhibition, Capa was once again represented through his images 
of war, including “Death of a Loyalist Soldier” and a series of refugee pictures 
from Spain.50 
Beginning in the 1960s, Cornell Capa worked to keep his brother’s achieve-
ments before the public under the new rubric of concerned photography. He 
did this primarily through the Fund for Concerned Photography (today, the 
International Center of Photography). The Fund’s first and pivotal group ex-
hibition of 1967, The Concerned Photographer, brought together the work of 
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seven photographers whom Cornell Capa identified as modeling a “vital con-
cern with their world and times.”51 Four of the photographers — Capa, Chim, 
Werner Bischof, and Dan Weiner — had recently died on assignment. The 
other two were André Kertész, representing the earlier generation of “candid 
photography,” and Leonard Freed, particularly known for his for documen-
tary work on black life in America. Placed side by side, their images testi-
fied to the photographers’ ability to empathize with their subjects and repre-
sent the universal aspects of their struggles. Cornell Capa explained that this 
group of mostly European and Jewish photographers had actually followed 
in the footsteps of the American documentary photographer Lewis Hine, 
producing work that showed a “personal commitment and concern for man-
kind.” Without obscuring the contents of his brother’s photographs, Cornell 
Capa did reframe what they meant and why they mattered for the sixties 
and beyond. The images were now a testament to Robert Capa’s humanism 
(rather than his antifascism) and to the American (rather than European or 
émigré) school of photography in which he worked.
When the Saturday Review devoted two pages to the exhibit on December 
9, 1967, under the title “Mutual Concern,” the paper offered a loose summary 
of the issues that had preoccupied photojournalists and the illustrated press 
to date (figure 10.2). On the right- hand page were three photographs, cap-
tioned to emphasize the photographer as author: “Robert Capa — Spain, 1938,” 
“David Seymour (‘Chim’) — Israel, 1953,” and “Leonard Freed — New York, 
1963.” Capa’s photograph showed a woman pausing in a doorway, cloaked in 
a dark coat and clutching a crying girl with a smooth- faced doll, which of-
fered an eerie contrast to the strained faces of the woman and child. Made 
in Barcelona in January 1939, this was one of Capa’s many Spanish refugee 
pictures that had circulated in the international press to inform readers of 
the specific events leading up to their flight and to demonstrate the human 
costs of the war more generally.52 Seymour’s photograph of a wedding cer-
emony in Israel — a country that he visited and photographed regularly after 
1951 — showed a couple standing under a chuppah (ritual canopy).53 Rifles and 
pitchforks double as posts, attesting to the makeshift nature of everyday life 
in the country, while the uncultivated, rolling hills in the background suggest 
an expansive land, free of other inhabitants. And Freed’s picture captures two 
gleeful children on a city street, the sister holding her little brother up to a 
fire hydrant’s spray. Lighthearted in comparison to Capa’s refugees, Freed’s 
picture had also appeared that year in his documentary photo book Black in 
White America. As part of an image sequence exploring white flight and the 
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rise of black ghettoes, the joyful portrait of childhood also points to the racial 
tensions that Freed had witnessed all across the country.54
These images introduced readers to “concerned” photography while 
evoking the shifting political issues that had preoccupied Left Jewish cul-
tural figures between the thirties and sixties. During the Cold War, New 
York intellectuals, authors, and photographers channeled their antifascist 
politics into new areas of activism that ranged from reclaiming Jewish iden-
tity and Zionism to becoming involved in the struggle for racial equality in 
the U.S.55 Whereas Capa and Chim took up the former, Freed tackled the 
latter. Upon seeing The Concerned Photographer, Freed said, “suddenly I 
feel I belong to a tradition.”56 In this case it was Cornell Capa who identified 
the “tradition” of photographing marginalized and oppressed groups as a 
mode of social activism and who created a unified narrative about the work 
10.2 “Mutual Concern,” Saturday Review, December 9, 1967, 66 – 67.
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of photographers who were predominantly Jewish (yet without mentioning 
the latter detail). 
Given the Red Scare that brought on Robert Capa’s passport troubles in 
1953, it was perhaps inevitable that by the sixties, the antifascist Hungarian- 
Jewish Capa would be transformed into the cornerstone of a new tradition of 
depoliticized yet compassionate photography that had its roots in American 
documentary practices. “The many awards established in [Robert Capa’s] 
name,” the Concerned Photographer exhibition catalog explained, “spell out 
the elements of the tradition: a deep concern for mankind, superlative pho-
tography, exceptional courage, and enterprise.”57 The Concerned Photogra-
pher gallery dedicated to Robert Capa emphasized his work from the Span-
ish Civil War, World War II, and the 1948 Arab- Israel War. The images were 
organized thematically by symbolic category: soldiers, mothers and children, 
refugees, and the aftermath of war. Eschewing chronological order or at-
tention to the historical specificities of each picture or conflict, the exhibit 
suggested that Robert Capa had a preordained career trajectory and unified 
oeuvre, whereas the exhibition texts depicted him as a brave combat photog-
rapher and a compassionate witness to the plight of civilians. The question of 
Capa’s antifascist, leftist politics was thus suspended and subsumed by other 
meanings: the formally symbolic and socially engaged aspects of his photog-
raphy, which could be appreciated in the new museum contexts for photog-
raphy being created amid the decline of the illustrated press.58 
Such a shift also informed how scholars and institutions would value Ca-
pa’s images in the twenty- first century.59 Today one finds that a 1937 photo-
graph by Capa from Bilbao, a copy of which was acquired by the Metropoli-
tan Museum of Art with the help of Cornell Capa, is lauded specifically for 
its symbolism and composition (figure 10.3).60 The picture shows two women 
running parallel to a sidewalk, the fabric of their skirts flying like their legs. 
Capa took the picture from the middle of the street, snapping the shutter as 
the women approached the center of the frame. The first woman appears 
scared, but her companion smiles slightly. Has she, like the figures on the 
sidewalk, noticed Capa’s camera? The graininess of the image heightens the 
sense of speed and emotional turbulence in the scene. This aesthetic would 
become a known feature of Capa’s work following the publication of his out- 
of- focus D- Day photographs in Life on June 19, 1944. From the perspective of 
the institution acquiring the photograph, the graininess is also a sign of au-
thenticity, marking it as a Capa photograph. The Met’s text explains: “As a re-
port on a specific conflict . . . this photograph could be found wanting because 
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of its lack of explicitness. However, the sense of urgency without precise cause, 
so perfectly captured, makes it a particularly compelling image.”61 While ac-
knowledging that the image is poor historical evidence — we see no perpetra-
tors, no indicators that this is Spain, and no signs of war — the Met focuses 
instead on the photographer’s skill as an artist. What matters, we are told, 
is that Capa used his camera to capture the dramatic sentiment of the mo-
ment. Endowed with new cultural and financial value — as the work of an es-
tablished author, as an accomplishment in documenting human emotions — 
this image lives out the fate that both The Family of Man and The Concerned 
Photographer exhibitions set into motion at a transitional moment in politics 
and the photo market. 
Legacies
The popularity of Robert Capa’s images of civilians running from air raids 
in the streets of Bilbao also contributed to an understanding of fascism as a 
European phenomenon. In the 1938 Death in the Making, Capa had repre-
10.3 Robert Capa, [“Crowds running for shelter when the air- raid alarm sounded, Bilbao, 
Spain”], May 1937. © International Center of Photography/Magnum Photos (2635.1992)
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sented the Bilbao raids with a photograph of two women running directly 
toward him, which he took as he stood on trolley tracks. The picture is simi-
lar to the one acquired by the Met in 2005, but it is even grainer and taken 
from an even closer vantage point. After Capa’s death, a tamer and more 
carefully composed picture began to be published and displayed to represent 
the same events (figure 10.4). In that photograph, a mother and daughter are 
crossing a street toward Capa. While the child looks off to the side and tries 
to keep up, the mother looks up intently, her expression stern and the grip 
on her daughter’s hand firm. The image contains little information about the 
circumstances, but the woman’s upward gaze invites viewers to imagine the 
sight of planes above them or to hear the sound of the “screaming” bomb 
blasts in Bilbao that Capa described in Death in the Making. 
Photography scholars have recently worked diligently to identify when, 
by whom, and under what circumstances such images were made.62 This is 
an important task because photographers such as Capa and Chim often shot 
10.4 Robert Capa, [“Women running for shelter when the air- raid alarm sounded, Bilbao, 
Spain”], May 1937. © International Center of Photography/Magnum Photos (2636.1992)
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similar compositions, and their pictures were often published with contra-
dictory dates or captions. We now have more information about the prov-
enance of these images, but what do they actually teach us about the history 
of modern conflict? In more than one photo history, one can read that Capa’s 
images of mothers and children are significant because Spain was the first 
conflict before World War II in which civilians were targeted en masse via 
aerial fire.63 By extension, Capa’s accomplishment was that he was among the 
first to capture a fascist coalition using a new military technology to target 
civilians. Yet in the years preceding Capa’s work, aerial bombardments of 
civilians occurred numerous times, including in Ethiopia, Iraq, and China, 
and they were not only the work of fascist regimes.64 Nor were aerial bomb-
ings the most significant source of the casualties in Spain, which totaled in 
the vicinity of half a million.65 
The aerial bombings in Spain were the first that could be easily covered, 
dramatized in the press, and made available through circulation in the years 
since. Earlier incidents, including the Japanese bombing of Shanghai, were 
covered in newsreels and with press photographs, but their coverage cannot 
be compared to the illustrious photo documentation of the Spanish Civil 
War.66 Moreover, the details surrounding those earlier events were often re-
pressed or obscured. Italian archives documenting the use of aerial bombs 
and gas in Ethiopia were closed to researchers in the 1960s and 1970s, and the 
country formally admitted to these acts only in 1995.67 During the Ameri-
can occupation of Japan, the country more commonly addressed its aggres-
sion against the U.S. as part of Japan’s “culture of defeat,” and as late as the 
1990s, photographic exhibitions deflected attention from Japan’s imperial 
legacy, including the violence carried out against other Asians.68 In those 
same decades, Capa’s war photographs from Spain were shown widely, trav-
eling to the very countries that were looking away from their own fascist 
legacies.69 More recent exhibitions with titles such as In Our Time (1989) and 
This Is War! (2007) have also circulated globally, suggesting that Capa suc-
ceeded in capturing the most important moments of the twentieth century — 
themselves deemed significant because they were photographed. 
Today, Capa’s photographs from Spain continue to be displayed and re-
printed by institutions that are invested in Capa’s centrality in the history 
of photojournalism and in the financial value of his work, rather than in a 
specific and exhaustive history of fascism’s rise. Compared with the relative 
invisibility of other visual histories of fascism and antifascism, the high vis-
ibility of Capa’s Spain pictures — especially in photo exhibitions and in photo 
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histories — suggests that Capa’s work offers the way into this chapter of the 
twentieth century. It would be difficult to understand the visual history of 
fascism without taking into account Capa’s contributions, but neither can 
one photographer’s work stand in for the complexities of that history. Capa’s 
iconic photographs open onto a larger history of the inclusions and exclu-
sions at play in visualizing fascism in the 1930s and in subsequent decades. 
They invite a look at many more images of the global Right that emerged 
during the photographer’s lifetime, and they should make us question how 
later generations formulated the significance of those visual legacies around 
the world. 
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Curating Architecture after World War II
Claire Zimmerman 
The similarities between German architecture in the 1930s 
and that of the rest of the western world at the same time 
seem even more striking to me now than they originally did.
 — Barbara Miller Lane
“Invisibilizing” Architecture
Within photography’s histories, photographic depictions of architecture oc-
cupy an ambiguous position.1 Often used as functional instruments that cou-
pled word and image to disseminate information about buildings, architects, 
and clients, they also helped inoculate a humanistic profession from substan-
tive technological change by substituting single images for concrete things. 
If a building looked like something modern, something traditional, or some-
thing ancient in a photograph, its technical aspects were less evident in its 
public reception. Building technology and architectural expression, already 
separate, were licensed by photography to part completely, recalling Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s memorable words about the separation of skins from car-
casses.2 Added to this disjuncture between image and constructed object, 
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media tactics could make entire historical fields vanish from discourse about 
buildings simply by excluding their photographs from magazines, journals, 
and books. The visual remediation of architecture layers editorial practice 
on top of image making on top of formal appearance, leaving much of the 
industry of architecture almost entirely to one side. Yet the economic force 
of publicity has made photography a powerful agent in determining archi-
tectural futures.
What did photographs of fascist architecture effect, then, both by presence 
and by absence, in histories written after World War II? Early national so-
cialist publications depicted the monumental architecture of the new regime 
in bold compositions deploying visual tropes of the interwar avant- gardes: 
asymmetrical compositions, raking views, and liberal use of the wide- angle 
lens.3 (figure 11.1) Radical visual tropes promiscuously coupled with conser-
vative building style provide just one example of fascism’s counter aesthetic, 
described so eloquently by Julia Adeney Thomas in the introduction to this 
volume. As the global political goals of the national socialist government 
emerged, so did national socialist architecture appear to concretize those 
goals, drawing from other states’ increasingly negative critiques of “the word 
in stone.”4 
Nazi buildings disappeared from much of the international architectural 
press after 1939. Similarly, historicizing architecture from the U.S. or the 
USSR also began to disappear, as if spirited away by visual association with 
the neoclassicism of the new Berlin. As fascist regimes broadcast “stripped 
classicism” as a house style in the press, so did the architectural profession 
elsewhere gradually release it. Both moves were part of media tactics largely 
unrelated to work “on the ground.”  
Contemporary architectural polemics are, by definition, geared toward 
future production. Selected narratives of the past strategically influence 
professional futures. Two caveats integrate photographic architecture into 
a book on the visual modes of global fascism. First, staged professional pho-
tographs of buildings meant for propaganda and trade publications differ 
fundamentally from photojournalistic images like those by Robert Capa, in 
which political ideology is often clearly mobilized.5 In commercial photog-
raphy of buildings, presumed photographic objectivity often obscures how 
composition and framing deliver rhetorical messages. Yet it is the success of 
the photograph as image, as much as other information about buildings, that 
determines the frequency of re- publication after an initial appearance. Read-
ers and writers of images also conflate photographs with “three- dimensional 
 260 Claire Zimmerman 
images” of carefully designed buildings, not seeing the complex tasks that 
buildings perform, which are invisible in photographs. Two formal tropes 
thus complicate architectural analysis: building form and photographic form. 
The latter often takes precedence over the former in historical and critical 
accounts.6 
U.S. historian Henry- Russell Hitchcock (1903 – 87), accomplished reader of 
architectural photographs, understood this gap between image and object. A 
steadfast ally of practicing architects, Hitchcock creatively affiliated national 
socialist, U.S., and Soviet eclectic classicism, using photography to create as-
sociations among buildings in which function, political goal, construction 
technique, and aesthetic address differed fundamentally. Photography helped 
historians such as Hitchcock jettison a heterogeneous array of buildings for 
a more singular image of building that had developed in Europe between 
the wars and was associated with a limited number of architect auteurs. Al-
11.1 Montage of images 
from Sydney Clark, 
“Architecture under the 
Surge of Nationalism,” 
Arts and Decoration 50 
(May 1939): 39. 
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though a logical way to promote new architecture, this was a dubious way to 
write the history of the immediate present. 
As international-style architecture became the avatar of U.S. imperial-
ism during the Cold War and the beacon of Western capitalism, alternative 
responses to modernity — some more technologically modern than their ex-
ternal appearance suggested — disappeared from view. Thus we might trace 
what happened, not when national socialist architectural photographs were 
made and first published, but rather when they began to disappear, edited 
out of postwar architectural history for decades. This virtual Bildverbot, an 
editorial iconoclasm, was accompanied by equally striking textual ellipses, 
as if not seeing the unwelcome image would make it disappear. Miller Lane 
reopened this chapter of German history in 1968, yet we are slow to probe the 
impact of fascism on architectural history after World War II. 
Using global politics as a fulcrum, postwar modernists of the 1950s and 
’60s excluded important recent developments from architectural discourse. 
Industrialization and war had produced radical inventiveness in rapidly built 
daylight factories and innovations in concrete and steel building technologies 
prompted by shortages of materials and time. Recognizable visual regimes 
such as “classicism,” “gothic,” and “Mesoamerican” clothed buildings that ex-
emplified significant economic and technical efficiencies. Overlooking these 
developments for a modernist aesthetic program equated with antifascism, 
the United States began its own campaign for global dominance against the 
USSR, using media tactics that are surprisingly familiar — as if the success 
of fascism’s counter aesthetic begot the hegemony of Cold War propaganda.
Substituting an abstract aesthetic program historically affiliated with 
the Left for a historicizing one newly associated with fascism by the likes of 
Hitchcock, modern architects and critics unwittingly reprised the semantic 
violence that inhered when building style, or photographic image, became 
instrument of political ideology, as in global fascist movements. Other essays 
in Visualizing Fascism suggest how images (included or excluded) reveal his-
torical developments with sometimes surprising directness. Here, the absent 
historiography of fascist architecture reveals an unwelcome postwar legacy, 
as photographs again obscured as much as they revealed of a new global or-
der advanced through architecture. The genie of dominating ambition could 
not be contained by the bottle of world peace. Considering eclectic architec-
ture, increasingly invisible in the media as the war passed, opens a complex 
chapter of North American architectural history, one that begins here a year 
before the 1933 election in Germany. The intertwining of historiography and 
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professional practice shows the past annexed to the present, retarding any ef-
fective “coming to terms” with difficult history. 
Hitchcock, 1932
In 1932, Hitchcock co-curated the influential exhibition Modern Architec-
ture: International Style at MoMA, bringing to U.S. audiences European ar-
chitecture along with select North Americans such as Frank Lloyd Wright 
(1867 – 1959), and providing a visual narrative for a new way of building.7 A 
formalist tour de force, the exhibition included detailed architectural models 
and photographs closely trained on the buildings they depicted. Two years 
later, Hitchcock reclaimed an august heritage for twentieth- century architec-
ture in print. His “Romantic Classicism in Germany” focused on architects 
Karl Friedrich Schinkel (1781 – 1841), Ludwig Persius (1803 – 45), and Leo von 
Klenze (1784 – 1864) (figure 11.2).8 
A second essay on Baroque garden design and a third on the city of Pots dam 
affiliated late eighteenth- and early nineteenth- century romantic classicism 
with architectural modernism, specifically that of the mid- 1920s.9 This trio 
of articles appeared in the American- German Review, established by the phil-
anthropic, business- oriented Karl Schurz Foundation in 1930 in order to pro-
mote German culture to U.S. audiences.10 In the 1932 exhibition and later ar-
ticles, Hitchcock steeped modernism in historical precedent, not revolution.11 
Similar shifts of rhetoric in modernist polemics have been noted elsewhere.12 
Historians and critics eager to establish architecture as a patronage art like 
painting, and to distance major public buildings from the political regimes 
they embodied, increasingly overlooked modernization processes in favor of 
historical genealogy. Photographic mediation aided and abetted this aim.
For historians before and after the war, the architectural eclecticism of the 
second half of the nineteenth century — Lewis Mumford’s “brown decades” — 
interrupted a stylistic evolution from neoclassicism (romantic or “revolution-
ary” classicism, ca. 1800) to modernism. The stripped classicism of Schin-
kel’s Greek and Roman designs, by contrast, threw a line backward and for-
ward at once, connecting ancient and modern and stabilizing contemporary 
developments. Hitchcock’s articles in the American- German Review belong 
to an entire literature on this topic.13 In all of these instances, the old au-
thorized the new, bestowing legitimacy and authority on newly produced 
work, despite implicit conflicts with the revolutionary program of the radical 
avant- gardes.
 Heedless Oblivion 263
At roughly the same time, however, traditional architects in Germany laid 
claim to similar territory. The place of Schinkel in the genealogy of Nazi 
architecture disrupted the historical claims of Hitchcock and others.14 The 
former responded in the Architectural Forum with a scathing review of the 
German contribution to the 1937 World’s Exposition in Paris, roundly con-
demning Nazi architecture and culture policy. Of Albert Speer’s oversized 
exhibition pavilion, Hitchcock wrote, “this is certainly the worst building in 
Paris” (figure 11.3).15
Thus unfolded before World War II a competition for cultural capital that 
prefigured similar skirmishes during the Cold War, if with different players. 
For both sides, affiliation with the past was a means to claim legitimacy in the 
present, an invaluable if intangible justification for “Architecture” in the eyes 
of clients, publics, and public officials. The authoritative past was also a blind 
11.2 Title page of Henry- 
Russell Hitchcock, 
“Romantic Classicism in 
Germany,” The American 
German Review, 
September 1934, 19.
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in the present, one that placed architecture on a historical continuum while 
simultaneously elevating it above the politics of its own day, “unmoored from 
history” like other hegemonic (fascist) practices.16
Hitchcock consistently rejected the deployment of historical architec-
ture as an overt political symbol. The defeat of national socialism also did 
not end his condemnation of architects who used historical styles to design 
twentieth- century buildings. Rather, one enemy (Germany) gave way to an-
other (the USSR) as he and other U.S. cultural actors began a coordinated 
strategy of resistance to communist culture — to both the megalomania of 
Soviet classical monuments and the instrumentalization of mass- produced 
prefabricated housing blocks. Cultural production on both sides of the Cold 
War conflict supplied a political weapon underwritten by state power, but 
in the U.S. this was masked by universalizing modernist rhetoric.17 Tracing 
Hitchcock’s postwar writings reveals how this particular fight was waged as 
the Cold War accelerated. Seeking to disconnect architecture from politics, 
Hitchcock emphasized aesthetic judgment as if it was independent of eco-
11.3 “The Paris Exhibition,” Architectural Review special issue, September 1937, 7. 
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nomics, class, or ideology, and of the architect as its arbiter. Paradoxically, 
the success of architecture as a political force in society came to reside in its 
aggressive refusal of party politics. Apolitical modernist architecture became 
the perfect vehicle for advancing imperialism- through- building, at home and 
abroad, throughout the years of the Cold War.18
Censoring the Historical Present
Hitchcock distanced both national socialist architecture and nineteenth- 
century building from the work of Persius and Schinkel. So have modern 
architects. Walter Gropius implicitly addressed national socialist appropria-
tions of German neoclassicism in 1935: “I belong to a Prussian family of ar-
chitects in which the tradition of Schinkel . . . was part of our heritage. . . . 
‘Respect for Tradition’ does not mean the . . . . the acceptance of domination 
by bygone aesthetic forms.”19 Interpreting the use of period styles by national 
socialist architects as a return to the historicism of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries made national socialist building appear safely ar-
rière garde. The Architectural Review, for example, called the 1937 Paris con-
tribution “the tragedy of Germany,” captioning a small photograph of the 
pavilion, “Germany has deliberately turned her architecture back to the time 
of Bismarck” — tragic in relation to the early development of modern archi-
tecture by Peter Behrens (1868 – 1940) and Gropius himself.20 
Hitchcock, unusually and deeply immersed in the history of nineteenth- 
century architecture, carefully nuanced Gropius’s critique, claiming that Ger-
many’s was a recent return, out of fashion more than revivalist.21 After describ-
ing the emigration of Gropius and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886 – 1969), 
he characterized German architecture as follows: “Those German architects 
who remained at home turned backwards in their tracks, though not very far 
backwards. . . . Very little of [it] deserves specific mention.”22 Affiliating the 
1930s with the period 1900 – 1914 helped him emphasize lack of development 
and stylistic obsolescence.23 Not only retrograde, national socialist build-
ing stemmed from a set of developments that were not deserving of “specific 
mention” because they were irretrievably flawed and aesthetically mediocre, 
in addition to being thoroughly outmoded. Hitchcock thus excluded it from 
the story altogether, as a nonorganic style incommensurate with its own his-
torical moment.24 Paul Mebes’s influential Um 1800, a book that connected 
twentieth- century German architecture to the “revolutionary classicism” of 
the French revolution in France and Germany, for example, was not even 
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mentioned in Hitchcock’s compendious Architecture: Nineteenth and Twen-
tieth Centuries of 1958.25 
Hiding in the Historical Past
If postwar historians presented national socialist architecture as quaintly 
backward- looking, so did Nazi theorists themselves.26 Architect and polemi-
cist Paul Schultze- Naumburg (1869 – 1949) narrated a genealogy remarkably 
similar to that of the Neues Bauen, linking romantic classicism to national 
socialism by stepping backward to turn- of- the- century reform movements, 
and from there to architecture “around 1800.” Like that of modernism, this 
genealogy skipped over mid- to late nineteenth- century historicism, when 
architects adopted revival styles to narrate building function, context, or 
manner of fabrication through the use of a set of established references that 
ranged over space and time.27
Yet revival styles that persisted from the nineteenth to the twentieth cen-
tury clad technologically modern buildings.28 As complex consumer prod-
ucts that take a long time to make, twentieth- century buildings increasingly 
required different orders of architectural production: aesthetic, technical, 
and propagandist. A highly articulated productive apparatus developed un-
der national socialism, where historical styles related to building program 
(function, use), desired propaganda image, economic constraints, or all 
three.29 Celebrating German ethnicity in Heimatstil architecture (“home-
land style”) was only one option from a heterogeneous stylistic mix that also 
included modern abstraction and monumental antiquarianism.30 This is not 
nineteenth- century relativism, where building style was didactic and ethi-
cally coded, as in the work of A. W. N. Pugin. Instead, the hierarchical appli-
cation of style under national socialism privileged unsubtle messaging about 
use, symbolization, and building economy.31
If arguments about style and its derivation could be debated endlessly and 
without conclusion throughout the first half of the twentieth century, they 
camouflaged an ongoing debate about relationships between architecture and 
technology. Here, modernists and national socialists parted company. The 
former projected transparency of form, use, and construction, with buildings 
as ostensible demonstrations of new building practices mediated by photog-
raphy and graphic arts. National socialist architects, by contrast, used stylistic 
diversity as message carrier mediated by photography and graphic arts. For 
Nazi architects, technological innovation would advance an efficient building 
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industry within local economic constraints. Construction technology and 
external appearance (style) belonged to different administrative realms and 
were not necessarily correlated, even as they coincided in buildings.
Miller Lane’s important 1968 book made this claim, just as more recent 
studies have deepened it.32 The integrated propaganda apparatus of the state 
(only possible through the systematic policy of coordination known as Gleich-
schaltung) set media priorities for architecture and building that differed 
dramatically from technical priorities. The differences between propaganda 
needs and the requirements of useful buildings represented a newly schis-
matic condition that was not unique to Germany at this time. As the twen-
tieth century passed, architecture was increasingly articulated around so-
phisticated demands for publicity and propaganda, in response to complex 
building tasks and developing technology, and as symbolic aesthetic practice. 
Miller Lane notes with regard to the first that “admiration for individualism 
and nostalgia for a hierarchical society and a preindustrial economy emerge 
from the party’s architectural propaganda between 1930 and 1933.”33 Simi-
larly, Hitler conflated two manners of construction that are often understood 
separately — that of a state and that of a work of art — so that the symbolism of 
architecture added yet another charge.34 At the same time, the practical chal-
lenges of building grew more complex under the material and labor shortages 
that characterized wartime escalation.
Product Placement
Using various styles to sell similar consumer products was commonplace in 
the 1930s, whether the relevant currency was political- symbolic capital or 
money. We need not turn to the nineteenth century for precedents. In 1923, 
the year in which Henry Ford’s My Life made its debut in Germany, Alfred 
P. Sloan became president of the General Motors Corporation in Detroit, 
which soon diversified car models in a family of brands (to include Opel from 
1929). Increasing the company’s consumer base, gm challenged the “purist” 
manufacturer of the Model T, which produced only one car model at a time 
until the second half of the 1920s. Sloan offered consumers automobiles in a 
multitude of styles and colors and at a range of prices, effectively spreading 
the demand for automobiles by applying stimuli. Such articulation lies at the 
core of successful commercial marketing.35 
The 1920s diversification of consumer markets in Detroit and the diversi-
fication of building typologies and stylistic wrappers that occurred in Ger-
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many after 1933 share a similar phase of capitalist development with a host of 
other consumer products. Paul Jaskot notes how “ss architects were respond-
ing like developers and engineers everywhere to contingencies of politics, 
war, and material shortages (let alone labour).”36 Another way in which na-
tional socialist builders responded to market pressures concerned working- 
class housing. Abandoning large- scale mass dwellings for political reasons, 
the state turned to single- family dwellings “on the rural side of the plant in 
which [laborers] work.” This was not only a planning decision or a strategy of 
deurbanization in Nazi Germany. Putting workers on land to grow food even 
as they also worked full- time in factories amortized the costs of such build-
ing and muted workers’ political voices.37 New housing policy was intended 
to make factory workers self- sufficient through land cultivation, an economic 
benefit.38 Compared with the racially selective home mortgage system spon-
sored by Ford Motor Company, in which monthly payments kept workers 
tied to their paychecks, German workers experienced different manners of 
social control. In both cases, architecture provided a mechanism.39 The mo-
dernity of national socialism is well understood in relation to propaganda, 
building technology, cultural politics, and economic modeling. Reducing it 
to backward- facing antiquarianism tamed its threat, rendering the state’s le-
thal nature familiar and easy to dismiss. Such moves disguised the equally 
lethal role that architecture had played, whether in accommodating prison-
ers in barracks, providing enclosures in which they worked to their deaths 
and were gassed or burned, or housing the ministers who debated the lives 
of others over cocktails at Wannsee Lake. But the straw man erected by An-
glophone critics to account for Nazi building during the war or immediately 
after it was not only historically inaccurate. It also had knock- on effects. 
Let us turn back to Detroit. An essay by Hitchcock on postwar U.S. ar-
chitecture shows how architectural images — how architecture as image — 
migrated across geographic and political boundaries to be flexibly deployed 
as a political tool. Hitchcock’s reference to “Nazidom” in 1947 relates the work 
of Detroit industrial architect Albert Kahn (1869 – 1942) to that of national 
socialist architects a decade and a half earlier. As improbable as any close 
comparison of these two turns out to be, made so in part because of Kahn’s 
Judaism, his thriftiness, and his lack of formality (in building as well as in 
organization), the association merits attention here.
By 1947 Hitchcock was an influential voice in Anglo- American archi-
tectural history (along with Lewis Mumford, and Nikolaus Pevsner in the 
U.K.), co- curator of the 1932 “International Style” show and a prolific writer. 
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In “The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius,” he 
compared Frank Lloyd Wright to Kahn, carefully distinguishing architecture 
from more prosaic building.40 The “architecture of bureaucracy” provided a 
revenue stream for architectural practices; the “architecture of genius,” by 
contrast, contributed to culture. Hitchcock’s postwar campaign, of which 
the essay was part, further articulated a distinction that Pevsner laid down 
in 1943: “A bicycle shed is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of architec-
ture.”41 Lest architects lose access to industrial and commercial building and 
the “bread and butter” income that such work provided, Hitchcock carefully 
distinguished the manner of building that sustained architects financially 
from that which elevated them within cultural spheres.42 Architects might 
build utilitarian buildings to generate revenue for their offices; only geniuses 
such as Wright would build for posterity.43 This critical scheme to safeguard 
professional architecture subsidized the unpredictable phase of architectural 
work — that of design — with more predictable tasks such as producing work-
ing drawings or supervising sites. Genius architecture was expensive; mun-
dane work could amortize its cost. For these reasons and others, Pevsner’s 
bipartite definition of architecture as either vernacular building or fine- art 
architecture was not sufficiently complex for postwar markets.
Kahn, in contrast to Wright, had contributed to modern architecture by 
perfecting the rapid delivery of factories, institutions, and commercial build-
ings. Kahn’s modern architecture, shockingly different from anything com-
ing from Europe in the 1920s, was based on a systematic reorganization of 
architectural work to adapt to the increasingly uncompromising demands of 
industrial clients. These clients were not primarily interested in aesthetics. 
Rather, they sought any economic advantage that might be gained over ag-
gressive competitors in an intensely competitive market. Worker productivity 
(for which more carefully designed architecture that better accommodates a 
range of human needs might be consequential), functionality, and predictabil-
ity of costs displaced aesthetics. Kahn’s handful of articles and speeches testify 
to the degree to which he had absorbed these values while retaining a belief in 
the value of design despite its imperviousness to clearly measurable standards. 
Kahn’s work had inspired European modernists as early as the 1910s and 
1920s, when his “Crystal Palace,” Ford’s Highland Park factory, was widely 
published by authors such as Gropius, Adolf Behne, and Werner Lindner. 
Part of a widespread “Amerikanismus,” or interest in American innovations, 
Kahn’s work was greeted as the latest technological building for large indus-
try (figure 11.4).44
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The raw material that Kahn provided was then crafted into “Architec-
ture” by Gropius and others.45 Yet, in his 1947 article, Hitchcock used the 
retrograde term “bureaucracy,” a word associated with nineteenth- century 
governmental inefficiency and the rationalization of state organizations, to 
detail the manner in which the work of Kahn’s firm could, as a function 
of its organization, produce undistinguished but highly competent build-
ings.46 Hitchcock understood bureaucratic building as an outgrowth of the 
war and postwar reconstruction.47 As European theorists signaled the need 
for a “new monumentality” after the war, Hitchcock instead accepted a fait 
accompli: that U.S. military might was based on U.S. industrial capacity. He 
11.4 Plate illustration showing the Highland Park Old Shop, also known as the “Crystal 
Palace,” by Albert Kahn, architect for the Ford Motor Company, 1908 – 10. From Werner 
Lindner, Die Ingenieurbauten in ihrer Guten Gestaltung (Berlin: Wasmuth, 1923), 110. 
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merely tried to work around this seemingly unavoidable fact, carefully se-
questering “bureaucratic” architecture from the art of building. Yet the term 
“bureaucratic” inadequately describes an architectural practice organized 
around mechanization and automation.48 Rather than bureaucratic proce-
dures, Kahn’s office strategically adjusted standard practices. 
Counterposing individual authorship with the lack of individual agency 
that is characteristic of bureaucracy, Hitchcock ends with a note: “The public 
monuments of Nazidom might serve as a warning. Moreover, England and 
America have their own horrible examples of twentieth- century bureaucratic 
monuments.” The retrograde “- dom” neutralized a lethal term and a recent 
and very modern threat, locating it in the distant past of kingdoms or fief-
doms, even as the second sentence in the same note summons past, present, 
and future — “twentieth- century bureaucratic monuments.”49 Notions of ap-
plied style as distinct from organic or integrated style (such as that found in 
modern architecture) reject theories of dressing or cladding that were staples 
of steel- and concrete- framed building and of twentieth- century architectural 
theory, and that remained popular among practicing professionals in the U.S.
Distancing modernization from the unfolding project of modernism, 
Hitchcock’s polemics collided with the demands of writing history or criti-
cism, as he himself acknowledged.50 Tunnel vision pushed “Nazidom” back 
into the distant past, where it could drag with it manners of building that 
Germany shared with other modern states, including the United States. 
Through such means, Hitchcock characterized Kahn’s work as retrograde 
and obsolete, like national socialist architecture. Fred Turner convincingly 
relates postwar reinvestment in the perceived power of individual experience 
to fears of mass psychology instilled by the success of Nazi propaganda and 
techniques of mass persuasion.51 Both are also part of the phase of capitalism 
that prevailed after World War I. Herein lies the most obvious reason to af-
filiate two such disparate cultural actors as Albert Speer and Albert Kahn: if 
you correlate them to the same general threat constituted by modernity itself, 
you can use one to dismiss both.
How close was Kahn’s superficial stylistic eclecticism to the architecture 
of national socialism? Kahn’s buildings were carefully calculated, reducing 
the quantity of material used in order to minimize cost. Stone was a cladding 
material attached in thin sheets to the steel frames of buildings and held by 
metal anchors, screws, mortar, and gravity. 
The firm pioneered new building technology across a range of materi-
als, seeking economies of scale through the use of thinner cladding, less re-
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inforcing in ferroconcrete, and less ornamentation; these were not removed 
entirely, but to an extent that would reduce cost while maintaining appear-
ance. Thus rondels on many Kahn buildings remained unsculpted, like blank 
spots where one would typically find figurative reliefs or inscriptions. Econ-
omy was particularly important in industrial buildings, although one finds 
it everywhere in Kahn’s practice — as in the Hatcher Library reading room at 
the University of Michigan, where a false barrel vault of canvas, wood, and 
plaster hangs from the steel trusses that span the reading room and support 
the floors above.
Somatic Economy
In contrast to this laboratory of reduced construction costs, the national so-
cialist building program developed an economic model founded on slave la-
bor from camps such as Flossenbürg and on a dearth of steel combined with 
11.5 General Motors Building, Detroit, Michigan, 1923, by Albert Kahn, architect. From the 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. Copyright © Albert Kahn Associates.
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plentiful masonry supplies, as Jaskot has shown.52 Large public buildings in 
Germany from this time are in many cases actually load- bearing masonry 
buildings, an extravagance in any open- market building economy. They were 
economically possible only because the labor that provided the stone was 
cheap, if not free (requiring only that concentration camp inmates be moni-
tored by guards and fed a minimal diet); the quarries themselves were gov-
ernment owned, and steel was unavailable for construction during wartime. 
But not only manufacture distinguishes these architectures. Whatever su-
perficial stylistic similarities might be identified in photographs, the build-
ings have a different affect across the board, as Hitchcock knew well from 
his personal experience at Pratt and Whitney.53 One could argue that Kahn’s 
buildings are “background” buildings that generally don’t draw sustained 
visual attention. Speer’s buildings, by contrast, present monumental stone 
architecture as urban ensemble, megastructure designed to draw attention, 
not deflect it, and meant to constitute a public that is subservient to the will 
of the state. Both literally and figuratively, it is the relative weight of these 
two kinds of buildings that distinguished one from the other at the end of 
the 1930s, even as their images could be superficially affiliated, particularly as 
they vanished from the press, vilified but no longer supplied.54
Hitchcock, 1958
Hitchcock continued to publish after 1947, just as his frequent publishing be-
tween 1929 and 1947 was interrupted only once, when he paused to write tech-
nical manuals for aircraft engines in a building designed by Albert Kahn.55 
His 1958 Architecture: Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries was a major ref-
erence work for architects and historians thirty years in the making, and it 
went through six editions and multiple reprints.56 The passage cited above, on 
German architects after 1933, focused on Peter Behrens and constitutes most 
of the discussion on national socialist architecture between 1933 and 1945. 
Titled “Behrens and Other German Architects,” the chapter includes Paul 
Bonatz (1877 – 1956), German Bestelmeyer (1874 – 1942), and Wilhelm Kreis 
(1873 – 1955) among those favored by the Nazi party. The same paragraph de-
scribes Oskar Kaufmann (1873 – 1956), who fled to Palestine in 1933, with no 
mention of a divergence of paths; indeed, the chapter title suggests that noth-
ing much happened to architecture in Germany after 1933, beyond the work 
of a few genius creators, the most important of whom (Behrens) died in 1940.
The penultimate chapter of Architecture, “Architecture Called Traditional 
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in the Twentieth Century,” is as good as its word. One sentence mentions 
Albert Kahn before a multipage discussion of prominent British colonial ar-
chitect Edwin Lutyens, a core member of the European “canon,” according 
to consensus, even though his biggest projects were sited in British India.57 
The text explains that traditional architecture “is primarily an instance of 
survival; and cultural survivals are among the most difficult problems with 
which history has to deal. Their sluggish life, sunk in inertia and conserva-
tism, is very different from the vitality of new developments” (392). Hitch-
cock thus dismisses the North American architectural scene that was ongo-
ing when MoMA first began its campaign for modern architecture in the 1932 
show; he equally mischaracterizes the construction juggernaut that engulfed 
Germany under Hitler.58 The fact that Kahn’s buildings were, in terms of 
building construction and technology, as modern as any that had theretofore 
been built — that historicist styles were merely draped over technologically 
modern buildings — was precluded from Hitchcock’s analysis both because 
of events in Germany and despite them. 
Modernizing Architecture
Historians hardly need question the ongoing prominence of formalism in 
architectural history or the inherent restrictions that formalist aesthetics 
impose. Yet we live with the negative consequences of positive decisions — 
decisions made for architecture, not against history. Traditional architecture, 
so called, “includes the majority of buildings designed before 1930 in most 
countries of the western world and a high but rapidly decreasing, proportion 
of those erected since,” and yet its popularity did not merit sustained exami-
nation.59 The ellipsis of national socialist architecture in Hitchcock’s book is 
mirrored and echoed by an equal silence about what is arguably the most crit-
ical and poorly understood achievement of modern building (but not “mod-
ern architecture”) in mid- twentieth- century North America: the unprece-
dented output of offices like Kahn’s that fueled industry leading into World 
War II. These offices built factories, office buildings and skyscrapers, cultural 
institutions, and homes. By omitting such buildings from architectural his-
tory, polemicists of modernism set cultural capital apart from finance and 
scientific capital, erecting a barrier between culture and its sites and means.60 
Parallel exclusions of national socialist and U.S. architecture from history are 
striking; they may be explained in part by Hitchcock’s own history.
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Johnson noted, in a Festchrift of 1982, that “from the architect’s point of 
view, what stands out in Russell’s scholarship is his use of primary visual 
sources. I can bear personal witness that from his first travels in 1930, to the 
latest for his German Renaissance book, Russell saw every extant building 
he writes about.”61 Not only conscious of distinctions between load- bearing 
masonry and steel- or concrete- frame construction, Hitchcock was also a 
sophisticated reader of photographs.62 By embracing selective formalism 
he erected a levee against the surge of modernization, fully aware that style 
was irrelevant to the juggernaut of industrial capitalism even as he opposed 
nineteenth- century styles with twentieth- century style. While Giedion and 
others explored the difficult proposition that the essential medium of archi-
tecture was space in time (and thereby, in some sense, the negation of form), 
Hitchcock pursued an alternative proposition.63 For him and many others, 
style represented an authoritative cultural signature, the defining feature of 
an age — and of a personality. Lest this seem hopelessly irrelevant today, re-
call the working relationship between Hitchcock and Johnson, and that be-
tween Johnson and contemporary architect Peter Eisenman (b. 1932 ). Eisen-
man’s influence over generations of architects should not be underestimated, 
in part because the progressive credentials that drape a sophisticated cultural 
conservatism based on architecture as elite practice camouflage that political 
belief far more effectively than Kahn’s neoclassical styling of the steel- framed 
gm Building.64 
In such a schema for architecture, it really only matters how buildings 
look in order for their value as cultural actors to be affirmed. How they are 
built, are inhabited, and age were within Hitchcock’s purview, but primarily 
insofar as these affirmed decisions made during the design process. For this 
reason, the interchangeability of the photograph for the building is reveal-
ing. Like photographs, building style is literally superficial, accounting for 
building surfaces, whether inside or out, but without any necessary reference 
to internal organization (generally deciphered in the plan) or construction 
(sometimes associated with the section). The image of architecture is its pho-
tograph because the photograph dutifully records all of the stylistic attributes 
that the camera’s eye can graze.65 This tautology partly explains the agency 
of photography in twentieth- century architecture; today it underpins a great 
deal of architecture and its history.
 276 Claire Zimmerman 
Conclusion: No Politics in Architecture  
Equals No Architecture in Politics
Hitchcock’s 1947 article and his 1958 book are Cold War histories. The first 
used recent catastrophe to undermine interwar building in the U.S. by asso-
ciating its image with wartime German architecture. Yet the so- called archi-
tecture of bureaucracy was an important part of the U.S. building industry, a 
key force in the development of urban and exurban landscapes of the United 
States and a linchpin of military- industrial power. It required careful study. 
Hitchcock’s 1958 book left this material out of the historical picture entirely. 
The stripped classicism of “bureaucratic” architecture continued unabated 
nonetheless, in buildings whose executors cared little for architectural dis-
course. Hitchcock’s cordon sanitaire around genius architecture protected a 
small percentage of building, not necessarily in the United States. By erecting 
it, he (and others) sought to protect professional elites, not to deploy architec-
ture for a more democratic “surround” in the built environment. 
The historian, attempting to secure agency for and yet simultaneously in-
demnify the architect from political responsibility, helped hand away both 
responsibility and agency, foreclosing a better correlation between politics 
and the places in which they occur. In fear of what had already happened, 
he (not she) removed architecture from discourse on public life and turned 
it into a fiction about itself.66 Construction at scale went on unabated, car-
ried out by those who saw buildings as machines that modulate economics, 
politics, form, and material for a variety of ends.67 Architects who removed 
themselves ever more fully from a public discourse that they could not con-
trol contrast with working architects such as Kahn who built the fabric of 
U.S. industry, which was then still largely urban.
More worrying still is the notion that investing architecture in questions of 
style and image — not technology, economic output, use, or means for living — 
though intended to avoid the hubristic demonstrations of national socialism, 
led to similar hubris in a different register, one less immediately lethal and 
more successfully global. The obliteration of German architecture from his-
torical consideration contributed to this repetition. Hannah Arendt sounded 
an alarm in 1950 when she wrote, 
We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and sim-
ply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead 
load which by itself time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean stream 
of Western history has finally come to the surface and usurped the dig-
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nity of our tradition. This is the reality in which we live. And this is why 
all efforts to escape, from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for 
a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are 
vain.68 
Yet as these words were written, architects were hard at work burying the past 
and embracing stylistic coherence in buildings throughout the U.S. and its 
international territories in the 1950s and 1960s. 
U.S. architects and critics celebrated high- rise glass and steel office build-
ings and monumental sculptural buildings designed for civic functions — as 
organic representations commensurate with the challenges of modern post-
war life, and as fundamentally nonpolitical representations. Intentionally or 
not, however, these agents of economic superiority and Cold War politics at 
home and abroad wielded an image of stylistic coherence that was inseparable 
from and associated with U.S. political influence. Would stylistic heterogene-
ity have altered global politics? Almost certainly not. Late modern architects 
took then- obsolete experiments of the 1920s as the basis for a new architec-
tural style for high- cost buildings, a style that “trickled down” through the 
economy of the built environment. Such consistency reinforced the inter-
ests of the state, whether through private capital (Hilton hotels, corporate 
office towers) or public buildings (U.S. embassies worldwide, corporate cam-
puses, and concert halls at home). The refusal to historicize — and visualize — 
fascism during the immediate postwar years condemned U.S. architects to 
repeat its mistakes, limiting new possibilities in the present and restraining 
the capacity of architecture to shape political life.69 
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CONCLUSION
Geoff Eley
How should we visualize fascism today? Taken together, our essays suggest 
several strong arguments. More than just an assortment of cases drawn from 
discrete parts of the world, they show fascism’s emergence in a shared global 
setting. By the 1930s, that setting contained multiple centers with multi-
directional flows: a globality of rival imperialisms caught in the fallout of a 
worldwide capitalist downturn. Just as World War II far exceeded a merely 
European framework of clashing nation- states, so fascism also had plural and 
varied origins. Fascism began from East Asia as well as Europe, from Africa 
and the Americas, with varying success across regions. These fascisms dis-
played similar political dynamics, ideology, and practices and had convergent 
political effects. An explicitly global understanding is vital for our purposes.1
By pointing to multiple origins, we also stress multiple forms. We want to 
pluralize the picture, whether in the movement or the regime phases, show-
ing the diverse starting points and trajectories of national fascisms as against 
the progenitive primacy of the Italian and German examples. Thus fascism 
sought power through stealthy maneuvers and elite- driven brokerage as well 
as by the full- frontal challenge of a Nazi Machtergreifung or Mussolini’s 
March on Rome; by more diffuse plebiscitary appeals, as against the highly 
organized, party- based mobilizing of the Nazis in 1928 – 32; and by backdoor 
institutional leverage rather than through popular disorders. The absence of 
a mass party on the Nazi pattern does not in itself mean the absence of fas-
cism. As our essays also show, fascism could just as frequently fail, or be suc-
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cessfully held at bay, rather than coming ultimately to power. In short, our 
range of examples reflects the convergent circumstances of political polariza-
tion and societal crisis across the globe during the interwar years, for which 
“fascism” then delivered the shared political language, whether as willingly 
embraced self- description or as a label its opponents bestowed.
We can go further. If fascism’s emergence was globally dispersed, taking 
variable forms and multiple paths, it also settled only gradually and unevenly 
into generic existence. It developed cumulatively rather than unfolding from 
an already assembled ground of principles comparable in coherence to lib-
eralism or conservatism and other political ideologies. “Fascism” as an ev-
eryday term preceded fascism as a category of sociopolitical analysis. But it 
soon named the commonalties of a variety of radical right- wing formations 
around the world, whose heterogeneous qualities caution against any restric-
tive typology of the movements that qualify or not. First came the loose and 
mobile repertoire of “fascism,” borne by all of the discursive noise and visual 
tactics surrounding Mussolini’s and similar movements, whether as viscer-
ally unreflected sloganeering and images or as consciously chosen terminol-
ogy and stagecraft by party intellectuals and strategists. Only then came fas-
cism as the stabilized category of political understanding. That being the 
case, a broader definition seems more helpful and appropriate. Thus fascism 
was a brutally distinct type of politics: it wanted to silence and even kill its 
opponents; it preferred coercively authoritarian rule over democracy; it cele-
brated an aggressively exclusionary idea of the nation over a pluralism hon-
oring difference; it presented itself in spectacles, photographs, graphics, and 
film as transcendently glorious, while invading every hearth and home, sit-
ting quietly and insidiously next to fathers, mothers, and children.
Both geographically decentered and historically dynamic, this nontypo-
logical definition then becomes eminently portable, not only spatially across 
the globe in the early twentieth century but also across very different times, 
including our own today. And approaching fascism visually allows us to 
grasp that portability especially well. Historians have recently grown nota-
bly attentive to fascism’s visual archive, perhaps earlier for Italy than for Ger-
many, embracing first film and then the arts more generally, from painting 
and sculpture to architecture and the built environment, and now photogra-
phy. Careful readings of these parts of fascism’s account of itself can bring us 
closer to the leitmotifs of fascist ideology — to the emotional evocations and 
fantasies of national wholeness Julia Thomas emphasized in the introduc-
tion: from the masculinist grievances and aggressions to the “vitalist energy 
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of youth, the comforts of naturally sanctioned belonging, and the necessity of 
righteous wars in a hostile world.” From the visual archive we can begin to re-
construct not only the intended fields of officially executed meaning but also 
their limitations, the places where doubts and misgivings — nonconforming 
recognitions — retreat into the privacies of the self and where even passive re-
sistance might occur. Materially and practically, in the machineries of propa-
ganda and cultural production, moreover, visuality was essential to fascism’s 
strategies of appeal, its drive for popular endorsement, whether before or af-
ter entry into power. The efficacy of those visual messages, Thomas argues, 
lay precisely in how “elusive and emotive” they were. The same dual effect — 
 practical transmission, resonance of appeal — occurred across borders too, 
not just literally as fascist ideas traveled from one country or region of the 
world to another, but also ideologically as fascists sought to realize their own 
global imaginary of interconnectedness.
For making sense of Far Right politics today, this alertness toward the vi-
sual can help in two ways in particular: one involves the fascist invasion of 
privacy; the other concerns the changing circulation of images between the 
early twentieth and early twenty- first centuries.
How should we judge fascism’s ideological appeal beyond the elaborate or-
chestrations of the spectacle where treatments most easily begin? If the fascist 
spectacle will certainly keep both its resonance for current Far Right sympa-
thizers and its interest for historians, the harder challenge concerns complex-
ities of reception, whether among the immediate participants in a Nuremberg 
Rally or in its wider viewing and listening audiences.2 On the one hand, the 
fearsome effects of fascism’s founding acts of violence (in Italy in 1920 – 22, 
in Germany in 1933 – 34) were clear enough: the new rules of permissible be-
havior had a brutally intimidating effect and were explicitly sanctioned by 
force beneath new codes of belonging and exclusion. But, on the other hand, 
even as the immediate ferocity started to settle, fascist regimes moved with 
decisive speed and distressing success to secure popular consent. Ordinary 
reactions to fascism’s rise or rule might well be structured psychically around 
“dissonance,” while contrary and divergent emotions jostled uncomfortably 
together. Conformity and dissent, enthusiasm and misgivings, might be ei-
ther managed and suppressed or consciously held apart and unthinkingly 
kept in play.3 Yet, however conflicted and ambivalent the individual motiva-
tion, ordinary Japanese, Germans, and Italians — Julia Thomas’s magazine 
readers, for example, or the viewers of Lutz Koepnick’s accessible and do-
mesticated Hitler, or Ruth Ben- Ghiat’s faces in the crowd — began necessarily 
 Conclusion 287
realigning their daily comportment, increasingly needing “to take a stance 
and position themselves according to new concepts and ideas.”4 The new 
times brought new interpellative mechanisms and expectations, new condi-
tions for the fashioning of public and private selves, new emotional registers, 
new conditions of conscience.5 Where fascists lacked equivalent control over 
a state — in the East Asian arenas examined by Maggie Clinton, Paul Barclay, 
and Ethan Mark, for example, or in Lorena Rizzo’s southern Africa — their 
visualizing strategies still drew similar complexities of response.
How fascists visualized this normalizing process by translating it into 
tropes, techniques, and repertoires of image- making — and how privately 
made, commercialized, and nonfascist images then circulated inside the 
resulting visual economy — takes us far beyond the large- scale public ma-
chinery of the spectacle. As Thomas observes, fascism had many ways of 
seeking “to abolish the distance between the state and its subjects.” Indeed, 
it was in the enjoyments, disappointments, and practicalities of quotidian 
life (through family, childhood, household, neighborhood, work, schooling, 
recreation, play, sexuality, intimate life) that ordinary subjects actually ex-
perienced the promises and affirmations fascists were claiming to supply. 
Imaginative use of photographic genres (magazine illustration, documentary 
reportage, tourism, hobbies, family albums) combined with an interpretive 
approach to ordinary people’s lives that uses oral histories, ego documents, 
and the more conventional written archive can bring us closer to this subjec-
tive and experiential dimension, as a number of our essays (e.g., Ben- Ghiat, 
Thomas, Koepnick, Rizzo, Metton) show. For fascism’s visual repertoire com-
prised not just the values choreographed into the imposing massed symbolics 
of the public spectacle — order, action, struggle, manliness, will, race, neces-
sity of war, rebirth, the New Man. Its fantasies of nation and empire required 
roseate small- scale sentimentality too: the joys and comforts of domesticity, 
the wholesomeness of family and healthfulness of children, fecundity and 
motherhood, the robustness of homegrown morality, the haven of civilized 
privacy. In his reading of Hoffmann’s Hitler portraiture, Koepnick shows 
these combining into an artfully engineered unity, where the transcendently 
heroic public was enhanced by the reassuringly idealized private.6 This visual 
joining of the national to the local, the political to the domestic, in such close 
and mutually inciting collaboration, was a key element of fascist strength and 
innovation. Fascist visuality brought politics (qua war and expansionism) 
into conversation with intimacy, interiority, and everydayness.
In a variety of versions, this same potent duality of public aggressions and 
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private reassurances could also be detected later. By the 1950s, once fascism 
and capitalist crisis were effectively decoupled, these terms were already be-
ing subtly reworked, as Nadya Bair and Claire Zimmerman each reveal: capi-
talist economic relations were perceived increasingly as natural and default, 
whereas Robert Capa’s iconic antifascist photographs were depoliticized and 
brought down to their “human interest.” But for our own time, the stark-
ness is back: Middle Eastern and central Asian bombing offensives and drone 
warfare, refugee crises and massive population displacements, rampant xe-
nophobia, anxiety about borders, and gun violence, on the one hand; fan-
tasies of family wholeness and the healthy national body, on the other. As 
constitutional democracy and its rules of civility reel beneath criticism and 
threat while worryingly large popular constituencies and powerful interests 
disavow the legitimacy and entailments of pluralism and difference, the space 
for an aggressively right- wing politics palpably widens. Without replicating 
the mass parties and other features of the 1920s and 1930s, the signs are famil-
iar: violence against enemies and opponents, coercively authoritarian rule, 
expansionist and exclusionary nationalism. But the conditions of political 
communication and exchange are now profoundly changed. Both the means 
and the mechanics of what a political movement can hope to accomplish have 
been transformed in the meantime by the bewildering extent and availabil-
ity of our contemporary visual archive — not just from television, film, and 
the classical reservoirs of public and private photography, but now, too, from 
the internet and web- based digital apparatuses of image storage, circulation, 
and retrieval combined with smartphone technology and personally man-
aged social media access.
This observation bridges to the second way our volume is pertinent for the 
present: the means of circulation and transmission per se. Of course, it was 
not ideas, images, and visual representations alone that traveled internation-
ally inside the geopolitical arenas where fascists were making their history. 
People and things did so too. In Paul Barclay’s account of the monuments and 
sites memorializing the dead, tourists voyaged and pilgrimaged all over East 
Asia for the purpose; Ethan Mark finds equally significant traffic between 
the colonial Dutch Indies and the Netherlands before Japanese expansion-
ism changed the directions for such exchange. In this volume, in his account 
of Slovakia, a regional forecourt to the Nazis’ eastward imperium, Bertrand 
Metton supplies cognate illustration of what that could mean — namely, the 
colonial circuitry of military, administrative, and economic occupation and 
collaboration with unfamiliar peoples that faced Germans and vice versa, 
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in a hall of two- way mirrors described more obliquely by Nadya Bair for the 
Spanish Civil War and its rival fascist and left- wing interventions.7 Using 
biographical studies of the central European emigration to southern Africa, 
Lorena Rizzo shows another way in which people and their ideas traveled, 
as her two women photographers, Ilse Steinhoff and Anneliese Scherz, reen-
acted subtle translations of fascist visuality.8
In the earlier twentieth century, the global resonance of fascist ideas both 
presumed and required a new mass- mediated public sphere. This made pos-
sible previously unimagined speed and quality of access to varieties of images 
and ideas originating elsewhere — through new visual and print technolo-
gies (illustrated magazines, advertising, cinema, photography), gramophone 
records and radio broadcasting, commercial entertainments, and new pat-
terns of consumption. Mussolini’s larger- than- life international popularity 
in the mid- 1920s, reaching “veritable boom” proportions country by country, 
supplies one compelling illustration of this.9 Whether in the eye- catchingly 
modernist graphic design described by Maggie Clinton, in poster and pam-
phlet illustrations, or in the conventions of newspaper and magazine photog-
raphy, fascist imagery traveled thickly into global circulation. The resulting 
iconographies, visual tropes, and narrative patterns helped shape how fascist 
political formations would be perceived in the future. By means of repeti-
tion, accumulation, and interarticulation, such visual languages solidified the 
political narratives fascists needed in order to drive their messages home — 
narratives of national wholeness, of heroic and armored masculinity, of fa-
milial health and female fecundity, of youthful vigor, of racialized commu-
nity, of militantly demonizing rejection of the Jewish and Bolshevik enemies. 
Given the transnational circuits of influence and indebtedness, such images 
helped vitally compose the layered ideological corpus that movements and 
regimes elsewhere would be able to raid.
These same processes become replicated across time. Postwar movements 
of the Far Right, presently far less inhibited than ever before and with appar-
ently increasing support in many parts of the world, fish freely in this deep 
reservoir of iconography, signs, and associations transmitted from an earlier 
past, netting much material — badges, insignia, uniforms, symbols, slogans, 
forms of action — that is instantly usable for styling themselves inside a rec-
ognizably fascist tradition. Sometimes these movements claim indigenous 
descent (worryingly so in Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere); at other times 
they cleave vicariously to the Nazi or Italian precursors. In the United States 
a topography of neo- Nazi, white supremacist, militia- styled, and “Alt- Right” 
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activism can be mapped in this way through its networks, writings, and web-
sites, thereby disclosing a visual repertoire selectively continuous with the 
1930s.10 Moreover, if the past delivers a serviceable resource in this fashion, it 
is also more readily retrievable. With the dramatic reconfiguration of pub-
licness that has been underway since the 1990s, the fascist proclivity for ap-
propriating and repurposing imagery — its distinctive counter aesthetic of 
“undisciplined eclecticism,” mobile symbolics, and aggressive negations, as 
Thomas explains it — flourishes but now presents itself differently. Presaged 
by the global diffusion of television since the 1960s, followed by the mass 
spread of fax machines, computers, and the early forms of the internet, the 
startling rapidity of new electronic communications, digital techniques, and 
information technologies — dvds, cable and satellite tv, laptops, cell phones, 
Skype, streaming, smartphones, social media — now allows not only novel 
forms of web- based organizing but also incomparably easier access. Increas-
ingly under this new dispensation, violence means not just physically harm-
ing and murdering opponents, but also coercively overriding democratic ci-
vility and its constitutional safeguards. It no longer relies as much on street 
fighting, pitched confrontations, and spectacular displays of massed force. It 
operates, rather, via verbal onslaughts, internet trolling, instantly transmit-
ted and reproduced visual incitements, and all the other virtual means of 
displaced but no less brutal assaultiveness. This very differently constituted 
visual landscape, made dramatically apparent in the instantaneous global si-
multaneity of the spectacle of 9/11, requires its own terms of analysis. We can 
certainly see definite continuities from the 1930s: repetitions of tropes and 
repertoires and familiar patterns of rhetoric, including the masculine nation, 
the soldierly nation, the rageful nation, the misogynist nation, the racialized 
and racially armored nation, and so forth. But the contents and coordinates 
of contemporary visuality equally clearly diverge, not least in their globally 
spatialized dimensions. Events in one place become instantly transmitted to 
watchers in another, meanings are deceptively graspable, distance shrinks. 
This volume offers a casebook for recognizing and situating these lineaments 
of contiguity and difference. 
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tive Perspectives (Houndmills, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Daniel Woodley, 
Fascism and Political Theory: Critical Perspectives on Fascist Ideology (London: 
Routledge, 2010); Aristotle A. Kallis, ed., The Fascism Reader (London: Routledge, 
2003); and Constantin Iordachi, ed., Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspec-
tives (London: Routledge, 2010). David D. Roberts, Fascist Interactions: Propos-
als for a New Approach to Fascism and Its Era, 1919 – 1945 (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2016), does consider Japan, but only as an occasional foil to the primary 
European cases. Another impressive anthology, Arnd Bauerkämper and Grze-
gorz Rossoliński- Liebe, eds., Fascism without Borders: Transnational Connections 
and Cooperation between Movements and Regimes in Europe from 1918 to 1945 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), is explicitly European from the outset. Two 
rare monographic exceptions would be Reto Hofmann, The Fascist Effect: Japan 
and Italy, 1915 – 1952 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); and Federico 
Finchelstein, Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argen-
tina and Italy, 1919 – 1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
 2 Intimations from contemporary political life are plentiful enough, sometimes very 
directly, as in the staging of Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign rallies (e.g., his de-
scent from the skies to address crowds in airport hangars) or in the organizing 
of a white supremacist torchlight procession. Hollywood has for decades drawn 
on the imagery of plebiscitary and charismatic acclamation exemplified by long- 
established readings of the Nuremberg Rallies and Leni Reifenstahl’s Triumph of 
the Will. Examples range from Privilege (Peter Watkins, 1967) and Network (Sid-
ney Lumet, 1976) to The Hunger Games trilogy (Gary Ross, 2012; Francis Law-
rence, 2013 and 2014 – 15) and Money Monster (Jodie Foster, 2016). Among literary 
versions of this syndrome, my own essay in this volume (chapter 3) opens with 
Don DeLillo’s novel White Noise (New York: Penguin, 1985).
 3 See Mary Fulbrook, Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the Ger-
man Dictatorships (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
 4 Kathryn Sederberg, “The 1930s in Nazi Germany as Seen through Diaries,” in a 
review of Janosch Steuwer, “Ein Dritter Reich, wie ich es auffasse”: Politik, Gesell-
schaft und privates Leben in Tagebüchern 1933 – 1939 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2017), 
published on H- German in H- Net Online, January 2018, www.h- net.org/reviews 
/showrev.php?id=50185/.
 5 See Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2003).
 6 See also Despina Stratigakos, Hitler at Home (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2015).
 7 Elsewhere Metton explores the role of hiking and youth movements during the 
later 1930s and 1940s in mapping the European imaginary of a Nazi- dominated 
New Order: Bertrand Metton, “From the Popular Front to the Eastern Front: 
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Youth Movements, Travel, and Fascism in France, 1933 – 1945” (PhD diss., Uni-
versity of Michigan, 2015), and “Nazi Europe and the Atlantic Wall: On Spatial 
Theory and the Wartime Fascist Worldview,” unpublished. Also Ruth Ben- Ghiat, 
Italian Fascism’s Empire Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015); 
Stephanie Malia Hom, The Beautiful Country: Tourism and the Impossible State 
of Destination Italy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015); and Stephanie 
Malia Hom, “Empires of Tourism: Travel and Rhetoric in Italian Colonial Libya 
and Albania, 1911 – 1943,” Journal of Tourism History 4, no. 3 (2012): 281 – 300.
 8 For the transnational circulation of fascist ideas, see Benjamin G. Martin, The 
Nazi- Fascist New Order for European Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2016); Johannes Dafinger, “The Nazi ‘New Europe’: Transnational 
Concepts of a Fascist and Völkisch Order for the Continent,” in Bauerkämper 
and Rossoliński-Liebe, eds., Fascism without Borders, 264 – 87; Roel Vande Winkel 
and David Welch, eds., Cinema and the Swastika: The International Expansion of 
Third Reich Cinema (Houndmills, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
 9 Hofmann, Fascist Effect, 38. See also Adam Tooze, “When We Loved Mussolini,” 
New York Review of Books, August 18, 2016, 55 – 56; John P. Diggins, Mussolini and 
Fascism: The View from America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972); 
Simonetta Falasca- Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Musso-
lini’s Italy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 50 – 55.
 10 For the growing literature surveying this scene, see Alexander Reid Ross, Against 
the Fascist Creep (Chico, CA: ak Press, 2017); Mark Bray, Antifa: The Anti- Fascist 
Handbook (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2017); David Neiwert, Alt- America: The 
Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump (London: Verso, 2017); Vegas Tenold, 
Everything You Love Will Burn: Inside the Rebirth of White Nationalism in Amer-
ica (New York: Nation Books, 2018).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abel, Jonathan E. Redacted: The Archives of Censorship in Transwar Japan. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012.
Abrahamson, Michael. “ ‘Actual Center of Detroit’: Method, Management, and De-
centralization in Albert Kahn’s General Motors Building.” Journal of the Society 
of Architectural Historians 77, no. 1 (March 2018): 56 – 76.
Abramson, Daniel. Obsolescence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.
Achilles, Manuela. “With a Passion for Reason: Celebrating the Constitution in Wei-
mar Germany.” Central European History 43, no. 4 (2010): 666 – 89.
Allert, Tilman. The Hitler Salute: On the Meaning of a Gesture. London: Picador, 2009.
Antliff, Mark. “Fascism, Modernism, and Modernity.” The Art Bulletin 84, no. 1 
(2002): 148 – 69.
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. London: Harcourt, Brace and  
World, 1979. Accessed July 20, 2017. https://archive.org/details/ArendtHannah 
TheOriginsOfTotalitarianism1979/.
Asahi Shimbun Company. Media, Propaganda and Politics in 20th- Century Japan, 
translated by Barak Kushner. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010.
Aschheim, Steven E. “Introduction.” In What History Tells: George L. Mosse and 
the Culture of Modern Europe. Edited by Stanley G. Payne, David J. Sorkin, and 
John S. Tortorice, 3 – 22. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004.
Atkins, E. Taylor. Primitive Selves: Koreana in the Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910 – 1945. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010.
Aumont, Jean. Du visage au cinéma. Paris: Editions de l’Etoile, 1992. 
Baer, Ulrich. Spectral Evidence: The Photography of Trauma. Cambridge, MA: mit 
Press, 2002.
Baranowski, Shelley. Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bis-
marck to Hitler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Baranowski, Shelley. Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the 
Third Reich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Baranowski, Shelley. “Strength through Joy: Tourism and National Integration in 
the Third Reich.” In Being Elsewhere: Tourism, Consumer Culture, and Identity 
in Modern Europe and North America. Edited by Shelley Baranowski and Eileen 
Furlough, 213 – 36. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.
 294 Bibliography
Barclay, Paul. Outcasts of Empire: Japan’s Rule on Taiwan’s “Savage Border,” 
1874 – 1945. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017.
Barrera, Giuliana. “Mussolini’s Colonial Race Laws and State- Settler Relations in 
Africa Orientale Italiana (1935 – 1941).” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 8 (2003): 
425 – 43. 
Bärsch, Claus- Ekkehard. Die politische Religion des Nationalsozialismus. Die re-
ligiöse Dimension des ns- Ideologie in den Schriften von Dietrich Eckert, Joseph 
Goebbels, Adolf Rosenberg und Adolf Hitler. Munich: W. Fink, 1998.
Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, translated by Richard 
Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1981.
Barthes, Roland. La Chambre claire: Note sur la photographie. Paris: Cahiers du Ci-
néma/Seuil, 1980.
Barthes, Roland. “Visages et figures,” Esprit 2 – 4 (July 1953): 1 – 11.
Bathrick, David. “Making a National Family with the Radio: The Nazi Wunsch-
konzert.” Modernism/Modernity 4, no. 1 (January 1997): 115 – 27.
Bauerkämper, Arnd, and Grzegorz Rossoliński- Liebe, eds. Fascism without Borders: 
Transnational Connections and Cooperation between Movements and Regimes in 
Europe from 1918 to 1945. New York: Berghahn Books, 2017.
Ben- Ghiat, Ruth. “Envisioning Modernity: Desire and Discipline in the Italian Fas-
cist Film.” Critical Inquiry 23, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 109 – 44.
Ben- Ghiat, Ruth. Italian Fascism’s Empire Cinema. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2015. 
Ben- Ghiat, Ruth, and Mia Fuller, eds. Italian Colonialism. New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2005. 
Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibil-
ity.” In Selected Writings, Vol. 4: 1938 – 1940. Edited by Howard Eiland and Mi-
chael Jennings, 251 – 83. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” In 
Walter Benjamin, Illuminations. Edited and with an introduction by Hannah 
Arendt, 219 – 53. London: Collins/Fontana, 1973.
Berezin, Mabel. Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Bergdoll, Barry. “Romantic Modernity in the 1930s. Henry- Russell Hitchcock’s Ar-
chitecture: Twentieth and Nineteenth Centuries?” In Summerson and Hitchcock: 
Centenary Essays on Architectural Historiography. Edited by Frank Salmon. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006.
Berger, John. “Understanding a Photograph.” In Classic Essays on Photography, 
291 – 94. Edited by Alan Trachtenberg. New Haven, CT: Leete’s Island Books, 1980. 
Berger, John. Ways of Seeing. New York: Penguin, 1972.
Berman, Marshall. All That Is Sold Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity. Lon-
don: Verso, 1983.
Bird, David S. Nazi Dreamtime: Australian Enthusiasts for Hitler’s Germany. Lon-
don: Anthem Press, 2013.
 Bibliography 295
Bischoff, Ralph Frederic. Nazi Conquest through German Culture. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1942. 
Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York: Harper Peren-
nial, 2001.
Blackbourn, David, and Geoff Eley. The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois 
Society and Politics Nineteenth- Century History. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984. 
Bosworth, Richard J. B., ed. The Oxford Handbook of Fascism. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009.
Bray, Mark. Antifa: The Anti- Fascist Handbook. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2017.
Brennen, Bonnie, and Hanno Hardt, eds. Picturing the Past: Media, History and 
Photography. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999. 
Brogini Künzi, Guilia. Italien und der Abessinienkrieg 1935/36. Paderborn: Ferdinand 
Schöningh, 2006. 
Brothers, Caroline. War and Photography: A Cultural History. London: Routledge, 
1997.
Buck, David. “Railway City and National Capital: Two Faces of the Modern in 
Changchun.” In Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Iden-
tity, 1900 – 1950. Edited by Joseph W. Esherick, 65 – 89. Honolulu: University of 
Hawai‘i Press, 1999.
Calvin, Andrew. “Delineating a Fascist Aesthetic? Boundary Transgression and the 
Nazi Degenerate Art Exhibition.” Paper presented at the Visualizing Fascism 
Workshop, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, June 2016.
Campbell, Ian. The Addis Ababa Massacre. London: Hurst, 2017. 
Canali, Mauro. Le spie del regime. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004. 
Canning, Kathleen. “Introduction: Weimar Subjects/Weimar Publics: Rethink-
ing the Political Culture of Germany in the 1920s.” In Weimar Subjects/Weimar 
Publics: Rethinking the Political Culture of Germany in the 1920s. Edited by Kath-
leen Canning, Kerstin Barndt, and Kristin McGuire, 1 – 28. New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2010.
Canning, Kathleen. “The Politics of Symbols, Semantics, and Sentiments in the Wei-
mar Republic.” Central European History 43, no. 4 (2010): 567 – 80.
Capa, Robert. Death in the Making. New York: Covici- Friede, 1938.
Caplan, Jane. “Politics, Religion, and Ideology: A Comment on Wolfgang Hardtwig.” 
Bulletin of the German Historical Institute (Washington, DC) 28 (spring 2001): 
28 – 36.
Carroll, Peter N., and James D. Fernandez. Facing Fascism: New York and the Span-
ish Civil War. New York: Museum of the City of New York and New York Uni-
versity Press, 2007. 
Carter, Erica. Dietrich’s Ghosts: The Sublime and the Beautiful in Third Reich Film. 
London: British Film Institute, 2004.
Cartier- Bresson, Henri. Henri Cartier- Bresson: The Mind’s Eye: Writings on Photog-
raphy and Photographers. New York: Aperture, 2005.
 296 Bibliography
Cather, Kirsten. The Art of Censorship in Post War Japan. Honolulu: University of 
Hawai‘i Press, 2012.
Chen. Zhongguo dianying shiye [The Chinese Film Industry]. Shanghai: Chenbao 
she, 1933. 
Choi, Jayne. “Cybernetic Industriousness: The Production of Albert Kahn Associ-
ates, 1918 – 42.” Unpublished manuscript, 2016.
Clark, Catherine E. “Capturing the Moment, Picturing History: Photographs of the 
Liberation of Paris.” American Historical Review 121, no. 3 (2016): 824 – 60.
Clark, T. J. Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the 1848 Revolution. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973.
Clarke, Peter. “The Century of the Hedgehog: The Demise of Political Ideologies in 
the Twentieth Century.” In The Future of the Past: Big Questions in History. Ed-
ited by Peter Martland, 113 – 126. London: Pimlico, 2002.
Clinton, Maggie. “Ends of the Universal: Chinese Fascism and the League of Nations 
on the Eve of World War II.” Modern Asian Studies 48, no. 6 (2014): 1740 – 68.
Clinton, Maggie. Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925 – 1937. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017.
Clossey, Luke, and Nicholas Guyatt. “It’s a Small World after All: The Wider World 
in the Historians’ Peripheral Vision.” Perspectives on History (May 2013). Ac-
cessed August 22, 2014. http://www.historians.org/publications- and- directories 
/perspectives- on- history.
Cohen, Aaron J. “Long Ago and Far Away: War Monuments, Public Relations, and 
the Memory of the Russo- Japanese War in Russia, 1907 – 14.” The Russian Review 
69 (July 2010): 388 – 411.
Cohen, Jean- Louis. Scenes of the World to Come. Montreal: Flammarion, 1995.
Conrad, Sebastian, and Sorcha O’Hagan. German Colonialism: A Short History. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Corner, Paul. “Collaboration, Complicity, and Evasion under Italian Fascism.” In 
Everyday Life in Mass Dictatorship. Edited by Alf Lüdtke, 75 – 93. New York: Pal-
grave, 2016. 
Crew, David. “The Pathologies of Modernity: Detlev Peukert on Germany’s Twenti-
eth Century.” Social History 17, no. 2 (1992): 319 – 28.
Crowley, James B. Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 
1930 – 1938. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.
Culver, Annika A. Glorify the Empire: Japanese Avant- Garde Propaganda in Man-
chukuo. Vancouver, BC, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 2013.
Cupers, Kenny. Use Matters: An Alternative History of Architecture. London: Rout-
ledge, 2013.
Dafinger, Johannes. “The Nazi ‘New Europe’: Transnational Concepts of a Fascist 
and Völkisch Order for the Continent.” In Fascism without Borders: Transna-
tional Connections and Cooperation between Movements and Regimes in Europe 
from 1918 to 1945. Edited by Arnd Bauerkämper and Grzegorz Rossoliński- Liebe, 
264 – 87. New York: Berghahn Books, 2017. 
 Bibliography 297
Dahm, Bernhard. History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century. London: Praeger, 1971.
Dale, Richard. “Reconfiguring White Ethnic Power in Colonial Africa: The Ger-
man Community in Namibia, 1923 – 1950.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7, no. 
2 (2001): 75 – 94.
Dalle Vacche, Angela. The Body in the Mirror. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1992.
Day, Gail. “Manfredo Tafuri, Fredric Jameson and the Contestations of Political 
Memory.” Historical Materialism 20, no. 1 (2012): 31 – 77. 
de Baecque, Antoine. Camera Historica: The Century in Cinema. New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2012. 
de Felice, Renzo. Mussolini il Duce: Gli anni del consenso 1929 – 1935. Turin: Einaudi, 
2007. 
Delage, Christian, and Vincent Guigueno. Le historien et le film. Paris: Gallimard, 
2004.
Del Boca, Angelo, ed. I gas di Mussolini. Rome: Editori Riuniti, 2007.
DeLillo, Don. White Noise. New York: Penguin, 1985.
Deng Yuanzhong. Guomindang hexin zhuzhi zhenxiang: Lixingshe, Fuxingshe, yu 
suowei “Lanyishe” de yanbian yu chengzhang [The Truth about the Guomin-
dang’s Core Organizations: The Forceful Action Society, the Renaissance Soci-
ety, and the So- Called “Blue Shirts”]. Taipei: Lianjing, 2000.
Denison, Edward, and Guangyu Ren. Ultra- Modernism: Architecture and Modernity 
in Manchuria. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016.
Didi- Huberman, Georges. Images malgré tout. Paris: Les Édition de Minuit, 2003.
Diggins, John P. Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1972.
Doane, Mary Ann. “The Close Up: Scale and Detail in the Cinema.” Differences 14 
(2003): 89 – 111. 
Domon, Ken. “Hōdō mango, 3.” Foto Times 17, no. 10 (October 1940): 50 – 52.
Domon, Ken. “Hōdō mango, 4.” Foto Times 17, no. 11 (November 1940): 44 – 46.
Domon, Ken. “Taigai senden zasshi ron” [A Discussion of International Propaganda 
Magazines]. Nihon hyōron 18 (September 1943): 62 – 66.
Dower, John W. “Japanese Cinema Goes to War.” In Japan in War and Peace: Se-
lected Essays, 33 – 54. New York: New Press, 1993. 
Dower, John W. “Throwing off Asia III.” Visualizing Cultures. Cambridge, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008. Accessed February 11, 2018. http://
visualizingcultures.mit.edu. 
Dower, John W., Anne Nishimura Morse, Jacqueline Atkins, and Frederic Sharf. The 
Brittle Decade: Visualizing Japan in the 1930s. Boston: Boston Museum of Fine 
Arts, 2012.
Drea, Edward J. Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853 – 1945. Lawrence: Uni-
versity of Kansas Press, 2009.
Driscoll, Mark. Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead, and Undead 
in Japan’s Imperialism, 1895 – 1945. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010.
 298 Bibliography
Dubow, Saul. “Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of 
Race.” Journal of African History 33, no. 2 (1992): 209 – 37.
Durica, Milan. Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov. Kosice: Pressko, 1995.
Du Toit, Marijke. “Blank Verbeeld, or the Incredible Whiteness of Being: Amateur 
Photography and Afrikaner Nationalist Historical Narrative.” Kronos 27 (2001): 
77 – 113.
Duus, Peter, and Daniel I. Okimoto. “Fascism and the History of Pre- War Japan: 
The Failure of a Concept.” Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 1 (November 1979): 
65 – 79. 
Düwel, Jörn, and Niels Gutschow. Baukunst und Nationalsozialismus: Demonstra-
tion von Macht in Europa, 1940 – 1943: Die Ausstellung Neue Deutsche Baukunst 
von Rudolf Wolters. Berlin: dom Publishers, 2015. 
Earhart, David C. Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media. 
Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2008.
Eberhardt, Martin. Zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Apartheid. Die deutsche Bev-
ölkerungsgruppe Südwestafrikas 1915 – 1965. Berlin: Lit, 2005.
Ebner, Michael, Kate Ferris, and Josh Arthurs, eds. Everyday Life in Fascist Italy. 
London: Palgrave, 2017.
Edwards, Elizabeth. Raw Histories: Photographs, Anthropology and Museums. Ox-
ford: Berg, 2001.
Eley, Geoff. A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society. Ann Ar-
bor: University of Michigan Press, 2005. 
Eley, Geoff. “Empire, Ideology, and the East: Thoughts on Nazism’s Spatial Imagi-
nary.” In Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the Ground of Consent in 
Germany, 1930 – 1945, 131 – 55. London: Routledge, 2013.
Eley, Geoff. Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the Ground of Consent in 
Germany 1930 – 1945. London: Routledge, 2013.
Eley, Geoff. “What Produces Fascism: Pre- Industrial Traditions or a Crisis of the 
Capitalist State?” In From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German 
Past. Edited by Geoff Eley, 254 – 82. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986.
Eman Hiromichi. Manshū jinjō shōgaku sahōsho. Dalian: Zaiman Nihon kyōikukai 
kyōkasho henshū- bu, 1940.
Erbaggio, Pier Luigi. “Writing Mussolini: Il Duce’s Biographies on Paper and on 
Screen, 1922 – 1935.” PhD diss., Department of Romance Languages and Litera-
tures, University of Michigan, 2016. 
Erjavec, Aleš, ed. Aesthetics Revolutions and Twentieth- Century Avant- Garde Move-
ments. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015.
Evans, Jessica, and Stuart Hall, eds. Visual Culture: The Reader. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage, 1999.
Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich in Power 1933 – 1939. New York: Penguin, 2005.
Falasca- Zamponi, Simonetta. Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Musso-
lini’s Italy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
“Fascist Temporalities.” Special issue, Journal of Modern European History 13 (2015).
 Bibliography 299
Favre, Sisto. “Film di guerra.” Lo Schermo, June 1943. 
Felak, James. At the Price of the Republic: Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, 1929 – 1939. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993.
Fernández, Horacio. Photobooks Spain 1905 – 1977. Madrid: Museo Nacional Centro 
de Arte Reina Sofía, 2014.
Ferris, Kate. Everyday Life in Fascist Venice. London: Palgrave, 2012. 
Ferro, Marc. Cinema and History, translated by N. Greene. Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1988. Originally published as Cinéma et histoire. Paris: Denoël, 
1977. 
Finchelstein, Federico. Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in 
Argentina and Italy, 1919 – 1945. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010.
Fletcher, W. Miles, III. “The Fifteen- Year War.” In A Companion to Japanese History. 
Edited by William M. Tsutsui, 241 – 62. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley- Blackwell, 2009. 
Föllmer, Moritz, and Rüdiger Graf, eds. Die “Krise” der Weimarer Republic: Zur Kri-
tik eines Deutungsmusters. Frankfurt: Campus, 2005.
Foster, Jeremy. “ ‘Land of Contrasts’ or ‘Home We Have Always Known’? The sar&h 
and the Imaginary Geography of White South African Nationhood, 1920 – 1930.” 
Journal of Southern African Studies 29, no. 3 (2003): 657 – 80.
Fritzsche, Peter. “Did Weimar Fail?” Journal of Modern History 68, no. 3 (1996): 
629 – 56.
Fritzsche, Peter. “Historical Time and Future Experience in Postwar Germany.” 
In Ordnungen in der Krise: Zur politischen Kulturgeschichte Deutschlands 
1900 – 1933. Edited by Wolfgang Hardtwig, 141 – 64. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007.
Fritzsche, Peter. “Landscape of Danger, Landscape of Design: Crisis of Modern-
ism in Weimar Germany.” In Dancing on the Volcano: Essays on the Culture of 
the Weimar Republic. Edited by Thomas W. Kniesche and Stephen Brockmann, 
29 – 46. Columbus, SC: Camden House, 1994.
Fritzsche, Peter. A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Fujitani, Takashi. Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan. Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1998.
Fulbrook, Mary. Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the German Dic-
tatorships. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Fuller, Mia. Moderns Abroad: Architecture, Cities, and Italian Imperialism. New 
York: Routledge, 2003. 
Furlong, Patrick J. “The National Party of South Africa: A Transnational Perspec-
tive.” In New Perspectives on the Transnational Right. Edited by M. Durham and 
M. Power, 67 – 84. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Gates, Lisa. “Of Seeing Otherness: Leni Riefenstahl’s African Photographs.” In The 
Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy. Edited by Sara 
Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop, 233 – 46. Ann Arbor: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1998. 
Gentile, Emilio. Politics as Religion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
 300 Bibliography
Gentile, Emilio. “A Professional Dwelling: The Origin and Development of the Con-
cept of Fascism in Mosse’s Historiography.” In What History Tells: George L. 
Mosse and the Culture of Modern Europe. Edited by Stanley G. Payne, David J. 
Sorkin, and John S. Tortorice, 47 – 62. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2004. 
Gentile, Emilio. The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1996.
Germer, Andrea. “Artists and Wartime Agency: Natori Yōnosuke—A Japanese  
Riefenstahl?” Contemporary Japan 24, no. 1 (2012): 21 – 50.
Germer, Andrea. “Visible Cultures, Invisible Politics: Propaganda in the Magazine 
Nippon Fujin, 1942 – 1945.” Japan Forum 25, no. 4 (2013): 505 – 39. 
Germer, Andrea. “Visual Propaganda in Wartime East Asia—The Case of Natori 
Yōnosuke.” The Asia- Pacific Journal 9, no. 20 (2011). https://apjjf.org/2011/9/20 
/Andrea- Germer/3530/article.html.
Geyer, Martin. “ ‘Die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen’: Zeitsemantik und die 
Suche nach Gegenwart in der Weimarer Republik.” In Ordnungen in der Krise. 
Zur politischen Kulturgeschichte Deutschlands 1900 – 1933. Edited by Wolfgang 
Hardtwig, 165 – 87. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007.
Geyer, Michael. “The Militarization of Europe (1914 – 1945).” In The Militarization of 
the Western World. Edited by John Gillis. New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1989. 
Gibson, James William. The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam. Boston: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 1986.
Giedion, Sigfried. “Spätbarocker und romantischer Klassizismus.” PhD diss., Uni-
versity of Munich, 1922.
Giliomee, Hermann. “The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 1929 – 48.” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 373 – 92.
Gillis, John, ed. The Militarization of the Western World. New Brunswick, NJ: Rut-
gers University Press, 1989.
Gordon, Andrew. Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1991.
Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Goto- Jones, Christopher. Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School and 
Co- Prosperity. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Goto- Jones, Christopher. Re- Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy. New York: 
Routledge, 2008.
Gough, Maria. “Back in the USSR: John Heartfield, Gustav Klucis, and the Medium 
of Soviet Propaganda.” New German Critique 107/36, no. 2 (2009): 133 – 83.
Grady, James H. “Henry- Russell Hitchcock: The First Thirty Years.” The American 
Association of Architectural Bibliographers Papers I (1965): 1 – 22. 
Graf, Rüdiger. “Either- Or: The Narrative of Crisis in Weimar Germany and Histori-
ography.” Central European History 43, no. 4 (2010): 592 – 615.
 Bibliography 301
Graf, Rüdiger. Die Zukunft der Weimarer Republik. Krisen und Zukunftsaneignungen 
in Deutschland 1918 – 1933. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008.
Gray, G. “Highlights of a Housing Tour of Northern Europe, Part II.” Octagon, Feb-
ruary 1938, 15 – 18.
Griffin, Roger, ed. Fascism, Totalitarianism, and Political Religion. London: Rout-
ledge, 2005.
Griffin, Roger. A Fascist Century. Palgrave: London, 2008.
Griffin, Roger. Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini 
and Hitler. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Griffin, Roger. The Nature of Fascism. London: Routledge, 1993. 
Griffin, Roger. “Withstanding the Rush of Time: The Prescience of Mosse’s Anthro-
pological View of Fascism.” In What History Tells: George L. Mosse and the Cul-
ture of Modern Europe. Edited by Stanley G. Payne, David J. Sorkin, and John S. 
Tortorice, 110 – 33. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004.
Gropius, Walter, and P. Morton Shand. The New Architecture and the Bauhaus. Lon-
don: Faber and Faber, 1935.
Gruber, Helmut. “History of the Austrian Working Class: Unity of Scholarship and 
Practice.” International Labor and Working- Class History 24 (fall 1983): 50 – 52.
Guerin, Frances. Through Amateur Eyes: Film and Photography in Nazi Germany. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012.
Guilbaut, Serge. How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984.
Gundle, Stephen. Mussolini’s Dream Factory. New York: Berghahn Books, 2012. 
Gundle, Stephen, Christopher Duggan, and Giuliana Pieri, eds. The Cult of the Duce. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013. 
Haddow, Robert H. Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 
1950s. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997.
Hanscom, Christopher P., and Dennis Washburn, eds. The Affect of Difference: 
Representations of Race in East Asian Empire. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i 
Press, 2016.
Harada Keiichi. “Irei no seijigaku.” In Nichiro sensō sutadiizu. Edited by Komori 
Yōichi and Narita Ryūichi, 219 – 33. Tokyo: Kinokuniya shoten, 2004.
Hardtwig, Wolfgang. “Political Religion in Modern Germany: Reflections on Na-
tionalism, Socialism, and National Socialism.” Bulletin of the German Historical 
Institute (Washington, DC) 28 (spring 2001): 3 – 27.
Harootunian, Harry D. “Comment on Professor Matsumoto’s ‘Introduction.’ ” Jour-
nal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan 5, nos. 2 – 3 (1967): 315 – 330.
Harootunian, Harry D. History’s Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the 
Question of Everyday Life. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
Harootunian, Harry D. Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community 
in Interwar Japan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Hedinger, Daniel. “The Spectacle of Global Fascism: The Italian Blackshirt Mission 
to Japan’s Asian Empire.” Modern Asian Studies 51, no. 6 (2017): 1999 – 2034.
 302 Bibliography
Hedinger, Daniel. “Universal Fascism and Its Global Legacy: Italy’s and Japan’s En-
tangled History in the Early 1930s.” Fascism 2 (2013): 141 – 60.
Herz, Rudolf. Hoffmann and Hitler: Fotografie als Medium des Führer- Mythos. Mu-
nich: Klinkhardt and Biermann, 1994.
Herzfeld, Michael. The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic 
Roots of Western Bureaucracy. New York: Berg, 1992.
High, Peter B. The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 
1931 – 1945. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003.
Hishikari Takashi. Chūreitō monogatari. Tokyo: Dōwa shūnju, 1942.
Hitchcock, Henry- Russell. “The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture 
of Genius.” Architectural Review 101 (January 1947): 3 – 6.
Hitchcock, Henry- Russell. “The Architectural Future in America.” Architectural Re-
view 81, no. 488 (July 1937): 1 – 2. 
Hitchcock, Henry- Russell. In the Nature of Materials 1887 – 1941: The Buildings of 
Frank Lloyd Wright. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1942.
Hitchcock, Henry- Russell. “Late Baroque German Gardens,” American- German Re-
view 1, no. 4 (June 1935): 26 – 33.
Hitchcock, Henry- Russell. Modern Architecture: Romanticism and Reintegration. 
New York: Payson and Clarke, 1929.
Hitchcock, Henry- Russell. “Paris 1937.” Architectural Forum (September 1937): 163. 
Hitchcock, Henry- Russell. “Romantic Architecture of Potsdam.” International Stu-
dio 99 (May 1931): 46 – 49.
Hitchcock, Henry- Russell. “Romantic Classicism in Germany.” American- German 
Review 1, no. 1 (September 1934): 19 – 24.
Hitchcock, Henry- Russell. “The Romantic Gardens of Potsdam,” American- German 
Review 2, no. 1 (September, 1935): 19 – 24.
Hoffmann, Heinrich. Hitler Was My Friend, translated by R. H. Stevens. London: 
Burke, 1955.
Hoffmann, Heinrich. Hitler wie ihn keiner kennt: 100 Bilddokumente aus dem Leben 
des Führers. Berlin: Zeitgeschichte- Verlag, 1941.
Hofmann, Reto. The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915 – 1952. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2015.
Hofmann, Reto, and Daniel Hedinger, eds. “Axis Empires: Towards a Global History 
of Fascist Imperialism.” Special issue, Journal of Global History 12, part 2 (July 
2017).
Holmes, Oliver Wendell. “The Stereoscope and the Stereograph.” Atlantic, June 1859. 
Accessed February 14, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive 
/1859/06/the- stereoscope- and- the- stereograph/303361.
Hom, Stephanie Malia. The Beautiful Country: Tourism and the Impossible State of 
Destination Italy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015.
Hom, Stephanie Malia. “Empires of Tourism: Travel and Rhetoric in Italian Colo-
nial Libya and Albania, 1911 – 1943.” Journal of Tourism History 4, no. 3 (2012): 
281 – 300.
 Bibliography 303
Hotta, Eri. Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013.
Hull, Matthew. Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Paki-
stan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012. 
Hüppauf, Bernd. “Emptying the Gaze: Framing Violence through the Viewfinder.” 
New German Critique 72 (1997): 3 – 44.
Iaccio, Pasquale. Cinema e storia. Naples: Liguori, 1988. 
Ikegami Shirō. “Tennō to shashin” [The Emperor and Photography]. Shashin Tenbō 
1, no. 1 (January 1947): 30 – 34.
Ina Nobuo. “Nihonteki shashin geijustu no kakuritsu e, 1” [Toward the Establish-
ment of Japanese- Style Photographic Art, I]. Camera Art 12, no. 5 (November, 
1940): 193 – 195.
Ina Nobuo. “Nihonteki shashin geijutsu no kakuritsu e, 2” [Toward the Establish-
ment of Japanese Photographic Art, 2]. Camera Art 12, no. 6 (December 1940): 
248 – 258.
Ina Nobuo. “Shin taisei ni okeru shashinka no ninmu” [The Duty of Photographers 
in the New Order]. Camera Art 12, no. 3 (September 1940): 85 – 89.
Iordachi, Constantin, ed. Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives. London: 
Routledge, 2010.
Iyob, Ruth. “Madamismo and Beyond: The Construction of Eritrean Women.” Nine-
teenth Century Contexts 22, no. 2 (2000): 217 – 38. 
Jackson, Anna. “Art Deco in East Asia.” In Art Deco 1930 – 1939. Edited by Charlotte 
Benton, Tim Benton, and Ghislaine Wood, 371 – 81. Boston: Bullfinch Press, 
2003.
Janos, Andrew. East Central Europe in the Modern World. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000.
Japanese Delegation to the League of Nations. The Manchurian Question: Japan’s 
Case in the Sino- Japanese Dispute as Presented before the League of Nations. Ge-
neva: League of Nations, 1933.
Jaskot, Paul. The Architecture of Oppression: The ss, Forced Labor and the Nazi Mon-
umental Building Economy. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Jaskot, Paul. “Building the Nazi Economy: Adam Tooze and a Cultural Critique of 
Hitler’s Plans for War.” Historical Materialism 22, nos. 3 – 4 (2014): 312 – 29.
Jaskot, Paul B. “Heinrich Himmler and the Nuremberg Party Rally Grounds: The 
Interest of the ss in the German Building Economy.” In Art, Culture, and Media 
under the Third Reich. Edited by Richard A. Etlin, 230 – 56. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2002.
Jay, Martin. “Can Photographs Lie? Reflections on a Perennial Anxiety.” Critical 
Studies 2 (2016): 6 – 19.
Jünger, Ernst. “Photography and the ‘Second Consciousness’: An Excerpt from ‘On 
Pain,’ ” translated by Joel Agee. In Photography in the Modern Era: European 
Documents and Critical Writings, 1913 – 1940. Edited by Christopher Phillips, 
207 – 10. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art/Aperture, 1989.
Kallis, Aristotle A., ed. The Fascism Reader. London: Routledge, 2003.
 304 Bibliography
Kamenec, Ivan. Slovensky Štát. Prague: Anomal, 1992.
Kamenec, Ivan. Tragédia Politika, Knaza a Človeka. Bratislava: Archa, 1998.
Kantorowicz, Ernst H. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theol-
ogy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958. 
Kasza, Gregory J. “Fascism from Above: Japan’s Kakushin Right in Comparative 
Perspective.” In Fascism outside Europe. Edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, 1–46. 
Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2001.
Kasza, Gregory J. The State and the Mass Media in Japan 1918 – 1945. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1988.
Kater, Michael. Hitler Youth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.
Kauffmann, Emil. Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier. Vienna: Passer, 1933.
Kern, Stephen. The Culture of Time and Space, 1880 – 1918. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983.
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler 1889 – 1936: Hubris. New York: Norton, 1998.
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler 1936 – 1945: Nemesis. New York: Norton, 2000.
Kersten, Rikki. “Japan.” In The Oxford Handbook of Fascism. Edited by R. J. B. Bos-
worth, 526 – 44. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Kikuchi, Yuko, ed. Refracted Modernity: Visual Culture and Identity in Colonial Tai-
wan. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2007.
Kimball, Fiske. “Romantic Classicism in Architecture.” Gazette des Beaux- Arts 25 
(February 1944): 95 – 112. 
Kimura, Masato, and Tosh Minohara. Tumultuous Decade: Empire Society, and Di-
plomacy in 1930s Japan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013.
Kinmonth, Earl H. “The Mouse That Roared: Saitō Takao, Conservative Critic of Ja-
pan’s ‘Holy War’ in China.” Journal of Japanese Studies 25 (1999): 331 – 60.
Kishi Toshihiko. Manshūkoku no bijuaru- media: Postā, ehagaki, kitte. Tokyo: Yo-
shikawa Kōbunkan, 2010.
Kita Ikki. Kita Ikki Chosaku shū. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1959.
Kitchen, Martin. Speer: Hitler’s Architect. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015.
Knight, Michael, and Dany Chan. Shanghai: Art of the City. San Francisco: Asian 
Art Museum, 2010.
Koepnick, Lutz. The Dark Mirror: German Cinema between Hitler and Hollywood. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
Koepnick, Lutz. “Face/Off: Hitler and Weimar Political Photography.” In Visual Cul-
ture in Twentieth- Century Germany: Text as Spectacle. Edited by Gail Finney, 
214 – 34. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.
Koepnick, Lutz. “Fascist Aesthetics Revisited.” modernism/modernity 6 (1999): 51 – 73.
Koepnick, Lutz. “Photographs and Memories.” South Central Review 21, no. 1 (spring 
2004): 94 – 129. 
Koepnick, Lutz. Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1999.
Koga, Yukiko. Inheritance of Loss: China, Japan, and the Political Economy of Re-
demption after Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016. 
 Bibliography 305
Koonz, Claudia. The Nazi Conscience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
Kracauer, Siegfried. From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German 
Film. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966
Kracauer, Siegfried. The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, edited by Thomas Y. 
Levin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Krautwurst, Udo Rainer. “Tales of the ‘Land of Stories’: Settlers and Anti- modernity 
in German Colonial Discourses on German South West Africa, 1884 – 1914.” PhD 
diss., University of Connecticut, 1997.
Kushnar, Barack. The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda. Honolulu: Uni-
versity of Hawai‘i Press, 2006.
Kuwabara Kineo. Manshu Shōwa ju- go nen [Manchuria in Shōwa 15 (1940)]. Tokyo: 
Shōbunsha, 1974.
Landy, Marcia. Cinematic Uses of the Past. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996.
Langbehn, Volker, and Mohammad Salama, eds. German Colonialism: Race, the Ho-
locaust, and Postwar Germany. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
Lattuada, Alberto. Occhio quadrato (1941). Reprinted in Piero Berengo Gardin, ed., 
Alberto Lattuada fotografo. Florence: Alinari, 1982. 
Lavin, Maud, and Matthew Teitelbaum, ed. Montage and Modern Life, 1919 – 1942. 
Cambridge, MA: mit Press, 1992.
Lebrun, Bernard, and Michel Lefebvre. Robert Capa: The Paris Years, 1933 – 1954. 
New York: Abrams, 2011.
LeCavalier, Jesse. The Rule of Logistics: Walmart and the Architecture of Fulfillment. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016.
Lee, Leo Ou- fan. Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 
1930 – 1945. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Le Houérou, Fabienne. L’épopée des soldats de Mussolini en Abyssinie, 1935 – 1936. 
Paris: L’Harmattan, 1994.
Lethen, Helmut. Cool Conduct: The Culture of Distance in Weimar Germany, trans-
lated by Don Reneau. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
Lockyer, Angus. “Expo Fascism? Ideology, Representation, Economy.” In The Cul-
ture of Japanese Fascism. Edited by Alan Tansman, 276–95. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2009. 
Loeffler, Jane. The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America’s Embassies. New 
York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998.
Luckert, Steven, and Susan Bachrach, eds. The State of Deception: The Power of Nazi 
Propaganda. Washington, DC: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2011.
Lüdtke, Alf, ed. Everyday Life in Mass Dictatorship. New York: Palgrave, 2016.
Luzzato, Sergio. The Body of Il Duce. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005. 
Madar, Chase. “23- f.” London Review of Books, September 8, 2011, 30 – 31. 
Maffei, Nicolas P. “The Search for an American Design Aesthetic: From Art Deco to 
Streamlining.” In Art Deco 1930 – 1939. Edited by Charlotte Benton, Tim Benton, 
and Ghislaine Wood, 361 – 69. Boston: Bullfinch Press, 2003.
 306 Bibliography
Mann, Michael. Fascists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Marino, Natalia, and Valerio Marino, Ovra a Cinecittà. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 
2005. 
Mark, Ethan. The Japanese Occupation of Java in the Second World War: A Trans-
national History. London: Bloomsbury, 2018.
Mark, Ethan. “Translator’s Introduction.” In Grassroots Fascism: The War Experi-
ence of the Japanese People. Edited by Yoshimi Yoshiaki, translated by Ethan 
Mark, 1 – 39. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.
Martin, Benjamin G. The Nazi- Fascist New Order for European Culture. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.
Maruyama, Masao. “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism.” In Thought 
and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics. Edited by Ivan Morris, 24–83. Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 1969. 
Maruyama, Masao. “ Theory and Psychology of Ultra- nationalism.” In Modern Jap-
anese Politics. Edited and translated by Ivan Morris, 1–24. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, [1963] 1969. 
Masey, Jack, and C. Morgan, Cold War Confrontations: US Exhibitions and Their 
Role in the Cultural Cold War. Baden: Lars Müller, 2008.
Matsumura, Janice. More Than a Momentary Nightmare: The Yokohama Incident 
and Wartime Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
McCulloch, Michael. “Building the Working City.” PhD diss., University of Michi-
gan, 2015. 
Mebes, Paul. Um 1800: Architektur und Handwerk im letzten Jahrhundert ihrer tradi-
tionellen Entwicklung. Munich: F. Bruckman, 1908.
Mendelson, Jordana. Documenting Spain: Artists, Exhibition Culture. and the Modern 
Nation, 1929 – 1939. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005.
Mendelson, Jordana. Revistas y Guerra, 1936 – 1939. Madrid: Museo Nacional Centro 
de Arte Reina Sofía, 2007.
Merleau- Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
Metton, Bertrand. “From the Popular Front to the Eastern Front: Youth Movements, 
Travel, and Fascism in France, 1933 – 1945.” PhD diss., University of Michigan, 
2015.
Metton, Bertrand. “Nazi Europe and the Atlantic Wall: On Spatial Theory and the 
Wartime Fascist Worldview.” Forthcoming. 
Mignone, Gian Giacomo. The United States and Fascist Italy: The Rise of American 
Finance in Europe, translated by Molly Tambor. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2015. 
Milla, Michal. Hlinkova Mládež, 1938 – 1945. Bratislava: Ústav Pamäti Národa, 2008.
Miller, Frank O. Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan. Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1965.
Miller Lane, Barbara. Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918 – 1945. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, [1968] 1985.
 Bibliography 307
Miller Lane, Barbara. Review of Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich. Journal of the 
Society of Architectural Historians 32, no. 4 (December 1973): 341 – 46. 
Mimura, Janis. Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime 
State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011.
Minick, Scott, and Jiao Ping. Chinese Graphic Design in the Twentieth Century. Lon-
don: Thames and Hudson, 2010.
Minobe Tatsukichi. Kenpō kōwa [Lectures on the Constitution]. Tokyo: Yūhikaku 
Shobō, 1921. 
Mirzoeff, Nicholas. The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2011.
Mishra, Pankaj. Age of Anger: A History of the Present. New York: Farrar, Strauss and 
Giroux, 2017. 
Mitter, Rana. Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937 – 1945. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2013.
Monbukagakushō, ed. Chūtō chiri ni. Tokyo: Chūtō gakkō kyōkasho kabushiki kai-
sha, 1944.
Monbukagakushō, ed. Chūtō chiri san. Tokyo: Chūtō gakkō kyōkasho kabushiki 
kaisha, 1945.
Moore, Bob, and Kent Federowich, eds. The British Empire and Italian Prisoners of 
War, 1940 – 1947. New York: Palgrave, 2002. 
Mosse, George L. The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism. New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1999.
Mosse, George L. Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality. 
New York: Howard Fertig, 1980.
Mosse, George L. The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass 
Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich. New 
York: Meridian, 1977.
Moyd, Michelle R. Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Every-
day Colonialism in German East Africa. Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2014.
Mussolini, Benito. “La mobilitazione generale. Discorso del 2 ottobre 1935.” In Scritti 
e discorsi, vol. 9, 217 – 20. Milan: Hoepli, 1935. 
Nagahara, Hiromu. Japan’s Pop Era: Music in the Making of Middle- Class Society. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. 
Naranch, Bradley, and Geoff Eley, eds. German Colonialism in a Global Age. Dur-
ham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015.
“The National Pavilions.” Architectural Review 83, no. 490 (September 1937): 110.
Neiwert, David. Alt- America: The Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump. Lon-
don: Verso, 2017.
Neocleous, Mark. Fascism. Buckingham, U.K.: Open University Press, 1997.
Nerdinger, Winfried. “A Hierarchy of Styles: Architecture between Neoclassicism 
and Regionalism.” In Art and Power: Europe under the Dictators 1930 – 45. Edited 
by David Elliott, Dawn Ades, Tim Benton, and Iain Boyd Whyte, 322 – 25. Lon-
don: Thames and Hudson, 1996.
 308 Bibliography
Nerdinger, Winfried, ed. Bauhaus- Moderne im National- sozialismus. Munich: Pres-
tel, 1993. 
Nishizawa Yasuhiko. Nihon shokuminchi kenchikuron. Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku 
shuppankai, 2008.
Nolan, Mary. “America in the German Imagination.” In Transactions, Transgres-
sions, Transformations: American Culture in Western Europe and Japan. Edited 
by H. Fehrenbach, 3 – 25. New York: Berghahn Books, 2000.
Nolan, Mary. The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890 – 2010. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Nolan, Mary. Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of 
Germany. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Pan, Lynn. Shanghai Style: Art and Design between the Wars. San Francisco: Long 
River Press, 2008.
Passerini, Luisa. Fascism in Popular Memory. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987. 
Passerini, Luisa. Mussolini immaginario. Rome: Laterza, 1991. 
Paxton, Robert O. The Anatomy of Fascism. New York: Vintage Books, 2005.
Paxton, Robert O. “Comparisons and Definitions.” In The Oxford Handbook of Fas-
cism. Edited by Richard J. B. Bosworth, 547 – 65. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009.
Payne, Stanley G. “Fascisms, Nazism, and Japanism.” International History Review 
6, no. 2 (May 1984): 265 – 76.
Payne, Stanley G. A History of Fascism 1914 – 1945. Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1995.
Peattie, Mark. “The Dragon’s Seed: Origins of the War.” In The Battle for China: 
Essays on the Military History of the Sino- Japanese War of 1937 – 1945. Edited by 
Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and Hans Van de Ven, 48 – 78. Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 2011.
Pennington, Lee K. Causalities of War: Wounded Japanese Servicemen and the Sec-
ond World War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015.
Person, John D. “Between Patriotism and Terrorism: The Policing of Nationalist 
Movements in 1930s Japan.” Journal of Japanese Studies 43, no. 2 (2017):  
289 – 318.
Peukert, Detlev J. K. Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism in 
Everyday Life. London: Batsford, 1987.
Peukert, Detlev J. K. Max Webers Diagnose der Moderne. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
and Ruprecht, 1989.
Peukert, Detlev J. K. The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity. New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1989.
Pevsner, Nikolaus. Outline of European Architecture. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1943.
Phillips, Richard T. “ ‘A Picturesque but Hopeless Resistance’: Rehe in 1933.” Modern 
Asian Studies 42, no. 4 (2008): 733 – 50.
 Bibliography 309
Pickowicz, Paul, Kuiyi Shen, and Yingjin Zhang, eds. Liangyou: Kaleidoscopic Mo-
dernity and the Shanghai Global Metropolis, 1926 – 1945. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
Pinto, António Costa. The Nature of Fascism Revisited. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2012.
Pinto, António Costa, ed. Rethinking the Nature of Fascism: Comparative Perspec-
tives. Houndmills, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
Ponzio, Alessio. Shaping the New Man: Youth Training Regimes in Fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015.
Poole, Deborah. Vision, Race, and Modernity: A Visual Economy of the Andean Im-
age World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Preston, Paul. The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth 
Century Spain. New York: Norton and Simon, 2012.
Rabinbach, Anson G. “The Aesthetics of Production in the Third Reich.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 11, no. 4 (1976): 43 – 74.
“Racconto (di C. Malaparte). Il corpo straziato di Mussolini a Piazzale Loreto e la 
folla sudicia.” Barbaridllo.it, July 20, 2017. http://www.barbadillo.it/67636- il 
- racconto- di- c- malaparte- il- corpo- straziato- di- mussolini- a- piazzale- loreto- e 
- la- folla- sudicia/
Reichel, Peter. Der schöne Schein des Dritten Reiches. Faszination und Gewalt des 
Faschismus. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1992.
Rentschler, Eric. The Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and Its Afterlife. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
Reynolds, Jonathan M. “Imperial Diet Building, National Identity.” In Culture of 
Japanese Fascism. Edited by Alan Tansman, 254 – 75. Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2009.
Richards, James Maude. Introduction to Modern Architecture. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1940.
Rieger, Bernhard. The People’s Car: A Global History of the Volkswagen Beetle. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.
Riley, Terrence, and Steven Perrella. The International Style: Exhibition 15 and the 
Museum of Modern Art. New York: Rizzoli/cba, 1992.
Rittich, Werner. New German Architecture. Berlin: Terramare, 1941.
Roberts, David D. Fascist Interactions: Proposals for a New Approach to Fascism and 
Its Era, 1919 – 1945. New York: Berghahn Books, 2016.
Rochat, Giorgio. Le guerre italiane, 1935 – 1943. Turin: Einaudi, 2005. 
Rochat, Giorgio. “The Italian Air Force in the Ethiopian War (1935 – 36).” In Italian 
Colonialism. Edited by Ruth Ben- Ghiat and Mia Fuller, 37– 46. New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2005. 
Rosenbaum, Ron. Waking to Danger: Americans and National Socialist Germany, 
1933 – 1941. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010. 
Rosenfeld, Gavriel D. Munich and Memory: Architecture, Monuments, and the Leg-
acy of the Third Reich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
 310 Bibliography
Rosenstone, Robert. Revisioning History: Film and the Construction of a New Past. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Ross, Alexander Reid. Against the Fascist Creep. Chico, CA: ak Press, 2017.
Ross, Corey. Media and the Making of Modern Germany. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2008.
Rossol, Nadine. Performing the Nation in Interwar Germany: Sport, Spectacle, and 
Political Symbolism, 1926 – 36. Houndmills, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Rossol, Nadine. “Performing the Nation: Sport, Spectacles, and Aesthetics in Ger-
many, 1926 – 36.” Central European History 43, no. 4 (2010): 616 – 38.
Roth, Alfred. “USA baut”: Bildbericht der Ausstellung Moderne amerikanische Archi-
tektur. Winterthur: Verlag Buchdruckerei, 1945.
Ruoff, Kenneth J. Imperial Japan at Its Zenith: The Wartime Celebration of the Em-
pire’s 2,600th Anniversary. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.
Saaler, Sven, and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, eds. Pan- Asianism: A Documentary 
History, volumes 1 and 2. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011.
Sachsse, Rolf. Die Erziehung zum Wegsehen: Fotografie im ns- Staat. Hamburg: Philo 
Fine Arts, 2003.
Sachsse, Rolf. “Kontinuitäten, Brüche und Mißverständnisse: Bauhaus- Photographie 
in den dreißiger Jahren.” In Bauhaus- Moderne im National- sozialismus. Edited 
by Winfried Nerdinger, 64 – 84. Munich: Prestel, 1993. 
Sandler, Willeke. “Deutsche Heimat in Afrika: Colonial Revisionism and the Con-
struction of Germanness through Photography.” Journal of Women’s History 25, 
no. 1 (2013): 37 – 61.
Saunders, Francis Stonor. The Cultural Cold War: The cia and the World of Arts and 
Letters. New York: New Press, 1999.
Schmitt, Carl. Staat, Bewegung, Volk: Die Dreigliederung der politischen Einheit. 
Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933.
Schmitz, Matthias. Caspar David Friedrich: His Life and Work. New York: German 
Library of Information, 1940.
Schmölders, Claudia. Hitler’s Face: The Biography of an Image, translated by Adrian 
Daub. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
Schnapp, Jeffrey T. Staging Fascism: 18 bl and the Theater of Masses for Masses. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996.
Schneider, Axel, and Daniel Woolf, eds. Oxford History of Historical Writing, volume 
5. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Schultze- Naumburg, P. Die Kulturarbeiten, 9 volumes. Munich: Calwey, 1901 – 1917. 
Schwartz, Margaret. Dead Matter: The Meaning of Iconic Corpses. Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 2015. 
Scobie, Alex. Hitler’s State Architecture. College Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1990.
Scrivano, Paolo. “A Thirty- Year Project: Henry- Russell Hitchcock’s Architecture: 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.” In Summerson and Hitchcock: Centenary 
 Bibliography 311
Essays on Architectural Historiography. Edited by F. Salmon. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2006.
Searing, Helen, ed. In Search of Modern Architecture: A Tribute to Henry- Russell 
Hitchcock. Cambridge, MA: mit Press, 1982.
Sederberg, Kathryn. “The 1930s in Nazi Germany as Seen through Diaries.” Review 
of Janosch Steuwer, “Ein Dritter Reich, wie ich es auffasse”: Politik, Gesellschaft 
und privates Leben in Tagebüchern 1933 – 1939. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2017.  
H- German in H- Net Online, January 2018. www.h- net.org/reviews/showrev.php 
?id=50185/.
Shen, Vivian. The Origins of Left-Wing Cinema in China, 1932 – 1937. New York: Rout-
ledge, 2005.
Shillony, Ben- Ami. Revolt in Japan: The Young Officers and the February 26, 1936 In-
cident. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973.
Shimada Toshihiko. “Designs on North China, 1933 – 1937.” In Japan’s Road to the Pa-
cific War: The China Quagmire. Edited by James Morley, 11 – 230. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1983.
Shimazu, Naoko. Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo- Japanese 
War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Shirer, William. Berlin Diary. Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, [1940] 1979.
Shu, Zhao. “cc de kuozhang huodong” [“The cc Clique’s Expanded Activities”]. In 
cc Neimu [The Inside Story of the cc Clique]. Edited by Chai Fu. Beijing: Zhong-
guo wenshi chubanshe, 1988.
Sims, Richard. Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation 1868 – 2000. New 
York: Palgrave, 2001.
Simson, Howard. The Social Origins of Afrikaner Fascism and Its Apartheid Policy. 
Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1980.
Sokolovič, Peter. Hlinková Garda, 1938 – 1945. Bratislava: Ústav Pamäti Národa, 2009. 
Sontag, Susan. “Fascinating Fascism.” In Under the Sign of Saturn: Essays, 73 – 105. 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980. Originally published in the New 
York Review of Books, February 6, 1975.
Sorlin, Pierre. The Film in History. Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1980.
Spector, Scott. “Was the Third Reich Movie- Made? Interdisciplinarity and the Re-
framing of ‘Ideology.’ ” American Historical Review 106, no. 2 (2001): 482 – 83.
Speer, Albert, and Rudolf Wolters. Neue Deutsche Baukunst. Prag: Volk und Reich 
Verlag, 1943.
Starl, Timm. Knipser: Die Bildgeschichte der privaten Fotografie in Deutschland und 
Österreich von 1880 bis 1980. Munich: Koehler and Amelang, 1995.
Steigmann- Gall, Richard. The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 
1919 – 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Steimatsky, Noa. The Face on Film. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
Stoler, Ann Laura. Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002.
 312 Bibliography
Stoler, Ann Laura. “Introduction: ‘The Rot Remains’: From Ruins to Ruination.” In 
Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination. Edited by Ann Laura Stoler. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2013.
Stoler, Ann Laura. “Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and 
the Cultural Politics of Exclusion.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 
34, no. 3 (July 1992): 514 – 51.
Strang, G. Bruce, ed. Collision of Empires. London: Routledge, 2013.
Stratigakos, Despina. Hitler at Home. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015.
Switzer, Les, ed. South Africa’s Alternative Press: Voices of Protest and Resistance, 
1880 – 1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Szpilman, Christopher W. A. “Fascist and Quasi- Fascist Ideas in Interwar Japan, 
1918 – 1941.” In Japan in the Fascist Era. Edited by Bruce Reynolds, 73 – 106. Lon-
don: Palgrave, 2004.
Szpilman, Christopher W. A. “The Yūzonsha’s ‘War Cry,’ 1920.” In Pan- Asianism: A 
Documentary History: Volume 2. Edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. 
Szpilman, 55–62. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011.
Tabata Shūichirō. Boku no Manshū ryokōki. Tokyo: Jidō tosho shuppansha, 1944.
Tachibana, Takashi. “The Aftermath of the Emperor- Organ Incident: The Tōdai 
Faculty of Law,” translated by Richard H. Minear. The Asia- Pacific Journal 11, 9, 
no. 1 (March 4, 2013): 1 – 21.
Taiheiyō sensō kenkyūkai, ed. “Shashin shuhō” ni miru senjika no Nihon. Tokyo: 
Sekai bunkasha, 2011.
Takenaka, Akiko. “Architecture for Mass- Mobilization.” In The Culture of Japanese 
Fascism. Edited by Alan Tansman, 235 – 53. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2009.
Takenaka, Akiko. Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2015.
Tang, Xiaobing. Origins of the Chinese Avant- Garde: The Modern Woodcut Move-
ment. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.
Tankha, Brij. Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan: A Vision of Empire. Folke-
stone, Kent, U.K.: Global Oriental, 2006.
Tansman, Alan. The Aesthetics of Japanese Fascism. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 2009.
Tansman, Alan, ed. The Culture of Japanese Fascism. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2009.
Taylor, Robert R. The Word in Stone: The Role of Architecture in the National Social-
ist Ideology. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
Tenold, Vegas. Everything You Love Will Burn: Inside the Rebirth of White National-
ism in America. New York: Nation Books, 2018.
Thies, Jochen. “Nazi Architecture: a Blueprint for World Domination: The Last 
Aims of Adolf Hitler.” In Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations. Ed-
ited by David Welch, 45 – 64. London: CroomHelm, 1983.
 Bibliography 313
Thomae, Otto. Die Propaganda- maschinerie bildende Kunst und Öffentlilchkeitsar-
beit im dritten Reich. Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1978. 
Thomas, Julia Adeney. “The Cage of Nature: Modernity’s History in Japan.” History 
and Theory 40, no. 1 (February 2001): 16 – 36. 
Thomas, Julia Adeney. “The Evidence of Sight.” Theme issue, “Photography and 
Historical Interpretation.” History and Theory 48 (December 2009): 151 – 68.
Thomas, Julia Adeney. “Power Made Visible: Photography and Postwar Japan’s Elu-
sive Reality.” Journal of Asian Studies 67, no. 2 (May 2008): 365 – 94. 
Thomas, Julia Adeney. Reconfiguring Modernity: Concepts of Nature in Japanese Po-
litical Ideology. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
Thomas, Julia Adeney. “Why Do Only Some Places Have History? Japan, the West, 
and the Geography of the Past.” Journal of World History 28, no. 2 (June 2017): 
187 – 218.
Till, Karen E. The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005.
Tohmatsu, Haruo. “From the Manchurian Incident to Japan’s Withdrawal from the 
League of Nations.” In Fifteen Lectures: Road to the Pacific War in Recent Histo-
riography. Edited by Tsutsui Kiyotada, 83 – 104. Tokyo: Japan Publishing Indus-
try Foundation for Culture, 2016.
Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Econ-
omy. London: Penguin, 2006.
Tooze, Adam. “When We Loved Mussolini.” New York Review of Books, August 18, 
2016, 55 – 56.
Trevor- Roper, Hugh. “The Phenomenon of Fascism.” In. Fascism in Europe. Edited 
by Stuart Woolf, 3–25. London: Methuen, 1981.
Troost, Gerdy. Das Bauen im neuen Reich. Bayreuth, 1938.
Tseng, Alice Y. “Domon Ken’s Murōji.” Special issue, “Pictures and Things: Bridging 
Visual and Material Culture in Japan.” Impressions 30 (March 2009): 114 – 18.
Tsutsui Kiyotada, ed. Fifteen Lectures on Showa Japan: Road to the Pacific War in Re-
cent Historiography, translated by Noda Makito and Paul Narum. Tokyo: Japan 
Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, 2016.
Turner, Frederick. The Democratic Surround: Multimedia and American Liberal-
ism from World War II to the Psychedelic Sixties. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2013. 
Umbach, Maiken. “Selfhood, Place, and Ideology in German Photo Albums, 
1933 – 1945.” Central European History 48 (2015): 335 – 65.
Umland, Andreas. “Diachronic and Cross- Cultural Comparison: Toward a Better 
Understanding of International Fascism.” Fascism 1 (2012): 62 – 63.
Vande Winkel, Roel, and David Welch, eds. Cinema and the Swastika: The Interna-
tional Expansion of Third Reich Cinema. Houndmills, U.K.: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2011.
van Leeuwen, Lizzie. Ons Indisch Erfgoed: Zestig jaar strijd om cultuur en identiteit. 
Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008.
 314 Bibliography
Vanvugt, Ewald. “Beknopte iconologie van de koloniale sculptuur in Amsterdam.” 
In Pluriform Amsterdam: Essays. Edited by Irene van Eerd and Berne Hermes, 
174 – 75. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 1998.
Viereck, George Sylvester, ed. A Nation Builds: Contemporary German Architecture. 
New York: German Library of Information, 1940. 
Viereck, George Sylvester, ed. The War in Maps 1939/40. New York: German Library 
of Information, 1941. 
Virilio, Paul. Vitesse et Politique: Essai de Dromologie. Paris: Galilée, 1977.
Vnuk, František. Mat’ Svoj Stát Znamená Život. Bratislava: Slovensky Ustav, 1991.
Vondung, Klaus. Magie und Manipulation: Ideologischer Kult und politische Religion 
des Nationalsozialismus. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1994.
von Moltke, Johannes. The Curious Humanist: Siegfried Kracauer in America. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016.
Wald, Alan. American Night: The Literary Left in the Era of the Cold War. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014.
Wald, Alan. Trinity of Passion: The Literary Left and the Antifascist Crusade. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
Walther, Daniel Joseph. Creating Germans Abroad: Cultural Policies and Settler 
Identities in Namibia. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002.
Ward, James M. “People Who Deserve It: Jozef Tiso and the Presidential Exemp-
tion.” Nationalities Papers 30, no. 4 (August 2002): 571 – 601.
Ward, James M. Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Josef Tiso and the Making of Fascist 
Slovakia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013.
Ward, Max. “Displaying the World View of Japanese Fascism.” Critical Asian Studies 
47, no. 3 (2015): 414 – 39. 
Watt, Lori. When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar 
Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009.
Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by 
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
Welch, David. “Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s 
Community.” Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 2 (2004): 213 – 38.
Werneburg, Brigitte. “Die veränderte Welt: Der gefährliche anstelle des entscheiden-
den Augenblicks: Ernst Jüngers Überlegungen zur Fotografie.” Fotogeschichte 51 
(1994): 51 – 67.
Wharton, Annabel. Building the Cold War: Hilton International Hotels and Modern 
Architecture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Whelan, Richard. Robert Capa: A Biography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. 
Willoughby- Herard, Tiffany. Waste of a White Skin: The Carnegie Corporation and the 
Racial Logic of White Vulnerability. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015.
Wilson, Sandra. “The Russo- Japanese War and Japan: Politics, Nationalism and 
Historical Memory.” In The Russo- Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 
1904 – 05. Edited by David Wells and Sandra Wilson, 160 – 93. New York: St. Mar-
tin’s, 1999.
 Bibliography 315
Winkler, Heinrich August. “Vom Mythos der Volksgemeinschaft.” Archiv für Sozial-
geschichte 17 (1977): 484 – 90.
Wohl, Robert. The Spectacle of Flight: Aviation and the Western Imagination. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.
Wollen, Peter. “Modern Times: Cinema/Americanism/The Robot.” In Raiding the 
Icebox: Reflections on Twentieth- Century Culture, 35 – 71. London: Verso, 1993.
Wollen, Peter. Paris Hollywood: Writings on Film. London: Verso, 2002. 
Wollen, Peter. Paris Manhattan: Writings on Art. London: Verso, 2004. 
Woodley, Daniel. Fascism and Political Theory: Critical Perspectives on Fascist Ideol-
ogy. London: Routledge, 2010.
Xiao, Zhiwei. “Constructing a New National Culture: Film Censorship and Issues 
of Cantonese Dialect, Superstition, and Sex in the Nanjing Decade.” In Cinema 
and Urban Culture in Shanghai, 1922 – 1943. Edited by Yingjin Zhang. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
Yang, Kuisong, Guomindang de “lian gong” yu “ fangong” [Koumintang: Unity with 
Communists and Anti- Communism]. Beijing: Shehuikexue wenxian chubanshe, 
2008.
Yiping, Wu. “Kangzhan shiqi Zhongguo Guomindang de wenyi zhengce jiqi yun-
zuo” [“The Literature and Art Policy of the Kuomintang, 1937 – 1945”]. PhD diss., 
National Chengchi University, 2009.
Yokoyama Atsuo. “Nihon gun ga chūgoku ni kensetsushita jūsan- ki no chūreitō.” 
Nihon kenkyū 49 (2014): 57 – 116.
Yoshiaki, Yoshimi. Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People, 
translated by Ethan Mark. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.
Young, Louise. Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperi-
alism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
Young, Louise. “When Fascism Met Empire in Japanese- Occupied Manchuria.” 
Journal of Global History 12 (2017): 274 – 96. 
Zachariah, Benjamin. “Global Fascisms and the Volk: The Framing of Narratives 
and the Crossing of Lines.” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 38, no. 4 
(2015): 608 – 12.
Zagarrio, Vito. L’immagine del fascism. Rome: Bulzoni, 2009.
Zahra, Tara. Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children and 
the Bohemian Lands, 1900 – 1948. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011.
Zexiang, Xu. “Ruhe jianshe Zhongguo minzu wenhua” [“How to Construct China’s 
National Culture”]. Zhongguo jianshe xiehui huibao [Periodical of the Chinese 
Cultural Construction Association] 1, no. 4 (1934): 22 – 24.
Zimmerman, Claire. “Albert Kahn in the Second Industrial Revolution.” aa Files 75 
(December 2017): 28 – 44.
Zimmerman, Claire. Photographic Architecture in the 20th Century. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
This page intentionally left blank
CONTRIBUTORS
Nadya Bair is a postdoctoral associate at Yale University’s Digital Humanities Lab. 
Her book project, The Decisive Network: Magnum Photos and the Postwar Image 
Market, examines how photo agencies shaped global visual culture and the business 
of picture supply after World War II. Bair’s articles have appeared in the journals 
History of Photography and American Art, and in the edited volume Getting the Pic-
ture: The Visual Culture of the News. She received her PhD in Art History from the 
University of Southern California. 
Paul D. Barclay is a professor and head of the History Department at Lafayette 
College in Easton, Pennsylvania. He is the general editor of the digital repository 
East Asia Image Collection (https://dss.lafayette.edu/collections/east-asia-image-col 
lection/) and author of Outcasts of Empire: Japanese Rule on Taiwan’s “Savage Bor-
der” 1874–1945 (2018). Barclay’s research has received support from the National En-
dowment from the Humanities, the Social Science Research Council, the Japanese 
Council for the Promotion of Science, and the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Ruth Ben-Ghiat is a professor of history and Italian studies at New York Univer-
sity. She writes about fascism, authoritarian regimes, war, and propaganda for aca-
demic and general audiences. Her latest book is the award-winning Italian Fascism’s 
Empire Cinema (2015).
Maggie Clinton is an associate professor of history at Middlebury College in 
Middlebury, Vermont. Her first book, Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture 
in China, 1925–1937, was published by Duke University Press in 2017. She is currently 
pursuing a master’s degree in social work at Columbia University.
Geoff Eley is the Karl Pohrt Distinguished University Professor of Contemporary 
History at the University of Michigan, where he has taught since 1979. He taught pre-
viously at the University of Cambridge (1975–79) and received a PhD from the Uni-
versity of Sussex (1974). His earliest works were Reshaping the German Right: Radical 
Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck (1980, 1991) and (with David Black-
bourn) The Peculiarities of German History (1980, 1984). More recent books include 
Forging Democracy: A History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000 (2002); A Crooked 
Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society (2005); The Future of Class in 
 318 Contributors
History (with Keith Nield, 2007); and Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the 
Ground of Consent in Germany, 1930–1945 (2013). He was coeditor of German Colo-
nialism in a Global Age (2014) and German Modernities from Wilhelm to Weimar: A 
Contest of Futures (2016). He is writing a general history of Europe in the twentieth 
century and a new study of the German Right titled Genealogies of Nazism: Conser-
vatives, Radical Nationalists, Fascists in Germany, 1860–1930.
Lutz Koepnick is the Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of German, Cin-
ema, and Media Arts at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. Koepnick 
has published widely on film, media theory, visual culture, new media aesthetic, 
and intellectual history from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. He is the 
author of the recent books The Long Take: Contemporary Art Cinema and the Won-
drous (2017); Michael Bay: World Cinema in the Age of Populism (2017); and On Slow-
ness: Toward an Aesthetic of the Contemporary (2014).
Ethan Mark is an associate professor of modern Japanese and Asian history at 
Leiden University, the Netherlands. He is author of Japan’s Occupation of Java in the 
Second World War: A Transnational History (2018) and of essays published in the 
American Historical Review and the Journal of Asian Studies. His annotated transla-
tion of Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese 
People was published by Columbia University Press in 2015.
Bertrand Metton teaches modern European history at Rutgers University in 
New Brunswick, New Jersey, and world history at the City University of New York, 
Queens College. He received his PhD in anthropology and history from the Univer-
sity of Michigan, Ann Arbor. His book project entitled “Hitler’s Europe: A Fascist 
Spatial Revolution,” examines the role fascist and Nazi conceptions of Europe played 
in reshaping the spatial imaginary and ideology of fascism during World War II. 
Lorena Rizzo is a historian of southern Africa (Namibia and South Africa) with 
a special interest in visual history. She’s the co-chair of the African Studies Center, 
University of Basel and an associate fellow at the Hutchins Center, Harvard Uni-
versity. Among her publications are Gender and Colonialism: A History of Kaoko in 
North-western Namibia, 1870s–1950 (2012); “Rethinking Empire in Southern Africa,” 
published in the Journal of Southern African Studies in 2015 (cowritten with Dag 
Henrichsen, Giorgio Miescher, and Ciraj Rassool); “Gender and Visuality: Identifi-
cation Photographs, Respectability and Personhood in Colonial Southern Africa in 
the 1920s and 1930s,” published in Gender and History in 2014; and “The Elephant 
Shooting: Colonial Law and Indirect Rule in Kaoko, North-western Namibia, 1920s 
and 1930s,” published in the Journal of African History in 2007. Her book entitled 
Photography and History in Colonial Southern Africa: Shades of Empire will be pub-
lished by Routledge & WITS University Press in 2019.
Julia Adeney Thomas is in the History Department at the University of Notre 
Dame. She received the American Historical Association’s John K. Fairbank Prize 
 Contributors 319
for Reconfiguring Modernity: Concepts of Nature in Japanese Political Ideology and 
the Berkshire Conference of Women Historians’ Best Article of the Year Award for 
“Photography, National Identity, and the ‘Cataract of Times’: Wartime Images and 
the Case of Japan,” published in the American Historical Review.  Two collaborative 
books, Japan at Nature’s Edge: The Environmental Context of a Global Power (with 
Ian J. Miller and Brett L. Walker) and Rethinking Historical Distance (with Mark 
Salber Phillips and Barbara Caine) consider theory, history, and the environment. 
Forthcoming work includes The Anthropocene with Mark Williams and Jan Zalasie-
wicz (Polity, 2020). She is currently completing The Historian’s Task in the Anthro-
pocene for Princeton University Press. 
Claire Zimmerman is an associate professor at the University of Michigan, author 
of Photographic Architecture in the Twentieth Century (2014), and coeditor of Neo-
avant-garde and Postmodern: Postwar Architecture in Britain and Beyond (2010). Re-
cent and forthcoming essays include “Reading the (Photographic) Evidence,” in the 
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians (2017); “Albert Kahn in the Second 
Machine Age,” in Architectural Association Files (2017); and “The Cost of Architec-
ture,” a coedited special issue of Grey Room (2018). Current projects include a histori-
cal analysis of the impact of U.S. industrialization on architecture through the Kahn 
family of Detroit, and continuing work on the impact of photographic architecture 
on producers and users of buildings worldwide.
This page intentionally left blank
Afrikaners, 148 – 49, 149
Alliance Photo, 240
American-German Review, 262
Amsterdam: Van Heutsz mausoleum in, 
191 – 93, 207 – 8; Van Heutsz monument in, 
183 – 84, 187 – 91, 195, 206 – 7
Aragon, Louis, 237
Architectural Review, 265
architecture: bureaucratic, 269 – 71, 276; 
of chūreitō, 53 – 54; historiography of, 
259 – 66, 268, 270 – 71, 273 – 76; Hitch-
cock on, 262 – 66, 268 – 71; modernist, 
262, 265 – 66; monumentalist, 80 – 82; 
Nazi, 80 – 82, 92n38, 263, 265 – 68, 272 – 73, 
279n23; photography and, 258 – 62, 260, 
266, 275; politics and, 264 – 5, 276 – 77; of 
Shinkyō, 49; technology and, 266 – 67; 
traditional, 273 – 74; in the United States, 
276 – 77
Arendt, Hannah, 276 – 77
Asahi camera, 172 – 73
Asahi gurafu, 169 – 70, 174
Atarashiki tsuchi, 3
Baiyushan tower, 49, 50, 53
Barcelona, 241
Batavia, Van Heutsz Monument in, 191, 
193 – 95, 203, 204, 205 – 6
Battle of Hawaii and the Malay Straits, The, 
203 – 4
Benjamin, Walter, 73 – 77
Bischof, Werner, 247
Blue Shirts, 21 – 25, 29 – 30, 32 – 33, 38, 41n4, 
42n19
Boers, 148 – 49, 149
Bose, Subhas Chandra, 4
Breker, Arno, 112 – 13
Burial at Ornans (Courbet), 1, 15
Capa, Cornell, 246 – 49
Capa, Robert: as celebrity photo- 
journalist, 240, 246; Death in the  
Making, 242 – 45, 250 – 51, 255nn31 – 33; 
“Death of a Loyalist Soldier,” 240, 246; 
life of, 236 – 38; reception of after death, 
245 – 53, 257n69; Spanish Civil War 
photography by, 237 – 38, 240 – 47, 248, 
249 – 53, 250, 251
capitalism, fascism and 3 – 4, 7, 14 – 15
cc Clique, 21 – 26, 32 – 33, 38, 41nn3 – 4; Cul-
tural Construction, 26 – 29, 27, 28
Chiang Kai-shek, 57
Chengde, chūreitō in, 53
Chen Lifu, 36 – 37, 41n4
Chim. See Seymour, David “Chim”
China: fascist periodicals in, 21, 22, 26 – 33, 
27, 28, 30, 31, 39 – 40; film in, 34 – 38; Na-
tionalist Party of (see Chinese Nationalist 
Party); New Life Movement in, 35 – 36,  
40
INDEX
Page numbers in italics refer to figures.
 322 Index
Chinese Nationalist Party: Japan and, 
57 – 58; New Life Movement, 35 – 36, 40; 
territorial jurisdiction of, 33. See also Blue 
Shirts; cc Clique
chūreitō, 45 – 47, 51; as agents of fascist cul-
ture, 58 – 59; Baiyushan tower in Lüshun, 
49, 50, 53; in Chengde, 53; in Dalian, 53; 
design of, 53 – 54; destruction of, 63 – 64; 
in didactic texts, 45, 46, 61 – 62; in Har-
bin, 53 – 54, 56; images of, 45, 46, 50, 54, 55, 
61 – 63, 62, 63; in Liaoyang, 53; in Mukden, 
53, 56, 60 – 61, 62; on postcards, 52 – 54, 
55, 61, 62, 63; in Qiqihar, 53 – 54, 55; in 
Shinkyō, 45 – 47, 46, 49, 53 – 56, 63; as tour-
ist sites, 52, 54 – 56
Coburn, Alvin Langdon, 173
Colijn, Hendrikus, 195
colonialism: Dutch, 186 – 87, 190 – 91, 196, 
200 – 201; in Ethiopia, 102 – 4; fascism and, 
3 – 4, 153; Italian, 102 – 4
colonization, fascist, 102
Concerned Photographer, The, 246 – 49,  
248
Confucianism, 23, 26, 35 – 36
Courbet, Gustave, 1, 15
Covici-Friede, 242, 254n30
Cultural Construction, 26 – 29, 27, 28
Dalian, chūreitō in, 53
Death in the Making, 242 – 45, 250 – 51, 
255nn31 – 33
DeLillo, Don: White Noise, 69 – 70
Domon Ken, 170 – 71, 174 – 75
Dudok, Willem Marinus, 193
Eisenman, Peter, 275
Emperor Organ Theory incident, 165 – 66
empire: culture of in Italy, 96 – 97, 101 – 4; 
Dutch crisis of, 198 – 202; interimpe-
rial competition, 197 – 98. See also 
imperialism
Estampas de la Guerra, 243, 244
Ethiopia: in Cultural Construction, 26 – 28, 
28; fascist colonization in, 102 – 3; Italian 
invasion and occupation of, 97, 100 – 104
Eynde, Hendrik van den, 193
Fanck, Arnold, 3
fascism: capitalism and, 3, 6 – 7; colonies 
and, 3 – 4; counter aesthetic of, 10 – 13; 
definition of, 285; as global phenomenon, 
2 – 4, 284; as ideology, 8; in Japan, 2 – 3, 7, 
17n5, 47 – 49, 160 – 66, 177, 197 – 98, 202 – 3; 
modernity and, 6 – 7, 74 – 79; in the Neth-
erlands, 184 – 88, 199 – 201; in Netherlands 
East Indies, 186 – 87, 199 – 201; origins of, 
6 – 7, 14 – 15, 284; portable concept of, 6 – 10, 
285 – 86; the public sphere and, 289 – 90; 
through redefinition, 161 – 62, 165 – 67, 177; 
representation and, 10 – 12; visual ap-
proach to the study of, 5 – 6, 285 – 86
Favre, Sisto, 105
February 26 Incident, 164 – 65, 179n15, 
180n18
“Fight to the Bitter End,” 175 – 76, 176
film: Chinese fascism and, 34 – 38; fascist, 
95 – 96; Italian, 97 – 98, 100 – 101, 104 – 5; 
Japanese, 203 – 4; Mussolini and, 98; Nazi, 
3, 34, 70 – 71, 84 – 85, 128 – 30, 129; prisoners 
of war in, 104 – 5, 105
Franco, Francisco, 238
Freed, Leonard, 247 – 48, 248
Friedman, Andre. See Capa, Robert
Fund for Concerned Photography, 246
Future, The, 21, 22, 29, 30, 40
General Motors Corporation, 267
Germany: architecture in, 80 – 82, 92n38, 
265 – 68, 272 – 73, 279n23; consumer indus-
tries of under Nazi rule, 85 – 86; film in, 
34, 70 – 71, 84 – 85, 128 – 30, 129; mass spec-
tacle in, 69 – 73, 79 – 84, 86 – 88; modernity 
in, 75 – 77; photography in, 111 – 32; Slova-
kia and, 214, 217, 229
gmd (Guomindang). See Chinese Nation-
alist Party
 Index 323
Goebbels, Joseph: on photography, 126 – 28; 
speech at the Sportpalast, 82
Gropius, Walter, 265
Guomindang. See Chinese Nationalist 
Party 
Hácha, Emil, 82, 92n37
Haile Selassie, 27, 28
Hall, Frits van, 195, 207
Hanxue zhoukan, 29, 31
Hara Setsuko, 3
Harbin, chūreitō in, 53 – 54, 56
Hatta, Mohammad, 196
Heutsz, Joannes Benedictus van, 183; Am-
sterdam monument to, 183 – 84, 187 – 91, 
189, 195, 206 – 7; Batavia monument to, 
193 – 95, 194, 203, 204, 205 – 6, 206; colonial 
brutality of, 189 – 90; De Jonge on, 194, 
196; in Dutch memory, 190 – 91; mauso-
leum of, 191 – 93, 192, 207 – 8
Heutsz, Johan Bastiaan van, Jr., 183 – 86
Hirohito, 165
Hishikari Takashi, 55, 60
historiography: of architecture, 258 – 66, 
268 – 71, 273 – 77; of fascist aesthetics, 
112 – 13; of Namibia, 135 – 36; of Nazi cin-
ema, 84; of South Africa, 134 – 5; visual 
evidence and, 96 – 97
Hitchcock, Henry-Russell, 260; Architec-
ture: Nineteenth and Twentieth Centu-
ries, 264, 273 – 74, 276; on architecture and 
politics, 264 – 65; “The Architecture of 
Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Ge-
nius,” 269 – 71, 276; on Kahn, 268 – 71; on 
modernism and its historical genealogy, 
262; on Nazi architecture, 263, 265, 273; 
photography used by, 260, 275, 283n62; 
“Romantic Classicism in Germany,” 262, 
263; on style, 275; on traditional architec-
ture, 273 – 74
Hitler, Adolf: air travel of, 72, 123; cam-
era shyness of, 115 – 16; in Hitler in seinen 
Bergen, 120, 121 – 22, 123; in Hitler wie ihn 
keiner kennt, 111 – 12, 116, 118 – 19, 119, 131; 
in Jugend um Hitler, 117 – 18, 118; photo-
graphs of, 111 – 26, 118, 119, 120, 123, 130 – 32, 
131; in rhetorical poses, 113, 121
Hlinka, Andrej, 230n3
Hlinka’s People’s Party, 211. See also Hlinka 
Youth
Hlinka Youth, 211 – 13; at Breslau youth 
games, 226, 227; Hitler’s European  
Project and, 225 – 28, 227; magazines  
published by, 213 – 30, 221, 222, 227, 
232nn10 – 11
Hoffmann, Heinrich: Hitler in seinen Ber-
gen, 120, 121 – 22, 123; Hitler wie ihn keiner 
kennt, 111 – 12, 116, 118 – 19, 119, 131; Jugend 
um Hitler, 117 – 18, 118; photography by, 
111 – 26, 118, 119, 120, 123, 130 – 32, 131; stu-
dio of, 112
ideology: everyday practices and, 83 – 86; 
fascism as, 8
Ikegami Shirō, 170 – 71
“Immortality on the Manchurian Plain,”  
52
imperialism: fascism and, 3; interimperial 
competition, 197 – 98; Japanese, 48, 198, 
202 – 4; Nazism as, 87 – 88. See also empire
Ina Nobuo, 167, 171 
individuality: fascism’s suppression of, 13; 
mass events and, 83 – 84, 94 – 95, 100 – 101
indoctrination, 83 – 84
Indonesia: as Dutch colony (see Nether-
lands East Indies); Japanese invasion and 
occupation of, 202 – 5
Indonesian Students’ Association, 194 – 95
Indonesia Raya, 204
Ingen-Housz, Bon, 192
Istituto Luce, 97, 100 – 101, 107
Italy: captured soldiers of, 104 – 5, 105; Ethio-
pia occupied by, 27 – 28, 28, 97, 100 – 104; 




Japan: Cabinet Information Bureau, 168, 
172 – 76; chūreitō constructed by (see 
chūreitō); Emperor Organ Theory inci-
dent in, 165 – 66; fascism in, 2 – 3, 7, 17n5, 
47 – 49, 160 – 66, 177, 197 – 98, 202 – 3; Febru-
ary 26 Incident in, 164 – 65, 179n15, 180n18; 
geography textbooks in, 44 – 45, 46; im-
perialism of, 48, 198, 202 – 4; Indonesia 
occupied by, 202 – 5; Manchuria and, 45, 
47, 51 – 52, 197; mass spectacle in, 166 – 67; 
National Diet Building, 53; photography 
in, 160 – 65, 163, 167 – 77, 169, 170, 173, 176
Jimmu, 166 – 67, 175
Johnson, Philip, 282n58; on Henry-Russell 
Hitchcock, 275
Jonge, J. C. de, 193 – 94, 196
Kahn, Albert: buildings designed by, 269, 
270, 271 – 72, 272; Hitchcock on, 268 – 71
KdF (Kraft durch Freude), 85 – 86
Kertész, André, 242, 247
Kita Ikki, 165
Konoe Fumimarō, 57
Kraft durch Freude, 85 – 86
Kuanchengzi Incident, 52
Kuwabara Kineo, 162 – 65, 163, 168 – 69, 169
Lattuada, Alberto, 105 – 6
Liaoyang, chūreitō in, 53
Liebeneiner, Wolfgang: Melody of a Great 
City, 128 – 30, 129
Liu Bingli, 36
loyal-spirit towers. See chūreitō
Luce, Henry, 239
Lüshun: chūreitō in, 49, 50, 53; mausoleums 
in, 49 – 50, 58
Lutyens, Edwin, 274
Macek, Alojz, 213 – 15
Mach, Alexander, 213, 230n3, 231n6
Magnum Photos, 236 – 37, 245 – 46
Malaparte, Curzio, 106
Manchukuo, 47; chūreitō in, 45 – 47, 49 – 56, 
58 – 64; Japanese tourism in, 52, 54 – 56; 
techno-fascism in, 48 – 49
Manchuria: chūreitō in, 45 – 47, 49 – 56, 
58 – 64; Japanese casualties in, 52; Japa-
nese invasion of, 47, 197; as Japanese life-
line, 45, 197. See also Manchukuo
Manchurian Incident, 48, 56 – 57, 60, 62
Manshu Shōwa ju-go nen, 168, 169
Matsuoka Yōsuke, 51 – 52
Mebes, Paul: Um 1800, 265 – 66
Melody of a Great City, 128 – 30, 129
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 117
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 249 – 50
Minobe Tatsukichi, 165 – 66
Modern Architecture: International Style, 262
modernism: in architecture, 262; in photog-
raphy, 173 – 74
modernity: fascism and 6 – 7, 74 – 79; photo-
montage and, 220 – 21
Montanelli, Indro, 103
monumentalism, 80 – 82
Morris, John, 246
Mosse, George, 78 – 79
Mukden, chūreitō in, 50, 53, 56, 60 – 61, 62
Mukden Incident, 56, 60
Mussert, Anton, 185, 199 – 200
Mussolini, Benito, 27, 28, 98, 99, 100, 106, 107
Mutō Nobuyoshi, 55 – 56
Nakusib farm, 141
Namibia. See South West Africa
Nationaal Socialistiche Beweging, 186, 199 – 201 
National Socialist German Workers’ Party. 
See Nazi Party
Nazidom, 268, 271, 282n49
Nazi Party: in Namibia, 135; Nuremberg 
Rallies of, 70 – 71, 81, 82. See also Nazism
Nazism: film and, 34, 70 – 71, 84 – 85, 128 – 30, 
129; as imperialism, 87 – 88; photography 
and, 111 – 32; the sacralization of politics 
and, 77 – 79; spectacle and, 69 – 73, 79 – 84, 
86 – 88. See also Nazi Party
 Index 325
Netherlands: colonial social body of, 186; 
fascism in, 184 – 88, 199 – 201; Indonesian 
colony of (see Netherlands East Indies). 
See also Amsterdam
Netherlands East Indies: fascism in,  
186 – 87, 199 – 201; Indo community in, 
200 – 201; Japan and, 199, 202; Japanese 
treatment of the Dutch in, 185, 203. See 
also Batavia
New Earth, The, 3
New Life Movement, 35 – 36, 40
newsreels, 37, 97
Nieuwenhuis, Domela, 195, 209n12
ni-ni-roku jiken, 164 – 65, 179n15, 180n18
nlm (New Life Movement), 35 – 36, 40
Nogi Maresuke, 50
Nová Mládež, 213, 215 – 30, 221, 222, 227, 
232n10
nsb (Nationaal Socialistiche Beweging), 186, 
199 – 201
nsdap (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Ar-
beiterpartei). See Nazi Party
Nuremberg Rallies, 70 – 71, 81, 82
Okada Keisuke, 164, 179n10
Okosongomingo farm, 141, 142
Onguma farm, 141
Peukert, Detlev, 75 – 77
Pevsner, Nikolaus, 268 – 69
photography: amateur, 127 – 28, 130 – 31; ar-
chitecture and, 258 – 62, 260, 266, 275; in 
Germany, 111 – 32; Goebbels on, 126 – 28; 
in Hlinka Youth magazines, 212, 214 – 15, 
217 – 30, 221, 222, 227, 235n59; humanist, 
245 – 47; in Japan, 160 – 65, 167 – 77; in Mel-
ody of a Great City, 128 – 30, 129; modern-
ist, 173 – 74; pictorialist, 172 – 73, 173; Span-
ish Civil War in, 237 – 47, 248, 249 – 53, 250, 
251. See also Capa, Robert; Hoffmann, 
Heinrich; photomontage; Scherz, An-
neliese; Steinhoff, Ilse 
photomontage, 220, 223
pictorialism, 172 – 73, 173
Pimpf, Der, 217, 232n17
Pohorylle, Gerta, 240
politics: aesthetics and, 73 – 79; architec-
ture and, 264 – 65, 276 – 77; sacralization 
of, 77 – 79
poor white-ism, 148
Port Arthur. See Lüshun
Prora, 86
Qiantu, 21, 22, 29, 30, 40
Qiqihar, chūreitō in, 53 – 54, 55
radio, 93n46, 122 – 23
Reich Chancellery, 81 – 82
Reich Harvest Festival, 81
representation, fascism and, 10 – 12
Riefenstahl, Leni, 34, 112 – 13; Triumph of the 
Will, 34, 71; Victory of Faith, 34
Roodenburgh, Jordanus, 192
Russia, Japanese views of, 58
Russo-Japanese War, 51 – 52, 57, 60 – 61
Ruttman, Walter: Berlin: Symphony of a 
Great City, 75
Saitō Makoto, 164
sar&h (South African Railways and Har-
bours), 143 – 45
Saturday Review, 247 – 48, 248
Scherz, Anneliese, 136, 145, 158n58; photog-
raphy by, 136, 145 – 53
Schinkel, Karl Friedrich, 262 – 63, 265
Schirach, Baldur von, 116
Schmitt, Carl, 125
Schultze-Naumburg, Paul, 266
Secondary Geography, 44 – 45, 46
Seymour, David “Chim,” 240, 247; photo-
graphs by, 243, 247, 248
Shashin shuhō, 54, 66n26, 165
Shinkyō, 49, 63; chūreitō in, 45 – 47, 46, 
53 – 56, 63
Shōwa Emperor, 165
Shōwa Restoration, 164, 179n11
 326 Index
Siberian Expedition, 52
Siege of Tobruk, 104, 105
Sima, Horia, 225
Sloan, Alfred P., 267
Slovakia, 211, 214; German influence on, 217. 
See also Hlinka Youth
Slovenská Deva, 213 – 14, 232n11
South Africa, 134 – 35
South African Railways and Harbours, 
143 – 45
South Manchurian Railway, 56, 61, 62
South West Africa, 134; Boers in, 148 – 49; fas-
cism in, 135 – 36; labor in, 141 – 43, 150 – 51; in 
photography by Scherz, 145 – 53, 147, 149, 
150; in photography by Steinhoff, 137 – 45, 
139, 144, 153; settler topography of, 141 – 42
Spanish Civil War, 238 – 39, 254n15;  
Francoist photo album of, 243, 244; in the 
illustrated press, 239 – 40; in photogra-
phy by Robert Capa, 237 – 38, 240 – 47, 248, 
249 – 53, 250, 251
spectacle: in fascist Japan, 166 – 67; and the 
individual, 83 – 84, 100 – 101; Nazi, 69 – 73, 
79 – 84, 86 – 88; across the political spec-
trum, 79 – 80
Speer, Albert: architecture of, 86, 273; Ca-
thedral of Light, 81, 82; German Pavilion, 
86, 93n49, 263, 264
Steichen, Edward, 245 – 46, 256n45
Steinhoff, Ilse, 136 – 37; Deutsche Heimat in 
Afrika, 137 – 41, 143, 153; photography by, 
136 – 45, 139, 144
Straž, 214
Strength through Joy, 85 – 86
Sukarno, 4, 196, 204 – 5 
Sweat and Blood Weekly, 29, 31




techno-fascism, 48 – 49
Tempelhof Airport, 81
tennō kikansetsu jiken, 165 – 66
Tiso, Jozef, 211
Tochter des Samurai, Die, 3
Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 54
tourism: German, 85; Japanese Manchu-
rian, 52, 54 – 56, 62
Tretyakov, Sergei, 220
Triumph of the Will, 34, 71
Troost, Paul, 112 – 13
Tsumeb, 142 – 43
Tuka, Vojtech, 217, 230n3
“Uchiteshi yamamu,” 175 – 76, 176
Um 1800 (Mebes), 265 – 66
unexception, state of, 162, 171, 177
Victory of Faith, 34
violence: fascism and 8, 290; as spectacle, 88
visuality of retreat, 148, 151
visual philanthropy, 149
Vlca, 213 – 14, 217, 232n10
Volksgemeinschaft, 73, 82 – 86
Voûte, Edward John, 183 – 84
Warner, Gerald, 61
Watanabe Jōtarō, 164
Weimar Republic, 75 – 77
Weiner, Dan, 247
Wenhua jianshe, 26 – 29, 27, 28
Westerling, Raymond, 207
White Noise (DeLillo), 69 – 70
White Terror, 22
Wilhelmina, Queen, 190
Willrich, Wolfgang: The Aryan Family, 71
Wonderful Horrible Life of Leni Riefenstahl, 
The, 34
Wright, Frank Lloyd, 262, 269
Yoshino Sakuzō, 59
youth organizations, fascist, 226, 228, 
234n49. See also Hlinka Youth
Zhengjiatun Incident, 52
This page intentionally left blank
This page intentionally left blank
This page intentionally left blank
This page intentionally left blank
